



# FINAL REPORT OF THE POLICE MANPOWER AUDIT COMMITTEE - VOLUME 1

## Now Is The Time No Sacred Cows

Presented to the Honourable Dr. Keith C. Rowley,  
Prime Minister, Government of the Republic of  
Trinidad and Tobago

OCTOBER 17, 2017

“When one considers the history of previous inquiries, their seemingly ignored recommendations, and the range of challenges facing the TTPS, it will be a delusion to think that all be well quickly once a permanent Commissioner of Police and Deputies are appointed. From what this manpower audit has discovered, there is still a lot of work to do. The time to start is now.”

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures .....	1
List of Tables .....	2
Acronyms .....	3
Preface .....	5
Acknowledgements .....	7
Executive Summary .....	11
Section One: Introduction .....	45
Section Two: Manpower Strength and Utilization of the TTPS .....	69
Section Three: Systems and Processes of the TTPS .....	107
Section Four: Community Policing and Partnerships .....	133
Section Five: Governance, Discipline Structure and Public Confidence .....	145
Section Six: Conclusion .....	188
Section Seven: Recommendations .....	190
Section Eight: List of Stakeholders Interviewed .....	207
Appendix	

# LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Stakeholder Perception Ranking of the TTPS by Percentage (%) .....	13
Figure 2: Stakeholder Perception Ranking of the TTPS by Percentage (%) .....	14
Figure 3: Stakeholder Perception Ranking of the TTPS by Percentage (%) .....	14
Figure 4: Stakeholder Perception Ranking of the TTPS by Percentage (%) .....	15
Figure 5: Stakeholder Perception Ranking of the TTPS by Percentage (%) .....	15
Figure 6: Overall Opinions by Newspaper .....	16
Figure 7: Vacation Leave of First Division Officers (as at September 28, 2017) .....	31
Figure 8: Serious Crimes Detection Rates (%) for 1990 to 2016 .....	51
Figure 9: Homicides Detection Rates (%) for 1990 to 2016 .....	55
Figure 10: Democratic Representation in Appointing a Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police .....	64

Figure 11: Vacancies in the TTPS (as at February 2017) .....	74
Figure 12: Acting Appointments in the TTPS (as at February 2017) .....	76
Figure 13: Comparison of Complaints against Police Officers for the Period 2010 to 2015 .....	172
Figure 14: Status of Complaints for the Period 2010 to 2015 .....	173
Figure 15: Complaints by Divisions for the Period 2010 to 2015 .....	174



# LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Number of Officers on Suspension as of February 2017	19
Table 2: Complaints by Division for the period 2014 to 2015	20
Table 3: Allegations of Criminal Offences for the period 2014 to 2015	21
Table 4: Homicides – Reported and Detected for 1990 to 2016	54
Table 5: Serious Crimes – Reported and Detected for 1990 to 2016	57
Table 6: Manpower Deficit per Division/Section/Unit within the TTPS	75
Table 7: Number of Officers on Suspension as of February 2017	91
Table 8: Number of Officers by Separation for the Period 2014 to 2016	97
Table 9: Allegations of Disciplinary Offences for the Period 2010 to 2015	174
Table 10: Allegations of Criminal Offences for the Period 2014 to 2015	175

# ACRONYMS

CAPA	Crime and Problem Analysis Branch
CID/CRO	Criminal Investigations Divisions / Criminal Records Office
COP	Commissioner of Police
E999/ RRU	Emergency 999 / Rapid Response Unit
GORTT	Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HMICS	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland
HR	Human Resource
IhRIS	Integrated Human Resource Information System (IhRIS/Payroll)
MNS	Ministry of National Security
OCNFB	Organised Crime, Narcotics and Firearm Bureau
PAB	Promotional Advisory Board
PCA	Public Complaints Authority
PMAC	Police Manpower Audit Committee
PSC	Police Service Commission
RTA	Road Traffic Accidents
SAUTT	Special Anti-Crime Unit of Trinidad and Tobago
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
SRP	Special Reserve Police
SSA	Strategic Services Agency
TTPS	Trinidad and Tobago Police Service



# PREFACE

The Final Report of the Cabinet appointed Committee mandated to conduct a Manpower Audit into the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) is divided into two (2) volumes.

**Volume I** consists of the following Sections:

- **Executive Summary** inclusive of a short list of quick-action Recommendations
- **Section One:** Introduction
- **Sections Two to Five:** Structural Areas Reviewed –
  - i. *Manpower Strength and Utilization of the TTPS*
  - ii. *Systems and Processes of the TTPS*
  - iii. *Community Policing and Partnerships*
  - iv. *Governance, Discipline Structure and Public Confidence*
- **Section Six:** Conclusion
- **Section Seven:** Recommendations
- **Section Eight:** List of Stakeholders Interviewed
- **Appendix**

**Volume II** contains the description of the Methodology, as well as, fuller details and data related to the content in Volume One. This Volume is broken down into the undermentioned **Sections (9 – 22)**:

- Overview of Volume II
- Methodology
- Review of Past Studies
- Public Opinion: Newspaper Articles
- Analysis of the Human Resource Unit, TTPS
- Analysis of Official Police Records
- Information Technology (IT) and the TTPS

- Analysis of Focus Groups Sessions
- Town Hall Meetings
- Analysis of PMAC Police Survey
- Analysis of Stakeholder Consultations
- Civilian Oversight Agencies
- Challenges Encountered by the Manpower Audit Committee
- Appendix

Given the seriousness of the Police Manpower Audit Exercise, and that “*crime is the number one problem in the country*”, the Audit Committee felt obliged to express its observations and facts discovered in the most dispassionate and frank manner.

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Given the complexity and scope of this exercise, the Audit Committee will like to express its thanks to several agencies and persons. Firstly, we say thanks to the Prime Minister, Dr. the Honourable Keith C. Rowley, the Minister of National Security, the Honourable Major General (Ret'd.) Edmund Dillon and indeed the Cabinet, for the trust and confidence reposed in us by asking us to undertake this critically important exercise and for their positive responses to our requests for implementation support.

We also must acknowledge Deputy Permanent Secretary (Ag.), Ms. Maria Joseph, Director and Deputy Director of the Office of Law Enforcement Policy (OLEP), Mr. Keith Renaud and Mr. Curtis Belford respectively; their kind support in providing periodic advice and physical facilities to the Committee is deeply appreciated. Thanks to Ms. Tricia Belcon, OLEP, for giving the Committee her daily attention.

The Committee has conducted several consultations and information-gathering exercises in Tobago, much of this supported by the Tobago House of Assembly (THA) and its Chief Secretary, Mr. Kelvin Charles. Thank you Mr. Charles.

Given the fact that Committee members had full-time occupations elsewhere, the Committee depended on the six-member Implementation Team for gathering and analyzing data, creating reports, etc. We say thanks to this team for carrying out this demanding task and participating in our numerous meetings – Mr. Trevor Percival (Team Supervisor), Dr. Alana Belcon, Mr. Ian Ramdhanie, Ms. Charlene Phillip, Ms. Shueta Kalpoo, and Ms. Roxanne Peters.

To the 100 agencies, officials, civic organizations and private citizens who took the time to provide their expert knowledge and views on the TTPS and the country's public safety requirements, the Committee expresses its deep appreciation. Their contributions have been fairly and properly utilized to inform our deliberations. The Committee also acknowledges the Commissioner of Police and his Executive for providing some access to information as well as logistical support for data capture.

We thank them further for allowing over 150 officers to take part in our focus group sessions and, as well, the 500 police officers of all ranks who participated in the Committee's survey. Their expert knowledge, experience and views have been very useful in shaping the Committee's report. Their identification of organisational and performance gaps in the TTPS and suggestions for improvement have been quite helpful.

The Audit Committee held a total of 80 meetings between January 2017 and October 15, 2017 - including general meetings, sub-committee meetings, consultations, etc. These internal and external activities required extensive logistical and secretarial support. To Mr. Ian Ramdhanie, for applying his technical skills so willingly and proficiently in helping to format the Committee's final report. For her diligence, efficiency and sustained dedication, the Committee also expresses its deepest gratitude to Ms. Diana Newsam.

With all this, and considering all that has gone before, the Police Manpower Audit Committee sincerely hopes that its work will not be in vain but instead will make a positive contribution towards improving the TTPS and the country's public safety. It has been our pleasure to accept this call to public service.

# VOLUME 1

Among other things, Volume One provides a critical review of the manpower issues in the TTPS, as well as, a thematic overview of the Manpower Audit Committee's findings with key recommendations for implementation.



# SECTION 1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“Given its public safety and national security duties, the TTPS has to be treated as an emergency situation, requiring the collective, non-partisan will to do so in a suitable manner”

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. It is now very clear that for a long time the general population is extremely angry and frustrated not only about crime, violence and police performance, but also about the inability of the authorities to deal more aggressively and positively with the general problem. Lawlessness across the land manifests itself in everyday misconduct, serious crime, brutal murders and violent gang-driven turf wars.
2. The social, psychological and economic costs are becoming quite high with parallel damage to the country's international reputation. The perpetual claim that crime is "*the country's Number One Problem*" has, for many years, failed to attract the kind of serious, dedicated attention that such problem deserves, thus keeping crime as a politically volatile issue.
3. The findings from this report should provide a golden opportunity for all of the relevant authorities, including the Commissioner of Police, to establish the required partnerships to improve the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS).
4. Cabinet by Minute No. 24 dated January 05, 2017, appointed a Police Manpower Audit Committee (PMAC) to examine the extent to which the manpower strength of the Service is meeting its major objectives and whether its human resource capacity is sufficient. Cabinet also agreed to a deadline of March 31, 2017, for the completion of the audit exercise.
5. Noting the scope and complexity of the mandate and the fact that all Members were employed on a full time basis, the Committee, in keeping with the aforementioned decision, submitted a Status Report, dated March 23, 2017, for the attention of Cabinet and articulated the need for:
  - i. an extension to the deadline for the Final Report<sup>1</sup>;

---

<sup>1</sup>Cabinet in Minute No. 583 dated March 29, 2017, agreed, *inter alia*, to accept the Status Report and extend the life of the Committee for a period of nine (9) months with effect from April 01, 2017

- ii. the establishment of an Implementation Team to support the Committee in the execution of the Audit. This team became fully operational on May 1, 2017<sup>2</sup>;
  - iii. budget allocations for the Audit exercise.<sup>3</sup>
6. The TTPS is in a very troubled and wounded state. Troubled, mainly because of the complex network of problems facing it and wounded, due to its continued inability to rescue and recover itself.
7. This phenomenon was highlighted by the data reviewed by the Audit Committee. One such avenue of data, the Committee's Police Survey, which involved 500 officers randomly selected across stratified ranks, suggests the need for help. For example, when asked whether they thought the TTPS is satisfactorily organised to deal effectively with crime, over half (54%) of the officers said "very unsatisfactory" or "unsatisfactory". The full results of the Survey Analysis is contained in Section 18 of Volume 2.
8. The public does not yet have a clear understanding of how police manpower is utilised on a day to day basis. When it comes to "doing paper work in office", 24% of Constables said they did an average of 7 to over 10 hours per day, while 39% complete 4 – 6 hours per day. Among Corporals and Sergeants, 20% spend 7 to over 10 hours per day engaged in paper work, whereas 40% noted approximately 4 – 6 hours per day. Fourteen percent (14%) of the persons in the Ranks of Inspector and Assistant Commissioner of Police said that they completed 7 to over 10 hours per day, and 59% indicated 4–6 hours per day. From the data available to the Committee, it is estimated that a daily average of 1,400 Officers are on patrol or outside duty across the country.
9. Given its public safety and national security duties, the reform of the TTPS has to be treated as an emergency situation, through collective, nonpartisan will for such

---


<sup>2</sup>Cabinet Minutes No. 648 and 963 dated April 12, 2017, and May 25, 2017, respectively

<sup>3</sup> Cabinet in Minute No. 648 dated April 12, 2017 approved a Budget for the PMAC for the period April 01 to July 31, 2017, estimated at \$577,776.00

to be effected in a sustainable manner. The degree of attention which the TTPS long required has not been forthcoming as it ought to be and it is this Committee's hope that the recommendations in this Final Report will help make a thoughtful, collectively-driven catalyst towards sustainable rescue and recovery of the TTPS.


10. This conclusion is derived from multi-dimensional data collected from stakeholders and civil society interviews, police officers' surveys, focus groups, TTPS statistics on manpower and performance, data collected from newspaper clippings and previous inquiries and reports into the Service. Figures 1 to 5 indicate that, from the views of civic society and key stakeholders, all is not quite well with the TTPS.
11. The perception ranking of the Service ("*positive*" vs. "*negative*") among the following stakeholders highlighted respectively, a 40% positive vs. 37% negative – **TTPS**; **Other Law Enforcement Agencies**– 8% positive vs. 41% negative; **Key Public Officials**– 3% positive vs. 43% negative; **Business Sector**– 4% positive vs. 31% negative; and **Prominent and Former High-level Officials**– 3% positive vs. 21% negative. A further analysis of the stakeholder consultations can be found in Section 19 of Volume 2. This gives an overall average of 12% with positive views and 35% negative views about the TTPS. "*Neutral*" and "*mixed*" assessments comprise the rest of proportions.

**Figure 1: Stakeholder Perception Ranking of the TTPS by Percentage (%)**




Stakeholder Group: TTPS

Figure 2: Stakeholder Perception Ranking of the TTPS by Percentage (%)




Stakeholder Group: Other Law Enforcement Agencies

Figure 3: Stakeholder Perception Ranking of the TTPS by Percentage (%)




Stakeholder Group: Key Public Officials

**Figure 4: Stakeholder Perception Ranking of the TTPS by Percentage (%)**



**Stakeholder Group: Business Sector**



**Figure 5: Stakeholder Perception Ranking of the TTPS by Percentage (%)**



**Stakeholder Group: Prominent and Former High-level Officials**

12. This trend towards a negative assessment of the TTPS is troubling and regrettable, mainly, because the TTPS' Strategic Plans, year after year, have positioned public support as a key foundation for policing – the basis for effective community policing. Thus, a quickened reshaping of public attitudes toward the TTPS is therefore clearly required.
13. The Committee's analysis of media content<sup>4</sup> coincides with the responses of the stakeholders listed at paragraph 11 above. Of the media content analysed, 52% revealed negative perceptions of the TTPS, 13% showed positive, while 26% were neutral and 9% mixed. Figure 6 and Section 12 of Volume 2 refer.

**Figure 6: Overall Opinions by Newspaper**



<sup>4</sup>This includes editorials, commentaries, news stories, letters, etc. from the three dailies for the period December 16, 2016 to April, 18 2017

14. A United States (US) Consultant Survey commissioned by the Ministry of National Security on Youth Perceptions of the TTPS in 2008<sup>5</sup> revealed that, generally, some 60% of the sampled 2,376 youths had negative views about the TTPS' service to citizens.
15. The 2017 PMAC's Police Survey also discovered this telling circumstance when Officers were asked what level of confidence they thought the public had in the TTPS, 47%, almost half, said "*very low*", while 35% felt such was "*low*", and 14% responded "*no confidence at all*".
16. Notwithstanding the reported success of the Police Youth Clubs, a paradigm shift is required in the minds of the youth and by extension, the wider population. The complaints and prevalent dissatisfaction within the TTPS itself about tribunal delays, unfair promotions, lack of equipment, etc., add to the loss of the organisation's reputation. Further details are provided in Section 4 of this report.
17. A manpower analysis in this context, therefore, is not only about plugging numbers into places but encompasses the level of morale, feelings of unfair treatment and a lack of having a voice in the organisation's operations. For example, when officers were asked whether or not they felt there was favouritism in assigning individuals to various Divisions, Units or Sections, 66% of them said "*very often*" or "*often*". Certainly manpower numbers and money do matter. But at the end of it, it is the human condition, human resources and the attitudes that really matter.
18. In the midst of town meetings, police concerts, periodic breakthroughs in arresting drug traffickers, delivering babies in emergency situations, the reported decrease in serious crimes, etc., the public remains quite disturbed about police misconduct, repeated allegations, trials and convictions of police officers. The issue of police complaints is further discussed in Section 5 of the report.

---

<sup>5</sup>(D. Johnson et al., Ministry of National Security, Youth Perception of the Police in Trinidad and Tobago, 2008, p. 27)



19. Despite the fact that all officers do not commit misconduct, there is a sufficient number of such persons in the Service to cause public alarm. While there was the strong view from all stakeholders that the estimated 6,800 actual strength (sanctioned estimated at 7,500) of the TTPS is enough, Police misconduct and corruption seriously weaken and subvert the TTPS manpower strength.
20. In this matter of police complaints and misconduct, the number of occurrences is not the issue, as the public has very high expectations of the police uniform, their conduct and performance. In this regard, one police offence is worth a thousand by a civilian. Apart from the list by the Police Complaints Authority (PCA), police corruption and indiscipline formed a major part of stakeholder concerns.
21. During the Committee's stakeholder interviews, several senior officials from the TTPS and related intelligence units explained the disturbing extent to which a particular type of corruption has contaminated the TTPS over the years. That is, when certain police investigations or raids are being confidentially planned, advance warnings (leaks) are given to the targets of these planned police action. The officials said such "*tip-offs*" can only come from inside the planning team itself.
22. Ironically, in the Committee's Police Survey, over 40% of all ranks and ages of officers stated that corruption in the Police Service exists either "*very much*" or "*much*" with a higher proportion of the young officers feeling this way. In fact, over 48% of officers with less than ten (10) years' service felt that corruption in the service exists "*very much*" or "*much*".
23. The manpower condition of the TTPS is also affected by the rate of suspensions. Table 1 below gives data on the number of officers on suspension, many paid, as of February 2017. Surprisingly, some officers have been on suspension for 7, 11 or 15 years.

**Table 1: Number of Officers on Suspension as of February 2017**

No.	Categories	No. of Officers	Duration to Date (Feb 2017)
1.	Assistant Commissioner of Police	1	2 years
2.	Senior Superintendent	1	5 years
3.	Assistant Superintendent	2	1-2 years
4.	Inspector	4	1-2 years
5.	Sergeant	7	2-7 years
6.	Corporal	22	1-11 years
7.	Constable	257	1-15 years
8.	Woman Police Constable	13	2-10 Years
	<b>Total</b>	<b>307</b>	

**Data Source: TTPS Complaints Division**

24. There have been repeated complaints by officers that charges of indiscipline and corruption drag on for several years without resolution. One (1) such case, as submitted by the Trinidad and Tobago Police Social and Welfare Association (TTPSSWA) to the Audit Committee, was called 55 times between 2014 and 2016 and the officer was not served with summons 41 times. Of the ten times a summons was served, the officer appeared 9, and 30 of the 55 times the hearing was called, the Tribunal did not have a quorum. It should be noted, however, that officers who serve on Tribunals are required to perform other police duties in addition to handling disciplinary matters.
25. Table 2 highlights Complaints by Police Divisions for the period 2014 to 2015. The table reveal a significant variance among Divisions for the period. Additionally, it is noted that the number of offences committed by police officers decreased in 2015.

26. Available figures from the PCA also indicate that allegations of criminal conduct by police officers went from 378 in 2014 down to 231 in 2015 (See Table 3); and allegations of disciplinary offences for the same period went from 665 to 442.

**Table 2: Complaints by Division for the period 2014 to 2015**

Police Division	Year	
	2014	2015
Northern	103	49
Port of Spain	44	45
Central	44	43
Southern	57	36
Western	39	35
Eastern	54	28
Tobago	33	28
North-Eastern	46	25
South-Western	20	12
Unknown	9	20
Specialist Section	70	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>519</b>	<b>321</b>

**Data Source: PCA Data**

27. Recently, there is an obvious attempt to tackle delinquent and criminal conduct in the TTPS. However, while the decrease in offences in itself may be encouraging, given the need to build public confidence in the police, and the behaviour standard expected of officers, the figures in 2015 are in themselves not satisfactory.
28. A police officer carries three (3) extraordinary features in public life:
- i. Even as a Constable, he or she has considerable lawful authority – more than the average citizen;
  - ii. An officer must respect the organisation’s uniform with intensity knowing that he/she is held to a higher standard;

- iii. Given that their protection and safety largely rest in the hands of the police officer, the public naturally has very high expectations of a police officer's conduct more than most occupations. Therefore, offences and public misconduct by an officer are met with high public disappointment and disgust. In light of this, punishment must be swift and decisive.

**Table 3: Allegations of Criminal Offences for the period 2014 to 2015**

<b>Allegation of Criminal Offences</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
Fatal Shooting	29	7
Non-fatal Shooting	17	4
Causing Death by Dangerous Driving	2	1
Murder	2	7
Assault	119	90
Assault occ. Actual Bodily Harm	16	4
Wounding with intent to do Grievous bodily harm	0	3
Assault and Battery	0	2
Common Assault	29	9
Harassment	34	18
Threat	10	7
Killing or Wounding Animals	2	3
Money Laundering	0	1
Rape	1	1
Indecent Assault	3	1
Incest	0	1
Grievous Sexual Assault	1	1
Sexual Harassment	1	1
Serious Indecency	0	1
Unlawful and unnecessary use of force	0	14
Larceny and Related Offences	42	16
Malicious Damage	19	11
Trespass and Unlawful Entry	1	1
Possession of Marijuana	0	1
Perverting Course of Justice	9	2
Wrongful Arrest	0	1
Shooting with Intent	0	5
Misbehaviour in Public Office	23	11
Dangerous Driving	1	1
Domestic Violence	0	2
Use of Obscene Language	0	4
Death in Police Custody	3	0
Illegal Quarrying	1	0
Kidnapping	1	0
Sex with a Female 14-16	3	0
Cruelty to Children	1	0
Unlawful Arrest and Detention	2	0

Impersonation of Police	1	0
Failure to account for Government Property	1	0
Malicious Prosecution	3	0
Discharge firearm 40m of road	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>378</b>	<b>231</b>

**Data Source: PCA Data**

29. In fact, when provisions in the Standing Orders of the TTPS and the Police Service Act (2006) are compared to what is actually done in and by the TTPS, several responsibility and performance gaps are noted – some big, some less so, but all in need of serious attention for a well-rounded, professionally-driven organisation.
30. The list of stipulated offences is quite long, despite such, a few examples are listed below:

**Appraisal:**

The Police Service Regulations (2007), Section 71(2) states that “*the Officer in charge of the Division or Branch shall forward to the Commissioner in each year in respect of each officer within the scale of pay a performance appraisal report not later than sixty days before an increment is due to an officer*”.

31. It is further stated in Section 71(3): “*A performance appraisal report shall relate to the period of service immediately preceding twelve months*”.
32. On the contrary, in completing the Committee’s Survey, 20% of all age groups represented by the sample population indicated that the last appraisal done for them was “*four years or more ago*”. In particular, of those in the Police Service between 11 to 20 years, 20% said their last appraisal was done more than “*six years ago*”. Full Analysis of the Committee Survey is in Section 18 of Volume 2.
33. How then was their performance judged, misjudged, or not judged at all? The Regulations clearly state that “*the Commissioner’s assessment of the job performance and career potential of each officer shall be made on the basis of the reporting officer’s appraisal*”, Section 71(4) refers. Thus this lack of compliance is a key manpower issue.

34. The disciplinary system seems to be in utter disrepair, partly due to the high level of bureaucracy involved. On one hand, the Regulations on police conduct and discipline are quite extensive (Sections 131-174 refer), while, on the other, the protracted delays and complaints about the process have adverse effects on manpower morale and effective utilisation.
35. Among the Regulations relating to misconduct are:
- (i) An officer shall always appear in public view properly dressed, cleanly and smartly turned out, smart in his movements, and respectful of his bearing and manner.
  - (ii) An officer shall not make any expressions of political and partisan opinions, and shall bear himself with strict impartiality in all matters.
  - (iii) An officer shall not be insubordinate by word, act or demeanour.
  - (iv) An officer shall not neglect, or without good and sufficient cause, omit, promptly or diligently to attend to or carry out anything which is his duty as an officer.
  - (v) An officer shall not inflict undue harm on citizens.
  - (vi) An officer shall not fail to work his beat according to orders.
  - (vii) An officer shall not fail to account for or make a prompt and correct return of any money or property received by him in his official capacity.
36. Other offences include for example, making malicious arrests, abuse of leave, drunkenness on the job, being engaged in any activity, occupation or undertaking which would impair one's usefulness as an officer or in conflict with the Service, etc.

37. The Committee presents these examples to help indicate that while there is an actual manpower strength of the Police Service, when and where there are indiscipline, corruption and abuse of the various forms, the TTPS manpower strength gets distorted and subverted.
38. With such extensive provisions to preserve police conduct and discipline, recordkeeping, Station inspections, legitimate sick leave, etc., the natural question that must be asked is, what went wrong to the current situation – for example, of indiscipline, fragmented recordkeeping and an almost hostile public opinion against the TTPS?
39. A related concern has been the protracted delays in appointing a permanent Commissioner of Police and Deputies. However, attempts to reform the process of appointment and oversight should not be too far removed from the other management challenges now facing crime and policing generally. The Committee therefore proposes three (3) options for these appointments as listed at paragraph 47.30 of the Executive Summary and further discussed in Section 5 of Volume 1.
40. Given the critical, dynamic relationship between police governance, management and the general crime problem, nine (9) related issues now face the TTPS and the country:
  - i. The problems of crime and its related institutions are quite complex and require systematic, multi-faceted solutions;
  - ii. Given the political, sociological, economic and psychological roots of crime, violence and crime management, the present problems did not start yesterday, nor the day before, neither will they be solved tomorrow. Now deeply rooted, these problems slowly crept upon us;
  - iii. Given the evolved complexity of the crime problems and the policy challenges involved, to impose complete blame for today's problems on any one particular group, while necessary in one sense, will merely

help neutralise and stultify the collective will and partnership so urgently required at this time;

- iv. In such circumstances, nothing short of a well-crafted and resource-supported five to seven-year reconstruction policy and well-targeted plan will suffice to have the required improvements in this very troubling crime and violence problem. Experience has repeatedly shown that hasty, overnight solutions do not work, especially in cases when instant increases in manpower are applied. It quickly becomes new wine in old bottles. For example, the quick decision to hire “1,000 more police officers” some ten years ago, did not produce the results expected, and perhaps, quite likely, must have merely just thicken the existing problems. In light of these circumstances, manpower should not be hastily added without appropriate analysis;
- v. A strong and efficient oversight body and a stable, well-governed and high-performing Police Service should be top of the reform agenda;
- vi. Further, it is now well known that incidents of crime, violence and activities that infringe on public safety are not confined to any particular district, race, religion, sex, social class, business or worker group or political party;
- vii. Therefore, it is now of crucial importance that, as far as practical, all relevant authorities find a collective, open-minded, evidence-based approach to establish the new oversight body, as well as, a well-structured policy and planning unit to ensure the effective and timely implementation required;
- viii. Whatever “*independence*” is given to the Police Oversight Body (POB), the situation is such today, that coordination and cooperation are vital to overcome the sophisticated challenges posed by criminals and their accomplices. The Audit Committee therefore advises that the Oversight Body, apart from what it is empowered to do, hold



regular roundtable discussions with the Commissioner of Police, Minister of National Security, Police Inspectorate (PI) and the National Security Council (NSC);

- ix. Reciprocity, coordination and accountability should be integral elements in the way forward.

#### **41 Knowing What to Do Is Not Enough**

41.1 Despite the development of Strategic Plans by the TTPS, it appears that the problem is not a matter of what must be done but how to achieve the necessary in a timely and sustainable manner. For example, the TTPS in its Strategic Plan 2014 – 2016, stated: “*Although significant investments of time, money and human effort have been made to transform the TTPS, the Organisation continues to struggle between holding on to its established conventions and culture, and taking hold of a new order of business that is consistent with a successful contemporary police organisation,*” (p.9). As such, the Service proposed to move the actual strength from 6,272 to 7,715 police officers. It should be noted that the TTPS, at that time, had a complement of 273 Special Reserve Police (SRP) and 1,010 civilian employees.

41.2 Several other Strategic and Operational Plans express a similar awareness of what must be done. Further, among key elements cited for improvement in the 2014 – 2016 Plan were: “*customer service, community relationships, high murder rate, low detection rate, illegal firearms, communication technology, public confidence and trust,*” (p.14).

41.3 The Plan continued: “*Each of the strategic action items will be assigned a responsible party and a timeline for implementation.... progress of implementation will be reviewed regularly*” (p.21).

41.4 Why then is there such low public confidence and trust in the TTPS? Why are there so many operational and management gaps in the TTPS’ public safety mission? Is it that delegated responsibilities and functions have failed? Can one conclude that the successes of the TTPS are clouded and overwhelmed by

the broadcasting of police misconduct and troubling detection rates? Have the imperatives for strict accountability by the TTPS and oversight of the Service lapsed or are they generally absent?

41.5 In its 2017 – 2019 Strategic Plan, the TTPS lists five (5) guiding principles for the organisation, among them are:

- i. The public of Trinidad and Tobago deserves an effective, efficient and professional service from its Police organisation;
- ii. The TTPS must upgrade its resources, skills and competencies to provide the level of professional service desired by the public;
- iii. The Police Service has a fundamental duty to establish the enabling systems, processes, procedures and controls to effectively manage its operations (p.9).

41.6 In light of the foregoing, why are there so many complaints about the abysmally slow rate of response to citizens' complaints? Why does the Human Resource Management System (HRMS) operate in such a fractured and outdated manner? The strategic plans of the Service highlight that the organisation is aware of what needs to be done, thus, the TTPS and the connected authorities must find ways to effectively get the job done. Strict supervision and accountability with severe consequences should be the new order of the day, otherwise another future TTPS Plan or Inquiry will very likely say the same things again.

## **42 The Human Resource Breakdown**

42.1 In spite of the assurances of the Prime Minister to the Committee that all Reports and documents required for the execution of this Audit exercise would be provided by the relevant agencies, the Committee faced significant challenges in this respect. The Human Resource System of the TTPS is in a

dire condition regarding record collection, storage and retrieval. As such, a manual driven system stored in cardboard boxes in 2017 will not suffice.

- 42.2 In light of the above, much of the data required for the manpower audit came from the TTPS' Human Resource Unit in hard copy (paper format) and had to be digitized for appropriate analysis by the Committee. Additionally, the Committee experienced difficulty in accessing specific manpower records of the TTPS and these challenges are further discussed in Section 13 of Volume 2.
- 42.3 Some examples of the Committee's difficulty to obtain such records were in the case of extended sick leave, overtime allowances and extra duty payments. Noting the time constraints involved, the Committee approached the Ministry of Finance for records that should have been properly stored by the TTPS. Nevertheless, from the data retrieved for the period 2014 to 2017, the TTPS' commuted overtime payments increased from \$39 Million in 2014 to \$43 Million in 2015, to \$58 Million in 2016 (that is, a 49% increase from 2014 to 2016) and to \$36 Million as of June 2017. This data represented a total of 1,300 officers and the commuted overtime reflected 53% of their base salary.
- 42.4 Overtime expenditure for the TTPS for the period 2013/2014 to 2014/2015 amounted to \$288,864,708.00. Despite receiving this overall figure, the Committee was unable to obtain a breakdown of it by rank, gender, etc. As such, a deeper analysis of records for Police Stations, Units and Branches would be required to determine the specific reasons for overtime incurred.
- 42.5 Despite receiving information on extended sick leave for 2016, the Human Resource Unit failed to provide the Committee with a year by year trend, thus, further analyses could not be done. This matter also requires additional inquiry as the 2016 data, for example, one officer submitted sick leave documents for 298 days.

### **43 Vacation Leave**


- 43.1 Punctuality and active presence on the job are vital for the effective operations of any public safety organisation. As such, the Police Service Regulations require an officer to be on call for active duty at any given time and one's absence from the job must be fully justified and granted by the necessary permissions. In this regard, the Regulations, in Sections 74 to 97 and their subsections, stipulate the various types of leave (13) that an officer is entitled to.
- 43.2 Section 74 (2) states that: "***Leave, other than sick leave, injury leave and maternity leave, shall be granted subject to the exigencies of the Service.***"
- 43.3 Section 74 (3) also states that: "***The Commissioner shall determine whether the exigencies of the Service are such as to enable an officer to proceed on leave at any given time***".
- 43.4 With regard to vacation leave, Section 75 states that: "***An officer is eligible for vacation leave each year only after the completion of one year of service.***"
- 43.5 Section 82(1) adds that: "***Vacation leave may normally be accumulated with the approval of the Commissioner to a maximum of:***
- (a) ***Ninety working days for First Division Officers***
  - (b) ***Sixty working days for Second Division Officers***
- 43.6 It continues in Section 82 (2) and 83 (2) to note that any excess of such leave must be with the approval of the Commissioner and that leave for the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner are granted by the Minister of National Security. Section 85 further stipulates that the Commissioner shall keep records of all particulars of such leave.
- 43.7 The Committee cites these examples to help illustrate the importance of the HRMS to effective leadership and manpower management of the TTPS.

- 43.8 In this regard, the Committee makes these observations for three (3) reasons:
- i. Vacation leave is a right of officers;
  - ii. Given the nature of Police work, the extensive Regulations require extreme care and diligence in giving and taking vacation leave;
  - iii. The Committee found great difficulty in retrieving officers' leave records to assess any effects on the manpower strength of the Service. A similar difficulty existed with the Committee's search for other types of records (e.g. sick leave and overtime).
- 43.9 By letter dated September 19, 2017, the TTPSSWA submitted a list of vacation leave outstanding for First Division Officers (FDOs), which includes the Ranks of Commissioner of Police to Superintendent of Police, as at May 04, 2017.
- 43.10 Under cover of letter dated September 20, 2017 the Audit Committee forwarded the vacation leave list, as presented by the TTPSSWA, for the attention of the Acting Commissioner of Police and solicited verification of the data and any explanation on it. Additionally, a request was also made for the outstanding vacation leave for Second Division Officers (SDOs) as this information was not provided by the Association.
- 43.11 Figure 7 shows the extent of outstanding vacation leave for 118 FDOs provided to the PMAC as at September 28, 2018. Overall, the data shows that just over one-quarter (26%) of the FDOs had between 1 to 100 vacation days available. A further 27% had between 101 to 200 days available. In addition, 20% had between 201 to 400 vacation days and a further 9% had over 400 of such days.
- 43.12 The data also revealed that approximately 14% of FDOs were on Pre-Retirement Leave (See Figure 7 for further details). It should be noted that in

addition to vacation leave days accumulated, 14% of the FDOs had Compensatory Days due to them ranging from 1 day to 109 days<sup>6</sup>.

- 43.13 It should be noted that the PMAC did not receive vacation leave data for the SDOs prior to the completion of this report.
- 43.14 Given (1) the retirement dates of these FDOs, (2) the added fact that from October 2017 up to when they are due to retire, more vacation days will be earned/added, and (3) the need for succession planning, the question arises as to why and how such extensive outstanding vacation leave was allowed to accumulate, even in the context of service exigency?
- 43.15 Given the manpower and financial implications, this is a matter that requires further attention.

**Figure 7: Vacation Leave of First Division Officers (as at September 28, 2017)**



**44 Ghosts from the Past**

<sup>6</sup> First Division Officers’ Vacation Leave Data received from the TTPS on October 10, 2017.

- 44.1 A review of previous inquiries on the TTPS may help fuel the impetus to fix the Service. From the early Lee Committee of 1958, the Darby Committee in 1964, the Carr Committee in 1971, the 1978 Bruce Committee, the Police Executive Research Forum Study of 1990, the 1991 O’Dowd Committee and most recently, the 2006 Mastrofski Report, hundreds of useful recommendations have been proposed for the reform of the TTPS, yet to date, little has been done in regard to systematic implementation.
- 44.2 This situation is not evident in the TTPS alone, as many other public institutions have suffered a similar fate, leaving the Committee to wonder at this entrenched culture of institutional neglect.
- 44.3 Of noteworthy mention is the fact that the objectives and recommendations from the inquiries listed at paragraph 44.1 above, bore startling similarities. For example, the O’Dowd Inquiry, a 4-member team from the United Kingdom (UK) aimed to review the structure, organisation, management and operations of the TTPS resulted in the production of over 100 recommendations. The Darby Commission, which produced 75 recommendations, examined the organisation, administration and discipline of the TTPS, while the Bruce Committee studied the structure and operations of the Service over a five-year period and submitted 95 recommendations for reform.
- 44.4 Mastrofski precluded his team’s recommendations in 2006 with this view: ***“Given the widespread disinclination of Officers to serve the public, now is an opportune time to launch an intensive campaign to change the cultural orientation of the Police from aloof and uncaring to one that is service-oriented.”***<sup>7</sup> One difference between those reports and the present Audit Committee is the extent of manpower details gathered. From then to now, very little, if anything, has changed for the positive. The culture of resistance and slackness of duty is still alive. Perhaps, the police officers from rank to rank are not yet aware of how very serious the problems have become and will get worse if not attended to now.

---

<sup>7</sup> Stephen D. Mastrofski, George Mason University (2006)

- 44.5 Given this historical, repeated lack of policy recommendations, there is need for a Policy Planning, Research and Development Division to monitor, implement and ensure timelines are maintained. Further, it will be helpful for Government to have the recommendations from previous reports synchronised with those from this manpower audit.
- 44.6 Compared to the other inquiries cited, this Manpower Audit Committee is the only one where senior police officers were included in the composition of the review body.

## **45 Manpower Deficits**

- 45.1 Part of the manpower utilisation picture can be gleaned from the differences between the sanctioned and actual strength of the TTPS' nine (9) Police Divisions and over twenty (20) Branches and Units. When the numerical strengths of 35 various Divisions and Units are examined, it was found that 32 of the 35 – almost all – had less officers than the requirements of the sanctioned strength. For example, the Human Resource Unit had 116 rather than 264; Professional Standards Bureau (PSB) had 19 rather than 55; Tobago Division had 252 rather than 371; and E-999 Unit had 57 rather than 177 – a total deficit of 1,830 Officers<sup>8</sup>.
- 45.2 Regarding the appointment of the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioners of Police, the Committee proposes three (3) alternative options. The Governance, Disciplinary Process and Public Confidence in Section 5 of Volume 1 gives more details.
- 45.3 For effective succession planning of the Service, special attention must be given to the retirement periods of the Police Executive and by the Service, as 533 Officers of *substantive* Ranks in the age group 50 – 55 will retire. This

---

<sup>8</sup>Source Data from Nominal Rolls supplied by the TTPS



figure includes 10 Assistant Superintendents of Police, 47 Inspectors, 121 Sergeants, 138 Corporals and 217 Constables.

## **46 Conclusion**

- 46.1 It may not be surprising now to find the many dedicated, committed officers looking up to the sky, asking why? why? The public is very angry at the entire Police Service because of the brazen crimes committed against citizens across the country and those minority of officers who also commit criminal offences. Crime, however, is not the only issue as there is a growing demand for efficient and effective management system of the TTPS. The process of public safety restoration and professional integrity in the Service will be tremendously helped if the many upright and dutiful officers now seek to have the miscreants among them punished, quickly reformed or leave the Service.
- 46.2 When one considers the history of previous inquiries, their seemingly ignored recommendations, and the range of inefficient structures, processes and outcomes entrenched within the TTPS, it will be a delusion to think that all will be well quickly once a permanent Commissioner of Police and Deputies are appointed. There is still a lot of work to do. Now that many of the manpower cracks and gaps have been uncovered, there is need for a deeper probe into effective manpower utilization, management, performance and accountability in the TTPS.
- 46.3 As part of moving forward, the Committee recommends that this Final Report be shared and discussed with the Commissioner, his Executive and other key law enforcement agencies.

## **47. Recommendations**

### **Selected Priority Recommendations for Early Implementation**

- 47.1 A shortlist of tentative Recommendations was submitted to the Prime Minister of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago and the Minister of National Security in July 2017. However, this list was amended and a fuller list of Recommendations is highlighted at Section 7 of this Volume.
- 47.2 These recommendations are derived mainly from the Committee’s Police Survey, stakeholders interviews, research into the TTPS records and systems, review of previous inquiries, suggestions from Chief Inspector of Her Majesty’s UK Inspectorate,<sup>9</sup> media content, and as such, within the limited time and resources available to the Committee.
- 47.3 There are two manpower related issues which, quite early, bothered the Committee. Because of the serious manpower implications of both, they can be termed the “*twin disasters*” of the TTPS, requiring swift attention.
- 47.4 While the information gathered indicates a disturbing variety of concerns and challenges over the TTPS, a most outstanding one is the troubling extent to which abuses of the various kinds of leave and overtime adversely affect the TTPS. These manpower defects (e.g., deployment, patrols, acting appointments, etc.) are made worse by the very disorganised and inefficient HRMS in the TTPS. Inefficient recordkeeping helps facilitate corruption. The widespread allegations of corruption in the TTPS help add urgency to the need for a quick and systematic review and improvement of the human resource units in these respects – digital filing, computer storage, technology usage, retrieval, staffing, supervision, accountability, etc. The available HR Portal which has been in a “*testing*” stage must be quickly implemented to facilitate the decentralization policy.
- 47.5 The next major “*disaster area*” is the inefficient and ineffective treatment of indiscipline and corruption charges and promotions leading to both

---

<sup>9</sup>However, while the Committee gratefully acknowledges Mr. Paul Holewell’s assistance, these recommendations and others are the responsibility of the Police Manpower Audit Committee.

demoralisation and manpower deficiencies. Here too, a quick and thorough review of both the system and procedures is urgently required.

- 47.6 To support the need for improved efficiency and expeditiousness, the two units in the TTPS, the Police Complaints Division and the PSB, must be appropriately resourced in both staff competence and updated Regulations.
- 47.7 The current system and procedures used for providing, measuring and recording overtime are quite outdated, inefficient and subject to wide abuse. A quick review is also required here.
- 47.8 There should also be a more formalized and transparent system for managing Extra Duties in the TTPS, for example, who is selected and how. To help avoid abuse and promote fairness, a proper financial and recordkeeping system for Extra Duties needs to be quickly developed. A clear policy on officers' disclosure of such extra income for taxation purposes must also be put quickly in place.
- 47.9 What all this means so far is that when one takes into account the abuse and deficiencies of overtime, the various types of leave, the inefficiencies and protracted delays over indiscipline and promotions, the widespread allegations of corruption, complaints and low confidence by citizens on one hand, and on the other hand, one looks at the deficiencies and disorder in the human resource management systems, one recognises why the TTPS, as an organisation, has been in an unhealthy state, and unable to make a quick recovery.
- 47.10 The system and procedures for all types of leave (e.g. sick, vacation, etc.) must be immediately reviewed to ensure that the rules are followed, and that there are no excesses or abuses to the detriment of the TTPS.
- 47.11 What is disappointing in all this is the fact that Cabinet in Minute No. 2701 dated September 23, 2004, granted approved for the decentralisation of the human resource functions to help improve efficiency and manpower integrity. Thus far, there has been no implementation of this.

- 47.12 The number of officers who are now in acting positions must be quickly reduced while at the same time, steps taken to expedite promotions now outstanding for several years. The “*acting*” culture creates manpower and performance deficiencies.
- 47.13 For example, the number of officers having to move up rather quickly into one (senior) acting position after another eventually creates a mismatch between the officers’ ability and what the acting post actually requires. Hence the need to fill vacancies substantively and quickly. It is counterproductive to place an officer, especially for long periods, in a position – for which he is not yet properly trained or experienced.
- 47.14 Given the state of recordkeeping in the TTPS, it was extremely difficult to get an accurate count of the number of officers and where each officer is exactly located within the TTPS. This manpower status/location system needs immediate attention.
- 47.15 There are too many gaps between the scheduled strength of certain units, stations, etc., and the number of officers actually deployed there. The rationale/policy for having such scheduled strengths or gaps – necessary as they may be – must be made clear.
- 47.16 Many officers have been sent for specialised training, or did so on their own, but with the result that the positions they occupy do not match the training they acquired. A systematic review of this situation must be quickly undertaken especially with respect to the financial and manpower implications for the TTPS.
- 47.17 The link between police investigations and the Forensic Science Centre is crucial. From its inquiries and information gathered, the Committee recommends the early addition of three more forensic pathologists and accordingly, the expansion of the required physical space and facilities.

- 47.18 Given widespread complaints against the hostile attitudes and discourtesy of many police officers, an increase in the number of dedicated front office service desks at stations is required for improved customer service. A pilot project in selected stations should be first implemented. Selected officers must be trained for this purpose and such customer service duties must form part of officers' performance appraisal.
- 47.19 Information sharing and in-house communication within the TTPS seem quite deficient and often a stumbling block to effective operations. Given its strategic importance, steps must be taken to improve both the structure and process of internal communication with periodic evaluation. The use of the email system should be maximised. There seems to be a lag here.
- 47.20 As a related deficit, many Second Division officers seem not to know the Police Service Regulations or important parts of the Police Standard Orders. Manpower numbers are important. So too is manpower intelligence. Given the administrative and operational importance of such knowledge, quickened in-house training programmes must be instituted.
- 47.21 There must be a Medical Board for the exclusive use of the TTPS to improve the integrity and efficiency of the medical clearance process.
- 47.22 The entry requirements and training required and offered to SRPs should be immediately amended. If SRPs are required to do the same "*policing*" duties as they now do, they must have the same qualifications and training, and with similar compensation as the TTPS. The perpetration of this dented, dual system, while appreciating the SRP's assistance in some respects, has also adversely affected the reputation of the TTPS.
- 47.23 Given the great value of updated technology to efficient and integrity-driven investigations, it is now necessary to get an overview of the gaps in the technology required for police investigations. Further, there is need for upgraded training required for the use of certain technology and equipment in the TTPS.

- 47.24 The TTPS must consider and expedite getting the necessary approvals for the use of non-lethal weapons like Tasers, pepper spray and rubber bullets – to be used judiciously according to the level of threat.
- 47.25 Civilianisation in the TTPS began over twenty (20) years now with the major purpose of relieving officers for more patrols, investigations, etc.<sup>10</sup>. Given that civilian numbers have now grown to almost 1,000 persons, and given complaints about police-civilian work relationships, it is time for a systematic review of the role and contribution of civilians in the TTPS.
- 47.26 Tamper-proof GPS tracking devices should be placed in all police vehicles to help improve manpower management as well as coordinating intelligence. There must be penalties for officers' mishandling the equipment.
- 47.27 The relevant authorities should provide direct real time CCTV footage to the TTPS to help its crime fighting, investigative and crime prevention initiatives.
- 47.28 Given the information and widespread concerns provided to the Committee, there must be a system of random checks of the lifestyle and finances of officers to help ensure a corruption-free TTPS. Apart from the several charges publicized and concluded, there are continuing reports of various types of corrupt practices, e.g., bribery, drug trafficking, even kidnapping and collaboration with criminals – all of which require quick and proper investigation beyond mere suspicion.
- 47.29 There must be a strong and effective oversight body for the police executive and TTPS. Two alternatives: (1) An amended Police Service Commission (PSC), or (2) a Police Oversight Body (POB) with a Police Inspectorate (PI). Either can also deal with the appointment of Commissioner and Deputy. Section 5 of Volume 1 provides more details on this matter.
- 47.30 In terms of appointing the Commissioner and Deputy, a third alternative: Direct election of these by the population. The appointment of the

---

<sup>10</sup> Cabinet Minute No. 3043 dated November 25, 1993

Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners of Police are highlighted in Section 5.

- 47.31 Given the long-standing bureaucratic and long-distance inefficiencies governing Regional Municipal Corporation police officers, and further the government's policy of devolving certain powers to local government, the Committee recommends that jurisdiction (e.g., hiring, discipline, etc.) be placed under each Corporation with checks and balances, and with the Commissioner having overall oversight and a common advisory body between them. The thrust for having local communities control much of their own welfare is now a worldwide movement towards fuller democracy and direct accountability. The time for this is now. Those who control must also be accountable. At present, the accountability system is fractured and beyond the reach required.
- 47.32 The Planning, Research and Project Implementation Division needs to be re-energised and with a staffing review so as to emphasise research, policy development and execution, monitoring and evaluation – all within timelines.
- 47.33 The Committee agreed that a significant reason for the inefficiency, ineffectiveness and lack of professional integrity and commitment in the TTPS stems from deficiencies in the recruitment, training and assessment systems. The examination failure rate is embarrassingly too high. The evidence strongly suggests a radical change based on substantial pre-service training.
- 47.34 The Committee recommends that the Police Academy be placed under the University of Trinidad and Tobago (UTT), similar to the teacher-training model. This pre-service training and certification will be upgraded accordingly, thus helping to ensure an improvement in police operations, professional image and integrity and career commitment. The TTPS can accordingly continue with modified forms of induction and orientation. This change must be implemented before September 2019.

- 47.35 From substantial evidence gathered so far, the Committee’s view is that “*more police*” is not the sustainable answer, but the efficient and effective use of police manpower. While there may be some public pressure for “*more police*”, the Committee, based on past experience and available evidence, recommends that great care be now taken with respect recruiting, training and managing Municipal Police and SRP. The records reveal significant performance challenges of both, thus contributing to low public confidence in the country’s overall public safety system.
- 47.36 The Committee therefore recommends that the process of hiring Municipal Police be slowed, and that a quick and urgent review be undertaken of the Municipal Police and SRP system in terms of governance, entry qualifications, training, discipline, etc., especially in view of our recommendations for upgrading the recruitment, training and qualifications of the TTPS.
- 47.37 After interviews with several relevant agencies, especially the Strategic Services Agency (SSA) and TTPS, and reviewing relevant documentation, the Committee recommends that steps be taken to tighten and streamline the country’s intelligence agencies with regard to utilisation of technology, gathering and sharing information, coordination and accountability. For one thing, as explained to the Committee, there are counter-productive gaps in the SSA legislation and in its amendments such that the coordination required, especially from the TTPS, rests too much on voluntary response. After consultations with key security agencies, the Committee recommends the gaps be now precisely identified and healed by regulations and by a Memorandum of Understanding between the SSA and the TTPS. Both the TTPS and SSA have agreed to have the MOU as a start.
- 47.38 Once this is done, and from the Committee’s extensive interviews, surveys and data analysis, and especially as explained by several government security agencies, the Committee further recommends that an urgent review be undertaken by an appropriate expert group of the significant intelligence and operational elements of both (former) SAUTT and current SSA in order to establish a hybrid anti-crime agency (with new name); OR to use the positive



elements from SAUTT to strengthen the SSA to serve the current intelligence and security needs of the country.

- 47.39 Over the years, the policy and implementation of community policing as a means of building public confidence and support for the police have been too ad hoc, ineffective and confusing. For example, the policy to have all officers function as community police officers, or establish special units/officers for community policing seems neither here nor there now. Given the importance of having an effective and public-supported community policing system in the TTPS, the Committee recommends a redefinition and review of Community Policing so that at least, each police station will be in a state of readiness to respond effectively and appropriately to the needs of the various communities. To help initiate this renewed and fresh wave of policing, the Committee recommends that a series of thoughtful, national programmes be implemented. This “*national wave*” must begin in January 2018.
- 47.40 While each case should be dealt with on its merits, the use of force by the police has become troubling, and in need of some policy and operational review. After an examination of several incidents, the Committee recommends that a more effective form of police response could be derived from the alternative use of such “*soft*” instruments like, for example, pepper spray, rubber bullets, Taser Guns, before resorting to extreme force – and depending on the level of threat. The use of vehicular and body cameras must now be a matter of high priority within clearly defined guidelines. Technology must be put in the service for effective law enforcement and public safety.
- 47.41 Based on a review of the various programmes and plans of the TTPS (e.g. Strategic Plans), the Committee recommends that all programmes and performance targets be precisely benchmarked (i.e., outcomes and timelines) so as to create a basis for both continuous improvement and performance accountability. Too many programmes have been mentioned but left hanging without any evidence of achievement.

- 47.42 A somewhat radical solution proposed by several key stakeholders is to revamp the entire Police Service by applying a substantial severance pay policy, buy-out exercise for the under-performing, uncommitted, undisciplined officers; leaving the high-performing, disciplined, career-oriented officers inside while generating a more appropriate, higher-level system of recruitment and training. To do less, it was said, would likely result in merely putting a plaster on a festering sore.
- 47.43 The findings, conclusion and recommendations of this report must be shared with the Commissioner, his executive and key stakeholders for consensus-building towards the implementation stage.

**Photo 1: One of the Many Meetings of the Police Manpower Audit Committee**



**At Head of the Table - Professor Emeritus Ramesh Deosaran, ORTT, Chairman, PMAC**

**Members Present (Right from the Chairman): Dr. Zameer Mohammed, Mr. Allan Meiguel, Dr. Levis Guy-Obiakor, Mr. Harold Phillip, Mrs. Erla Christopher, Mr. Anand Ramessar, Mrs. Jacqueline Wilson.  
Hidden – Ms. Diana Newsam, Secretary to PMAC**

# SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

“It must be now understood that fifty-five years after Independence, we are obliged to face and tackle our problems with courage and higher wisdom. If ‘there shall be no sacred cows,’ then there shall also be no timidity, hesitation or denials towards the required solutions. We cannot expect to do the same thing in the same way and expect better results.”

# INTRODUCTION

## 1 Context

### 1.1 Composition of the PMAC

1.1.2 In accordance with the decision of Cabinet in Minute No. 24 of January 05, 2017, a seven (7) member PMAC was appointed by letters dated January 10, 2017, to undertake a manpower audit of the TTPS<sup>11</sup>. The Committee was mandated, *inter alia*, to:

- i. Examine the existing manpower strength at all Ranks of the TTPS;
- ii. Examine the objectives, recruitment, training, deployment, career progression, standards of conduct and performance of the TTPS;
- iii. Examine the extent to which such standards and performance meet the expected levels of efficiency and effectiveness; and
- iv. Make recommendations for reform.

1.1.2 The PMAC<sup>12</sup> comprised of:

- Professor (Emeritus) Ramesh Deosaran, ORTT – Chairman
- Ms. Jacqueline Wilson, PSM (Gold), Retired Permanent Secretary
- Mr. Harold Phillip, Deputy Commissioner of Police (Acting)
- Mrs. Erla Christopher, Deputy Commissioner of Police (Acting)
- Mr. Allan Miguel, Attorney at Law
- Dr. Levis Guy-Obiakor, Security Management Consultant

---

<sup>11</sup> The PMAC's Installation Ceremony occurred on January 17, 2017, at the Ministry of National Security, Temple Court 1, Abercromby Street, Port of Spain

<sup>12</sup> The PMAC was classified by the Minister of Finance in accordance with the Criteria for Classification of Cabinet appointed Committees in Range 1. In this regard, the Chairman and Members received a remuneration of \$2,700.00 and \$1,000.00 per month, respectively (*Cabinet Minute No. 2388 dated September 10, 1998*, refers).

- Mr. Anand Ramesar, Assistant Superintendent of Police (Acting) and Member of the TTPSSWA

1.1.3 Cabinet subsequently agreed to the appointment of an eight (8) member, Dr. Zameer Mohammed, Assistant Vice President, UTT. Dr. Mohammed's appointment took effect from May 25, 2017<sup>13</sup>.

1.1.4 To help emphasize the seriousness of the Manpower Audit, the Honourable Dr. Keith Rowley, Prime Minister of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, advised the Committee that there should be “*no sacred cows*” in pursuing the manpower audit and data gathering mission; and further that all reports and documents required for the mission should be made available to the Audit Committee, except for those under high intelligence classification.

## **1.2 The Manpower Audit**

1.2.1 The general Terms of Reference of the manpower audit were:

- i. Assess the numerical strength of the organisation;
- ii. Consider the extent to which resources (human, physical, etc.) were provided;
- iii. Determine the extent to which the organisation is efficiently and effectively meeting its objectives; and
- iv. Make recommendations for reform.

1.2.2 Given its internal structure, operational objectives, interdependencies with other organisations and its administrative and legislative framework, the TTPS is a very complex organisation. Traditional models of leadership and

---

<sup>13</sup>Cabinet Minute No. 963 dated May 25, 2017

management may work with adjustments, but also with an understanding of the socioeconomic, community and geographic diversity of the country and the society.

- 1.2.3 In a comparative analysis of police organisations in English-speaking democracies, Bayley<sup>14</sup> noted the extent to which a Police organisation and its leadership have to adjust to suit the community expectations and subculture of the organisation.
- 1.2.4 Citizens in our local culture expect police officers to be seen on the beat or on regular patrols, either in person or at the opened police station, so that they can respond to situations within a reasonable time. For example, closing down a community's police station, whether for reasons of mobile technology or operational centralization, will produce upsetting, disconnecting consequences for a community.
- 1.2.5 Police leadership, from top to middle management, remains a critical component for police performance. For example, in their book, *Effective Police Supervision*, H. Moore and W. Wegener<sup>15</sup>, stated: ***“When a police department is well managed it is always found to have outstanding leadership. Effective leadership can transform a marginal organisation into a successful one. Inspired leadership is extremely contagious and will cause officers to achieve high levels of productivity.”***
- 1.2.6 A manpower audit of the police service requires, for example, deep digging for numbers that fluctuate from one time to another, examining the numerous reports, plans and statistics, holding interviews, field visits, matching numbers with objectives and performance, etc. There must be, in the first place, a reasonable time period and sufficient resources to carry out this complex, multi-layered manpower tasks.

---

<sup>14</sup>David Bayley, In *Modern Policing*; eds. M. Tonry and N. Morris, University of Chicago Press, 1996, pp. 509 – 545

<sup>15</sup>Anderson Publishing p.127

- 1.2.7 In this respect, the Committee was given a deadline of March 31, 2017 to submit its Final Report to Cabinet. However, after its initial meetings, the PMAC recognised the broad scope and depth of data gathering required and the clear inability of the committee members to carry out the audit by themselves as all members were fully employed in different sectors of society. In keeping with the decision of Cabinet for the Ministry of National Security to provide the administrative and logistical support to the Committee, the Office of Law Enforcement Policy (OLEP) was provided for Committee meetings and from January 31, 2017, a Business Operations Assistant II was seconded to the Committee to perform administrative duties.
- 1.2.8 Subsequently, Cabinet approved the Committee's request for an extension to the life of the exercise for nine (9) months with effect from April 01, 2017<sup>16</sup> and for the establishment of a six (6) member Implementation Team (IT) to provide support in the areas of project coordination and supervision, research, and data analysis<sup>17</sup>. This team became fully functional on May 01, 2017, and had a termination date of July 31, 2017.
- 1.2.9 Without the support of the Implementation Team, the collection of further data after July 31, 2017, proved difficult as the Committee faced challenges in getting information and documentation to complete its tasks. Noting the aforementioned and considering that much more could not be achieved without additional personnel, the PMAC agreed to submit its Final Report to the Government of Trinidad and Tobago by September 30, 2017. It is therefore necessary to consider the PMAC's Final Report under these challenging conditions.
- 1.2.10 Given the requirements of a Police Manpower Audit and from what the Committee has observed, a HRMS is quite different from the traditional public service system.

---

<sup>16</sup>Cabinet Minute No. 583 dated March 29, 2017

<sup>17</sup>Cabinet Minutes No. 648 and 963 dated April 12, 2017, and May 25, 2017, respectively

### **1.3 Methodology**

1.3.1 The methods utilized by the Committee and the Implementation Team for the Audit included:

- i. Review and collection of data from TTPS sources;
- ii. Review of previous reports on the TTPS;
- iii. Collection and content analysis of media reports and editorials on crime, policing and national security from December 2016 to April 2017;
- iv. Extensive nationwide interviews with approximately 100 key stakeholders and content analysis of these interviews. List of stakeholders is at Section 8 of this Volume.
- v. Town meetings and public memoranda;
- vi. Review of laws and regulations governing the TTPS (e.g., Police Service Act, Standing Orders, PSC legislation);
- vii. Survey of 500 Police Officers randomly selected from various Divisions and Ranks;
- viii. Twenty-four (24) focus group sessions held with 216 Officers and civilian staff randomly drawn from various Units and the nine (9) Police Divisions.

Further details of the methodology utilised is enclosed in Volume Two (2) of the Report.

1.3.2 During its operations, the PMAC held a total of 80 formal meetings representing a total of 30 regular committee meetings, as well as, meetings



with officials of the Trinidad and Tobago Government, the Government of the United Kingdom and British High Commission in Port of Spain, and stakeholders.

## **1.4 Situational Analysis**

This is a brief narrative on some of the prevailing conditions that led to the present manpower audit into the TTPS.

### **1.4.1 The Crime Situation: Serious Crimes and Detection Rates**

1.4.1.1 The Audit was largely driven by the state of the country's crime statistics, public fears and controversies, as well as, the concerns of the Government. When the number of serious crimes reported to the TTPS from 1990 to 2016 in intervals (that is, over the last 27 years) are examined, it shows an increase by 6% from 16,199 in 1990 to 17,134 in 2000. Then, from 2000 to 2010, the number of serious crimes increased by 17% from 17,134 to 20,126. However, from 2010 to 2016, there was a decrease by 43% from 20,126 to 11,493<sup>18</sup>.

1.4.1.2 The following law enforcement connections are also relevant:


- i. When reported serious crimes increased by 6% from 1990 to 2000, its crime detection rate increased by only 1% point, that is from 30% to 31% for the corresponding period;
- ii. When reported serious crimes increased by 17% from 2000 to 2010, its crime detection rate decreased from 31% to 16%, almost by half for the corresponding period;

---

<sup>18</sup>Crime and Problem Analysis Branch (CAPA), TTPS, 2017

iii. Notwithstanding the grim picture, some improvement appeared. When reported serious crimes decreased by 43% from 2010 to 2016, the crime detection rate increased from 16% to 24% for the corresponding period. See [Figure 8](#) for details and trends.

**Figure 8: Serious Crimes Detection Rates (%) for 1990 to 2016**



**Data Source: CAPA, TTPS, 2017**

1.4.1.3 The Audit Committee noted, however, that some progress has been made over the years, for example, in the retrieval of illegal firearms. For this year this far, over eight hundred (800) illegal firearms were removed off the nation’s streets by the TTPS<sup>19</sup>.

**1.4.2 Crime Detection Rate - Comparison with International Benchmark**

1.4.2.1 If we accept the international benchmark of a crime detection rate of 30% as adequate, over the last twenty-seven (27) years (1990 to 2016), the only years where such was attained or higher was 1990, 1992, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000.

<sup>19</sup> TTPS Data as at October 10, 2017

- 1.4.2.2 The other twenty-one (21) years were below this standard, in fact, for six (6) consecutive years, that is, 2008 to 2013, the crime detection rates were below twenty percent (20%), ranging between 16% to 19%.
- 1.4.2.3 What would account for this fluctuation, that is, for only six of twenty-one years the detection rate rose above thirty percent?
- 1.4.2.4 While these detection rates may express some measure of police performance, a greater understanding will be gained from the rate of convictions or acquittals and the role played by police witnesses. As the Magistrates have complained (e.g., interview with former Chief Magistrate), a major reason for repeated case adjournments and many dismissals is the persistent absenteeism of police witnesses at trials.
- 1.4.2.5 According to the interview data, it is not only the middle management of the service that is frequently absent from their station command post but police witnesses in court. It would be dishonest, however, to suggest that only police absenteeism leads to case-delays or dismissals since nonattendance by lawyers and magistrates contributes as well. The aforementioned takes us into the inefficiencies in the administration of the justice system, in which the TTPS is just one part, but a very important component.

### **1.4.3 The Five (5) Troubling Police Divisions**

- 1.4.3.1 There are nine (9) Police Divisions across Trinidad and Tobago – Northern, Port of Spain, Central, Southern, Western, Eastern, North-Eastern, South-Western, and Tobago. Over the past ten (10) years or so, there were five (5) Police Divisions that consistently had the highest numbers of reported serious crimes. In terms of crime rates, hot spots and overall management challenges, the five troubling Police Divisions are Port of Spain, Northern, North-Eastern, Central and Southern.

#### **1.4.4 The Homicide Tragedy**

1.4.4.1 It is well-known that our twin-island state is suffering from a very serious problem with homicides. In fact, from 1990 to 2000, homicides increased by 43% from 84 to 120. Then, from 2000 to 2010, it increased by 294% from 120 to 473. And, from 2010 to 2016, there was a small decrease by 2% from 473 to 462. From 2004 to 2005, there was an increase from 260 to 386 – a large leap. And, from 2007 to 2008, it jumped again from 391 to 547. See Table 4.

#### **1.4.5 The Constant Slide: Homicide Crime Detection Rates**

1.4.5.1 While the homicide rates were climbing from 84 in 1990 to 462 in 2016, the homicide detection rates were sliding down annually. It went from 69% in 1990 to 16% in 2016. In fact, from 1990 to 2000, the detection rate fell from 69% to 57%. Then, from 2000 to 2010, it slid from 57% to 23%. And this worsened as from 2010 to 2016, it dropped from 23% to a very low of 16%. See Figure 9.


1.4.5.2 What would have led to these poor performances? Were they related to Police manpower? Other issues? We know the number of officers assigned to the Homicide Bureau was boosted. We know the training offered to Homicide Officers was increased. We know expertise from the institution formerly known as SAUTT was shared with the TTPS. What can therefore account for these low detection rates?

**Table 4: Homicides – Reported and Detected for 1990 to 2016**

Year	Reported	Detected	Detection Rate (%)
1990	84	58	69
1991	97	74	76
1992	109	69	63
1993	111	65	59
1994	139	71	51
1995	121	80	66
1996	107	60	56
1997	101	77	76
1998	97	66	68
1999	93	67	72
2000	120	68	57
2001	151	69	46
2002	171	74	43
2003	229	92	40
2004	260	69	27
2005	386	96	25
2006	371	100	27
2007	391	74	19
2008	547	99	18
2009	507	140	28
2010	473	107	23
2011	352	79	22
2012	380	69	18
2013	408	62	15
2014	405	81	20
2015	420	71	17
2016	462	75	16

**Data Source: CAPA, TTPS, 2017**

**Figure 9: Homicides Detection Rates (%) for 1990 to 2016**



**Data Source: CAPA, TTPS, 2017**

#### **1.4.6 Impact of Crime, Public Perception and Policing**

1.4.6.1 Even while the rate of serious crimes is reported as decreasing (now approximately 11,000 per year), public fear and widespread concerns have risen, or at least remain unconsolated by this reported trend. See [Table 5](#). The rising homicide levels (now approximately 500 annually) together with low detection rates apparently generate high levels of public fear. Pressures from several sources – public and private – have grown for urgent action against serious crimes, especially the brazen murders.

1.4.6.2 In addition, the traditional media (print, television, and radio, and more so, talk shows) as well as social media (e.g., Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, Snapchat, etc.) are today bringing such criminal incidents instantaneously and dramatically into our homes and through the rapid expansion of mobile phones and other handheld devices. Indeed, such “*crime news*” viral transmission has both positive and negative dimensions – the right to know vs. the fears from having known, and known with very dramatic and graphic features.

- 1.4.6.3 Further, many editorials, commentaries and blogs reveal the public’s sense of frustration with the crime problem and the continued inability of the authorities to deal with it. The consistent complaints by citizens over the slow or absent response by police to calls for help aggravate public fears and frustrations.
- 1.4.6.4 There have been repeated calls by the TTPS, government officials, as well as, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the private sector for all to work together to deal with the crime problem facing the country. Our data (surveys, interviews, opinion polls, public memoranda, town meeting, etc.) strongly reveal widespread mistrust and low public confidence in the Police – a condition that requires immediate and urgent restoration. Over 90% of the police officers interviewed in the Survey admitted that public confidence in the TTPS was “*low*”, “*very low*” or “*without any confidence at all*”.
- 1.4.6.5 Furthermore, interview data from some 100 civic and business organisations, government officials and other prominent citizens not only expressed similar views, but went further to severely criticise the public behaviour and law enforcement performance of the Police Service generally. For example, a content analysis of public officials’ views revealed only 3% said “*positive*” things about the TTPS. The rest was “*negative*” (approximately 40%), “*mixed*” or “*neutral*” (57%).
- 1.4.6.6 There is thus a general reluctance as well as fear by members of the public to come forward and assist the police. Many persons fear that the information, tips, reports, etc. that they provide may end up in the hands of rogue police officers and the wider criminal element. In our recent past, there have been a number of cases whereby police officers have been arrested for committing various types of (alleged) crimes.

**Table 5: Serious Crimes – Reported and Detected for 1990 to 2016**

Year	Serious Crimes		
	Reported	Detected	Detection Rate %
1990	16199	4857	30
1991	16157	4623	29
1992	17680	5241	30
1993	19548	5199	27
1994	18621	4898	26
1995	16783	4560	27
1996	18093	5025	28
1997	16989	5156	30
1998	15796	5324	34
1999	16261	5375	33
2000	17134	5289	31
2001	15724	4156	26
2002	16810	4366	26
2003	16890	4502	27
2004	16386	4428	27
2005	17989	4693	26
2006	19565	4797	25
2007	19661	4596	23
2008	20566	3394	17
2009	22162	3860	17
2010	20126	3320	16
2011	15877	2984	19
2012	17841	2977	17
2013	13147	2371	18
2014	12057	2777	23
2015	11135	2556	23
2016	11493	2743	24

**Data Source: CAPA, TTPS, 2017**

1.4.6.7 The widespread publication of such allegations (e.g., drug trafficking, murder, assault, larceny, kidnapping, etc.) has significantly diminished the level of public confidence in the TTPS. These offences, as worrisome as they naturally are, gain critical importance because of the expected role of a police officer – to serve and protect the public and more precisely, when



such offences were committed by persons wearing the police uniform, public shock and disappointment grow exponentially .Section 5 provides more information on this matter.

## **1.5 The Devastating Psychology of Perception: Real Consequences**

1.5.1 Most of the antagonisms against the TTPS (like other organisations) are based on perceptions. For many years now, the TTPS has been fighting a losing battle with public perceptions. Reliance on media advertisements and press conferences has seemingly produced little or no positive results. For anyone – whether a subject or object of analysis – to treat “*perception*” as trivial, as “*no big thing*” could be a tragic mistake.

1.5.2 Most of the time in human encounters and relationships, it is perception that determines behaviour. The human mind first perceives, then act. And once certain perceptions – sometimes energised by prejudices and stereotypes– become implanted, there is great difficulty to change or remove them. As a means of mental comfort, they feed upon themselves, resisting change.

1.5.3 Changing them will require strong facts, evidence supported arguments, especially from credible sources. Anything less will merely strengthen the original perception and even reject the messenger, in this case the TTPS. There is enough evidence to show that at this time of its existence, the TTPS needs to have a serious, in-depth, independent analysis of the role and effect of public perception on its performance.

## **1.6 The Manpower Audit into the TTPS**

1.6.1 The Police Manpower Audit, with its data and recommendations, should help reform the TTPS to utilize its manpower more effectively and improve its public reputation both in terms of law enforcement and

professional integrity. To do otherwise now will drive the TTPS further into an area of darkness and the social and economic consequences are deadly serious.

1.6.2 One way towards solutions is to review the human resource element of the TTPS. However, as explained elsewhere in this report, the human resource management and support system is weak, fragmented and, for all practical purposes, too chaotic to help drive the police leadership into the performance levels expected. Furthermore, the large amount of specialized training given to the human resource staff and even the introduction of specialist human resource civilians into the TTPS have so far failed to generate the efficiency and effectiveness expected from the department.

1.6.3 From all data and opinions to date, the unanimous conclusion is that an increase in police manpower is neither now necessary, nor desirable. The critical issue is the extent to which the manpower is effectively utilized and the extent to which the Human Resource System (human, physical) is available and properly supervised.

1.6.4 The levels of sick leave extensions and abuse, the continued slackness and protracted delays in pursuing and concluding charges of police indiscipline and corruption and the apparent excesses of overtime pay all combine to illustrate the unhealthy condition in which the overall HRMS sadly exists. Such management deficiencies help distort and in fact weaken and contaminate the manpower strength of the service.

## **1.7 An Overview**

1.7.1 Overall, the results gathered so far from this Police Manpower Audit exercise (Committee findings and Implementation Team Reports) reveal five (5) major dimensions. Briefly:

- 1.7.2 The TTPS has become an unhealthy organisation, long deprived of required attention, such as, appropriate recruitment and training standards, staff appraisals, performance outcomes, a stabilized, transparent appointment and promotion system, and an effective middle management supervision. Instead, it has become a dysfunctional organisation, plagued with protracted delays in providing for required reforms and equipment (e.g., body cameras, speed guns, GPS-equipped vehicles, pepper spray, etc.), resulting in an organisation that is far removed from its expected objectives and much to the disappointment of many citizens who still hold some affection for it and its noble purpose. Such dissonance leaves the public in a perpetual love-hate relationship with the TTPS.
- 1.7.3 As the data shows, the HRMS of the TTPS, a key driver in such an organisation, is actually broken down if one considers the current manner of basic administrative functions like record-gathering, filing and retrieval. The policy situation is made worse when it is considered that Cabinet Minute No. 2701 dated September 23, 2004, agreed, *inter alia*, to decentralise and improve the Human Resource System of the TTPS. However, to date, this decision has not been implemented. If the management objective is, for example, effective policing, expeditious appraisals, fairness and accountability, the Human Resource System in the TTPS is an area of darkness. Section 3 of Volume 1 provides more information on this matter.
- 1.7.4 The level of public confidence and trust in the TTPS is exceedingly low – too low to gain the extent of public support required for community partnership and support for democratic policing. Of all the data gathered and interviews completed, the TTPS as a whole has no public champion. Media advertisements and interviews by the TTPS are no match for public misconduct by some officers, widespread unanswered allegations of police corruption and indiscipline, ineffective attention to citizen complaints and low levels of crime detection.

- 1.7.5 Worse yet, serious complaints by officers themselves have been publicly made about unfair treatment regarding promotion and protracted tribunal hearings. So the poisoned perceptions and allegations against the TTPS are both internal and external.
- 1.7.6 Faced with such rooted organisational and operational challenges, there has been an unhelpful degree of defensiveness towards a realistic admission of these long-standing problems, and a lukewarm attitude towards the significant reforms required. In the circumstances, it will be very unfortunate for the TTPS and its related institutions to exhibit such resistance to change. The TTPS should seek to establish high standards of professional integrity and performance – thus making the organisation an attractive place in which to build a career. This situation has prevailed for too long, as the majority of police officers themselves now admit, there is too much at stake for public safety and the TTPS’ own reputation.
- 1.7.7 The Audit Committee found that, for the past thirty years, most of the recommendations from various official reports (many quite costly) were not implemented. This has created a situation where many of the Audit Committee’s recommendations will naturally reflect some of what have already been made many years ago.
- 1.7.8 This perpetrated deficiency in police governance has helped to stultify and cripple the organisational and operational progress of the TTPS over the years. This historical decay started years ago, especially in terms of, but not limited to, the obvious lack of implementing previous, relevant recommendations for police reform and improvement. This dearth makes it somewhat difficult to cast total blame on present authorities. Noting the above, the time is now for the required action.

## **1.8 Moving Forward: Implications**

1.8.1 Before 2006 or thereabout, the Commissioner of Police perpetually complained of “having responsibility but without authority”. However, arising from a major police reform exercise in 2006, the Constitution was amended and now states:

*Section 123A. (1) Subject to section 123(1), the Commissioner of Police has the complete power to manage the Police Service and is required to ensure that the human, financial and material resources available to him are used in an efficient and effective manner.*

1.8.2 The words “available to him” imply some measure of dependency.

1.8.3 Further, the Commissioner of Police now has powers to appoint, promote, transfer and discipline officers below the rank of Deputy Commissioner. Compared to what obtained before where such powers resided in the PSC, the Commissioner now has powers of both responsibility and authority. The PSC is empowered to appoint, discipline and dismiss the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner. It is here that questions must be asked about the various levels of the Police Service where inefficiency, ineffectiveness and lack of accountability existed and continue to exist – under the hand of the Commissioner at one level, and under the aegis of the PSC at another level.

1.8.4 An organisation, especially one with so many organic parts like the TTPS, does not begin to die overnight. The disease of inaction and neglect enters day by day, slowly affecting one part after another, until the entire body grows too weak to help itself. The TTPS has grown weak internally, with several of its organic parts (e.g., promotion, discipline, human resource, measured accountability, etc.) now severely affected. These symptoms are seen in instances where, for example, an officer remains on paid suspension for over twelve years and the fact that the TTPS is facing very low public confidence and trust.

1.8.5 In such circumstances, it will take nothing less than a five to ten-year period to properly reform the TTPS and bring it, if not exactly, but close to benchmarked, time-lined levels of management, performance, professional integrity and public confidence. This will require courage and cooperation from all sides. The time is now to do so.

## **1.9 Intelligence**

1.9.1 A glimmer of some hope arose when the Director of the SSA, following an interview with the PMAC, submitted a list of proposals for coordination, improved efficiency and effectiveness of the country's intelligence services. This list was shared with the Commissioner of Police and comments on the matter were solicited. In the end, both the Director, SSA and the Commissioner of Police, TTPS, agreed to work together toward establishing a MOU as a start.


## **1.10 Appointment and Police Oversight: The Democratic Way**

1.10.1 The three (3) proposals for appointments and oversight of the Police Service contain significant departure from the present. The under mentioned are reasons for this:

- i. From current evidence and past experience, the present system is not working, much to the dissatisfaction of the population;
- ii. Previous reforms have been misguided, marginal and timid;
- iii. Previous reforms and the present system lack an understanding of what the voice of the people and representative government mean in establishing such systems, systems which have very serious impact and consequences for the population.

1.10.2 The ***first*** proposal is that the report from the Multi-Sector Review Team on the PSC be adopted with significant amendments. The ***second*** is to establish a Police Oversight Body supported by a Police Inspectorate. The ***third*** proposal is to have the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners of Police directly elected by popular vote – the democratic way with live and direct accountability to the population. This latter proposal is not without precedent in certain democratic countries and the rationale for each proposal is explained in Section 5. See **Figure 10** for a democratic representation of appointing a Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police.

**Figure 10: Democratic Representation in Appointing a Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police**



1.10.3 Whichever option is chosen, it must be now understood that fifty-five years after Independence, we are obliged to face and tackle our problems with courage and higher wisdom. If there shall be “no sacred cows”, then there shall also be no timidity, hesitation or denials towards the required solutions. We cannot expect to do the same thing in the same way and expect better results.

## 1.11 The Ultimate Solution

- 1.11.1 On more than one occasion, the Committee heard from interviews that one radical solution is to revamp the entire Police Service; apply a substantial severance pay/buyout exercise for the many underperforming, uncommitted, undisciplined officers, while retaining the high-performing ones thus generating a more appropriate, higher level system of recruitment and training. To do less, it was said, would likely result in merely putting a plaster on the sore. In light of the circumstances, now is the time!

*Photo 2: Members of the PMAC explain the Objectives of the Audit to the Media*



**Left to Right: Mr. Harold Phillip, Deputy Commissioner of Police, TTPS & Member – PMAC, Dr. Levis Guy-Obiakor, Security Management Consultant & Member – PMAC, Professor Emeritus Ramesh Deosaran, ORTT, Chairman, PMAC**



## **1.12 Technical Assistance to the PMAC from the Government of the United Kingdom**

- 1.12.1 In accordance with Cabinet’s decision in Minute No. 24 dated January 05, 2017, arrangements were made by the Ministry of National Security for the PMAC to meet with several Officials of the British High Commission in Port of Spain on February 20, 2017 to see the extent to which technical assistance could be provided for the audit exercise. This meeting included Mr. Paul Holewell, Force Liaison Lead, Armed Services and British Overseas Territories, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS), formerly known as Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), the Official of the Government of the United Kingdom designated to provide any assistance which the Audit Committee required.
- 1.12.2 At an early meeting with the PMAC and the Minister of National Security, Mr. Holewell advised that such an Audit would take up to three years and requires substantial resources for completion. However, Mr. Holewell, on request, did provide helpful advice on several matters relating in particular to human resource management and operations of the TTPS.
- 1.12.3 For example, he suggested that as part of TTPS strategic planning, there should be hard data to indicate the extent to which the plans are achieved. While giving several resource references, he also pointed to the need to restructure the police organization.
- 1.12.4 On July 27, 2017, the Committee sent the final report of its Implementation Team for Mr. Holewell’s comments, suggestions, etc. This was also copied to Mr. Julian Davies, National Crime Agency (NCA) International Liaison Officer – Trinidad. It should be noted that Mr. Davies was established as the liaison between the PMAC, the British High Commission in Port of Spain and Mr. Holewell, at a meeting between

Officials of the High Commission and the Committee on April 07, 2017.  
We still await his response to the Implementation Team’s final report.

***Photo 3: Representatives of the Government of the United Kingdom and PMAC***



**At the forefront: Professor Emeritus Ramesh Deosaran, Chairman – PMAC and Mr. Paul Holewell, Force Liaison Lead, Armed Services and British Overseas Territories, HMICFRS**

**In the Background (left to right): Mr. Keith Renaud, Director – OLEP, Mr. Julian Davies, NCA International Liaison Officer – Trinidad and Mr. David Robinson, Crown Prosecution Service Criminal Justice Adviser to Trinidad and Tobago**

**SECTION 2:**  
**MANPOWER STRENGTH**  
**& UTILIZATION OF THE**  
**TTPS**

# Manpower Strength and Utilization of the TTPS

## 2 Introduction

2.1.1 This Section deals with the critical issues of manpower strength and utilization in the TTPS. These are the real “*brass-tacks*” issues confronting many police services in the world, that is, what is the manpower strength, is it adequate and appropriate, and is it being utilized in the most efficient and effective manner to protect and serve the much diversified populace.

2.1.2 Of course, it was quite difficult to examine all issues related to manpower strength and utilisation. As a result, the PMAC treated with the following matters as high priority:

- a. Manpower Numbers, Availability and Allocation
- b. Recruitment
- c. Overtime and Leave
- d. Disciplinary Action
- e. Civilianisation in the TTPS
- f. Municipal Police / SRP / Related Institutions

## 2.2 What is Manpower Strength and Utilisation?

2.2.1 When the PMAC makes reference to manpower strength, we place attention to all of the human resources that comprise the TTPS, from Commissioner of Police to Constable, as well as those other human capitals that impact on policing as a whole. Importantly, also, we consider the major role that the SRP is currently playing in the policing of Trinidad and Tobago.

- 2.2.2 However, policing in Trinidad and Tobago is not just the TTPS. We also have other entities playing key policing functions. These include the Municipal Police, that is, those working through the various city, borough and regional corporations in Trinidad – all fourteen (14) of them. Added to these are the Estate Police Officers as well as Private Security Personnel including precepted and non-precepted. All of these constitute the policing strength in Trinidad and Tobago. Other agencies jointly assist the TTPS and also do their own “*policing*” functions, for example, the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (TTDF), Immigration Division, Customs and Excise Division, sea and air Port Officers, Prison Service, etc.
- 2.2.3 In its literal sense, manpower utilisation is how well the relevant human resources are used to fulfil its mandate. For example, with regard to policing, are they adequately allocated and deployed when and where necessary to both prevent and deal with the dynamic crime situation? Are the right collaborations established within the TTPS in terms of its various Divisions, Branches and Units (i.e., internal collaboration) as well as with external agencies to deal with the crime and public safety concerns of Trinidad and Tobago?

### **2.3 Role of Manpower Strength and Utilisation to Policing**

- 2.3.1 There is no doubt that strength and utilisation of manpower in policing is the make or break in security and public safety in any country. The extent to which police manpower and its utilization are functional in a society, so will the safety to live and work be. As such, all of the relevant stakeholders (internal to the TTPS as well as external) must ensure that the manpower strength and its utilisation is at its optimal level at all times otherwise there will be dire consequences for all.

## **2.4 Data and Information Sources**

2.4.1 For this section, a wide variety of data and information sources were utilized. These include an analysis of official documents, reports, policies and data as well as information from surveys, focus groups sessions, stakeholder interviews, newspaper articles and contributions from members of the public. Importantly, views from policing officers themselves (police officers, SRPs, municipal police officers, etc.) are taken into consideration.

## **2.5 Findings: Manpower Strength and Utilization**

### **2.5.1 Manpower Strength**

#### **2.5.1.1 Manpower Numbers: Total & Problems**

2.5.1.2 There is a serious challenge in getting the accurate number of police officers in the TTPS in 2017 as various official sources gave varying accounts. This predicament weakens the ability of the TTPS to plan and implement its operations in the most efficient and effective way because not knowing the accurate number of officers at your disposal at any point in time in the fight against crime is surely a tenuous position to occupy.

2.1.1.3 However, information provided by the TTPS states that at February 13, 2017 the “sanctioned strength” of the TTPS is 7,884 officers. Further, the “actual strength” at that date was 6,768, that is, 86% of what was officially required for the TTPS. Therefore, it showed a 14% or 1,116 officer positions as being “vacant”.

- 2.1.1.4 This 14% shortfall of police officers in a nation where crime is the number one problem is not the only manpower deficit. Official information also showed that a further 10% to 20% of officers are not on duty at any one time due to several “leaves” such as vacation, injury, sick, extended sick, study, no pay, suspension, etc. That is, over thirty percent (30%) of the police officers required to do policing are not on job at any given time.
- 2.1.1.5 Officers work on various shift systems, for example, 8-hours, 10-hours, 12-hours, 14-hours, 24-hours and even 48-hours shifts. So if we take away the officers who are on leave from the actual strength, we have an estimated 4,700 officers available on any given day. If we split a day into two shifts for example, there are estimated 2,350 officers in active duty for the whole of Trinidad and Tobago in any given time. Is this adequate especially in view of the fact that the Committee found many officers will be performing substantial administrative/desk duties – in spite of having civilian staff?

## **2.5.2 Manpower Distribution by Divisions, Branches and Units: Further Problems**

- 2.5.2.1 An April 2017 Nominal Roll (or roll call list) of the TTPS reveals an interesting and worrisome trend. Officers can be deployed to Police Divisions where they are further allocated to Police Stations or they can be placed into specialist Units or Branches. This Nominal Roll includes regular police officers and SRPs. In fact, for April 2017, there were 9,234 officers in total – Regular and SRPs.
- 2.5.2.2 The data showed that 63% of the officers were regular officers and 37% were SRPs. Is this ratio satisfactory especially as the SRPs did not undergo the same recruitment training and do not have the same entry requirements as

regular police officers? Are the SRPs supposed to be “*reserve*” and not be used on a permanent basis?

2.5.2.3 Let’s take a deeper look into how regular officers and SRPs are allocated. In the nine Police Divisions across Trinidad and Tobago; 64% of the officers are regular officers and 36% are SRPs. Again, is this ratio satisfactory?

2.5.2.4 Further, in over thirty branches and units, 70% of the officers are regular officers and 30% are SRPs. Is this desirable?

2.5.2.5 The whole issue of SRPs and the role they are playing in the TTPS and, by extension, policing in Trinidad and Tobago is quite serious. They did not undergo the required training and are not required to have the same entry requirements as a regular police officer. The level of accountability varies compared to that of the TTPS. Further, they are paid much less than a regular police for doing the “*same*” policing functions and do not have any of the benefits that regular officers are entitled too. This will, of course, lead to feelings of unfair treatment that can lead to a range of other problems. This inferiority feeling was expressed widely by almost all of the SRPs in the various focus group sessions held across Trinidad and Tobago by the PMAC.

2.5.2.6 In an interview which the PMAC had with the then Chief Magistrate, it was noted that the SRPs play a key role in the magisterial/court system. In fact, it was noted that they “*hold up*” the magisterial system.


### **2.5.3 Manpower Challenge: Vacancies**

2.5.3.1 The TTPS data shows that there are over one thousand vacancies and mostly at the lower rank, that is, the foot soldiers. This is an urgent problem that must



be treated with great seriousness. In fact, when we look at how the vacancies are spread across the various police divisions as well as branches and Units, it exists across all except one or two. Worryingly, vacancies exist in key units and Branches like Homicide, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Special Branch, Child Protection, Rapid Response, Guard and Emergency while there are surpluses in other Units and Branches. See [Figure 11](#) and [Table 6](#) for details.

**Figure 11: Vacancies in the TTPS (as at February 2017)**



**Data Source: Summarized Data from the TTPS as of February 2017**

**Table 6: Manpower Deficit per Division/Section/Unit within the TTPS**


Division/Branch/Unit	Sanctioned Strength	Actual Strength	Deficit	Deficit %
ANTI-CORRUPTION INVESTIGATIONS	45	27	18	40%
POLICE BAND	80	64	16	20%
CENTRAL DIVISION	462	403	59	13%
CHILD PROTECTION UNIT	169	114	55	33%
CID / CRO	247	267	-20	-8%
COMMUNITY POLICING SECRETARIAT	19	31	-12	-63%
COMPLAINTS DIVISION	57	42	15	26%
COURT & PROCESS BRANCH	274	109	165	60%
CRIME & PROBLEM ANALYSIS	30	35	-5	-17%
CRIMINAL GANG & INTELLIGENCE	54	61	-7	-13%
E-999 RRU	177	57	120	68%
EASTERN DIVISION	411	385	26	6%
EXECUTIVE	15	15	0	0%
FINANCE BRANCH	82	41	41	50%
FINANCIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION	45	37	8	18%
FRAUD SQUAD	106	70	36	34%
GUARD & EMERGENCY BRANCH	354	203	151	43%
HOMICIDE	308	263	45	15%
HUMAN RESOURCE BRANCH	264	116	148	56%
INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE	190	177	13	7%
MOUNTED & CANINE BRANCH	125	90	35	28%
NORTH EASTERN DIVISION	324	321	3	1%
NORTHERN DIVISION	644	628	16	2%
OCNFB	197	95	102	52%
PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT UNIT	0	0	0	
POLICE ACADEMY	81	94	-13	-16%
PORT OF SPAIN DIVISION	465	333	132	28%
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BUREAU	55	19	36	65%
SOUTH WESTERN DIVISION	450	322	128	28%
SOUTHERN DIVISION	647	613	34	5%
SPECIAL BRANCH	290	222	68	23%
TOBAGO DIVISION	371	252	119	32%
TRAFFIC / HIGHWAY PATROL	397	255	142	36%
TRANS / TELECOM BRANCH	96	50	46	48%
WESTERN DIVISION	353	243	110	31%
			<b>1830</b>	

**Data Source: TTPS Nominal Rolls supplied May 2017 as of April 2017**

## 2.6 The “Acting” Breakdown

2.6.1 According to the TTPS data as of February 2017, there are approximately 5% of officers who are acting in positions. While overall this does not seem a troubling proportion, when it is looked at by the various ranks, it is over ninety percent for some ranks. [Figure 12](#) gives these details.

**Figure 12: Acting Appointments in the TTPS (as at February 2017)**



**Data Source: Summarized data from the TTPS as of February 2017**

2.6.2 It is often said that officers who are in “acting” positions possess the same powers and gain the same remuneration as if they were confirmed in that position. This may be so but it is much more than this. When they are acting, they are not necessarily the one to be confirmed in that position when the time

comes. This brings tremendous uncertainty and undue anxiety. Also, when persons are not confirmed in positions, it has a ripple effect on all of the ranks below. The current state of key acting positions is disastrous for overall succession planning in the TTPS.

## **2.7 The Rank Distribution of Officers**

2.7.1 It is common in organisations like the Police Service to have a firm hierarchical, pyramidal structure with the few top brass and plentiful foot soldiers at the bottom. In the TTPS, there are ten (10) ranks. The question that now has to be asked is whether this current structure is serving the TTPS as an organisation and Trinidad and Tobago as a country. Is the time ripe now for a review of this structure? Also, how are the relationships among the upper, middle and lower ranks? A deeper look into this area is needed with serious out-of-the-box thinking.

## **2.8 The Municipal Police Conundrum**

2.8.1 Currently, it is estimated that over one hundred Municipal Police officers across Trinidad. There is a variety of jurisdictional issues surrounding them as some officers report to the City, Borough or Regional Corporation, some report to the Statutory Authority, some to the Ministry of Local Government, etc. It is not a clear-cut story. As such, there are many matters that have been taken to the various courts.

2.8.2 There is a plan to significantly increase the number of municipal police officers to approximately one thousand in the first instance. Other issues as to

whether the Commissioner of Police and/or the existing PSC should have jurisdiction over them are also in the mix.

- 2.8.3 The bureaucratic deficits and fractured mode of governance exercised over these municipal officers have created twisted accountability and ineffective municipal policing. These are “local police” in a local government setting with local responsibilities. For improved, quicker accountability and remedies, for deepened democracy and public input, the time has come for the regional corporations to have control over their respective municipal officers with the Commissioner of Police having overall oversight. The appropriate administrative and legislative apparatus should be put in place for this.

## **2.9 Voices of the Police: Staffing**

- 2.9.1 When the police officers across all ranks, divisions, units and branches were surveyed by the PMAC, almost sixty percent of them (59%) rated the staffing in the TTPS as “*very unsatisfactory*” or “*unsatisfactory*”. This is not a comfortable feedback to get from the ‘horses’ mouth’ as it were.
- 2.9.2 In fact, more troublesome for the TTPS to deal with are the feelings of lower-ranked officers when compared to higher-ranked officers. For instance, while 60% of Constables and 65% of Corporals to Sergeants felt that staffing in the TTPS was “*very unsatisfactory*” or “*unsatisfactory*”, it was the opposite for higher-ranked officers in that over fifty percent (50%) of Inspectors to Assistant Commissioners of Police felt the staffing was “*very satisfactory*” or “*satisfactory*”.

2.9.3 The mandate of the TTPS is to deal with crime. When officers were asked whether the TTPS was organised do deal with crime, almost sixty percent of them (58%) said “*very unsatisfactory*” or “*unsatisfactory*”.

## **2.10 The Stakeholders Spoke: Number of Police Officers**

2.10.1 The PMAC conducted 100 interviews with various stakeholders. Interestingly, the majority of them said that there are adequate numbers of police officers and that the problem was not the number of officers but the manner in which they were utilised. These respondents included the Commissioner of Police, the TTPSSWA, the Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Industry and Commerce, the Chaguanas Chamber of Industry and Commerce, the Mayaro/Rio Claro Regional Corporation, former Commissioners of Police, former Ministers of National Security, etc.

## **2.11 Words from Focus Group Consultations**

2.11.1 Over thirty focus group consultations were conducted with various ranks, Divisions, Branches and Units of the Police Service as well as several institutions that interact and work closely with them, for example, the TTDF, Immigration Division, Prison Service, Probation Officers, etc. They were asked about the adequacy of police to which they all responded that there were sufficient officers in the TTPS. The problems are inefficient utilisation, unfair treatment and indiscipline.

## **2.12 If Enough Officers, What is the Problem Then?**

- 2.12.1 There was overwhelming agreement by all – those internal and external to the Police Service – that the TTPS has adequate number of officers. If this is the case, then it seems to be a management and leadership problem.

## 2.13 Key Issues Arising From PMAC

- 2.13.1 First, there is the problem of not having the sanctioned strength of the TTPS filled. Why is it that in 2017 there are over eleven hundred positions not filled? This situation would have been building up over time; it just didn't happen overnight. We can't say that we are serious about crime in Trinidad and Tobago while not filling these vacant positions in the police Service and expect the TTPS to deliver to the level the public expects it to do.
- 2.13.2 Second, there is the “*Hollywood*” phenomenon that is plaguing the TTPS, and by extension, the wider public service. We found that there were over three hundred (300) persons in acting positions and over ninety percent (90%) of certain ranks. Not only will this be demoralising to these officers, but it also holds back many other officers from moving up in the promotional system.
- 2.13.3 Third is the situation of supervision, management and allocation of human resources. While almost ninety percent (88%) of the police officers stated in the PMAC Survey that they have a “*very satisfactory*” or “*satisfactory*” relationship with their supervisors, there is the massive overall problem of how the officers are allocated, deployed, etc. For example, from the survey, two-thirds (66%) of police officers said that deployment of police officers based on training, qualifications and experience are done so “*sometimes*” while a further 13% said this is not done so at all.

- 2.13.4 To make matters worse, officers were asked whether there was favouritism in assigning officers to Divisions/Branches/Units. Two-thirds (68%) said this (favouritism) was done “*very often*” or “*often*” and a further 29% said “*sometimes*”. This is where the main problem seems to rest.
- 2.13.5 In fact, 45% of officers surveyed rated the leadership of the TTPS as “*very unsatisfactory*” or “*unsatisfactory*”. These were also the views from almost all of the stakeholders interviewed and from persons who participated in the focus group sessions.

## **2.14 Officers: Where are you?**

- 2.14.1 A very disturbing reality in the TTPS is that a proper working system whereby knowledge of officers’ allocations to divisions, stations, units, or branches are not readily available on a real time basis. There are many instances whereby the official police records will indicate that officers are assigned to a particular unit, branch or division but the reality is that many of them may be somewhere else in the TTPS and the official records do not reflect this. It’s disastrous for human resource planning. In fact, there are instances when officers are no longer on duty or in the police service but the official records reflect otherwise. This is as a result of long delays in the updating of records despite the acquisition of comprehensive human resource management software.

## **2.15 Recruitment**

- 2.15.1 Generally, this is where officers are recruited as Police Constables. There are provisions whereby the Commissioner of Police can recruit or appoint police



officers to certain ranks without having such persons passing through the traditional route. From our findings, this has not been a route usually accessed by the Commissioner. Probably, the time is ripe for increased usage of these powers.

- 2.15.2 Several other issues arise here. The data shows that the TTPS is not recruiting adequate police constables to fill the vacancies. In fact, it is estimated that 250 officers are separating from the TTPS annually. The TTPS needs to recruit about 300 officers per year for a five to ten-year period to make up this deficit. This is not currently being done. Several reasons have been put forward for this situation, for example, the TTPS does not have the capacity to train the required numbers of recruits in terms of the Police Academy (PA).
- 2.15.3 Then, the TTPS may not be attracting the right type and number of officers as many applicants are disqualified for several reasons, for example, their background checks reveal unsuitability, failed drug tests, failed qualifying examinations, etc. In fact, about 60% of applicants are weeded out. There is also the pressing problem of the inadequate monitoring of recruits when they leave the Training Academy and enter active duties in the Police Service.
- 2.15.4 As a result, the TTPS and the Ministry of National Security have to urgently rethink its current police recruitment policy and develop one that meets the policing needs of the twenty-first century. We must put on record our satisfaction in raising the academic entry requirements into the Police Service a few years ago from three (3) CXC/CSEC Ordinary Level passes to five (5) was a step in the right direction; but more needs to be done.

- 2.15.5 Discussions were held as to whether the current height requirements of recruits<sup>20</sup> should be revisited as well. Probably the time has come for persons who are shorter to be considered for entry into the Police Service. They can, of course, have other attributes and skills sets that do not necessarily require being a particular height.
- 2.15.6 Discussions were held as to whether a certain proportion of officers should be recruited from the various universities and tertiary education institutions across Trinidad and Tobago. They may possess a different aptitude and skills set that can be used for various specialist policing functions required for today's world.

## **2.16 Promotional Process**

### **2.16.1 The First Division**

- 2.16.1.2 The Police Service Act of 2006 and its amendments in Act No. 13 of 2007 introduced the requirements for merit assessments as opposed to seniority considerations. Since the inception of the Acts, the TTPS has conducted four (4) promotional assessments for the First Division with the last assessment being held over the period 2013–2014. The TTPS is now (2017) in the process of preparing to conduct another one. The burning question now is: Why this long gap in promotions?
- 2.16.1.3 The Committee made several requests to have access to the reports of the previous assessments but these have not been forthcoming. The Committee is of the view that there needs to be a revision on how these assessments are conducted in terms of methodology, assessment content, etc. to suit First Division Officers.

---

<sup>20</sup>5 feet, 6 inches for males; and 5 feet, 4 inches for females

## **2.16.2 The Second Division**

2.16.2.1 The Committee notes that Officers contending for promotion within the Second Division are required to sit written examinations in Law, Police Duties and English Language (only in respect of persons without a CXC or equivalent pass in English Language). There is a Police Service Examinations Board (PSEB) to administer these examinations.

## **2.17 Police Promotional Exams and High Failures**

2.17.1 A review of examination results for promotion to the positions of Corporal and Sergeant for example, showed very high level of absentees and a low and declining performance by candidates. For example,

- In the English Exam for Corporals in 2016, only 46% passed
- In the Law Exam for Corporals in 2015, only 50% passed
- In the Police Duties Exam for Corporals in 2016, 66% passed
- In the Law Exam for Sergeants in 2015, 59% passed
- In the Law Exam for Sergeants in 2016, 50% passed

- In the Police Promotion (Main/Supplemental) Exam for Corporals in 2014, 53% were absent
- The Police Promotion (Main/Supplemental) Exam for Corporals in 2015, 45% were absent.

2.17.2 Are these scores acceptable for officers who have been in the system? – These are not recruits.

2.17.3 In addition, the Board noted the repeated and adverse comments by the various examiners, e.g., candidates provided incorrect, partially correct or incomplete answers; candidates demonstrated a worrying lack of knowledge of basic police functions and procedures, etc.

2.17.4 It is also noteworthy that the examiners have made repeated calls for the weaknesses displayed in these job specific examinations to be addressed through training. It appears, however, that there are no effective linkages between the administration of the examinations and the Police Academy.

2.17.5 Successful candidates from the examinations are required to be assessed by the Promotions Advisory Board. (PAB)<sup>21</sup> However, the Act only allows the PAB to treat with one (1) rank of officer at a time. This contributes to the tardiness of the process and makes it extremely difficult to reduce these delays. In addition, if any officer raises any objections through the court, the entire process must be ceased until the court matters are resolved. Also, one can imagine these top managers away from their regular duties and responsibilities for the entire period? It thus adversely affects operations.

---

<sup>21</sup>This comprises the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Administration), an Assistant Commissioner of Police and the Director of Human Resource Management

- 2.17.6 In addition, while the PAB has conducted assessments for promotions to the levels of Corporal and Sergeant in 2016, the Committee understands that assessments for the promotion of Sergeants to Inspectors have not been conducted since 2011.

## **2.18 Overtime and Leave**

### **2.18.1 Overtime**

- 2.18.1.1 As indicated in the Executive Summary, the TTPS' expenditure for overtime increases steadily over each fiscal. This situation is of grave concern to the PMAC and its evidence suggests that the overtime system is being abused in the TTPS. In fact, several Departmental Orders have been issued to curtail it both by the TTPS and the Ministry of Finance. The abuse takes place, for instance, where the actual application and approval processes have been compromised in many ways.
- 2.18.1.2 What were the officers' views on the factors contributing to overtime as gleaned from the PMAC 2017 survey? When asked if the exigencies of the job cause overtime, 61% of them said yes. When asked if the structure of the working hours is responsible, 51% said yes. And, 27% said it was due to absenteeism problems in the TTPS. These all point to structural and manpower issues that the TTPS needs to address urgently. In fact, a more detailed and possibly forensic examination is required. Officers who breach the procedures should be dealt with to the full extent of the Police regulations as well as the criminal law.

### **2.18.2 Leave Abuses**

- 2.18.2.1 It is widespread knowledge in and out of the police service that the various “leaves” available to officers are being abused. This circumstance is contributing significantly to the low numbers of officers available on any given day to carry out policing duties.
- 2.18.2.2 The TTPS has to confront this problem in a more serious manner as its current low-key efforts are not bearing fruit. Officers are finding cleverer ways of beating the system to the detriment of the police service. In fact, from several of the stakeholder interviews and focus group discussions, many instances were noted whereby officers who were on sick leave were found to be working elsewhere or were not really in need of the leave.
- 2.18.2.3 In the survey of police officers, 83% of them said that sick and injury leave was being abused “*very much*” or “*much*”. Then, 72% said that medical exemptions are abused “*very much*” or “*much*”. A further 39% said that study leave is being abused “*very much*” or “*much*”.
- 2.18.2.4 In fact, there needs to be greater enforcement of the TTPS’ Absence Management Policy that was developed to deal with this very critical issue.
- 2.18.2.5 Another serious issue concerning leave is the inordinate length of time it takes for leaves to be classified by the various personnel and departments. There are many incidents where officers proceeded on leave without the necessary authorization/classification given upfront. The data also revealed that there are other instances where officers return from leave and it was not yet classified and entered into the Police Service’s human resource system.
- 2.18.2.6 An examination of some of the possible reasons as to why and how these abuses take place leads the PMAC to one conclusion – the human resource

recordkeeping system to record, classify, track and monitor all leave matters is in an almost non-functioning mode.

- 2.18.2.6 The PMAC's own observations uncovered that files and boxes with such confidential personnel matters are stacked and stored haphazardly all over the place leaving it open to be interfered with. Also, the long delays in data entering and storing such information into the computerised system are major contributors as well.
- 2.18.2.7 Extended Sick Leave was another specific area where the Committee found abuses, e.g., it was noted that in 2016, the number of extended sick leave requests ranged from a minimum of one (1) day to a maximum of two hundred and ninety-eight (298) days. There is also the serious problem of delays of having the Medical Board to determine the fitness of officers to remain on duty. Problems also exist with the inadequate availability of the Police Medical Officer to assess the fitness of officers to resume duty.
- 2.18.2.8 The Committee is of the firm view that the number of sick leave days taken especially by the lower-ranked officers can seriously affect the manpower availability of the TTPS and thus its service to the country.
- 2.18.2.9 As a result of all the leave abuses and other such serious human resource problems in the TTPS, there may be the need to completely overhaul this system as its chaos, inefficiency and wrongdoing are negatively affecting the entire police service. This is despite the TTPS having customised software to put its house in order but for whatever reason it has not gotten off the ground as it ought to.

## **2.19 Disciplinary Matters**

- 2.19.1 It is often been said that police officers are a replica of the society. This may be true but the public expects much more from its police officers in terms of their behaviour especially when it comes to their involvement in illegal activities or even abuse of powers.
- 2.19.2 The data from the TTPS' Strategic Plan shows that from 2015 to 2016 for example, the number of allegations made against police officers increased by 42% from 2,267 to 3,211.
- 2.19.3 Overall, there are three bodies that deal with Police misconduct. These are (1) the Police Complaints Division and (2) the Professional Standards Bureau (PSB)– both within the TTPS; and the (3) Police Complaints Authority (PCA) which operates independently to the Service. Recently, there have been calls for another type of body similar to the Police Internal Affairs Division as seen in the United States of America. It is strongly recommended that a full discussion be done on this matter to ensure we have the right system in place and to avoid any duplication.

## **2.20 What did the PCA find?**

- 2.20.1 For the periods 2010/11 to 2013/14, the number of complaints against Police Officers rose annually from 255 to 491 – an increase of 93%.
- 2.20.2 For 2014, complaints were highest in the following Police Divisions: Northern, Southern and Eastern and for 2015, they were Northern, Port of Spain and Central.
- 2.20.3 The four (4) major allegations against police officers were:



- a. Neglect of duty;
- b. Discreditable conduct;
- c. Unlawful/unnecessary exercise of authority; and
- d. Corrupt practices.

2.20.4 The data revealed that the top seven (7) allegations of criminal offences made against police officers were:

- a. assault;
- b. harassment;
- c. fatal shooting;
- d. common assault;
- e. larceny;
- f. malicious damage; and
- g. non-fatal shooting.

2.20.5 A full examination of the systems and processes in the TTPS concerning disciplinary matters will be done in Section 5 of this Volume, however, the PMAC wishes to state at this point that the current disciplinary process is a failure as it takes an inordinate length of time for matters to be heard and finalised.

2.20.6 In fact, data from various interviews, discussions and court cases, indicate that matters take many, many years before being finalised. There are several instances whereby officers retire from the service and their matters have not been determined. There is also evidence whereby officers who are before the disciplinary process and are suspended from duty continue to receive full pay when the Regulations stipulate that they should not. As far back as 2006,

Professor Stephen Mastrofski in his study of the TTPS noted that the disciplinary complaints process needs improvement<sup>22</sup>.

2.20.7 When officers were asked in the 2017 PMAC Survey to what extent they think corruption exists in the Police Service, 75% of them said “*very much*” or “*much*”. This same level of wrongdoing was expressed by officers and stakeholders in the focus group sessions and interviews. The belief of corruption in the TTPS runs deep and wide.

2.20.8 The Committee looked at the numbers of suspensions as well as the rank of officers involved. It was a quite worrisome picture. Table 7 shows these.

**Table 7: Number of Officers on Suspension as of February 2017**

No.	Categories	No. of Officers	Duration to Date (Feb 2017)
1.	Assistant Commissioner of Police	1	2 years
2.	Senior Superintendent	1	5 years
3.	Assistant Superintendent	2	1-2 years
4.	Inspector	4	1-2 years
5.	Sergeant	7	2-7 years
6.	Corporal	22	1-11 years
7.	Constable	257	1-15 years
8.	Woman Police Constable	13	2-10 Years
	<b>Total</b>	<b>307</b>	

Data

Source: Complaints Division, TTPS

<sup>22</sup> Stephen D. Mastrofski, George Mason University, (2006)

## 2.21 Civilianisation in the TTPS

- 2.21.1 As far back as 1998, Cabinet agreed to establish a Human Resource Management Unit in the Ministry of National Security to service its various divisions including the TTPS. A further decision was taken to establish Human Resource Sub Units in each of the divisions including the TTPS. In fact, it was noted the TTPS was one of the first public organisations to benefit from such an introduction of a HRMS. It was recommended that *“if the Police Service is to perform effectively, an integrated Human Resource System, consistent with the current administrative configuration is the only feasible structure to produce the desired results.”*
- 2.21.2 Despite such, from a wide cross section of stakeholders including those from the Police Service itself, the TTPS is quite ineffective. This was the consistent views gathered from the PMAC Survey, stakeholder interviews, focus group sessions, town meetings, etc.
- 2.21.3 In fact, when we surveyed the officers, more than two-thirds of them (70%) said that the introduction of civilians in the TTPS has *“very little”* or *“little”* impact in helping the Police. Interestingly, a higher proportion of the lower-ranked officers gave this response than higher-ranked officers.
- 2.21.4 Common comments given during the discussions with police officers were that the introduction of civilians into the TTPS has made things worse.
- 2.21.5 However, when the PMAC held similar discussions with civilian staff in the TTPS, they made frequent references to the lack of support and cooperation they receive from police officers in the execution of their duties. In other words, they claimed that the officers were preventing or frustrating them from performing as they ought to. There is counter-productive rivalry.

- 2.21.6 There were also many instances whereby civilian staff informed the PMAC that officers refused to comply with their requests because of their “*civilian*” status. The PMAC therefore calls for an urgent review of the civilianisation in the TTPS. In fact, in 2008, Stephen Mastrofski from George Mason University who worked with the TTPS made a similar call for a review<sup>23</sup>.
- 2.21.7 Both in principle and practice, the TTPS should be embracing civilianisation wholeheartedly. The current number of civilians working in the TTPS is almost one thousand (932 persons), however, is this adequate? Police officers should be doing mainly police duties and let civilians handle the administrative work of the TTPS. This will have a positive effect on the crime situation when more police officers are out in the public preventing, fighting and solving crime.
- 2.21.8 Another key aspect to consider in civilianisation is that the TTPS should hire civilians who are specialists in certain policing areas. For example, there may be criminologists, forensic scientists, psychologists, etc. who are not police officers but who can make a significant dent in the crime problem together with the police service. Currently, some of the civilians head key units in the TTPS such as Information Technology, Finance, Research and Planning, Human Resource, etc., but they experience problems when dealing with officers.
- 2.21.9 Dealing specifically with the Human Resource Unit which is a key component of the civilianisation plan of the TTPS, we found that there were one hundred and seventy (170) employees all functioning at the Police Headquarters in Port of Spain.

---

<sup>23</sup> Stephen D. Mastrofski, George Mason University (2008)

2.21.10 Research has shown that the Human Resource Unit and some of its sub units have been performing below an acceptable standard and this may possible since they are operating in a very highly centralized environment; with about 65% of the staff function at the head office. Therefore, all of the human resource systems and processes are also highly centralized resulting in extreme delays and inability to meet deadlines.

2.21.11 Although policy development is a critical role for the Human Resource Unit, it was that only in 2016 that it has begun this process together with the management of the TTPS to allow for the updating and rewriting policies for greater clarity and cohesiveness. The following policies and procedures have been received by the Committee:

- a. Policy Manual on Occupational Safety and Health (OSH): Completed and approved by the Commissioner on April 01, 2016;
- b. EAP Policy: Draft working document;
- c. Absence Management Policy and Procedures Manual: Draft working document; and
- d. Code of Ethics and Conduct for Contract Employees – Draft working document

2.21.12 Key policies that are yet to be developed or reviewed include:

- a. Orientation;
- b. Workforce Planning Recruitment;

- c. Training and Development;
- d. Career and Succession Planning;
- e. Rewards and Recognition;
- f. Overtime;
- g. Extra Duty;
- h. Gender Discrimination;
- i. Sexual Harassment;
- j. Entry into the First Division and other specialist policing functions from outside the Police Service;
- k. Dress Code.

## **2.22 Top Structure of the TTPS**

- 2.22.1 An analysis of the top organisational structure of the TTPS suggests that there may be some overlap. This has the potential of losing greater strategic focus on key areas of policing. As such, with some restructuring there can be greater efficiency and effectiveness in the TTPS. Recommendations for these restructuring will be presented in Section 7 of this report.

## **2.23 Training and Development**

- 2.23.1 The Police Academy (PA) is the primary in-house training Unit in the TTPS responsible for both recruits as well as ongoing professional development training. A large number of officers do engage in training in other educational institutions in Trinidad and Tobago as well as from other countries.
- 2.23.2 The Committee found a lack of integration and coordination with other areas of the police service, e.g., examinations and assessment reports, that is, when such examinations and assessments point to clear areas of weaknesses among police officers, the PA is not that responsive to mount training programmes to counter these gaps. In fact, the results of the Promotional Assessments and Examinations together with the marks and comments from examiners are not made available to the Provost of the Academy. This information is vital in assisting the Academy in developing remedial programmes.
- 2.23.3 Further, it should be noted that while the Academy has embraced the non-traditional areas like cybercrime and the needs of the differently-abled, it is not clear that these initiatives are part of a larger strategy that requires different skill sets which can be introduced through the introduction of certain professional disciplines.

## **2.24 Performance Management**

- 2.24.1 The TTPS uses the Performance Management Appraisal System (PMAS) that is used by the wider public service. It is geared towards measuring the level of competence of individual officers in the performance of their duties. The success of this system depends in large measure on the leadership of the TTPS and the setting of performance goals, standards, coaching, monitoring and feedback. Overall, the committee found that the PMAS in the TTPS has not been satisfying the purposes for which it was intended.

2.24.2 The PMAC is of the view that decentralization of the human resource function, as was originally intended when the HRM structure was designed, would significantly improve the execution of the PMAS. However, unless direct responsibility is placed squarely in the hands of the management and leadership of the TTPS as a direct performance accountability, the implementation of PMAS will not be achieved.

## 2.25 Succession Planning

2.25.1 The Committee found that there seems to be no usage of the available data by the TTPS to engage in effective succession planning. We found that in the age group 50 to 54 years that will be retiring in the next five (5) years, the highest proportion (41%) were Constables. This was followed by Corporals (25%), Sergeants (22%), Inspectors (9%) and Assistant Superintendents of Police (2%).

2.25.2 In the First Division, the highest proportion of them (46%) to retire in the next five (5) years comes from the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police. Further, the average number of FDOs to retire annually for the next five (5) years is twenty-one (21).

2.25.3 In view of the information gathered, it is clear that there is an urgent need for the TTPS to engage in Separations Succession Planning. See Table 8 for the number of separations for the last three years:

**Table 8: Number of Officers by Separation for the Period 2014 to 2016**

TYPE OF SEPARATION	YEAR		
	2014	2015	2016
COMPULSORY RETIREMENT	129	160	330
OPTIONAL RETIREMENT	22	11	13



RESIGNED	10	17	10
MEDICAL GROUNDS	3	4	1
DECEASED	18	11	13
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>182</b>	<b>203</b>	<b>367</b>

**Data Source: Summarized Data received from the TTPS as at March 31<sup>st</sup>, 2017**

- 2.25.4 On average, the TTPS recruits approximately 250 officers annually. If they continue at this rate, and there is an expressed view to increase the number of police officers in the TTPS on the whole, there are big problems in achieving these numbers. If not addressed urgently, the Police Service may end up with fewer numbers of officers than it needs not only to fill the current shortage, but also the additional numbers that it wants (See Table 8 above).

## **2.26 That Absent Human Resource Policy**

- 2.26.1 To date (2017), the TTPS does not have an overall approved Human Resource Policy Document which it can provide to each officer. There are bits and pieces of human resource matters that are in various Regulations, Departmental Orders and a few policies as stated above that have been approved. However, despite being in operations for a long time<sup>24</sup> there is no comprehensive Human Resource Policy in place.

## **2.27 Manpower Utilization: Not Good Performance**

---

<sup>24</sup>The TTPS dates back to 1592. In 1966, the Police Service Regulations was enacted. Source: TTPS Strategic Plan 2017-2019, p. 10

- 2.27.1 Overall, based on the foregone discussions and the unacceptable crime rate in Trinidad and Tobago with a population of approximately 1.3 million persons in a geographic area of 5,128 square kilometres, the PMAC can conclude that the utilization of the manpower available in the TTPS has not passed the test.
- 2.27.2 In fact, the ratio of TTPS officers to population is one of the highest in this part of the world. So, it's not just about numbers. It is in their utilization where we have fallen down by most standards and according to the views by all of the stakeholders in this Police Manpower Audit. These were the similar findings from all of the previous studies and reports done on the TTPS from decades ago to current time. Pushing more officers into an already inefficient system will merely thicken the problems. It will be like new wine in old bottles, thus we must fix the system.

## **2.28 Manpower Allocation: Considerations**

- 2.28.1 Is there are straightforward formula and policy for manpower allocation to the various police stations? Is it based primarily on the serious crime rate? No. It's not that simple. A police Station by police Station manpower allocation vs. the crime rates there would require deeper analysis. Such allocations will also have to take into account, for example, the number of citizen complaints, requests for policing services, etc. in relation to both serious and minor crimes. The PMAC would have liked to examine this relationship but was constrained by time and resources. In fact, the Committee considered and recommends a scientific intervention in this regard, which is examining the relationship between police response and citizens' complaints. Project X as detailed in Appendix 1 provides such details.

## **2.29 No Need to Increase to Sanctioned Strength**

- 2.29.1 From the research and analysis undertaken thus far, the PMAC sees no justification for an increase in the sanction strength of the TTPS at this time given the TTPS Manpower/Population ratio in comparison to global values. Rather, every effort should be made to fill the existing vacancies in which there are no acting incumbents through an increase in recruitment at the lowest ranks.
- 2.29.2 However, the TTPS urgently requires an injection of senior leadership and implementation capacity and this might be achieved through the implementation of recommendations designed to achieve this and through a review of current capacity in order to rationalize and appropriately staff those areas which require specialist attention and skills.

## **2.30 Challenges and Conclusions**

### **2.30.1 Challenges**

Some of the main challenges in this Section of the Report were:

- i. Getting information and data from the TTPS in a timely manner for analysis was problematic;
- ii. Much of the information that were provided to the PMAC were in formats that did not lend itself to quick and meaningful analysis. Many of the information were in hardcopy that needed transformation to an electronic version for analysis and this was very time consuming;
- iii. Many of the information we got from various sources were inconsistent and considerable time was spent in verification;

- iv. Many of the policies were late in coming and were in fact in draft form.

### **2.30.2 Conclusion**

The main conclusions are as follows:

- i. The total number of police officers is acceptable for Trinidad and Tobago at this time. In fact, the ratio of police officers to population is on the high end when compared internationally.
- ii. The main issue is the allocation and utilization of officers in the most efficient and effective way.
- iii. There needs to be a more scientific, strategic and transparent methodology in deploying officers to the various Divisions, Units and Branches. Instances of corruption and favouritism were strikingly present.
- iv. Vacancies and Acting appointments need to be immediately addressed as they lead to further problems in the Police Service.
- v. Discussions need to take place on the role municipal police can play alongside the TTPS officers in dealing with crime with the aim of getting a win-win situation for Trinidad and Tobago.

- vi. Serious problems exist in knowing where officers are on the job on a real time basis. In fact, the system in use is not up-to-date and this poses massive human resource planning problems.
- vii. Quick and urgent work needs to be done on the recruitment side of the TTPS as the outflow of officers is higher than the intake. At the current rate, the TTPS will be facing a further human resource shortage as per its required strength. Focus should be placed on attracting the right officers for contemporary society and policing.
- viii. The unacceptable police overtime bill must be addressed. Overtime can't be eliminated but it must be checked as numerous instances of breaches and irregularities plague the TTPS.
- ix. The abuse of the various leaves that officers can access continues to trouble the TTPS. This severely hampers the number of officers available for use in the TTPS.
- x. The disciplinary process in the TTPS is very inefficient and is being abused by many officers. In fact, the various disciplinary routes for police officers need to be streamlined as well for efficiency. The number of allegations against officers has been increasing annually and this is a main cause of concern for members of the public as well as the Police Service itself.
- xi. The TTPS should continue with its civilianisation process in principle but it needs to review it first. There are views from both sides, that is, officers and civilians that have merit in them. Civilianisation holds great benefit for crime fighting and crime prevention that it shouldn't be treated flippantly.

- xii. The utilization of police manpower as it ought to be used has failed both the TTPS and the country over the years. It's critical that the necessary fixes be urgently made to the glaring problems in the TTPS for it to deliver on its mandate to protect and serve.
- xiii. The lack of an official Human Resource Policy is hurting the TTPS in many ways.
- xiv. The poor academic performance of a substantial number of Officers in promotional exams is a matter of serious concern for the future of the TTPS.

### **2.30 Recommendations**

- i. There is a number of “*policing*” officers available in Trinidad and Tobago. This includes TTPS officers, SRP, Municipal Police officers, Estate Constables and Private Security officers. There needs to be a comprehensive study to take into account all of these personnel and how they can jointly play a role in the security and safety of Trinidad and Tobago. As of now, they are mainly operating in their own sphere with sporadic collaboration. A more-structured approach is badly needed for these times when we need all hands on deck.
- ii. The TTPS must ensure that it has an adequate number of officers available at all times especially for those public-based functions like at the front desks at police stations, patrols, investigations, telephone operators, drivers, etc. This will help build public confidence.
- iii. There must be an urgent review of the current work-shift systems employed in the TTPS. From officers’ views, the highest proportion of them said an 8-

hour shift-system is the most effective one. This should be further discussed and decided upon. It can also reduce the overtime bill of the TTPS as well as provide other soft benefits like more free time for officers, etc.

- iv. Steps must be taken to improve significantly the managerial and leadership skills-sets for the appropriate officers in the TTPS. This also calls for the correct selection and promotion of officers.
- v. Currently, the TTPS is not recruiting adequate officers at the Constable level. This must be immediately addressed. The number of officers separating from the TTPS annually is greater than the number of intakes, and, as such, the Service has a shortfall of officers and this low recruitment further compounds the problem. The TTPS needs to acquire the necessary resources to recruit adequate officers.
- vi. Special consideration must be given to the targeting and recruiting of officers from tertiary-level education institutions, for example, who may have a higher skills-set and aptitude. They may be targeted for specialist Units and Branches. Of course, they must satisfy other requirements.
- vii. The relevant laws must be amended so that minor road traffic accidents (e.g., those that do not involve deaths, serious injuries, damage to certain cost values, etc.) should not require the police officers to be involved in the reporting and investigation processes but it should be left to other agencies and the insurance companies to handle. This has been done in many other jurisdictions across the world. It thus frees up hundreds of police officers as well as hundreds of thousands of police manpower hours spent on minor road accidents. Such spared manpower can be then focused on crime fighting and crime prevention purposes where it is more needed.

- viii. The TTPS must consider a review of the number of Units and Branches in its current structure with the aim to reduce redundancy where it is fitting. There are some Units that can be merged which can free up many officers as well as produce significant cost savings to the TTPS. The Committee notes the recent (September 2017) merger of the Organised Crime, Narcotics and Firearms Bureau (OCNFB) and the Criminal Gang and Intelligence Unit (CGIU) to form the Organised Crime Intelligence Unit (OCIU). It believes that there are other mergers that can be effective.
- ix. There must be urgent discussion on the need to review the relevant laws relating to the use (not trafficking) of small quantities of marijuana (decriminalisation) to help ease up the burden on the criminal justice system and the time of police officers.
- x. Given the public safety needs and complaints of the various communities, the police must make greater, sustainable use of bicycle patrols in its community policing programmes.

***Photo 4: The TTPSSWA making a Presentation to the PMAC***





**Mr. Michael Seales, President – TTPSSWA (Centre) and Professor Emeritus Ramesh  
Deosaran, Chairman, PMAC**

**Section 3:**  
**Systems & Processes of**  
**the TTPS**

# **Systems and Processes of the TTPS**

## **3 Introduction**

3.1 This Section deals with a number of systems and processes in the TTPS with particular emphasis on Technology as well as Financial and Recordkeeping due to their extreme significance as the slightest inefficiency in any of these systems in the Police Service can cost the society its security and safety.

## **3.2 Data and Information Sources**

3.2.1 For this Section, a wide variety of data and information sources were utilized. These include an analysis of official documents, reports, policies and data as well as information from PMAC Survey, focus groups sessions, stakeholder interviews, newspapers and contributions from members of the public. Importantly, views from policing officers themselves (Police Officers, SRPs, Municipal Police officers, etc.) are taken into consideration.

## **3.3 Relevance of Systems and Processes to Police Manpower Audit**

3.3.1 An effective system with a concomitant set of processes and procedures can provide the following four major benefits to the TTPS.

## **3.4 Efficient Utilization**

- 3.4.1 With adequate systems and processes, there is the efficient management and utilization of all resources in the TTPS for the optimization of manpower in the TTPS. The setting of large-scale manpower planning requires a robust system of procedures to promote such efficiency and transparency.

### **3.5 Motivation**

- 3.5.1 The staffing function not only includes putting right persons in the job, but it also comprises motivational programmes, that is, incentive plans to be framed for further participation and employment of employees. Therefore, a consistent set of systems and processes to guide incentive plans, structural adjustments and technological deployment within the TTPS must become an integral part of planning functions.

### **3.6 Better Human Relations**

- 3.6.1 Human relations become strong through effective control, clear communication, effective supervision and leadership. The manpower planning function must incorporate a systemic approach to learning and development within the TTPS; the result of which can lead to cooperation and better human relations.

### **3.7 Higher Productivity**

- 3.7.1 Productivity levels increase when resources are utilized in the best possible manner. Higher productivity is a result of minimum wastage of time, money, efforts and energies. This can be possible through clear systems and

processes in all related TTPS activities, for example, performance appraisals, training and development, remuneration, etc.

### **3.8 Key Findings**

3.8.1 Overall, this examination of the various systems and processes in the TTPS reveals three (3) important themes:

- a. Accountability
- b. Technology Deployment and Data Integrity
- c. Structure (Organisational)

### **3.9 Accountability**

3.9.1 The PMAC found that while there are lots of procedures through the laws governing the Police Service, its attendant regulations, policies, standing orders, departmental orders, etc., there is a considerable lack of adherence to them as well as accountability when breaches occur.

3.9.2 Let's look at the processing of leave. The current system has led to the widespread abuse of sick leave, study leave and medical leave. In fact, over eighty percent (83%) of police officers in the Committee's 2017 Survey indicated that officers abuse sick leave "*very much/much*", 72% said officers abuse medical leave "*very much/much*" and 39% said there is abuse of study leave "*very much/much*". The lack of accountability for leave management stems primarily from the failure to formulate and execute an efficient procedural system to enhance the efficient administration of leave

management. This has even resulted in the TTPS devising an Absence Management Policy.

### **3.10 Perception of Corruption and Unfair Disciplinary Procedures**

- 3.10.1 There is a high percentage of corruption in the TTPS as expressed by the officers themselves through the survey. In fact, 75% of them said that there is “*very much/much*” corruption in the TTPS.
- 3.10.2 The problem is further exacerbated when almost seventy percent (69%) of the officers felt that the disciplinary processes in the TTPS are “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”.

### **3.11 Unclear Performance Standards and Rewards**

- 3.11.1 The voices of the police officers pointed to the absence of clearly articulated guidelines and procedures for performance standards within the TTPS. For example, almost one-third of them (29%) said that the performance standards or targets set for them for their duties were “*very unrealistic/unrealistic*”.
- 3.11.2 The situation worsens tremendously when performance appraisals were brought into the picture. Seventy percent (70%) of the officers rated the overall performance appraisal system as “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”.
- 3.11.3 When this was probed deeper in the survey, almost one (1) out of five (5) officers (18%) said that they never had a performance appraisal/performance review done. Then, almost ten percent (8%) said that they had one done more than five years ago.

- 3.11.4 As such, there is ample evidence to demonstrate that the regulations and procedures for such assessments are not being adhered to in any satisfactory way.

### **3.12 Reporting Structures**

- 3.12.1 We found that in some cases, for example, there is an inherent lack of clarity in reporting structures, for example, between Police Officers and civilian staff. This was evident in our discussions with many personnel in the administrative divisions and functions of Information Technology, Finance and Human Resources.

### **3.13 Paper-Based and Manual Practices**

- 3.13.1 The PMAC found in Payroll for example, that all overtime payment records are paper-based, calculated manually and entered into IHRS/IGP. Overtime payments are entered in the Vote Book and lumped into salary with no clear distinction of overtime amounts.
- 3.13.2 Processing such through a computerised Financial Management System will allow for greater checks and balances especially in the cases of Overtime and Extra Duty Allowance.

### **3.14 Events and Special Functions / Extra Duties (ED)**

- 3.14.1 Often, the TTPS is required to provide services that require officers who are off-duty to work. This is called Extra Duty. It can include their presence in parties, large sporting events, public events, etc. Here, payments are made to

the TTPS and/or officers directly and mostly in cash. Issues of who selects which officers to be offered this additional source of income have been raised as to whether it is an open, fair and transparent process. Additional concerns on whether this income is declared by the receiving officers for taxation purposes and what system was employed the TTPS to record these financial transactions were highlighted.

### **3.15 Technology Deployment and Absorption**

#### **3.15.1 Hardware and Technological Infrastructure**

3.15.2 The PMAC found that there is little evidence of a systems approach to technology acquisition and deployment, and the current system seems at best ad hoc. This is manifested in the lack of available equipment and tools for the TTPS, for example, very often, hardware is procured without accompanying software and in some instances the capacity planning for accompanying software maintenance is absent.

3.15.3 There is also a disconnect between the capacity of the infrastructure, personnel who operate the technological systems, and pragmatic user requirements of the TTPS.

3.15.4 The PMAC also found that hardware acquisition has been divorced of appropriate licensed software and user training resulting in lack of user uptake and technology absorption within the TTPS.

3.15.5 Interestingly, there is evidence of hardware availability in almost every Police station yet user utilization rates have been at a minimum.



- 3.15.6 The Committee in its Survey enquired about the availability of tools to assist police officers in the performance of their jobs. More than three quarters of the officers (76%) said it's "very little/little".
- 3.15.7 Further, over sixty percent (63%) of the officers said that the availability of transportation vehicles to assist them in their job is "very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory".
- 3.15.8 These all point to systemic and procedural problems in the TTPS that require remedying.

### **3.16 Work Efficiency**

- 3.16.1 On the issue of work efficiency, almost half of the officers (45%) said that they spend 4-6 hours doing routine paper work. In this regard, laws and regulations must be changed in the TTPS, as well as, in the judicial system to accommodate a more efficient mode of operations.
- 3.16.2 In fact, the positive impact of technology on the performance of officer's duties was quite low. We found that almost forty percent (38%) of the officers said that the introduction of technology in the TTPS had "very little/no impact" on the performance of their job, while 44% said the impact was "moderate".
- 3.16.3 Over eighty percent (82%) of officers that said the introduction of technology did not have any notable positive impact which we would have expected.

### **3.17 Internal Communications**

3.17.1 Although Departmental Orders are issued electronically, each officer has an email address with a TTPS domain name (@tpps.gov.tt) and each station has at least one available computer, the evidence suggests that the uptake of utilization of communication technology is dramatically low. In fact, more than two-thirds (68%) of the officers felt that the internal communication processes in the TTPS were “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”.

### **3.18 Data Integrity**

3.18.1 With regard to data availability and standardization, basic human resource data on transfers, separations, retirement, academic accomplishments, etc., are not up-to-date on the Versadex System. The Versadex System is the backbone of data storage for all information in the TTPS, yet it is not current on most categories of data. In light of this circumstance, measures need to be implemented to ensure that this system is updated in the shortest possible time.

3.18.2 The only component that the PMAC can confirm that it has witnessed as working real time is the crime reports and statistics capability that the CAPA Unit utilizes.

3.18.3 We also found that data entry in areas other than crime reports is incomplete and inconsistent. Thus, the reliability and validity of such data are questionable.

3.18.4 Further, we uncovered that data capture forms across the TTPS lack standardization, for example, in basic monthly nominal rolls. This poses a

serious problem when the data is to be used for planning and decision-making. One wonders how such decisions are being made at this time in the TTPS.

- 3.18.5 With regard to asset management, we found that an automated Asset Management System software exists but is not being utilized. Further, we also found that the fleet management system is incomplete as there are significant data omissions.
- 3.18.6 The above examples just show how some of the systems and processes in place at the TTPS are absent, and even where they are in place, they are failing miserably with little or no accountability in place for many years.
- 3.18.7 The technology deployment and data integrity within the TTPS lack adequate systems and procedures or proper implementation of them where they exist. The data systems are inefficient and the concomitant procedures are either inappropriate or non-existent. In areas where data items exist, the validity and integrity of the data is questionable making the decision-making process short on precision.

### **3.19 Structure (Organisational)**

- 3.19.1 Organisational efficiency is built around structure, people and performance indicators. This section addresses the relationship between structure and efficiency and the implications for proper systems and procedures within the TTPS.
- 3.19.2 Notwithstanding the numerous administrative and crime fighting units within the TTPS, there is widespread dissatisfaction as to whether the TTPS is optimally organized/structured to deal with crime. Almost sixty percent

118

(58%) of officers were “*very unsatisfied/unsatisfied*” with the TTPS’ handle on crime. This sentiment was also echoed by many of the stakeholders whom we interviewed.

- 3.19.3 The systems for entry into and promotion within the TTPS were also seen as flawed by the officers surveyed. More than two-thirds (68%) of the respondents said they were “*very unsatisfied/unsatisfied*” with these systems. This is an obvious structural flaw and hurdle to effective management of the TTPS.
- 3.19.4 The vast majority of police officers (84%) who participated in the PMAC Survey said that they are “*dissatisfied*” with the current system to appoint a Commissioner of Police in Trinidad and Tobago. However, this is outside the remit of the TTPS and will be dealt with in greater detail in the governance section of this Report.
- 3.19.5 There is no clear system and procedural framework for the use of civilians within the TTPS. This issue has manifested itself with undesirable outcomes especially in the administrative management of the TTPS. Almost seventy percent (69%) of officers engaged via the Survey felt that the use of civilians in the TTPS had “*very little/little*” effect in actually helping the police. This points to the bigger issue of whether the policy and procedural guidelines are working, as structurally, almost every function within the corporate services domain (e.g., Finance, IT, Public Affairs, Human Resources, etc.) should be tasked with civilian personnel leaving line officers free to active police duties.
- 3.19.6 Another structural flaw is in the deployment of officers to Stations/Units/Branches based on capability, competency and training. In fact, 21% of the officers surveyed said that deployment is based on these criteria. Of the remaining seventy-nine percent, 66% said it is done so

“*sometimes*” and 13% said “*not at all*”. To compound matters, 68% said that there is “*favouritism*” in the assigning of officers to Divisions/Units/Branches.

3.19.7 A quite ticklish structural/organisational issue is that of work shifts. Currently, officers work a variety of work shifts and this can be seen as a main contributor to the high overtime bill. Long shifts also play a key part in officers’ inability to function at their optimum level, as well as, officers being deprived of appropriate family and social time. However, when asked what shift length they thought was best suited for greatest efficiency in their job, almost half of the officers (48%) said an 8-hour shift system. This was followed by 32% which said a 12-hour shift. In this regard, the TTPS must review its shift system with the intent of adopting one that is most efficient for the officers and for policing.

3.19.8 Another fundamental system and process in the TTPS is its Training and Development policies and practices. The PMAC noted that 59% of the officers who participated in its Survey indicated that the training and development policies and practices of the Service were “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. This response was also corroborated through the focus group discussions with officers of various ranks across Trinidad and Tobago.

3.19.9 Dealing with court matters is another critical feature of policing work as officers have to take alleged offenders before the judiciary. Despite such, there have been several reports regarding the lack of officers’ attendance on this critical matter. Some of the reasons put forward by officers themselves for their non-attendance to court are set out below:

- a. 65% said it is due to the frequent court postponements and trial delays;

b. 42% said it is due to conflicting schedules;

c. 41% said it is due to loss of days;

d. 30% said it is too time consuming.

3.19.10 We believe that the TTPS must address these organisational matters urgently.

3.19.11 Treating your staff members well is one of the key ingredients in getting them to perform better. When asked their feelings on the Reward and Recognition policies in the TTPS, over eighty percent (83%) of officers said it was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”.

3.19.12 When the PMAC enquired on the compensation packages of officers, more than three-quarters of the respondents (77%) said that it was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”.

## **3.20 A Case for Reassessment of the Intelligence Gathering Apparatus**

### **3.20.1 Intelligence-Gathering and Manpower Issues**

3.20.1.2 Overall, the situation exists where law enforcement and each of the other protective agencies including the military have their own intelligence gathering and processing mechanisms. There is sporadic and ad hoc sharing of intelligence among these stakeholders despite all being concerned about national security, safety, crime-fighting and crime prevention.

- 3.20.3 A number of studies<sup>25</sup> were conducted all of which called for a national intelligence agency apparatus which allows all stakeholders to benefit from the collection and sharing of intelligence that should be held in one intelligence repository.
- 3.20.4 The collection and use of data from the environment where each of these national security agencies operate in is an essential tool in crime prevention and crime fighting. Such data must be corroborated, analysed and tested before it becomes actionable intelligence. Once actionable, law enforcement and other agencies where necessary can use it appropriately.
- 3.20.5 The methodology to be employed in acting upon the data collected should be as varied as one can imagine given the opportunities present in the environment, e.g., surveillance confidential informants, CCTV, undercover operatives, etc.
- 3.20.6 The PMAC found that the issue of crime, especially the rate of murders, was highest on the list of concerns for the majority of members of the communities sampled. The low rate of detection for serious crime was also a major concern.
- 3.20.7 The Committee also recognized that among law enforcement officers the issue of intelligence gathering and information sharing was a vexing issue with the SSA – the central repository of intelligence gathered by the various law enforcement entities. It was noted that the present system of interaction was based solely on voluntary action by individuals and loose MOUs that are largely ignored.

---

<sup>25</sup>For example, the Ross Report (2009) and the Gibran Report (2011)

- 3.20.8 It is a strategy in the right direction for the merger of the Criminal Gang and Intelligence Unit and Organised Crime, Narcotics and Firearms Bureau, however, it is hoped that there is a clear data-driven rationale for this direction especially since there are other Units that can be similarly merged to facilitate the effective utilization of available manpower.
- 3.20.9 The issue of exclusive domain and the protection of turf is as relevant today as it was many years ago as evidenced in the many reports on this subject. This practice is counter-productive in that the purpose of intelligence gathering is akin to that of a jigsaw puzzle– the aim of which is to put the pieces together so that a clear picture emerges from the efforts of investigators. When the pieces of the puzzle are held, in silos, by different entities, for example, CGIU, the TTDF Intel Unit, Customs, SSA, Immigration, Prisons, to name a few, law enforcement is deprived of the true picture of crime and criminality within the environment to which it relates. This redounds only to the benefit of criminals and the enterprises which they operate.
- 3.20.10 This is against the background of a murder rate averaging in excess of four hundred per year and a detection rate that tumbled to a low of 16% in 2016. As such, the public is very frustrated at the authority’s ability to provide adequate safety and protection. Interestingly, the very community whose confidence in the police is waning are the same people upon whom law enforcement must rely for information about criminal conduct.

### **3.21 Conclusion: Get on Top of Your Game**

- 3.21.1 The TTPS has to be on top of its game at all times. They are in a constant war with criminals who threaten the safety and well-being of the population. As



such, the Service must be in order before it can effectively help the rest of the society, however, this study has revealed that it is barely standing, propped up by weak structures.

- 3.21.2 As has been said repeatedly in this Report and the many previous reports and studies done on the TTPS, there are many excellent recommendations and plans that can put the organization on a better footing. The main problem is in its implementation and the holding of persons responsible for the portfolios for which they are responsible. If this Police Manpower Audit cannot result in a system to get this done, we would all be failing once again.

### **3.22 Challenges**

- 3.22.1 Some of the main challenges experienced were:
- 3.22.2 Much of the information and data requested were not received on a timely basis.
- 3.22.3 Many of the policies on the various systems and procedures were also late in coming.
- 3.22.4 Data integrity issues arose as several data items could not have been reconciled, e.g., number of Officers vs. nominal roll, etc.
- 3.22.5 The TTPS lacks many key policies as well. They are functioning on existing principles and practices. For instance, a Human Resource Policy is currently being drafted.
- 3.22.6 There were also many policies that are in “draft” form so they may not carry the necessary weight because of this “*draft*” status.

### **3.23 Recommendations**

- 3.23.1 The establishment of a cross-agency intelligence co-ordinating Unit designed to facilitate the flow of intelligence data through secure channels from the various silos to the central repository where it can be analysed with a view to developing a good actionable sight picture and the farming out of tasks to the various operational units for decisive action, debrief and assessment of further opportunities from these actions.
- 3.23.2 Such an important Unit should be headed by a well-trained and experienced law enforcement professional, or a strategic mixture of both law enforcement and military experience. This Unit should be empowered to elicit compliance from the varied intelligence sources.
- 3.23.3 There should be a well-structured Policy, Planning, Research and Development Unit to guide and support the TTPS in all of its duties and responsibilities.
- 3.23.4 Since the country gained political independence, a number of studies and reports were done on the TTPS. Hundreds of very useful recommendations were made; many very relevant even today. There is need for a system now to synchronise all of these recommendations together with those of this PMAC to take the TTPS into a more efficient, effective and sustainable institution. After this consolidation stage, the main step should be (a) developing an Implementation Plan, (b) establishing an Implementation Team and (c) also having in place a Monitoring and Evaluation Team.

- 3.23.5 Having adequate data integrity is probably the basic data challenges facing the TTPS today. The inability for certain data to be verified is a frightening reality and must be fixed with great urgency.
- 3.23.6 A most fundamental need in the TTPS at present is the need to implement standardised data forms.
- 3.23.7 There should be a redefinition and review of community policing so that at least, each Police Station will be in a state of readiness to respond effectively and appropriately to the needs of the various communities. To help initiate this renewed and fresh wave of policing, the Committee recommends that a series of thoughtful, media-supported national programmes be implemented. This “*national wave*” should begin in January 2018. Not only is the policy of community policing unclear, but its operation at the ground level needs substantial review and redirection.
- 3.23.8 Based on a review of the various programmes and plans of the TTPS (e.g., Strategic Plans), the Committee recommends that all programmes and performance targets be precisely benchmarked (outcomes and timelines) so as to create a basis for both continuous improvement and performance accountability. Relevant reports should be produced since too many programmes have been mentioned but left hanging without any evidence of achievement.
- 3.23.9 The TTPS currently has an Asset Management and Fleet Management System that is not being fully utilised. As such, measures need to be put in place for this to be fully and quickly actioned.
- 3.23.10 A proper Fixed Asset Register (furniture and equipment) should be developed in accordance with Financial Regulations.

- 3.23.11 There are comprehensive software and other systems in the TTPS for human resource information storage and processing but are not being fully utilised. Again, this can be quickly and fully rolled out.
- 3.23.12 There is the urgent need to move away as far as possible from a paper-based system for many of the operations in the TTPS to a computer-based one. To do some of this, it may require changes to regulations, laws, etc. This will, of course, lead to greater efficiency in the TTPS' operations.
- 3.23.13 Greater supervision and management of personnel and work items in the Human Resource Unit are badly needed. This need is also applicable to every other area in the TTPS.
- 3.23.14 There is the need for all employee files to be brought up-to-date so that the best decisions are made when allocating officers to the various Divisions, Units and Branches. At present, since all of the files not current, the best deployments cannot be made.
- 3.23.15 The systems and procedures for overtime and leave should be immediately reviewed to ensure that they are not abused. Persons (officers and/or civilian staff) who have breached the relevant regulations on overtime and/or leave payments should be dealt with to the full extent of the laws and police regulations.
- 3.23.16 The method of payment for overtime and leave must be urgently reviewed as it is in a paper-based/manual format that makes it difficult to track. A digitised system should be instituted.
- 3.23.17 The TTPS should take the necessary steps to restructure itself to reduce the annual overtime expenditure.
- 3.23.18 The entire system of vacation leave needs a complete review for both FDOs and SDOs. The current regulations on vacation leave are not being adhered to

as many officers have accumulated significant number of vacation days leave. This has very serious consequences for the manpower flow and operations in the TTPS as well as for appropriate succession planning and acting appointments. There is need now, therefore, for an effective Vacation Leave Management Policy to deal with the current situation.

- 3.23.19 There is the need to revisit and amend the PCA Act to bring the SRPs under the PCA's ambit. As of now, the PCA deals with serious misconduct for officers under the Police Service Act. As SRPs have their own laws, any alleged infractions by SRPs are excluded from the PCA's remit.
- 3.23.20 The PCA Act and the Police Service Regulations should also be reviewed to allow the PCA to present its findings to the disciplinary tribunals on behalf of the prosecution or defence.
- 3.23.21 Greater collaborative arrangements with external agencies to the TTPS should be fostered, for example, between SSA and the TTPS on joint intelligence. Other such arrangements can be developed between the TTPS and the Customs and Excise Division, Immigration Division, Prison Service, TTDP, Municipal Police, Estate Police Constables and private security agencies, etc. Formalised/institutionalised systems should be in place rather than personal connections and informal arrangements as seems to be the case in many instances.
- 3.23.22 In the long term, there may be the need for an out-of-the-box review of the current 10-rank system in the TTPS to see if it is working effectively for the officers, the TTPS, and the country. For example, the level of the Assistant Commissioner of Police should display an appropriate mix of high level professional skills ranging from, but not limited to, management, finance, information technology, intelligence and criminal investigations. Persons at this level may be sworn or unsworn officers.

- 3.23.23 There should be strict adherence to the Police Regulations and laws on performance appraisals. Non-compliance is causing havoc in the TTPS. Several reports indicate that it is not being done on time with even several years of lapses for some officers. This lapse has implications for officers' performance, morale and fairness.
- 3.23.24 The TTPS needs to urgently and independently conduct an internal assessment as to the main contributors to the high failure rates in the promotional examinations in the Second Division, for example, in the 2016 English exam for Corporals, 54% failed; while 50% failed the Corporal's Law examination in 2015. Also, for the 2016 Law exam for Sergeants, 50% failed.
- 3.23.25 In addition, the high level of absenteeism at these exams should also be investigated.
- 3.23.26 For the improved skills-sets of police officers and in preparation for the various examinations, it should be mandatory that the results of these assessments should be made available to the Provost, Police Academy. This will allow him/her to develop and deliver compensatory professional development training programmes for such officers who are falling short of the mark.
- 3.23.27 Clear lines of communication, as well as, reporting roles and responsibilities of officers and civilians must be drawn since the current situation often leads to confusion and serious conflicts.
- 3.23.28 The TTPS should work feverishly to complete several of its policies related to human resource as an official Human Resource Policy is not yet available. The several bits and pieces that have been approved thus far should be made easily available to all officers and those that are in draft form should be quickly finalised. Such approved policies should be placed on the TTPS's

intranet for all officers, as well as, the TTPSSWA should ensure that their membership is well-informed of the policies.

- 3.23.29 There should be stricter supervision and accountability for the development and execution of policing duties and responsibilities with consequences (positive and negative). Despite the existence of systems and procedures, lack of supervised accountability is still pervasive in the TTPS.
- 3.23.30 The TTPS should set more realistic performance standards and targets for their officers as many of them said this was not the case. This is basic human resource management requirement.
- 3.23.31 There is need for a systems approach for technology acquisition and deployment as serious mismatches take place, for example, between hardware and software.
- 3.23.32 The TTPS should remedy the disconnect between the capacity of the infrastructure, personnel who operate the technological systems, and pragmatic user requirements of the TTPS.
- 3.23.33 Further examination should be conducted to determine why a significant proportion of officers felt that the technologies that were introduced in the TTPS did not have any positive impact on their job.
- 3.23.34 Officers themselves complained about the inadequacy of transportation vehicles in the TTPS for them to carry out their duties. This basic requirement should be quickly fixed and measures implemented to increase the number of approved drivers as the evidence presented to the PMAC indicated that there are sufficient vehicles available for use, however, there is a dearth of police drivers. The PMAC also recommends that all police officers should be approved drivers so there is always an officer available to drive a police vehicle.

- 3.23.35 The TTPS has to develop a comprehensive seamless training and development plan for the entire police service, from the Recruit straight through to Commissioner. The PMAC did not receive evidence that there is enough continuous training for all officers as they remain in the police service. From the Committee's analysis of the Service, it appears that officers take the initiative to undertake training on their own in areas that they desire with the intention of getting a placement in a particular job function. There should be specific training and development tracks from which each officer may select and/or training tracks based on the current and future needs/directions of the TTPS.
- 3.23.36 More joint operations between the police and other related agencies such as the TTPS, Prison Service, Customs and Excise, Immigration Division, etc., are needed to boost the fight against crime. There should be adequate and appropriate teambuilding among agencies and the officers involved in these joint operations rather than just arbitrarily putting various officers from various agencies to work together.
- 3.23.37 An effective system should be designed and implemented whereby all employees and line managers are made aware of existing and new rules, regulations, policies and manuals that are relevant to both their areas of responsibilities as well as of the entire Police Service.
- 3.23.38 Systems should be put in place for greater compliance with prudent financial management procedures, for example, ensuring utilization of budgetary releases, maintenance of relevant vote books as specified by the audit reports, etc.
- 3.23.39 The TTPS should ensure that funding for IT-related projects should include maintenance and licensing renewal as well.



- 3.23.40 There should be adequate resources for the installation and maintenance of the CCTV cameras across Trinidad and Tobago. This should be a massive project undertaken by the relevant authorities as a strategic means to detect and prevent crime.
- 3.23.41 Consideration should be given to adjusting the recruitment packages for both Recruits and current officers who possess additional educational and vocational qualifications that will impact the performance of their duties. Currently, there exists a system where points are given to officers with particular qualifications like a law degree, etc. However, this should be revised to encourage officers to engage in training and education to meet the current and future needs of the TTPS more directly.
- 3.23.42 There should be improvements in the vetting and background checks of all Recruits to the Police Service. We have seen some improvements in the system over the years, but it can be further strengthened.
- 3.23.43 Further, there should be a system to monitor the activities of all officers to ensure that their finances and activities are above board. There are many reports that some officers are involved in wrongdoings and systems must be instituted to identify and weed these officers out of the Service as soon as evidence is presented and the due process is followed.
- 3.23.44 All police officers should undergo regular firearm training to ensure that they remain technically competent at all times as the Committee was informed that many officers have not used their firearms for many years. A clear training plan and its implementation are critically needed here.
- 3.23.45 All officers should undergo training in the use of Taser guns, baton, etc., on a regular basis as part of an overall training plan for all officers.

- 3.23.46 Further, all officers should be certified in First Aid and CPR so that they can perform such assistance as first responders.
- 3.23.47 Additionally, all officers should be trained in basic mediation and conflict resolution so that they can use the relevant techniques to defuse situations among peers as well as when dealing with the public.
- 3.23.48 The TTPS needs to quickly engage on a service-wide campaign on sharing to all of its employees, information of its Employee Assistance Programme. Many officers said that do not know about this service and the TTPSSWA must also do a better job of informing its members of the availability of this facility.
- 3.23.49 Discussions should be held as to whether the material used for the police uniform needs to be changed to suit Trinidad and Tobago's tropical climate. This is in an attempt to ensure that officers are more comfortable on their job. Despite such, specialised Units will need to use their required wear when required.
- 3.23.50 The TTPS should take steps to ensure that officers attend to all court matters as required as there are many instances where officers fail to attend for several reasons. There is the need for a computerised, real-time system to track and ensure that officers are always available to attend to their court duties with reminders, etc.
- 3.23.51 The TTPS should review its "*Transfer*" policy and practice to ensure that transfers do not unnecessarily disrupt the smooth flow of things in particular Divisions, Units and Branches. There have been instances where by the time officers get acclimatised to a particular post or place, they are transferred. This is especially relevant to community policing where building relationships with the community takes time and if officers are transferred soon after such relationships are built, the process starts over for the other officers. Of course,

this should not interfere with officers' rights to move to other Units, for promotions, etc. The transfer of an officer as a disciplinary measure is a policy of dubious merit.

3.23.52 The TTPS should take into consideration several demographic factors like age, gender, education level and number of years in service when devising policies and strategies for manpower involvement and utilisation since all policies should be open and fair; in other words, have demographic-sensitive policies.

3.23.53 There should be a review of systems and procedures for the use of police officers as well as private security personnel for large events – both public and private – in Trinidad and Tobago. This will include police on official duty, overtime, as well as extra duties, and executed bearing in mind applicable laws and regulations (local, regional and international), in addition to best practice in the industry.

*Photo 5: Members engaged during in a Stakeholder Consultation Interview*



**Left to Right: Mr. Allan Meiguel, Member – PMAC, Professor Emeritus Ramesh Deosaran, Chairman, PMAC (Center) and Mr. Trevor Percival, Project Supervisor – PMAC Implementation Team**

**SECTION 4:**  
**COMMUNITY POLICING**  
**& PARTNERSHIPS**

# Community Policing & Partnerships

## 4 Introduction

4.1 This Section deals with various matters surrounding the police responses to community needs and challenges, or more specifically, their relationship with the various communities that they ought to interact with daily.

4.1.2 As we all know, both the police and the community must work hand in hand to create a safer and more comfortable environment for both residents and the business communities to live and work in. One method adopted to accomplish this is community policing.

## 4.2 What's "*Community*"?

4.2.1 We cannot continue to view "*community*" as only a geographical space like the Southern Police Division, Sangre Grande Police Station District or the community of Lowlands Tobago.

4.2.2 We must view "*community*" as a community of interests as well, beyond geographical borders. For instance, there may be a community of white-collar workers who may need particular attention by the Police. Also, there may be a community of persons who engage in online bullying that targets young people and women; they need special focus as well. All of these communities, be they geographical and/or of interests, do have needs and require responses from the police.

### **4.3 What's Community Policing?**

4.3.1 “*Community Policing*” is a much misused phrase in the TTPS context. The application of this policing paradigm has shifted as often as police leaders come and go. At one time, there was a special Community Policing Unit in the TTPS. At another time, there was the declaration that – all Officers are community policing officers.

4.3.2 However, there was and still continues to be an unfair unofficial classification of community policing officers as performing “*soft*” policing and the other officers as engaging in traditional law enforcement or “*hard*” policing. It’s an unfortunate competition as to which one is better than the other. There was, nonetheless, in the TTPS, a clear line of comparison and division between community policing and other policing.

4.3.3 But while all of this was going on for years, the public/communities were crying out for more partnerships with the police to create a safer and better society.

4.3.4 Community Policing, therefore, is where both the community and the police work together to solve problems in the communities that affect their security and safety. The format for its implementation is a separate issue. There is now a need for a thorough review of both the concept and practice of community policing in Trinidad and Tobago.

### **4.4 Data and Information Sources**

4.4.1 For this section, a wide variety of data and information sources were utilized. These include an analysis of official documents, reports, policies and data, as

well as, information from surveys, focus groups sessions, stakeholder interviews, newspapers and contributions from members of the public. Importantly, views from policing officers themselves (Police Officers, SRPs, Municipal Police Officers, etc.) are taken into consideration.

## **4.5 Key Findings and Recommendations**

- 4.5.1 From an analysis of newspaper clippings over a four-month period which included Letters to the Editor, Editorials, issues with crime in the various communities, etc., over fifty percent (51%) of the information when analysed were negative of the police. Further, 13% were mixed which can therefore contain positive and negative responses.
- 4.5.2 What does this tell us then? It means that both the media as a “*community*”, as well as, individual citizens didn’t really have a positive relationship or experience with the TTPS and that greater work needs to be done by the police. For example, each of these negative experiences could have been converted into a positive one and shown to the wider communities through appropriate forums.
- 4.5.3 This points to a much larger issue. That is, how do the police communicate its messages to the various communities?
- 4.5.4 First of all, the police weekly press briefings overall do not inspire the various communities as the statistics presented do not resonate with the wider population. What communities want to see is results. They want to know how many persons have been charged and brought before the courts and the results of the investigations thus far in the very public criminal matters.



- 4.5.5 Second, the town meetings that are usually held have poor attendance and they do not capture a fair representation of communities. Possibly, in 2017, this mode of communication has outlived itself.
- 4.5.6 Third, the social media presence of the TTPS needs commendation. We have noticed the TTPS' presence on Facebook and Twitter, for example, where updates are posted regularly. This must be supported further.
- 4.5.7 Fourth, the police need to make greater efforts in partnering with many community groups like schools, NGOs, faith-based organisations, youth clubs, etc. They should not wait for these entities to come to them. They must go to them and become members of these groups, attend their meetings and functions, etc. It is there that they will hear the community's concerns and more than likely hear the solutions that they can be part of.
- 4.5.8 Fifth, we have noticed that the police visibility in the public roads have increased via motorcycle and cars. This should be further encouraged but officers must not ride or drive by quickly without observing and interacting with members of the public. Very often, officers would drive by even when errant drivers break many of the traffic laws in their presence.
- 4.5.9 Sixth, we often hear about Police Youth Clubs but which communities are these mostly in? Why can't they be in every police station district across Trinidad and Tobago? This matter should be reviewed so that certain communities are not left out.
- 4.5.10 Related to this is – what is relationship between the police and the various schools in an area? Is it that schools only see the police when a criminal matter is referred to them? Why can't this relationship be built around positive things as well too?

- 4.5.11 In the following sections, we will deal with many of the concerns and other recommendations that came out of the PMAC’s interactions with members of the various communities. Some of these can be treated as recommendations as well.
- 4.5.12 There is the need for increased sensitivity training for police officers. It was noted that quite often, many police officers operate without or lack sensitivity when they interact with members of the communities who may visit a police station, make a telephone call to the police station, meet on the streets, etc. In fact, many of these instances have been highlighted in the media.
- 4.5.13 There should be increased street patrol as the police will not only be able to directly see and hear the concerns of the members of the public, but their very presence can serve as a deterrent to potential crime.
- 4.5.14 It was noted that there is notable lack of trust in the police by the public. In fact, the police officers themselves admitted in the 2017 survey that the public has “*very little*” or “*no confidence*” in the police, reflected through the responses of 82% of the officers surveyed. A further 14% said there is “*no public confidence*” in the police making it a high 96% “*without public confidence*” in the Service. This needs drastic action by the police and it can’t happen overnight.
- 4.5.15 The community members are also deeply concerned about victimisation when they make reports about police officers, friends of police officers, or relatives of them. This cannot be allowed to take place.
- 4.5.16 Similarly, there is also the call for the police and the relevant authorities to deal with corruption in the TTPS. When this is done, public confidence in the

police may improve. In fact, in the PMAC Police Survey, 75% of the officers said that corruption in the TTPS was “*very much/much*”.

4.5.17 As recommended in paragraph 4.5.18 regarding the use of police force, there should be urgent steps to equip the police with a range of non-lethal weapons for their use, e.g., Tasers, pepper spray, etc. However, there is the need for the TTPS and other relevant agencies like the PCA and Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), for example, to strengthen their efforts on crimes committed by police officers including their abuse of power. Many stakeholders that the PMAC interviewed expressed this view and suggested an urgent review of these matters. It is well known that there are limitations to police crime statistics, for example, with regard to the non-reporting of crimes. As such, these must be supplemented with the use of crime victimisation surveys. Notwithstanding the crime statistics, the public’s fear of crime now requires more attention.

4.5.18 The public is pleading for the relevant authorities to enact the necessary legislation for police officers to be able to use non-lethal weapons when interacting with members of the public. Of course, a comprehensive policy on this is needed, more-so, on the use of force in the police service. There have been several cases that took place in full public view whereby the officers used their firearm when another weapon could have been used if they had them, e.g., Tasers, pepper spray, etc. The findings of the PMAC 2017 Survey revealed that almost seventy percent (69%) of Officers said they wanted to be able to use these non-lethal weapons while an additional 22% said they “*moderately*” support the use of them.

4.5.19 There is the view that the police itself is responsible for the lack of public support in them and that they must be the ones to fix it on their ends. The police must come up with a plan to win over the support of the public

otherwise their jobs will be much harder than what it is now to solve and prevent crime.

- 4.5.20 For increased community safety, it was noted that more joint patrols and operations between the police and the TTDF be done. While this received overall favourable support from several of the persons in the focus group sessions, there were some causes of concern that were red-flagged more so from some of the Defence Force personnel. They noted, for example, that there were several instances whereby the police failed to act on intelligence that the TTDF provided to them. The Defence Force also added that some of the rouged police officers were having a negative influence on the soldiers when they are out on joint patrols.
- 4.5.21 And, we had some complaints from the other side. Many police officers noted that when in joint patrol with the Defence Force, new intelligence arrived and it needed a shift in operations. However, due to the nature of the TTDF's operations, the personnel could not have altered their operations to suit the new circumstances.
- 4.5.22 All in all, however, there were more good than bad but there are areas where many kinks can be sorted out to facilitate a united front from both institutions and enable more regular joint operations to the satisfaction of the public.
- 4.5.23 Many members of the various communities were sceptical about the police contact numbers of 999, 555 as well as that of Crime Stoppers. They were not too clear about confidentiality and anonymity issues. These are simple matters that can be sorted out to build public confidence across the various communities.

- 4.5.24 Some of the community representatives also discussed the matter of hotspot policing and wanted further information on it so that they can be of further assistance. They also wanted to be in the know about how communities become classified as a hotspot, when do they come off the list, etc. They questioned the sudden announcement of the establishment of a police station in the Enterprise community, Chaguanas, when crime spiked there a few months ago.
- 4.5.25 With regard to when poor police customer service occurred, many members of the communities said that there should be consequences for such officers as well as officers who excelled should be rewarded.
- 4.5.26 In fact, as far back as 2006, Professor Stephen Mastrofski in his study of the TTPS, said that there should be a very strong focus on customer service training in the TTPS but this has fallen down like so many other recommendations from the dozens of studies done on the TTPS<sup>26</sup>.
- 4.5.27 Some members of the business community expressed during interviews with the PMAC that overall, there is a good working relationship between the police and their organisations. They, however, identified several areas where they were hopeful that collaboration would have been possible but this did not bear fruit. Interestingly, they noted that they offered many areas of assistance to the police but the offers were not always adopted.
- 4.5.28 Because most of the community members are unaware of the crime rate in their respective communities, they will generally assume those presented for the national community applies to them. This is more so the national homicide count that is published almost daily in the three newspapers, as well as, spread all over social media. This thus forms their reality whether the

---

<sup>26</sup> Dr. Stephen D. Mastrofski, George Mason University (2006)

crime occurred in their community or not and it subsequently feeds their fear of crime.

## **4.6 Challenges**

- 4.6.1 There were no major challenges experienced in executing this part of the PMAC's business, that is, in getting the views of the major stakeholders and communities. All of the participants were willing to share with us their experiences with the police and *vice versa*. The only hiccup was the relatively low attendance at the Town Meetings, and as was discussed earlier, this mode of collaboration and interaction may not be too relevant in 2017.

## **4.7 Recommendations**

- 4.7.1 The TTPS should engage in more meaningful relationships with the public and by extension the various and diverse communities across Trinidad and Tobago using a wide range of contemporary communication strategies. Town meetings and weekly press briefings have limited impact in building public confidence especially in the former where attendance is quite low and unrepresentative of the various communities. Reenergised and reconfigured patrol-driven community policing programmes will be quite useful.
- 4.7.2 All officers must be adequately trained and retrained in customer service as there are numerous complaints from members of the public. This will help in building public confidence in the TTPS. In fact, officers should be evaluated on this criterion and be rewarded or penalised as the case may be. It should

also form a key component in their performance appraisals. A front-line service desk at stations will help.

- 4.7.3 With regard to discipline, there should be an appropriate public education campaign to educate members of the public as well as many police officers themselves about the three routes available for complaints against police officers. As of now, there is much public confusion about the similarities and differences among the Police Complaints Division, the PSB and the PCA.
- 4.7.4 All police officers except in special tactical circumstances should have and display their identification badges. This will significantly contribute to increasing public confidence in the police.
- 4.7.5 There should be a mental transformation in police officers from seeing communities as only geographical areas. Communities must be seen as communities with various interests, as well as with social, physical and public safety needs. This is a foundation for effective community policing.
- 4.7.6 The TTPS should be engaging the various communities in a more proactive way rather than in a reactive way. For example, each police station must have its own a strategy for the communities therein and the officers must be appropriately trained to interact with the community accordingly.
- 4.7.7 Special consideration should be given by the TTPS, the PCA and other agencies in Trinidad and Tobago to deal with victimisation to members of the public who make reports on police officers. This was a serious concern expressed by citizens.
- 4.7.8 There should be a wide public education campaign on the various telephone numbers and other ways in which the public may contact the police. Many members of the public are sceptical about the confidentiality and anonymity

of their numbers. The public must be reassured of this for their support in terms of providing information and intelligence to the TTPS.

- 4.7.9 There should be creative ways whereby the TTPS can provide timely and accurate crime information on the various communities to the communities themselves. Very often, communities are exposed to national and divisional crime information but not on their police station districts. This would enable the communities to work closer with the police officers in their stations to deal with the specific crime problems they have in their own jurisdiction. This is an essential feature of community policing that is sorely lacking in Trinidad and Tobago.

***Photo 6: Representatives of AMCHAM T&T at a Stakeholder Consultation Interview***



**Left to Right: Ms. Aurelia Bruce, Research Officer, AMCHAM T&T, Mr. Ravi Suryadevara, Immediate Past President, AMCHAM T&T, Professor Emeritus Ramesh Deosaran, Chairman, PMAC (Centre), Mr. Keith Renaud, Director, OLEP, Mr. Mr. Allan Meiguel, Member – PMAC and Dr. Levis Guy-Obiakor, Member – PMAC**





# SECTION 5: GOVERNANCE, DISCIPLINARY STRUCTURE & PUBLIC CONFIDENCE

“Generally, given the crucial importance of the police service to the country’s democracy and constitutional rights and freedoms, safety and security, the system of appointments, promotions, transfers, discipline and appeals at all levels within the Police Service must of necessity be efficient, effective, fair, transparent and enjoying substantial public confidence.”

149

# **Governance, Disciplinary Structure And Public Confidence**

## **5 Introduction**

5.1 This Section deals with many critical issues affecting the Police Service today in terms of governance, discipline structure and public confidence with the latter being touched on to some extent in the previous section. These three elements are essential not only for the betterment of the TTPS today, but importantly, for its survival in the near future. The TTPS has to get these three elements right for it to be an effective organisation serving the needs of the population and visitors.

## **5.2 Data and Information Sources**

5.2.1 For this section, a wide variety of data and information sources were utilized. These include an analysis of official documents, reports, policies and data as well as information from surveys, focus groups sessions, stakeholder interviews, newspapers and contributions from members of the public. Importantly, views from policing officers themselves (Police Officers, SRPs, Municipal Police Officers, etc.) are taken into consideration.

## **5.3 POLICE GOVERNANCE**

### **5.3.1 Objective**

5.3.2 To examine the appointment and oversight function of the PSC to see the extent to which it is functioning efficiently, effectively with public satisfaction and in the context of Police management; and make alternative proposals.

## **5.4 Oversight of the PSC**

- 5.4.1 The manner in which the manpower of the TTPS is effectively utilised and managed depends a lot on all-round police leadership. This, in turn depends heavily, in terms of operations, performance levels and accountability, on the Commissioner and Deputies in the first instance.
- 5.4.2 Therefore, the appointment and oversight of the Commissioner and his or her Executive are critical matters. This is the major job of the current PSC.
- 5.4.3 The following is a brief discussion to help justify the Committee's proposals to remove the current PSC and replace it with a new appointment and oversight system.

## **5.5 Police Oversight in a Democracy**

- 5.5.1 For a sustainable understanding of the structure and functions of the PSC in a democratic system of representative government, it is very important to understand the philosophy underlying government-citizen relations.
- 5.5.2 This includes, in particular, the extent to which the voice of the people must be heard on its own, or effectively through their elected representatives.
- 5.5.3 This is so especially with a taxpayers' funded agency like the TTPS which is responsible for citizens' safety and national security; and when inefficiencies and ineffectiveness are present with a lack of proper accountability. In fact, this democratic-driven proposition may well apply to other Service Commissions. Today, the concerns and frustrations of the population over the current PSC do not get the level of attention deserved.

## 5.6 Importance and Relevance to TTPS Manpower

- 5.6.1 Generally, given the crucial importance of the police service to the country's democracy and constitutional rights and freedoms, safety and security, the system of appointments, promotions, transfers, discipline and appeals at all levels within the police service must, of necessity, be efficient, effective, fair, transparent and enjoying substantial public confidence.
- 5.6.2 This section focuses on oversight of the Police Service Executive, that is, the Commissioner of Police, and the three Deputies of Commissioner. Ranks beneath the Deputy Commissioner now largely fall within the powers of the Commissioner.
- 5.6.3 Following the reviewed Police Service Act (2006) and the constitutional amendments from 2006 regarding the appointment of a Police Commissioner and Deputy (*with the attendant Legal Notices*), the new appointment system has been unexpectedly plagued by protracted delays, inefficiencies, resignations, exorbitant costs, public dissatisfaction and sharpened political controversies.
- 5.6.4 Driven by a politically-bipartisan mandate, the current constitutionally-framed system was eventually described as a “*bureaucratic nightmare, a tangled web, convoluted and confusing*” by several constitutional lawyers, senior public officials and prominent citizens – even by the PSC members themselves.
- 5.6.5 In addition, while these new constitutional provisions sought to remove the Prime Minister's veto over the appointment of the Commissioner and Deputy, this veto in effect still exists under the Prime Minister since he controls the Cabinet which forms the majority in Parliament – a majority which

determines approval or disapproval of the PSC's recommendations to Parliament.

- 5.6.6 To claim, therefore, *that the PSC is without "political influence" or beyond the "Prime Minister's veto"* is not quite true.
- 5.6.7 Further, the data gathered by the Audit Committee from several sources (e.g., official reports, stakeholder interviews, Police Survey, media articles) in both Trinidad and Tobago, express very strong views on the inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of the current PSC system, most of this due to the complicated legislative and administrative framework in which the PSC exists.
- 5.6.8 For one thing, as unanimously advocated by stakeholders and the police officers themselves, the appointment and oversight system now needs significant changes for the purpose at hand.
- 5.6.9 More precisely, it is embarrassing and demoralizing to have in the country's Police Service, a Commissioner acting for over three years – with seven six-month acting reappointments and a string of downstream senior officers also acting accordingly.
- 5.6.10 The late Dana Seetahal, SC.: stated: ***"The process involved in the appointment of a commissioner and deputy commissioners is not only more long-winded than in respect of appointment to any other top post in the Public Service, but also it is the most political."***
- 5.6.11 She added: ***"The appointment of a commissioner has proved to be not just tedious but unmanageable and leaves it open for the authorities to continue with acting commissioners ad infinitum."***<sup>27</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup>Express, February 1, 2014, p.13

- 5.6.12 At one of the Committee’s stakeholder interviews, former Chairman of the PSC, Dr. Kenneth Lalla, SC., CMT, gave several reasons why the PSC has not been serving its purpose effectively and cannot really do so within its present administrative and legislative framework.
- 5.6.13 At a Joint Select Committee (JSC) of Parliament meeting on March 25, 2011 on the PSC’s 2011 Annual Report, then Chairman of PSC, Mr. Nizam Mohammed said: **“In seeking to bring the Police Service up to the standard of service acceptable to the nation...we discovered a myriad of problems at the Police Service Commission.”** He also complained about the lack of implementing previous recommendations to reform the PSC. He said the current method of appointing a Commissioner of Police and Deputy has been and is **“tedious, expensive and generally unsatisfactory.”** He added that the then Attorney General promised to make legislation to reform the PSC and the appointment process.
- 5.6.14 He also added: **“We have no proper physical, library, facilities for the part time Appeal Tribunal.”** The JSC questioned the high rate of absenteeism of officers as witnesses in court; also about the worrisome delays in the Commissioner of Police setting up Tribunals and having delayed, protracted decisions on discipline, promotion, etc.
- 5.6.15 Before 2006, the Commissioner of Police had delegated powers from the PSC. After 2006, the Commissioner had full powers to discipline officers below the rank of Deputy Commissioner of Police. At this JSC meeting, it was further noted that some disciplinary matters take as long as three (3) years before coming to the PSC Appeal Tribunal. The JSC also noted the conflict with having PSC administrative staff hired by the Director of Personnel Administration (DPA) as public servants, thus affecting the constitutional independence of the PSC from having its own staff. The JSC strongly

recommended that views of civil society be heard on the PSC functions and also about the Police Service. The JSC pledged to assist in getting new legislation to reform the PSC.

- 5.6.16 In fact, there has been a ground-swell of citizens' complaints not only against crime and violence, but more precisely against the PSC's inability to appoint a substantive Commissioner. After reviewing "government's failure" to deal with crime and the Police Service, management professional Ashton Brereton, addressed the former Prime Minister: ***"If I were in your shoes, I would take immediate steps to have the Constitution amended to provide for new arrangements for the management of the Police Service."***<sup>28</sup>
- 5.6.17 The PSC itself, in its 2014 Annual Report stated: ***"Attention has already been drawn in previous reports to the lengthy, convoluted and protracted nature of the selection and appointment procedures which, accordingly, have challenged the immediate prospect of a fully appointed leadership of the Police Service."***(p. 7)
- 5.6.18 While a few government officials claimed that an acting Commissioner has all the powers of a substantive Commissioner, and is expected to perform accordingly, the downstream instability, loss of public confidence and personal embarrassment are all further causes for immediate reforms.
- 5.6.19 As indicted earlier, data gathered from stakeholders' interviews, police officers, newspaper clippings, human resource files, citizen complaints, etc., revealed that the levels of leadership, management of the TTPS, public safety performance, staff morale and public confidence are disturbingly low. The deficiencies of the current PSC – particularly in its monitoring and evaluation systems – are said to contribute to this state of affairs.

---

<sup>28</sup> Trinidad Express, October 01, 2014



- 5.6.20 The American Chamber of Commerce of Trinidad and Tobago (AMCHAM T&T) concluded: “*The uncertainty surrounding the highest position (acting appointment of the Commissioner) in the TTPS does not auger well for the management and leadership below or for public perception of the TTPS.*”<sup>29</sup>
- 5.6.21 In addition, and according to the evidence gathered, the TTPS human resource system required to support police leadership is fractured, very inefficient and disorganized.
- 5.6.22 An oversight body must therefore also ask: How can a Commissioner lead effectively when his human resource support system is fragmented, largely paper-stored and chaotic? This human resource deficiency is treated in a separate section of this Manpower Audit Report.

## **5.7 The Way Forward to Oversight Reform: From 2011**

- 5.7.1 Faced with cumbersome, inefficient PSC functions and the deleterious consequences on the police service and public confidence, the PSC under a new chairman held a Roundtable Conference at Hilton Hotel in 2011 on the need for PSC reform with participants from the PSC, the Police Executive (including Commissioner and Deputy), both sides of Parliament, Ministry of National Security, etc.
- 5.7.2 The results from this “Hilton Roundtable” helped prepare a request by the PSC Chairman for a meeting with the Prime Minister.

---

<sup>29</sup>PMAC’s Stakeholder Interview, 2017

- 5.7.3 In fact, in September 23, 2011, on this request, the then Prime Minister, Attorney General and Minister of National Security subsequently held a meeting with the PSC to discuss the inefficient and ineffective functioning of the PSC, and consider reforms.
- 5.7.4 The then Cabinet established a nine-member Multi-Sector Review Committee in October, 2011, to examine and recommend appropriate reforms to the PSC. Its general Terms of Reference were to “*consider providing greater autonomy, improved efficiency and performance, relevance and clarity to the constitutional mandate and functions of the Police Service Commission.*”
- 5.7.5 This bi-partisan Review Team comprised Ministers, Members of Parliament from both sides of the House, experts in law, human resource management and social sciences. Cabinet appointed the Chairman of the PSC as Chairman of the Review Team.
- 5.7.6 After slight revision as requested, the Review Committee submitted its Final Report on March 2013 with thirty-five (35) recommendations aimed at improving the autonomy, structure and operations, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness of the PSC. This Report was presented to the Prime Minister and Cabinet, through the Attorney General.<sup>30</sup>
- 5.7.7 The PMAC understands while in 2013 Cabinet approved the Review Team Report in principle, it was sent for further study to the Cabinet’s Finance and General Purpose Committee (F&GP). The PMAC also understands that no further action on the Report or its recommendations was since taken.

---

<sup>30</sup>Cabinet-Appointed Multi-Sector Review Team for PSC Reforms, March 13, 2013

## 5.8 Oversight Reforms: Structure, Functions and Rationale

5.8.1 In approaching its task to improve the system of appointing and oversight of a Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police, the Committee carefully weighed the balance required between required civilian oversight on one hand, and the independence of these Police officials on the other hand “*to undertake investigations and prosecutions without fear or favour.*”

5.8.2 This oversight and operational dilemma is expressed in three competing principles:

- i. In a democratic society, a fundamental principle is to have some form of civilian control over the Police and military services;
- ii. The Police, under its Commissioner or Chief, must be politically independent enough to exercise their investigative powers without fear or favour and especially treat everyone as being equal in the eyes of the law;
- iii. A democratic government, elected fairly and freely, must feel secure that the Police will not take any untoward action to jeopardize the government’s popular mandate.<sup>31</sup>

5.8.3 The claim that the current PSC is constitutionally independent, free from political influence, remains a fractured claim. The PSC depends exclusively on the Director of Personnel Administration (DPA) for its day-to-day operations, recruitment function and staff controls.

---

<sup>31</sup>Deosaran, R. Police Governance: From Oversight Puzzle to Political Disguise. Paper presented at Annual Conference of Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police, May 16-19, 2016

- 5.8.4 Further, the PSC depends on Parliament for approval or disapproval of its recommendations.
- 5.8.5 More recently, a controversial amendment was proposed to the existing (PSC) legislation which required (i) that the recruitment process for Commissioner or Deputy be triggered by the Minister of National Security in the form of a missive to the PSC<sup>32</sup>. The PSC will then contract a private firm to advertise and submit a short list to the PSC.
- 5.8.6 This private-firm intervention, apart from chipping away at the constitutional role of the PSC, also makes somewhat irrelevant the specialist criteria set for PSC members. No other Service Commission requires such criteria, nor does any Commission require such an extensive complicated appointment process.
- 5.8.7 From the private firm's list, the PSC will select its preferred candidate for submission to Parliament through the President. Parliament by majority vote will then approve or disapprove. If disapproved, the process will revert to the short list, and re-submit to Parliament accordingly, etc.
- 5.8.8 By the majority vote in Parliament over the PSC's nomination, there is "*political influence*." So while removing political influence over the PSC was a major objective of the early joint talks which led to the 2006 and further constitutional amendments, political influence over the PSC remains. The Commissioner remains a "*political appointment*". The question remains, however, why and when is "*political intervention*" not desirable?

---

<sup>32</sup>Withdrawn by Court Order in *Harridath Maharaj vs. the Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (defendant) and the PSC (intervenor)*, CV 2016 – 01218

## **5.9 Oversight Comparisons**

- 5.9.1 It should also be noted that so far, from the Committee’s inquiry, no other CARICOM state has such an embedded, constitutionally-driven, convoluted system of appointment.
- 5.9.2 Further, when compared to police oversight bodies across the US and Canada (North American Civil Oversight for Law Enforcement – NACOLE, Canadian Civil Oversight for Law Enforcement – CACOLE), no oversight body was so constitutionally entrenched or administratively convoluted.
- 5.9.3 This was so whether the oversight body comprised civic organisations or government-appointed officials. The quest in this country for the PSC’s independence went so far east, it eventually came back west.

## **5.10 Political Influence or Intervention?**

- 5.10.1 Therefore, given the country’s experience so far in establishing an appropriate Police oversight body, several elements must now be considered, not only for their idealistic principles but also for their practical value in terms of efficiency, fairness, transparency and accountability.
- 5.10.2 Political influence should not attract absolute fear. Political influence – Executive or Parliamentary – if properly applied in the spirit of a civilian, representative government, is justifiable in establishing public institutions, or holding public institutions to account. Political intervention does not necessarily mean “*undue*” political influence in a democratic system of representative government.

- 5.10.3 It is not undue political influence if the Minister calls upon the Commissioner for a particular report. It is not undue political influence if the Prime Minister, as head of the National Security Council, calls upon the Commissioner to explain or account. The relationship between the Commissioner, the Minister and the Oversight Body should be active and mutually helpful.
- 5.10.4 However, “*undue political influence*” will arise, for example, if a Minister or politician directly attempts to command the Commissioner or Police Officer as to which investigation to initiate or stop, or whom to arrest or free. To this extent the Commissioner is “*independent*”. (N.B.: This is a matter separate from the DPP’s constitutional function. Constitution, Section 90(3).)
- 5.10.5 The PMAC, considering all the above, sought to find a workable balance between the principle of civilian oversight in a democratic society on one hand, and the establishment of an oversight body that will be representative, transparent, efficient and accountable. And at the same time, to find a workable balance between such an oversight body and the Commissioner and police having the independence to investigate and prosecute without fear or favour on the other hand.
- 5.10.6 For us, it is undesirable to have a system whereby a Commissioner could be arbitrarily hired, disciplined, dismissed or politically manipulated. At the same time, we do not wish an oversight system whereby the process is exceedingly convoluted, confusing, protracted and extremely immunized from accountability.
- 5.10.7 The major reasons for the up-and-down, seemingly zigzagged approach to police oversight and governance in this country over the years seem to be:

- i. the lack of understanding of the philosophy behind police oversight in a democracy, and
- ii. the widespread mistrust of both police and politicians as perceived by the public.

5.10.8 Two separate public opinion polls commissioned by two daily newspapers recently published results revealing significant public mistrust and low public confidence in politicians, Parliament, judiciary, police and the government's ability to deal effectively with crime and violence.<sup>33</sup> One poll revealed that 96% of the sampled population were quite concerned about crime and corruption in the country. The pollster added: "*Crime remains by far the top issue of national concern for the fourth year in a row*".<sup>34</sup>

5.10.9 Such widespread public perceptions are important to consider in the construction and maintenance of key public institutions such as the police service and its oversight body. Unfortunately, such low public confidence in key public safety institutions helps to question political oversight or influence – even when justifiably required.

5.10.10 Parliament has so far created an oversight system (PSC) with inherent contradictions, so much so that much of the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of oversight remains protected or covered by the constitutional immunity bestowed on the oversight body.

5.10.11 From evidence gathered by the Audit Committee, the current PSC oversight system has produced more problems and increased public dissatisfaction.

---

<sup>33</sup>Trinidad Guardian and Daily Express September 7, 2017, p. 3

<sup>34</sup>Express, September 10, 2017.

- 5.10.12 There are therefore two related issues:
- i. Efficient *police management and performance with accountability* largely driven by the Commissioner;
  - ii. Efficient *police oversight and accountability* largely driven by the oversight body.
- 5.10.13 How much political influence? A democracy of representative government, that is government fairly and freely elected, must allow the people's representatives to have fair and reasonable control over the agency with such powerful powers – the Police Service.
- 5.10.14 So rather than allow the public mistrust of politicians to drive the status and structure of the oversight body (e.g., PSC) into a sterilised, excessively immunized state, it is more democratic to create a system in which the oversight body, reasonably representative, can do its work but with increased transparency and accountability. It must also ensure that the *representative* element in the oversight body possesses the integrity required.
- 5.10.15 From the Audit Committee's review of oversight bodies, it seems that countries (e.g., Canada) where public trust in politicians is relatively high, the need for high-level immunity of oversight bodies is relatively low.
- 5.10.16 For this country, it is desirable to have politicians with increased accountability and increased public trust, rather than to have the continuing fear and mistrust of politicians push oversight bodies so deeply and intricately buried in the Constitution, and where inefficiency, non-transparency, high costs, protracted delays and ineffectiveness thrive under cover.



5.10.17 The challenge in our democracy, therefore, is not so much for extreme immunity for the oversight body, but for politicians and a Parliament with increased public confidence on one hand, and an oversight body that is democratically representative, quickly effective, transparent and accountable enough.

## 5.11 Data and Evidence

5.11.1 Data gathered from the Committee’s various sources strongly recommend abolishing the current PSC system. Integral parts of the PSC oversight functions include the Commissioner’s leadership, his staff appraisal and performance review, discipline, financial accountability, level of public confidence in the TTPS, etc. In other words, overall, the PSC judges the Commissioner on his integrity, leadership and management of the Police Service.

5.11.2 And so, the extent to which the PSC itself is properly staffed, resourced and in charge of its administration, is the extent to which the PSC would likely be efficient and effective in executing its oversight functions in these respects. The current PSC faces serious administrative problems.

5.11.3 When asked how satisfied they felt with the “*current leadership of the TTPS*”, almost 50% of the Police sample (survey of 500 Officers of all ranks) said “*very unsatisfactory*” or “*unsatisfactory*”.<sup>35</sup>

5.11.4 Given the PSC oversight in ensuring effectiveness of the Commissioner’s role regarding officers’ discipline, officers were asked to rate their satisfaction with the disciplinary process in the TTPS. Seventy percent (70%) of the officers said “*very unsatisfied*” or “*unsatisfied*”.

---

<sup>35</sup>PMAC’s Police Survey Report, 2017

- 5.11.5 When asked about the system of promotion in the TTPS, sixty-eight percent (68%) said it is “*very unsatisfactory*” or “*unsatisfactory*”.
- 5.11.6 Overall, the ratings in these and related criteria reveal general dissatisfaction within the various levels of the police service, and more so, the need for close-up, stronger supervision and discipline by the Commissioner.
- 5.11.7 When the officers were directly asked whether they thought the present system of appointing the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner is satisfactory or not, eighty-four percent (84%) said it was “*unsatisfactory*”.
- 5.11.8 In light of its extensive survey of police officers and 14 such recommendations, the Committee’s Implementation Team concluded that “*all relevant authorities should review the process for appointing the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner*”.
- 5.11.9 Data from focus groups and stakeholders’ interviews also indicate a strong preference for a radically changed PSC in terms of structure, functions and accountability. With new perspectives, the Committee now seeks to do so.

## **5.12 Towards Reform**

- 5.12.1 Noting the deficiencies of the current PSC system, the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (GORTT) in its Draft National Development Policy (2016-2030)<sup>36</sup> proposed the establishment of two related oversight and management agencies:

---

<sup>36</sup> Draft National Development Strategy 2016 – 2030 (VISION 2030), “Many Hearts, Many Voices, One Vision”, March 21, 2017, p. 98

- a. Police Management Agency (PMA)
- b. Police Inspectorate (PI)

5.12.2 As stated separately in the policy documents, the PMA is intended to “*develop the necessary leadership expertise, skills and professionalism that will take this arm of our nation’s protective services forward: to uphold accountability, plan and execute police operations, set the ethics and values of the TTPS*”.

5.12.3 A review of the Police Standing Orders revealed the vast amount of inspections senior offices are required to do on a daily or monthly basis. From the data gathered, such inspection operations are far from what is expected.

5.12.4 As further stated, the PI is intended to “*develop trust and confidence in the Police Service: to treat with potential abuse of state power, ensure quality assurance and oversight of Police operations, and will be annually accountable to Parliament*”.<sup>37</sup>

5.12.5 Though in need of some reconfiguration, these oversight and management functions seem quite reasonable to the Audit Committee.

5.12.6 Let us consider, for example, the Police Inspectorate. Its objective “*to develop trust and confidence in the Police Service*” is a necessary objective. Police in-the-field performance, utilization of manpower, vehicles and

---

<sup>37</sup> 20160115, Unrevised Senate Debate – Friday, January 15, 2016 – 1.30 p.m.  
<http://www.ttparliament.org/hansards/hs20160115.pdf>

technology, proper physical condition for stationed officers were found by the Audit Committee and its Implementation Team to be quite unsatisfactory.

- 5.12.7 This is largely due to a lack of the required supervision and systematic inspection by senior and middle management. A well-configured PI should be quite effective in filling this space in a systematic and accountable manner.
- 5.12.8 However, the role of these additional institutions (PMA and PI) may sound confusing alongside the status and functions of the existing PSC and the powers of the Police Commissioner.
- 5.12.9 For example, as stated in the Constitution: ***“Subject to section 123(1), the Commissioner shall have the complete power to manage the Police Service and is required to ensure that the human financial and material resources available to the Service are used in an efficient and effective manner.” (Section 123A).***
- 5.12.10 The Commissioner is also constitutionally empowered to appoint, promote, transfer and discipline all Officers below the rank of Deputy Commissioner (Section 123A refers).
- 5.12.11 In other words, the Commissioner is now manager of the Service, except for the management proposals the PSC or Minister may submit to him and hold him accountable.
- 5.12.12 Therefore, to avoid conflict, duplication and waste of resources, the Committee recommends that the PSC in its present form be abolished and be replaced either by:

- i. An extensively-amended PSC, or
- ii. By an entirely new oversight system incorporating both a Police Oversight Board (POB) and a supporting Police Inspectorate (PI)

5.12.13 Noting that the appointment process may not necessarily be combined with oversight in one system, the Committee further proposes an appointment alternative, that is, that the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners be elected by the direct vote of the eligible population, thus bringing the people's voice and representative government into motion. This helps ensure direct accountability. (*see below*)

5.12.14 The opportunity is therefore now available to establish a more relevant, representative efficient, accountable police oversight and inspection system for both the Police Executive and its lower ranks.

5.12.15 Mere tinkering will not do. Neither will a slavish copying of what other countries do in this regard. The institutions we create should be guided by our own needs and experiences, rather than superficially twisting our needs to fit an imported system.

5.12.16 In fact, an overview of several other countries by the Committee and its Implementation Team revealed not a standardised oversight system, but a variety of police oversight and management bodies – each body according to its own country's needs.

5.12.17 We should do the same, courageously, thoughtfully, ground-up and within the realm of representative democracy; not merely out of the simple mechanics of immediate necessity.

## **5.13 OLEP’S POTENTIAL**

- 5.13.1 The Office of Law Enforcement and Policy (OLEP) in Cabinet Minute No. 2181 of August 23, 2007, was established to coordinate, develop and provide training to some twelve public safety units (e.g., Praedial Larceny Squad, Transit Police, Parliamentary Police, etc.).
- 5.13.2 From the programmes covered so far, OLEP seems to have a strong potential for strengthening the country’s public safety network as well as the reviewed community policing programmes of the TTPS. In doing so, however, OLEP should ensure that the accountability in terms of manpower usage, financial expenditure and physical facilities, are effectively utilised.
- 5.13.3 It is not productive, for example, to have the Transit Police Unit (TPU) with eleven out of its eighteen vehicles not working; and for five of its twelve motorcycles also not working. The Praedial Larceny Squad as another example, and given its mandate, also needs to improve its accountability and level of responsiveness to Praedial Larceny complaints<sup>38</sup>.

## **5.14 Further Details**

### **5.14.1 First Option: Police Oversight Board (POB)**

- 5.14.1.2 A full-time Police Oversight Board (POB)
- 5.14.1.3 The Committee recommends that the oversight, appraisal, discipline, promotion and appointment system be done by the permanent POB from

---

<sup>38</sup>Transit Police, Annual Report, 2016

Commissioner of Police to Assistant Commissioner of Police. (The POB can hear final appeals from the Commissioner's decisions on discipline, promotion, transfer, etc.).

- 5.14.1.4 The Commissioner will have similar powers over the rest of the TTPS (except the appeals). The POB will operate with reciprocal collaboration with the Police Inspectorate (PI).
- 5.14.1.5 The PI will have everyday inspection, evaluation and supervision of the TTPS and report to the POB.
- 5.14.1.6 A seven-member POB should be appointed. To help satisfy the representation requirement, the POB should be appointed by the President on advice – and constitute four members selected by Government, one by the Opposition, one by the Police Social and Welfare Association; and one independent person selected as Chairman by the President. (The POB with regulations, etc., should be established through an Act of Parliament.)

#### **5.14.2 Second Option: Multi-Sector Review of the PSC**

5.14.2.1 This Multi-Sector Report on PSC Reform (2013) has been reviewed and amended by the Audit Committee, especially to help achieve PSC administrative autonomy. The Committee's proposed amendments are attached to the **Multi-Sector Committee Report**.

5.14.2.2 Among the Audit Committee's amendments are:

- i. PSC membership to be increased from five to seven full-time members;

- ii. The Commissioner should have full administrative autonomy over the civilian staff;
- iii. That the President selects PSC members after consultation with Prime Minister and Opposition Leader; and that nominations of PSC members should not go to Parliament for debate and approval or rejection;
- iv. The PSC's recommendations for Commissioner and Deputy, however, should go to Parliament.
- v. See Section 5.21 for details on PMAC's Proposal for the Amending the PSC after a review of the Multi-Sector Review Team Report.

### **5.14.3 Third Option: The Popular Vote**

- 5.14.3.1 As indicated earlier, this is the most democratic and representative system of appointing a Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner.
- 5.14.3.2 It dramatically increases transparency, continued accountability and citizen-driven policies and programmes through its system of town hall meetings. In other words, it makes the Police Service a truly community policing agency.
- 5.14.3.3 The population will have a live and direct role in partnering with the Police to help ensure crime prevention, community policy, information gathering and shared intelligence.



- 5.14.3.4 The much-advertised slogan that “crime is everybody’s business” will find deep and productive roots through a well-organised, Election and Boundaries Commission (EBC)-driven popular vote.
- 5.14.3.5 The Commissioner of Police and the three Deputies should be directly elected by the population, but with oversight under the amended PSC or the POB. ACPs appointed by the oversight body in consultation with the Commissioner.

## **5.15 The Disciplinary Process**

- 5.15.1 This subsection deals with the disciplinary process in the TTPS. It provides an evaluation of it from various sources including the voices of the police officers themselves.
- 5.15.2 Overall, there are three (3) ways in which disciplinary matters concerning police officers can be dealt with. Two ways are internal in the police service and one is external to the TTPS. These are:
- a. The Police Complaint Division (internal TTPS)
  - b. The PSB (internal TTPS)
  - c. The PCA (external TTPS)
- 5.15.3 There is much confusion in the minds of many members of the public as well as stakeholders on what are the differences among these three routes of lodging and dealing with complaints against the Police. In fact, even some members of the TTPS do not know the main differences. There needs to be a serious campaign to educate all on these matters.
- 5.15.4 Further, an urgent assessment is needed to see if all three approaches are needed, for example, can they be streamlined into one agency? Are there

avoidable duplications and waste of resources in having all three systems in place at the same time especially as there will be common costs like administrative, investigative, physical infrastructure, etc.?

## **5.16 The Police Complaints Division of the TTPS**

- 5.16.1 The disciplinary process in the TTPS is governed by the Police Service Act (Ch. 15:01) and the Police Service Regulations 2007. More specifically, it is outlined in Regulation 156 and its interpretation and application is provided for in Departmental Order #14 of 2008. These provide strict timelines for all stages between allegations and the final disposal.
- 5.16.2 Regulation 156(4), for example, posits that the investigation shall be prompt and a report of the findings shall be forwarded to the Disciplinary Officer within thirty days of the investigator's appointment. However, an extension may be applied for to complete the investigation but not for more than a further thirty days.
- 5.16.3 The main problem is that matters take more than the stipulated time to be dealt with resulting in Officers either being on the job while they have matters before the Complaints Division or Officers being placed on suspension with pay for long periods. These issues do not auger well for both the Police Service and the public who watch in disgust.
- 5.16.4 From data provided to the PMAC from the TTPS, we saw that the number of complaints received were increasing. Complaints increased by 8% from 2014 to 2015 (712 to 770) and by 15% from 2015 to 2016 (770 to 887). Or, looked at another way, they increased by 25% from 2014 to 2016!

- 5.16.5 The data shows that the percentage of complaints investigated fluctuates year to year, e.g., in 2014, 71% were investigated, in 2015, 90% were investigated and in 2016 the figure was 52%.
- 5.16.6 One of the possible reasons can be the inadequate manpower deployed to the Complaints Division. However, this Division received an increase in its actual strength in May 2017. The number of actual FDOs is equal to the sanctioned strength – no problem here. However, there are shortfalls for SDOs – the middlemen and foot soldiers as they say. Inspectors are short by 25%, Sergeants are short by 11%, Corporals are short by a high of 64% and Constables by 33%.
- 5.16.7 Some of the other problems facing the internal complaints process are outlined below:
- 5.16.7.1 It was noted that too often, prosecutors are sourced from departments external to the Complaints Division which results in poor attendance in many cases thus leading to many delays.
- 5.16.7.2 In fact, there is current case where a matter was called 55 times, the Officer was not served 41 times, there was not a quorum on 30 times and the matter was fixed for trial 2 times and it has not been resolved to date.
- 5.16.7.3 There are also problems in the process of disclosing of documents to the offending officer as required. This points to a management issue. On average, the Committee was informed that the process is delayed by at least two hearings to accommodate this process.
- 5.16.7.4 We were also informed that many prosecutors appear to be poorly trained and they relied on their own experience and ad hoc advice as matters progress.

- 5.16.7.5 Tribunal Officers are selected at the discretion of the Commissioner of Police. There is no special criterion for persons who are serving as Tribunal Officers. It was noted that, too often, persons sitting as Tribunal Officers are due for retirement in a few months' time and may end up retiring before matters are closed off.
- 5.16.7.6 It was revealed to the PMAC that Tribunal Officers are also required to do other policing duties other than tribunal duties. This will indeed have a negative impact on their attendance on tribunal duties.
- 5.16.7.7 A key problem is whether the public has confidence in police officers investigating themselves. And, the answer will more than likely be no. In fact, some of the stakeholders interviewed had an issue with this. Therefore, this needs to be revisited urgently if public confidence in the Police Service can be improved.
- 5.16.7.8 The TTPS has noted that the standard of investigation from Officers external as well as some members of the Division has not been as thorough and comprehensive as reasonably necessary. As a result, they introduced standardised operating procedures as well as standardised forms and reports that will help in quality control. Another area that they identified with some shortcomings deals with matters having to be sent back to Investigating Officers which will be of course be time consuming.
- 5.16.7.9 There was a very important court ruling in case of Sheldon David. Here, while the Complaints Division found him guilty at their hearing, upon appeal, the decision was quashed on the grounds of delay. As a result of this, the TTPS has instituted a new system.

- 5.16.7.10 From the Police Officers' voices themselves in the survey conducted by the PMAC in 2017, almost seventy percent of them (69%) said the disciplinary process in the TTPS is “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory.*” Interestingly, older Officers, Officers with a higher educational level and Officers who had a higher rank in the Police Service were of higher proportions in the group which said “*very unsatisfactory*” or “*unsatisfactory*” than officers who were younger, had a lower educational background and were of a lower rank.
- 5.16.7.10 When we looked back at previous reports done on the police service, Professor Stephen Mastrofski noted in 2006 that there is the urgent need to strengthen the disciplinary process in the TTPS<sup>39</sup>. This same recommendation would have been made decades before but would have borne little or no fruit.


## **5.17 The Police Complaints Authority (PCA)**

- 5.17.1 The PCA is the civilian oversight body mandated to independently investigate complaints against police officers involved in criminal offences, police corruption and serious police misconduct. It was established in 2010.
- 5.17.2 This subsection will look at the PCA's data of allegations made against police officers.
- 5.17.3 Figure 13 shows that over the period 2010/2011 to 2014/2015, the PCA received 1,877 complaints against police officers. There was a 93% increase in complaints from 2010/2011 to 2013/2014 while it decreased by 35% from 2013/2014 to 2014/2015.

---

<sup>39</sup> Stephen D. Mastrofski, George Mason University (2006)


**Figure 13: Comparison of Complaints against Police Officers for the Period 2010 to 2015**



**Data Source: Annual Reports, PCA**

- 5.17.4 Figure 14 also shows that for the period 2010 to 2015, 60% of the matters (1,279 matters) were still active investigations. A further 28% (606 matters) were completed investigations and 12% (254) were before the Courts.
- 5.17.5 Figure 15 below gives the trends for the number of complaints made against police officers by Police Divisions and Specialist Sections over the two (2) year period of 2014 and 2015. Overall, in 2014, Northern, Southern and Eastern were the highest three, however, the total for the specialist Units were the second highest. In 2015, the highest three Police Divisions were Northern, Port of Spain and Central. It should be noted that there was no data for Specialist Units for 2015 to enable any comparisons.

**Figure 14: Status of Complaints for the Period 2010 to 2015**




**Data Source: Annual Reports, PCA**

5.17.6 Table 9 shows the number of Allegations of Disciplinary Offences against police officers for the period 2014 to 2015. Overall, Discreditable Conduct, Unlawful/Unnecessary Exercise of Authority and Neglect of Duty had the highest numbers.

5.17.7 Table 10 gives the trend for Allegations of Criminal Offences made against police officers for the period 2014 to 2015. Overall, the five highest were Assault, Larceny and related offences, Harassment, Common Assault and Fatal Shooting.

**Figure 15: Complaints by Divisions for the Period 2010 to 2015**



Data Source: Annual Reports, PCA

**Table 9: Allegations of Disciplinary Offences for the Period 2010 to 2015**

Allegation of Disciplinary Offences	2014	2015
Neglect of Duty	127	108
Discreditable Conduct	304	191
Unlawful/ Unnecessary Exercise of Authority	169	75
Falsehood/ Prevarication	7	0
Corrupt Practice	51	32
Using Property of Service Without Consent	2	0
Breach of Confidence	1	1
Failure to acc. for Gov't Property	1	0
Accessory to a Disciplinary Offence	2	0
Oppressive Conduct	1	1
Breach of Police Service Regulations	0	34
<b>Total</b>	<b>665</b>	<b>442</b>

Data Source: Annual Reports, PCA



**Table 10: Allegations of Criminal Offences for the Period 2014 to 2015**

<b>Allegation of Criminal Offences</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
Fatal Shooting	29	7
Non-fatal Shooting	17	4
Causing Death by Dangerous Driving	2	1
Murder	2	7
Assault	119	90
Assault occ. Actual Bodily Harm	16	4
Wounding with intent to do Grievous bodily harm	0	3
Assault and Battery	0	2
Common Assault	29	9
Harassment	34	18
Threat	10	7
Killing or Wounding Animals	2	3
Money Laundering	0	1
Rape	1	1
Indecent Assault	3	1
Incest	0	1
Grievous Sexual Assault	1	1
Sexual Harassment	1	1
Serious Indecency	0	1
Unlawful and unnecessary use of force	0	14
Larceny and Related Offences	42	16
Malicious Damage	19	11
Trespass and Unlawful Entry	1	1
Possession of Marijuana	0	1
Perverting Course of Justice	9	2
Wrongful Arrest	0	1
Shooting with Intent	0	5
Misbehaviour in Public Office	23	11
Dangerous Driving	1	1
Domestic Violence	0	2
Use of Obscene Language	0	4
Death in Police Custody	3	0
Illegal Quarrying	1	0
Kidnapping	1	0
Sex with a Female 14-16	3	0
Cruelty to Children	1	0
Unlawful Arrest and Detention	2	0
Impersonation of Police	1	0
Failure to account for Govt Property	1	0
Malicious Prosecution	3	0
Discharge firearm 40m of road	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>378</b>	<b>231</b>

**Data Source: Annual Reports, PCA**

- 5.17.8 Although the PCA is the oversight body for complaints against police officers, it is governed by the PCA Act which stipulates how it should operate. Once investigations are completed by the PCA, the Authority can take no further action and the file is sent with recommendations either to the Commissioner of Police or the DPP for further action. This needs to be addressed seriously. In fact, the PCA has been calling for some more teeth including prosecutorial powers.
- 5.17.9 Further, there may be a need to amend the PCA Act to give it powers to deal with matters or complaints of the Special Reserve Police, as apparently, a lacuna exists. The PCA, in dealing with Serious Police Misconduct, is restricted to the regulations under the Police Service Act. However, the SRPs are covered under Special Reserve Police Act.

## **5.18 Challenges**

- 5.18.1 There were a few challenges in this section of the audit exercise. These included:
- 5.18.1.2 Not many details on the government's propositions of the Police Management Authority and the Police Inspectorate were available for the Committee to consider. The Committee had to research similar institutions in other jurisdictions but were unsure as to the model, for example, in which the Government had an interest.
- 5.18.1.3 The Committee experienced tremendous difficulty in getting statistics and reports from the various authorities to conduct its analysis. When received, they were in forms that did not lend itself to easy analysis.

## **5.19 Conclusion**

- 5.19.1 It is quite necessary and urgent for a new or amended governance structure for oversight of the TTPS. It cannot continue as it is now as it is not working for the Police Service, for the Government, and importantly, for the people of Trinidad and Tobago. The time to do this is now!
- 5.19.2 We have seen that the number of complaints surrounding Police Officers is increasing annually. They are also quite serious in nature and they seem to be concentrated in a few Police Divisions and in Specialist Units. These must not be treated in a soft way. The three routes to deal with these must be reviewed to reduce delays and redundancy and to deliver fair results in a more timely manner and in line with the Regulations set for these matters.

## **5.20 Recommendations**

- 5.20.1 From all the views and evidence gathered by the Committee, and gaining from the appointment, oversight and management experiences of the TTPS over the years, the Audit Committee proposes three options for consideration. Notably, these options fit into a scale from narrow conservatism to one of democratic representation and accountability.
- i. Make the substantial reforms to the existing PSC as proposed in the Multi-Sector Review Team Report and with the Committee's amendments;
  - ii. Establish a representative full-time Police Oversight Board (POB) to recruit, monitor, evaluate, appoint, promote,

discipline from Commissioner down to Assistant Commissioner;

- iii. Have the Commissioner of Police and the three Deputies directly elected by the population, but with oversight under the reformed PSC or the POB. (*ACPs appointed by the oversight body in consultation with the CoP*) This popular vote option will be productively aligned with the system of town meetings and frustration-easing accountability across the country;
- iv. The Police Inspectorate (PI), appointed by the POB, to play a major role in leadership training, inspections, quality assurance, measurement and evaluation. Its inspection data, advice and reports are to be provided to the oversight body. The PI is to be appointed by the POB.

5.20.2 While the Committee recommends that the Commissioner should retain overall management of the Police Service, and direct jurisdiction of ranks from Senior Superintendent down, the oversight body selected should also be empowered to make regular managerial and operational proposals to the Commissioner. Achievement of such PI-driven proposals should be part of the oversight evaluation.

5.20.3 Moreover, for all-round efficiency, it is recommended that the oversight body work closely with the Commissioner and more so with the Minister of National Security in developing performance and assessment criteria.

5.20.4 Of course, the legislative and administrative details for each option will require further work.

- 5.20.5 In all these circumstances, the Audit Committee strongly recommends that an Implementation Team comprising of eleven (11) persons of the requisite high-level professional skills and experience be immediately appointed by the Cabinet to help speed up this process.
- 5.20.6 A radical solution proposed by several stakeholders is to revamp the entire Police Service by applying a substantial severance pay, buy-out exercise for the many under-performing, uncommitted, indisciplined officers; leaving the high-performing career-oriented ones inside while generating a more appropriate, higher-level system of recruitment and training. To do less, it was said, would likely result in merely putting a plaster on the sore.
- 5.20.7 A five to seven-year policy reconstruction and well-targeted plan to deal with the major issues facing the TTPS must be developed and implemented.
- 5.20.8 The Committee agreed that a significant reason for the inefficiency, ineffectiveness and lack of professional integrity and commitment in the TTPS stems from deficiencies in the recruitment, training and assessment systems. The evidence strongly suggests a radical change based on substantial pre-service training. That is, the Committee recommends that the Police Academy be placed under the University of Trinidad and Tobago (UTT), similar to the teacher training model. This pre-service training and certification will be upgraded accordingly, thus helping to ensure an improvement in police operations, professional image and integrity and career commitment. The TTPS can accordingly continue with modified forms of induction and orientation. This change should be implemented before September 2019.
- 5.20.9 With regard to the discipline of SRPs, it was recommended earlier that the Police Authority Act needs to be amended to include the SRPs.

- 5.20.10 Currently, various municipal police officers report to different persons. Some officers report to the local government body, some to the Statutory Authority, etc. Many matters have ended up in the courts. Urgent steps should be taken to streamline this troubling manpower issue.
- 5.20.11 The Office of Law Enforcement and Policy (OLEP) has a useful purpose. Its role should be strengthened with regard to training and policy advice but with the necessary approved accountabilities for itself and the various Units under its jurisdiction.
- 5.20.12 The TTPS should strengthen its efforts in dealing with corruption and abuse of power in the service. The two internal routes available are the Police Complaints Division and the Professional Standards Bureau. The inordinate length of time it takes for disciplinary matters to be heard and determined is embarrassing to the service. Additional steps should be taken to abide by the guidelines and court rulings.
- 5.20.13 There should be greater accountability of tribunal and other officers dealing with such complaints matters. Dedicated current TTPS officers, qualified civilians as well as attorneys, retired police officers, magistrates and judges can be used to serve on these tribunals so that matters can be dealt with expeditiously and within the timeframe provided.
- 5.20.14 The Committee noted previous studies found that the collusion between police officers and gang members were getting stronger. As a result, the TTPS must urgently institute systems to deal with this corrupt practice.
- 5.20.15 There should be an urgent review for much closer and productive collaboration among the three systems available now for citizen complaints: Police Complaints Division, the PSB and the PCA.

- 5.20.16 The TTPS should take a further examination of the trend that complaints against officers were highest in certain Police Divisions and specialist Units over the years to determine if there are underlying localised causes for these trends; are they the same officers, are there facilitating conditions there, etc.

## **5.21 PMAC's Proposed Amendments: Governance Arrangements for the Police Service – The Multi-Sector Review Team**

### **5.21.1 Introduction**

- i. The Police Service Commission (PSC) was established on June 1, 1956.<sup>40</sup> In the wake of widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of the police service, the Constitution was amended with respect to the procedure to be followed for the appointment of members of the Police Service Commission.<sup>41</sup>
- ii. Under the new provisions the President, after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, is required to nominate to the House of Representatives persons who are qualified and experienced in the disciplines of law, finance, sociology or management. The President is further required to make appointments to the PSC after the House of Representatives approves the Notification issued by the President in respect of each nomination. The present PSC comprises of a Chairman and four (4) members. Its method of functioning as well as its roles and responsibilities are fully set out in Section 20 of Volume 2.

---

<sup>40</sup> This appointment was by the Trinidad and Tobago (Constitution) Amendment Order in Council 1956 (1956 No. 835).

<sup>41</sup> (Amendment) Act No.6 of 2006, which took effect from January 1, 2007, amended section 122 of the Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago

### **5.21.2. The Multi-Sector Review Team on the Police Service Commission**

- i. In 2011, a Multi Sector Review Team (MSRT) was appointed by the Government to consider providing greater autonomy, relevance and clarity to the constitutional mandate and functions of the PSC. This Team comprised a broad base of participants. The full Report of this Team is attached at Volume 2.
- ii. Its final recommendations - under two categories – Administrative and Legislative - which arose from extensive consultations, were submitted to the Cabinet in 2013. These are contained in Volume 2.
- iii. However, a decision was not taken on this matter by the then administration prior to the General Elections of 2015 which led to a change in Government.
- iv. As part of its deliberations and based on discussions with the Chairman of the Police Service Commission, and Representatives of the Leader of the Opposition, the PMAC is of the view that there is merit in revisiting these recommendations as they present a viable option for strengthening the governance arrangements for the police service.
- v. The PMAC now proposes that one option for strengthening governance which would lead to a more effective and efficient police service is the adoption of these recommendations with some adjustments as will be discussed in succeeding paragraphs. Should this Proposal be adopted, the PMAC also proposes that a Police Inspectorate should be created under the jurisdiction of the PSC.



### 5.21.3 PMAC's Recommendations to the MSRT's Proposals

- i. The adjustments now proposed in the Administrative Recommendations relate to the introduction of one new provision and related amendments to Recommendations #4, #7 and #11 of the MSRT Report.
- ii. During its deliberations, the PMAC noted that the chaotic state of the human resource function in the police service is further exacerbated by the multiple governing bodies. The permanent civilian staff who mainly perform Human Resource, Accounting and Auditing functions fall under that aegis of the Public Service Commission. This results in a revolving door syndrome since at short notice these persons are moved to other agencies in the Civil Service.
- iii. On the other hand, the Commissioner of Police is responsible for the appointment of all civilian contract staff. The PMAC considers it appropriate that a new provision be introduced to allow the Commissioner of Police to be given full administrative autonomy over all the civilian staff of the Police Service, that is, to recruit, retain and instruct its own support staff to have full management responsibility for the functioning of the Police Service. However, any civilian staff recruited at the levels which fall under the remit of the Police Service Commission (that is, Assistant Commissioner and above) should be under its jurisdiction.
- iv. At Recommendation #4 where it is proposed that the members of the PSC should remain part-time, the PMAC recommends full-time membership for the Chair and Deputy Chair in the light of its proposal for widening the remit of the PSC to include the Assistant Commissioners, any relevant civilian staff and its further strengthening by the introduction of a Police Inspectorate which is discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

- v. In Recommendation #7, a proposal is made for the Secretariat to be given the authority to recruit an additional eighteen (18) persons in light of the widening of the remit of the PSC. The PMAC recommends that this be replaced with:

*The Police Service Commission should undertake a review of its Secretariat and make recommendations to ensure that it has the required Secretariat Support to enable it to discharge and perform its duties efficiently, effectively and fairly*

- vi. Recommendation #11 provides for the powers of the PSC to be expanded to include within its constitutional remit the offices for the Assistant Commissioner of Police. The PMAC agrees with this initial recommendation and further recommends that the PSC's remit be further expanded to include any civilian staff who may be recruited at that level and above.
- vii. The PMAC also recommends that the legislative amendments proposed by the MSRT should be further expanded to include the recommendations now made.

#### **5.21.4 The Police Management Agency and the Police Inspectorate**

- i. The Government, in its Draft National Development Policy 2016-2030, highlighted the need for the strengthening of National Security Structures in dealing with crime. In so doing, it proposed two crime agencies:
  - a. A Police Management Agency (PMA); and
  - b. A Police Inspectorate (PI)

- ii. These shall institutionally strengthen the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service by modernizing the management of the Police Service, inclusive of capacity building and training of police officers.<sup>42</sup>
- iii. The Police Inspectorate would be established to “develop trust and confidence in the police service.”
- iv. **The Police Management Agency will:**
  - a. Develop the necessary leadership expertise;
  - b. Uphold accountability;
  - c. Develop the skills and professionalism of the workforce;
  - d. Enhance the capability to plan and execute police operations;
  - e. Implement effective operational processes, practice and doctrine;
  - f. Set and maintain the ethics and values that need to be embedded in the service’s professional culture<sup>43</sup>

5.21.5 The Police Inspectorate will:

- a. treat with potential abuse of state power and an overreach by the police service in the discharge of their duties; and
- b. Ensure quality assurance and have oversight of police operations and will be held accountable through annual reporting to Parliament<sup>44</sup>

5.21.6 The PMAC is of the view that a Police Inspectorate established under the aegis of the PSC could allow for the robust monitoring and management of the Police Service.

---

<sup>42</sup>Draft National Development Policy 2016-2030

<sup>43</sup> People’s National Movement Manifesto 2015

<sup>44</sup> Richard Lord, Trinidad Guardian Published: Saturday, January 16, 2016



***Photo 7: Dr. Kenneth R. Lalla, SC., CMT, at a Stakeholder Consultation Interview***

**Professor Emeritus Ramesh Deosaran, Chairman – PMAC welcoming Dr. Kenneth R. Lalla, former Chairman – PSC to the Stakeholder Consultation Interview. Ms. Diana Newsam, Secretary – PMAC looks on in the background**

# SECTION 6: CONCLUSION

# CONCLUSION

- 6.1 Given the serious implications of the information gathered by this Police Manpower Audit, there is no alternative than for quick, determined, courageous action for implementing the recommendations now required to help save the TTPS from further deterioration and low public confidence.
- 6.2 There should be of course some discussion around these recommendations but such discussions should remember that there have been previous inquiries into the TTPS without any deliberate action taken by the relevant authorities to implement the recommendations made by these studies. What we now have therefore is a “*bottled neck*” situation from which this Audit Committee Recommendations seek to escape.
- 6.3 The Committee has noted with concern, the failed implementation of previous reports. The PMAC strongly recommends the establishment of an Implementation Team comprising of eleven (11) appropriately skilled and experienced professionals to facilitate early implementation.
- 6.4 Part of the reasons for historical irresponsibility is the continued absence of little or no accountability from the relevant authorities. There is now a clear and present danger facing both the TTPS and the country’s public safety at large. The time is now for the required action by all concerned.

**SECTION 7:  
RECOMMENDATIONS**

# Recommendations

7.1 The following represents the full list of recommendations of the Police Manpower Audit Committee following their nine (9) month review of the TTPS. The eighty-two (82) recommendations listed below represent are a full compilation of those itemised in the Executive Summary as well as those within the various sections of the Report. For consistency, all of the recommendations are now presented under the four structural themes discussed in Sections 2 to 5 of this Report.

## 7.2 Manpower Strength and Utilisation in the TTPS

7.2.1 There are a number of “policing” officers available in Trinidad and Tobago. These include TTPS officers, Special Reserve Officers, Municipal Police Officers, Estate Constables and Private Security officers. There needs to be a comprehensive study to take into account all of these personnel and how they can jointly play a role in the security and safety of Trinidad and Tobago. As of now, they are mainly operating in their own sphere with sporadic collaboration. A more-structured approach is badly needed for these times when we need all hands on deck.

7.2.2 The TTPS must ensure that it has adequate numbers of officers available at all times especially for those public-based functions like at the front desks at police stations, patrols, investigations, telephone operators, drivers, etc. This will help build public confidence.



- 7.2.3 There should be an urgent review of the current work-shift systems employed in the TTPS. From officers' views, the highest proportion of them said an 8-hour shift-system is the most effective one. This should be further discussed and decided upon. It can also reduce the overtime bill of the TTPS as well as provide other "soft" benefits like more free time for officers, etc.
- 7.2.4 Steps should be taken to improve significantly the managerial and leadership skills-sets for the appropriate officers in the TTPS. This also calls for the correct selection and promotion of officers.
- 7.2.5 Currently, the TTPS is not recruiting adequate officers at the Constable level. This should be immediately addressed. The number of officers separating from the TTPS annually is greater than the number of intakes. The TTPS already has a shortfall of officers. This low recruitment of officers is further adding to the problem. The TTPS needs to acquire the necessary resources to recruit adequate officers.
- 7.2.6 Special consideration should be given to the targeting and recruiting of officers from tertiary-level education institutions, for example, who may have a higher skills-set and aptitude. They may be targeted for specialist Units and Branches. Of course, they must satisfy other requirements.
- 7.2.7 The relevant laws should be amended so that minor road traffic accidents (e.g., those that do not involve deaths, serious injuries, damage of certain costs, etc.) should not require the police officers to be involved in the reporting and investigation processes but it should be left to other agencies and the insurance companies to handle. This has been done in many other jurisdictions across the world. It thus frees up hundreds of police officers as well as hundreds of thousands of police manpower hours spent on minor road accidents. Such spared manpower can be then be focussed on crime fighting and crime prevention purposes where it is more needed.

- 7.2.8 The Police Service should consider a review of the number of Units and Branches in its current structure with the aim to reduce redundancy where it is fitting. There are some Units that can be merged which can free up many officers as well as produce significant cost savings to the TTPS. The Committee notes the recent (September 2017) merger of the Organised Crime, Narcotics and Firearms Bureau (OCNFB) and the Criminal Gang and Intelligence Unit (CGIU) to form the Organised Crime Intelligence Unit (OCIU). It believes that there are other mergers that can be effective.
- 7.2.9 There should be urgent discussion on the need to review the relevant laws relating to the use (not trafficking) of small quantities of marijuana (decriminalisation) to help ease up the burden on the criminal justice system and the time of police officers.
- 7.2.10 Given the public safety needs and complaints of the various communities, the police should make greater, sustainable use of bicycle patrols in its community policing programmes.

### **7.3 Systems and Processes in the TTPS**

- 7.3.1 There should be a well-structured Policy, Planning, Research and Development Unit to guide and support the TTPS in all of its duties and responsibilities.
- 7.3.2 Since the country gained political independence, a number of studies and reports were done on the TTPS. Hundreds of very useful recommendations were made; many very relevant even today. There is need for a system now to synchronise all of these recommendations together with those of this 2017 Police Manpower Audit Committee to take the TTPS into a more efficient,

effective and sustainable institution. After this consolidation stage, the main step should be (a) developing an Implementation Plan, (b) establishing an Implementation Team and (c) setting up a Monitoring and Evaluation Team.

- 7.3.3 Having adequate data integrity is probably the basic data challenges facing the TTPS today. The inability for certain data to be verified is a frightening reality. This must be fixed with great urgency. How can manpower decisions and effective leadership be achieved without having reliable, strategic datasets?
- 7.3.4 An effective cross-agency Intelligence Co-ordinating Unit is urgently needed at this time. Such an important Unit should be headed by a well-trained and experienced law enforcement professional, or a strategic mixture of both law enforcement and military experience. This Unit should be empowered to elicit compliance from the varied intelligence sources.
- 7.3.5 A most fundamental need in the TTPS right now is for it to use standardised data forms. This is a very simple item to implement and should be done immediately.
- 7.3.6 There should be a redefinition and review of community policing so that at least, each Police Station will be in a state of readiness to respond effectively and appropriately to the needs of the various communities. To help initiate this renewed and fresh wave of policing, the Committee recommends that a series of thoughtful, media-supported national programmes be implemented. This “national wave” should begin in January 2018. Not only is the policy of community policing unclear, but its operation at the ground level needs substantial review and redirection.
- 7.3.7 Based on a review of the various programmes and plans of the TTPS (e.g., Strategic Plans), the Committee recommends that all programmes and

performance targets be precisely benchmarked (outcomes and timelines) so as to create a basis for both continuous improvement and performance accountability. Too many programmes have been mentioned but left hanging without any evidence of achievement.

- 7.3.8 The TTPS currently has an Asset Management and Fleet Management system that is not being fully utilised. This needs to be fully and quickly actioned.
- 7.3.9 A proper Fixed Asset Register (furniture and equipment) should be developed in accordance with Financial Regulations.
- 7.3.10 There are comprehensive software and other systems in the TTPS for HR information storage and processing but are not being fully utilised. Again, this can be quickly and fully rolled out.
- 7.3.11 There is the urgent need to move away as far as possible from a paper-based system for many of the operations in the TTPS to a computer-based one. To do some of this, it may require changes to regulations, laws, etc. This will, of course, lead to greater efficiency in the TTPS' operations.
- 7.3.12 Greater supervision and management of personnel and work items in the Human Resource Unit are badly needed. This need is also applicable to every other area in the TTPS.
- 7.3.13 There is the need for all employee files to be brought up-to-date so that the best decisions are made when allocating officers to the various Divisions, Units and Branches. Right now, because all of the files are not current, the best deployments cannot be made.
- 7.3.14 The systems and procedures for overtime and leave should be immediately reviewed to ensure that they are not abused. Persons (officers and/or civilian staff) who have breached the relevant regulations on overtime and/or leave

payments should be dealt with to the full extent of the laws and police regulations.

- 7.3.15 The method of payment for overtime and leave must be urgently relooked as it is in a paper-based / manual format that makes it difficult to track. A digitised system should be instituted.
- 7.3.16 The TTPS should take the necessary steps to restructure itself to reduce the annual overtime expenditure.
- 7.3.17 The entire system of vacation leave needs a complete review for both First and Second Division Officers. The current regulations on vacation leave are not being adhered to as many officers have accumulated significant number of vacation days leave. This has very serious consequences for the manpower flow and operations in the TTPS as well as for appropriate succession planning and acting appointments. There is need now, therefore, for an effective Vacation Leave Management Policy to deal with the current situation.
- 7.3.18 There is the need to revisit and amend the Police Complaints Authority Act to bring the SRPs under the PCA's ambit. As of now, the PCA deals with serious misconduct for officers under the Police Service Act. As SRPs have their own laws, any alleged infractions by SRPs are excluded from the PCA's remit.
- 7.3.19 The PCA Act and the Police Service Regulations should also be reviewed to allow the PCA to present its findings to the disciplinary tribunals on behalf of the prosecution or defence.
- 7.3.20 Greater collaborative arrangements with external agencies to the TTPS should be fostered, for example, between the Strategic Services Agency and the TTPS on joint intelligence. This is just one example. Others can be with

Customs and Excise, Immigration Division, Prison Service, Defence Force, municipal police, estate police, private security, etc. Formalised/institutionalised systems should be in place rather than personal connections and informal arrangements as what seems to be the case in many instances.

- 7.3.21 In the long term, there may be the need for an out-of-the-box look at the current 10-rank system in the TTPS to see if it is working effectively for the officers, the TTPS, and the country.
- 7.3.22 There should be strict adherence to the Police Regulations and laws on performance appraisals. Non-compliance is causing havoc in the TTPS. Several reports indicate that it is not being done on time with even several years of lapses for some officers. This lapse has implications for officers' morale and fairness.
- 7.3.23 The TTPS needs to urgently and independently conduct an internal assessment as to the main contributors to the higher failure rates in the promotional examinations in the Second Division, for example, in the 2016 English exam for Corporals, 54% failed; while 50% failed the Corporal's Law exam in 2015. Also, for the 2016 Law exam for Sergeants, 50% failed.
- 7.3.24 In addition, the high number of absenteeism at these exams should also be investigated. Something is definitely wrong there. For the improved skills-sets of police officers and in preparation for the various examinations, it should be mandatory that the results of these assessments should be sent to the Provost. This will allow him/her to develop and deliver compensatory professional development training programmes for such officers who are falling short of the mark. Currently, this is not being done and the Committee cannot understand why.

- 7.3.25 Clear lines of communication as well as reporting roles and responsibilities of officers and civilians must be drawn. Very often, this confusion leads to serious conflicts.
- 7.3.26 The TTPS should work feverishly to complete several of its policies related to human resource. In fact, an official Human Resource policy is not yet available. The several bits and pieces that have been approved thus far should be made easily available to all officers and those that are in draft form should be quickly finalised. Such approved policies should be placed on the TTPS's intranet for all officers as well as the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Social and Welfare Association should ensure that their membership is well informed of the policies.
- 7.3.27 There should be stricter supervision and accountability for the development and execution of policing duties and responsibilities with consequences (positive and negative). Despite the existence of systems and procedures, lack of supervised accountability is still pervasive in the TTPS.
- 7.3.28 The TTPS should set more realistic performance standards and targets for their officers as many of them said this was not the case. This is a basic human resource management requirement.
- 7.3.29 There is need for a systems approach for technology acquisition and deployment as serious mismatches take place, for example, between hardware and software.
- 7.3.30 The TTPS should remedy the disconnect between the capacity of the infrastructure, personnel who operate the technological systems, and pragmatic user requirements of the TTPS.

- 7.3.31 Further examination should be conducted to determine why a significant proportion of officers felt that the technologies that were introduced in the TTPS did not have any positive impact on their job.
- 7.3.32 Officers themselves complained about the inadequacy of transportation vehicles in the TTPS for them to carry out their duties. This basic requirement should be quickly fixed. In fact, we found that even while there were vehicles available for officers to use, there were not enough approved drivers. As such, all police officers in the TTPS should be approved drivers so that in any event, any officer could drive a police vehicle.
- 7.3.33 The TTPS has to develop a comprehensive seamless training and development plan for the entire police service, from Recruit straight through to Commissioner. There is no evidence that there is enough continuous training for all officers as they remain in the police service. It seems that officers generally undertake training on their own in areas that they wish and hope to get a placement in a particular job function. There should be particular training and development tracks for each officer to select from and / or training tracks based on the current and future needs/directions of the TTPS.
- 7.3.34 More joint operations between the police and other related agencies like defence force, prison, customs, immigration, etc. are needed to boost the fight against crime. There should be adequate and appropriate team-building among agencies and officers involved in these joint operations rather than just arbitrarily putting various officers from various agencies to work together.
- 7.3.35 An effective system should be designed and implemented whereby all employees and line managers are made aware of existing and new rules, regulations, policies and manuals that are relevant to both their areas of responsibilities as well as of the entire police service.



- 7.3.36 Systems should be put in place for greater compliance with prudent financial management procedures, for example, ensuring utilization of budgetary releases, maintenance of relevant vote books as specified by the audited report, etc.
- 7.3.37 The TTPS should ensure that funding for IT-related projects should include maintenance and licensing renewal as well.
- 7.3.38 There should be adequate resources for the installation and maintenance of the CCTV cameras across Trinidad and Tobago. This should be a massive project undertaken by the relevant authorities as a strategic means to detect and prevent crime.
- 7.3.39 Consideration should be given to adjusting the packages for both recruits and current officers who possess additional educational and vocational qualifications that will impart in the performance of their duties. Currently, there exists a system where points are given to officers with particular qualifications like a law degree, etc. However, this should be revised to encourage officers to engage in training and education to meet the current and future needs of the TTPS more directly.
- 7.3.40 There should be improvements in the vetting and background checks of all recruits to the police service. We have seen some improvements in the system over the years, but it can be further strengthened.
- 7.3.41 Further, there should be a system to monitor the activities of all officers to ensure that their finances and activities are above board. There are many reports that some officers are involved in wrongdoings and systems must be instituted to identify and weed these officers out of the TTPS as soon as evidence is presented and the due process is followed.

- 7.3.42 All police officers should undergo regular firearm training to ensure that they remain technically competent at all times. The Committee was informed that many officers did not use their firearms for many years. A clear training plan and its implementation are badly needed here.
- 7.3.43 All officers should undergo training in the use of Tasers, baton, etc. on a regular basis as part of an overall training plan for all officers.
- 7.3.44 Further, all officers should be certified in First Aid and CPR so that they can perform such assistance as first responders.
- 7.3.45 Additionally, all officers should be trained in basic mediation and conflict resolution so that they can use the relevant techniques to defuse situations among peers as well as when dealing with the public.
- 7.3.46 The TTPS needs to quickly engage on a service-wide campaign on sharing to all of its employees information of its Employee Assistance Programme. Many officers said that do not know anything about it. In fact, the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Social and Welfare Association must also do a better job of informing its members of this facility available to them.
- 7.3.47 Discussions should be held as to whether the material used to make the police uniform needs to be changed to suit Trinidad and Tobago's tropical climate. This is in an attempt to ensure that officers are more comfortable on their job. Of course, specialised Units will need to use their required wear when required.
- 7.3.48 The TTPS should take steps to ensure that officers attend to all court matters as required. There are many instances where officers fail to attend for several reasons. There is the need for a computerised, real-time system to track and ensure that officers are always available to attend to their court duties with reminders, etc.

- 7.3.49 The TTPS should review its “Transfer” policy and practice to ensure that transfers do not unnecessarily disrupt the smooth flow of things in particular Divisions, Units and Branches. There have been instances whereby by the time officers get acclimatised to a particular post or place, they are transferred. This is especially relevant to community policing where building relationships with the community takes time and if officers are transferred soon after such relationships are built, it’s a start over process for the other officers. Of course, this should not interfere with officers’ rights to move to another Unit, for promotions, etc. To transfer an officer as a disciplinary measure is a policy of dubious merit.
- 7.3.50 The TTPS should take into consideration several demographic factors like age, sex, education level and number of years in service when devising policies and strategies for manpower involvement and utilisation since all officers are not the same; in other words, have demographic-sensitive policies.
- 7.3.51 There should be a review of systems and procedures for the use of police officers as well as private security personnel for large events – both public and private - in Trinidad and Tobago. This will include police on official duty and those on overtime as well as extra duties. This should be done in light of the various applicable laws and regulations (local, regional and international) as well as best practice in the industry.

## **7.4 Community Policing and Partnerships**

- 7.4.1 The TTPS should engage in more meaningful relationships with the public and by extension the various and diverse communities across Trinidad and Tobago using a wide range of contemporary communication strategies. Town meetings and weekly press briefings have limited impact in building public

confidence especially in the former where attendance is quite low and unrepresentative of the various communities. Re-energised and reconfigured patrol-driven community policing programmes will be quite useful.

- 7.4.2 All officers must be adequately trained and retrained in customer service as there are numerous complaints from members of the public. This will help in building public confidence in the TTPS. In fact, officers should be evaluated on this criterion and be rewarded or punished as the case may be. It should also form a key component in their performance appraisals. A front-line service desk at stations will help.
- 7.4.3 With regard to discipline, there should be an appropriate public education campaign to educate members of the public as well as many police officers themselves about the three routes available for complaints against police officers. As of now, there is much public confusion about the similarities and differences among the Police Complaints Division, the Professional Standards Bureau and the Police Complaints Authority.
- 7.4.4 All police officers except in special tactical circumstances should have and display their identification badges. This will significantly contribute to increasing public confidence in the police.
- 7.4.5 There should be a mental transformation in police officers from seeing communities as only geographical areas. Communities must be seen as communities with various interests as well as social, physical and public safety needs. This is a foundation for effective community policing.
- 7.4.6 The TTPS should be engaging the various communities in a more proactive way rather than in a reactive way. For example, each police station must have its own a strategy for the communities therein and the officers must be appropriately trained to interact with the community accordingly.

- 7.4.7 Special consideration should be given by the TTPS, the Police Complaints Authority and other agencies in Trinidad and Tobago to deal with victimisation to members of the public who make reports on police officers. This was a serious concern expressed by citizens.
- 7.4.8 There should be a wide public education campaign on the various telephone numbers and other ways in which the public may contact the police. Many members of the public are sceptical about the confidentiality and anonymity of their numbers. The public must be reassured of this for their support in terms of providing information and intelligence to the TTPS.
- 7.4.9 There should be creative ways whereby the Police Service can provide timely and accurate crime information on the various communities to the communities themselves. Very often, communities are exposed to national and divisional crime information but not on their police station districts. This would enable the communities to work closer with the police officers in their stations to deal with the specific crime problems they have in their own jurisdiction. This is an essential feature of community policing that is sorely lacking in Trinidad and Tobago.

## **7.5 Governance, Discipline Structure and Public Confidence**


- 7.5.1 In all these circumstances, the Audit Committee strongly recommends that an Implementation Team comprising of eleven (11) persons of the requisite high-level professional skills be immediately appointed by the Cabinet to help speed up this process.

- 7.5.2 A radical solution proposed by several stakeholders is to revamp the entire Police Service by applying a substantial severance pay, buy-out exercise for the many under-performing, uncommitted, undisciplined officers; leaving the high-performing career-oriented ones inside while generating a more appropriate, higher-level system of recruitment and training. To do less, it was said, would likely result in merely putting a plaster on the sore.
- 7.5.3 A five to seven-year policy reconstruction and well-targeted plan to deal with the major issues facing the TTPS must be developed and implemented.
- 7.5.4 The Committee agreed that a significant reason for the inefficiency, ineffectiveness and lack of professional integrity and commitment in the TTPS stems from deficiencies in the recruitment, training and assessment systems. The evidence strongly suggests a radical change based on substantial pre-service training. That is, the Committee recommends that the Police Academy be placed under the University of Trinidad and Tobago (UTT), similar to the teacher training model. This pre-service training and certification will be upgraded accordingly, thus helping to ensure an improvement in police operations, professional image and integrity and career commitment. The TTPS can accordingly continue with modified forms of induction and orientation. This change should be implemented before September 2019.
- 7.5.5 With regard to the discipline of SRPs, it was recommended earlier that the Police Complaints Authority Act needs to be amended to include the SRPs.
- 7.5.6 Currently, various municipal police officers report to different persons. Some officers report to the local government body, some to the Statutory Authority, etc. Many matters have ended up in the courts. Urgent steps should be taken to streamline this troubling manpower issue.

- 7.5.7 The Office of Law Enforcement and Policy (OLEP) has a useful purpose. Its role should be strengthened with regard to training and policy advice but with the necessary approved accountabilities for itself and the various Units under its jurisdiction.
- 7.5.8 The TTPS should strengthen its efforts in dealing with corruption and abuse of power in the service. The two internal routes available are the Police Complaints Division and the Professional Standards Bureau. The inordinate length of time it takes for disciplinary matters to be heard and determined is embarrassing to the Service. Additional steps should be taken to abide by the guidelines and court rulings.
- 7.5.9 There should be greater accountability of tribunal and other officers dealing with such complaints matters. Dedicated current TTPS officers, qualified civilians as well as attorneys, retired police officers, magistrates and judges can be used to serve on these tribunals so that matters can be dealt with expeditiously and within the timeframe provided.
- 7.5.10 The Committee noted previous studies found that the collusion between police officers and gang members were getting stronger. As a result, the TTPS must urgently institute systems to deal with this corrupt practice.
- 7.5.11 There should be an urgent review for much closer and productive collaboration among the three systems available now for citizen complaints: Police Complaints Division, the Professional Standards Bureau and the Police Complaints Authority.
- 7.5.12 The TTPS should take a further examination of the trend that complaints against officers were highest in certain Police Divisions and specialist Units over the years to determine if there are underlying localised causes for these trends; are they the same officers, are there facilitating conditions there, etc.







# LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS INTERVIEWED

1. Officials of the Tobago House of Assembly (THA)
2. Minority Party – Tobago House of Assembly (THA)
3. Airports Authority of Trinidad and Tobago (AATT)
4. Tobago Emergency Management Authority (TEMA)
5. Port Authority of Trinidad and Tobago
6. Eco-Industrial Development Company of Trinidad and Tobago
7. Citizens Security Programme
8. Comprehensive Economic Development Plan
9. Pigeon Point Board
10. Tobago Chamber of Commerce
11. Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Industry and Commerce
12. All Tobago Fisherfolk Association
13. Tobago Hotel and Tourism Institute
14. Tobago Hospitality and Tourism Association
15. Tobago Lawyers Association
16. Dr. Kenneth R. Lalla, SC. CMT – former Chairman, PSC
17. Mr. Basdeo Panday – former Prime Minister
18. Mr. Overand Padmore – former Minister of National Security
19. Mr. Gary Griffith – former Minister of National Security
20. Mr. Trevor Paul – former Commissioner of Police, TTPS
21. Mr. Everaldo Snaggs – former Commissioner of Police, TTPS
22. Mr. James Philbert – former Commissioner of Police, TTPS
23. Mr. Clive Dottin – former Senator and Member of the PSC
24. American Chamber of Commerce Trinidad and Tobago (AMCHAM T&T):
  - Mr. Ravi Suryadevara – President
  - Ms. Aurelia Bruce – Research Officer

25. Chaguanas Chamber of Industry and Commerce:
  - Mr. Richie Sookhai
  - Mr. Vishnu Charran
  - Mr. Z. Ali
26. Couva Point Lisas Chamber of Commerce:
  - Mr. Ramchand Rajbal Maraj – 1<sup>st</sup> President
  - Mr. Mukesh Ramsingh – 2<sup>nd</sup> President
27. Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Industry and Commerce:
  - Mr. Robert Trestrail – President
  - Mr. Gabriel Faria – Chief Executive Officer
  - Mr. Andrew Johnson – Attorney at Law and Member
28. The Honourable Fitzgerald Hinds, Minister in the Ministry of the Attorney General and Legal Affairs;
29. The Honourable Mr. Kelvin Charles, Chief Secretary, Tobago House of Assembly (THA)
30. Senator Wade Mark – Opposition
31. Mr. Rodney Charles, M.P. – Opposition
32. Mr. Roger Gaspard, SC. – Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP)
33. Mrs. Marcia Ayers-Caesar – former Chief Magistrate
34. Dr. Maria Therese Gomes – Chairman, Police Service Commission (PSC)
35. Mr. David West – Director, Police Complaints Authority (PCA)
36. Ms. Arlette Lewis – Director, Forensic Science Centre
37. Mr. Glen Parmessar – Deputy Director, Forensic Science Centre
38. Mr. Peter Richards – Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Rural Development and Local Government
39. Mr. Motilal Ramsingh – Chief Executive Officer, Mayaro / Rio Claro Regional Corporation
40. Mr. Churchill Pacheco – Inspector (Ag.), Municipal Police, Mayaro / Rio Claro Regional Corporation
41. Strategic Services Agency (SSA)

42. Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service
43. Customs and Excise Division
44. Immigration Division
45. Office of Law Enforcement (OLEP), Ministry of National Security
46. Commissioner of Police
47. Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Social and Welfare Association
48. Provost, Police Academy
49. Homicide Bureau, Trinidad and Tobago Police Service

***Photo 8: Representatives of the Chaguanas Chamber of Industry and Commerce at a Stakeholder Consultation Interview***



**Mr. Anand Ramesar, Member – PMAC, chairing discussions with representatives of the Chaguanas Chamber of Industry and Commerce, namely, Mr. Richie Sookhai, President, and Members – Mr. V. Charran and Mr. Z. Ali. Taking notes is Mr. Ian Ramdhanie, Researcher – PMAC Implementation Team**

# **Police Manpower Audit Project X**

## **A Ground Level Manpower Audit: A Scientific Intervention**

**By Professor Ramesh Deosaran**

**(Approved by the Police Manpower Audit Committee  
as a Model for Continuous Assessment of Police-Citizen  
Relationships in Various Police Divisions)**

**© 2017**

***“Police leaders must recognize that no single factor has been more crucial to reducing crime levels than the partnership between law enforcement agencies and the communities they serve.”***

**President of the International Chiefs of Police,  
Yousry Zakhary, 2014.**

***"The key to successful law enforcement is collaboration ... to address the situation in our country, the Police Service cannot do it alone. We need everyone to be on board. You can't stand on the sidelines."***

**Commissioner (Acting) Stephen Williams.**

**April, 2017**



©2017



## Objectives:

- 1. To find out how satisfied victims felt by treatment at police station and subsequently;**
- 2. To what extent and how often did the police contact the victim after the first report;**
- 3. What was the staff (sanctioned and actual) at each police station;**

## Objectives (continued):

- 4. How long did the police take to respond or visit the scene for enquiries;**
- 5. Was there a shortage of manpower or equipment in the police responses;**
- 6. What is the current status of each reported crime and reasons.**

## Design and Sample:

- 1. A Police Division is not homogeneous. Police Stations districts that are in Police Divisions can be categorised into one of the following categories: Urban, Rural or Mixed.**
- 2. For seven out of the nine Police Divisions, Police Stations can be classified as operating in either Urban, Rural or Mixed districts. One police station will be randomly selected from each category. (7 police divisions x 3 types of police stations categories each = 21 police stations)**
- 3. For the other two Police Divisions, there were no Police Station operating in Urban districts. As such, one Rural and one Mixed Police Station will be randomly selected from these two Police Divisions. (2 police divisions x 2 types of police stations categories each = 4 police stations)**
- 4. Total Number of Police Stations in Sample = 25**

## **Design and Sample (continued):**

- 5. Use database with crime reports and demographics for each police station selected.**
  
- 6. Select three reported crimes with victims from each of the police stations. (25 police stations x 3 reported crimes each = 75)**
  
- 7. The three selected crimes are:**
  - House break-ins**
  - Domestic Violence**
  - Wounding and Shooting**

## Design and Sample (continued):

- 8. Select five victims for each of the three reported crimes (25 police stations x 3 crime types x 5 victims = 375 crime incidents)**
- 9. For each victim/crime, get name, address, etc.**

## **Method & Analysis:**

- 1. Compare the crime database / demands and compare with station manpower;**
- 2. Compare results across police stations;**
- 3. Check manpower gaps, e.g., sick leave, etc. at each police station;**
- 4. Interview officers at the station e.g. constables, corporals, sergeants and possibly division commanders, etc; and**
- 5. Use Standing Orders / Job Specifications to assess manpower performance**

## Method :

1. Questionnaire
2. Database
3. Interviews
4. Victimization survey in each of 9 police divisions and 31 police stations
5. Conduct of focus group discussions with constables, sergeants, senior superintendents

## Period for Crime Data:

**The year 2016.**



# FINAL REPORT OF THE POLICE MANPOWER AUDIT COMMITTEE - VOLUME 2

## Now Is The Time No Sacred Cows

Presented to the Honourable Dr. Keith C. Rowley, Prime  
Minister, Government of the Republic of  
Trinidad and Tobago

OCTOBER 17, 2017



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section 9: Overview of Volume 2	15
Section 10: Methodology	25
Section 11: Review of Past Studies	28
Section 12: Public Opinion: Newspaper Articles	34
Section 13: Analysis of the Human Resource Unit, TTPS	44
Section 14: Analysis of Official Police Records	74
Section 15: Information Technology (IT) and the TTPS	157
Section 16: Analysis of Focus Groups Sessions	163
Section 17: Town Hall Meetings	170
Section 18: Analysis of PMAC Police Survey	184
Section 19: Analysis of Stakeholder Consultations	253
Section 20: Civilian Oversight Agencies	334
Section 21: Challenges Encountered by the Manpower Audit Committee	346
Section 22: Selected References	351
Section 23: Appendices	355

# LIST OF FIGURES

<i>Figure 1: Relationship Chart between TTPS and its Stakeholders</i>	<b>20</b>
<i>Figure 2: Overall Opinions by Newspaper</i>	<b>37</b>
<i>Figure 3: General categories of newspaper articles along with the distribution of positive or negative opinions within each category</i>	<b>39</b>
<i>Figure 4: Sub Categories for the 3 most popular general categories expressed in the newspaper articles</i>	<b>40</b>
<i>Figure 5: Manpower Distribution of Regular Police Officers by Percentage (%)</i>	<b>80</b>
<i>Figure 6: Manpower distribution of Regular Police Officers by percentage within the Units/Branches/Sections</i>	<b>81</b>
<i>Figure 7: Comparison of TTPS Regular Officers to Full Time &amp; Part Time SRPs by Division</i>	<b>85</b>
<i>Figure 8: Comparison of TTPS Regular Officers to Full Time &amp; Part Time SRPs by Branches/Units/Sections</i>	<b>87</b>
<i>Figure 9: Full Time &amp; Part Time SRPs by Unit/Section</i>	<b>89</b>
<i>Figure 10: TTPS Officers by Gender</i>	<b>91</b>
<i>Figure 11: TTPS Officers Gender by Substantive Rank</i>	<b>93</b>
<i>Figure 12: Age Structure of the TTPS as of February 2017</i>	<b>94</b>
<i>Figure 13: Number of Officers (in Substantive Rank) Aged 50-54 Years Retiring in the next Five Years</i>	<b>95</b>
<i>Figure 14: First Division Officers (Sanctioned Strength) for Compulsory Retirement: 2017 – 2021</i>	<b>96</b>
<i>Figure 15: Second Division Officers (Sanctioned Strength) for Compulsory Retirement: 2017-2021</i>	<b>98</b>
<i>Figure 16: Number of Officers Separated from the TTPS by Separation category for the Period 2014 to 2016</i>	<b>99</b>
<i>Figure 17: Vacancies in the TTPS (as at February 2017)</i>	<b>101</b>
<i>Figure 18: Acting Appointments in the TTPS (as at February 2017)</i>	<b>103</b>

<i>Figure 19: Process Diagram of the Administration of Overtime Payments</i>	<b>106</b>
<i>Figure 20: Total Overtime Expenditure for Financial Years 2013/2014 and 2014/2015</i>	<b>108</b>
<i>Figure 21: Summary of Funds Expended for Overtime by Rank for the Financial Years 2013/2014 and 2014/2015</i>	<b>109</b>
<i>Figure 22: Estimated Per Capita Expenditure by Rank for the Financial Years 2013/2014 &amp; 2014/2015</i>	<b>111</b>
<i>Figure 23: Total Expenditure for Commuted Overtime and Base Salary for Commuted Police Officers the period 2014 to June 2017</i>	<b>112</b>
<i>Figure 24: Growth in Commuted Overtime and Base Salary for Commuted Police Officers the period 2014 to June 2017</i>	<b>114</b>
<i>Figure 25: Comparison of Releases for the Various Head/Sub Head in the TTPS for financial years 2013/2014 to 2015/2016</i>	<b>124</b>
<i>Figure 26: Road Traffic Accidents 2010-2016</i>	<b>131</b>
<i>Figure 27: Comparison of Complaints against Police Officers for the period 2010 to 2015</i>	<b>133</b>
<i>Figure 28: Status of Complaints for the period 2010 to 2015</i>	<b>134</b>
<i>Figure 29: Number of Investigations Completed for the period 2010 to 2015</i>	<b>135</b>
<i>Figure 30: Complaints by Division for the period 2014 to 2015</i>	<b>136</b>
<i>Figure 31: Allegations of Disciplinary Offences for the period 2014 to 2015</i>	<b>138</b>
<i>Figure 32: Allegations of Criminal Offences for the period 2014 to 2015</i>	<b>140</b>
<i>Figure 33: Number of Officers suspended in the TTPS from 2008 to 2017</i>	<b>144</b>
<i>Figure 34: Officers Suspended within the TTPS by Police Division</i>	<b>147</b>
<i>Figure 35: Histogram of the Number of Extended Sick Days Requested for 2016</i>	<b>151</b>
<i>Figure 36: TTPS Manpower for April 2017 and Crime Statistics for 2016</i>	<b>153</b>
<i>Figure 37: Correlations between TTPS Manpower (April 2017) and Crime (2016)</i>	<b>154</b>
<i>Figure 38: Age of Officers</i>	<b>188</b>
<i>Figure 39: Rank of Officers</i>	<b>189</b>

<i>Figure 40: Number of Years' Experience in the TTPS</i>	<b>190</b>
<i>Figure 41: Highest Level of Education Attained</i>	<b>190</b>
<i>Figure 42: Overall Rating of Staffing within the TTPS</i>	<b>193</b>
<i>Figure 43: Satisfaction that TTPS is Organised to Deal with Crime (%)</i>	<b>195</b>
<i>Figure 44: Effectiveness of Use of Civilians in the TTPS to Help Police (%)</i>	<b>197</b>
<i>Figure 45: Level of Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction with Current Supervisor (%)</i>	<b>199</b>
<i>Figure 46: Leadership of the TTPS</i>	<b>201</b>
<i>Figure 47: Deployment of Officers based on Training, Qualification and Experience (%)</i>	<b>203</b>
<i>Figure 48: Favouritism in Assigning Officers to Divisions/Units/Sections (%)</i>	<b>205</b>
<i>Figure 49: Work Shift Lengths &amp; Job Efficiency (%)</i>	<b>207</b>
<i>Figure 50: Availability of Tools and Equipment to Perform Duties (%)</i>	<b>209</b>
<i>Figure 51: Number of Hours Spent on Paper Work Per Day (%)</i>	<b>211</b>
<i>Figure 52: Impact of Technology on Performance of Duties (%)</i>	<b>212</b>
<i>Figure 53: Availability of Transportation Vehicles to Perform (%)</i>	<b>215</b>
<i>Figure 54: Training and Development Opportunities (%)</i>	<b>217</b>
<i>Figure 55: Use of Non-Lethal Equipment in Execution of Duties (%)</i>	<b>219</b>
<i>Figure 56: Internal Communication in TTPS (%)</i>	<b>221</b>
<i>Figure 57: Abuse of Sick &amp; Injury Leave (%)</i>	<b>223</b>
<i>Figure 58: Abuse of Study Leave (%)</i>	<b>224</b>
<i>Figure 59: Abuse of Medical Exemptions (%)</i>	<b>226</b>
<i>Figure 60: Corruption within the TTPS (%)</i>	<b>227</b>
<i>Figure 61: Disciplinary Process</i>	<b>229</b>
<i>Figure 62: Performance Standards / Targets (%)</i>	<b>231</b>
<i>Figure 63: Last Appraisal of Performance Review</i>	<b>233</b>
<i>Figure 64: Overall View on Performance Appraisal System</i>	<b>235</b>
<i>Figure 65: Rewards and Recognition Policies (%)</i>	<b>237</b>
<i>Figure 66: Compensation Package</i>	<b>239</b>
<i>Figure 67: Satisfaction with Current Job</i>	<b>241</b>
<i>Figure 68: Public Confidence in the TTPS (%)</i>	<b>243</b>

<i>Figure 69: System to Appoint a Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners of Police</i>	<b>245</b>
<i>Figure 70: Suitability of One Association to Represent First and Second Division Officers (%)</i>	<b>247</b>
<i>Figure 71: Entry and Promotion in the TTPS</i>	<b>248</b>
<i>Figure 72: Stakeholder Classification by Number of Individuals</i>	<b>256</b>
<i>Figure 73: Stakeholder Categories by Individuals (%)</i>	<b>257</b>
<i>Figure 74 Structural Headings and Responses – TTPS</i>	<b>266</b>
<i>Figure 75 Structural Headings by Percentage (%) - TTPS</i>	<b>267</b>
<i>Figure 76: Ratings by Percentage (%) – TTPS</i>	<b>275</b>
<i>Figure 77: Structural Headings &amp; Responses – Other Law Enforcement Agencies</i>	<b>277</b>
<i>Figure 78: Structural Headings by Percentage (%) – Other Law Enforcement Agencies</i>	<b>278</b>
<i>Figure 79: Ratings by Percentage (%) – Other Law Enforcement Agencies</i>	<b>285</b>
<i>Figure 80: Structural Headings &amp; Responses – Public Officials</i>	<b>289</b>
<i>Figure 81: Structural Headings by Percentage – Public Officials</i>	<b>290</b>
<i>Figure 82: Ratings by Percentage (%) – Public Officials</i>	<b>301</b>
<i>Figure 83: Structural Headings &amp; Quantity of Response – Business Sector (Trinidad)</i>	<b>305</b>
<i>Figure 84: Structural Headings by Percentage – Business Sector (Trinidad)</i>	<b>305</b>
<i>Figure 85: Ratings by Percentage (%) – Business Sector</i>	<b>314</b>
<i>Figure 86: Structural Headings &amp; Responses – Prominent Citizens</i>	<b>316</b>
<i>Figure 87: Structural Headings by Percentage – Prominent Citizens</i>	<b>317</b>
<i>Figure 88: Ratings by Percentage (%) – Prominent Citizens</i>	<b>325</b>
<i>Figure 89: Structural Headings &amp; Responses – Tobago Stakeholders</i>	<b>327</b>
<i>Figure 90: Structural Headings by Percentage (%) – Tobago Stakeholders</i>	<b>328</b>
<i>Figure 91: Ratings by Percentage (%) – Tobago Stakeholders</i>	<b>332</b>

# LIST OF TABLES

<i>Table 1: Review of Past Studies/Reports into the TTPS: Matrix of Main Recommendations and Their Status</i>	<b>30</b>
<i>Table 2: Distribution of Articles by Newspaper</i>	<b>35</b>
<i>Table 3: Most frequent topic categories for Newspaper Articles</i>	<b>35</b>
<i>Table 4: Examples of articles from the Most Popular Categories</i>	<b>36</b>
<i>Table 5: Examples of Article Topics with varying overall opinions</i>	<b>38</b>
<i>Table 6: Police Manpower /Population Ratios for select Countries</i>	<b>76</b>
<i>Table 7: Manpower Distribution for Police Divisions</i>	<b>78</b>
<i>Table 8: Manpower Distribution for Police Branches/Units/Task Forces</i>	<b>78</b>
<i>Table 9: Manpower Distribution of Regular Police Officers by Percentage</i>	<b>80</b>
<i>Table 10: Manpower Distribution of Regular Police Officers by percentage within the Units/Branches/Sections</i>	<b>82</b>
<i>Table 11: Regular Police Ranks by Division</i>	<b>83</b>
<i>Table 12: SRP Ranks by Division</i>	<b>83</b>
<i>Table 13: Comparison of the Requirements between Regular Officers &amp; SRPS</i>	<b>84</b>
<i>Table 14: Population Size of Officers by Division</i>	<b>86</b>
<i>Table 15: Population Size of TTPS Regular Officers to Full Time &amp; Part Time SRPS by Branches/Units/Sections</i>	<b>88</b>
<i>Table 16: Population Full Time &amp; Part Time SRPS by Units/Sections</i>	<b>90</b>
<i>Table 17: Number of Officers by Separation for the Period 2014 to 2016</i>	<b>99</b>
<i>Table 18: Manpower Deficit per Division/Section/Unit within the TTPS</i>	<b>102</b>
<i>Table 19: Overtime Rate per hour by Rank</i>	<b>110</b>
<i>Table 20: Divisions/Branches/Units/Sections that received Commuted Overtime Allowance</i>	<b>113</b>

<i>Table 21: Irregularities of Overtime within the TTPS</i>	<b>115</b>
<i>Table 22: TTPS Hourly Rate of Extra Duties by Rank</i>	<b>118</b>
<i>Table 23: Number of Vehicles Purchased for the Period 2010-2016</i>	<b>120</b>
<i>Table 24: Breakdown of Releases for Financial Year 2013/2014 to 2015/2016</i>	<b>125</b>
<i>Table 25: Breakdown of Releases from the TTPS</i>	<b>125</b>
<i>Table 26: Road Traffic Accidents from 2010 to 2016</i>	<b>130</b>
<i>Table 27: Comparison of Complaints against Police Officers for the period 2010 to 2015</i>	<b>133</b>
<i>Table 28: Status of Complaints for the period 2010 to 2015</i>	<b>134</b>
<i>Table 29: Number of Investigations completed for the period 2010 to 2015</i>	<b>135</b>
<i>Table 30: Complaints by Division for the period 2014 to 2015</i>	<b>137</b>
<i>Table 31: Allegations of Disciplinary Offences for the period 2014 to 2015</i>	<b>138</b>
<i>Table 32: Allegations of Criminal Offences for the period 2014 to 2015</i>	<b>141</b>
<i>Table 33: Number of Officers on Suspension as of February 2017</i>	<b>143</b>
<i>Table 34: Number of Officers Suspended in the TTPS from 2008 to 2017</i>	<b>145</b>
<i>Table 35: Categories of Offences resulting in Suspension within the TTPS</i>	<b>146</b>
<i>Table 36: Statistical Information for Extended Sick Leave Requests for 2016</i>	<b>149</b>
<i>Table 3: Manpower and Crime Statistics for the 9 Divisions of the TTPS</i>	<b>152</b>
<i>Table 38: Proposed vs. Actual Samples and Equivalence</i>	<b>186</b>
<i>Table 39: Stakeholder Classification by Number of Individuals</i>	<b>256</b>
<i>Table 40: Stakeholder Categories</i>	<b>257</b>
<i>Table 41: Structural Headings and Responses –TTPS</i>	<b>266</b>
<i>Table 42: Ratings by Percentage (%) – TTPS</i>	<b>275</b>
<i>Table 43: Structural Headings &amp; Responses – Other Law Enforcement Agencies</i>	<b>277</b>
<i>Table 44: Ratings by Percentage (%) – Other Law Enforcement Agencies</i>	<b>284</b>
<i>Table 45: Structural Headings &amp; Responses – Public Officials</i>	<b>289</b>
<i>Table 46: Ratings by Percentage (%) – Public Officials</i>	<b>301</b>
<i>Table 47: Structural Headings &amp; Quantity of Responses – Business Sector (Trinidad)</i>	<b>304</b>
<i>Table 48: Ratings by Percentage (%) – Business Sector</i>	<b>314</b>

<i>Table 49: Structural Headings &amp; Responses – Prominent Citizens</i>	<b>316</b>
<i>Table 50: Ratings by Percentage (%) – Prominent Citizens</i>	<b>324</b>
<i>Table 51: Structural Headings &amp; Responses – Tobago Stakeholders</i>	<b>327</b>
<i>Table 52: Ratings by Percentage (%) – Tobago Stakeholders</i>	<b>331</b>



# ACROYMNS

AATT	Airports Authority of Trinidad and Tobago
ACIB	Anti-Corruption Investigations Bureau
ACP	Assistant Commissioner of Police
AFAC	Australian Fire Authorities Council
AIPM	Australian Institute of Police Management
AKU	Anti-Kidnapping Bureau
AMCHAM	American Chamber of Commerce (Trinidad and Tobago)
ASST. SUPT.	Assistant Superintendent
BOS	Board of Studies
CAPA	Crime and Problem Analysis
CAPE	Caribbean Advanced Proficiency Examination
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CCTV	Closed Caption Television
CGIU	Criminal Gang Intelligence Unit
CID	Criminal Investigations Department
CMT	Chaconia Medal
COP	Commissioner of Police
CPL	Corporal
CRO	Criminals Record Office
CSEC	Caribbean Secondary Education Certificate
CSI	Crime Scene Investigator
CSP	Community Safety Partnership
CTU	Counter Trafficking Unit
CXC	Caribbean Examination Council
DCP	Deputy Commissioner of Police
DPP	Director of Public Prosecutions
EAP	Employee Assistance Programme
EMA	Environmental Management Authority

FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations
FDO	First Division Officer
FIB	Financial Investigations Bureau
FREQ	Frequency
GCE	General Certificate of Education (London)
GORTT	Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago
HDC	Housing Development Corporation
HR	Human Resource
IATF	Inter-Agency Task Force
IDC	Immigration Detention Centre
iHRIS	Integrated Human Resource Information System
INSP	Inspector
IT	Information Technology
K9	Canine
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
LBGT	Lesbians, Bisexual, Gay and Transgender
MOPS	Multi-Option Police Service
MP	Member of Parliament
NTA	National Training Agency
NO.	Number
OCNFU	Organised Crime, Narcotics and Firearms Unit
OLEP	Office of Law Enforcement Policy
OSH	Occupational Safety and Health
PAB	Promotional Advisory Board
PC	Police Constable
PCA	Police Complaints Authority
PMAC	Police Manpower Audit Committee
PMAS	Performance Management Appraisal System
PMCD	Public Management Consulting Division
PSC	Police Service Commission
RRU	Rapid Response Unit

RTA	Road Traffic Accident
SAUTT	Special Anti-Crime Unit of Trinidad and Tobago
SC	Senior Counsel
SDO	Second Division Officer
SGT	Sergeant
SNR SUPT	Senior Superintendent
SRP	Special Reserve Police
SSA	Strategic Services Agency
SUPT	Superintendent
TEMA	Tobago Emergency Management Agency
THA	Tobago House of Assembly
TM	Telephone Messaging
TTDF	Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force
TTPS	Trinidad and Tobago Police Service
TTPSSWA	Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Social and Welfare Association
US	United States
USA	United States of America
UTT	University of Trinidad and Tobago
UWI	University of the West Indies
VMCOTT	Vehicle Management Company of Trinidad and Tobago

# VOLUME 2

**SECTION 9:**  
**OVERVIEW OF VOLUME 2**

# OVERVIEW OF VOLUME 2

## 9 Description of Volume 2

9.1 Volume 2 of the Final Report presents the findings and recommendations generated as a result of a comprehensive set of data analyses, surveys, public meetings, stakeholder consultations, and other activities. Specifically, the PMAC and the Implementation Team engaged in a number of projects in its examination of the relevant manpower issues affecting the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS).

## 9.2 Engagement of the Implementation Team

9.2.1 Noting that the Members of the PMAC were all employed on a full time basis and considering the decision of Cabinet that the Ministry of National Security will provide the necessary administrative support for the execution of this Audit<sup>1</sup>, the PMAC submitted to the Ministry a proposal for the engagement of an Implementation Team.

9.2.2 The proposal informed the need for persons with skills in the areas of project coordination and supervision, research, data analysis and administration. The Project Supervisor and Researcher commenced duties on February 15, 2017, and March 01, 2017, subject to the approval of the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of National Security, to assist the Audit Committee in the preparation of its Status Report, dated March 23, 2017, to the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.

---

<sup>1</sup> Cabinet Minute No. 24 of January 05, 2017

9.2.3 In accepting the Status Report, Cabinet agreed to the establishment of an Implementation Team to support the PMAC in the execution of the Manpower Audit<sup>2</sup>. The Data Analysts, Business Operations Assistant II and the Project Coordinator assumed duties on April 24, 2017, and May 01, 2017, respectively.

9.2.4 The Implementation Team consisted of:

- 1 Project Supervisor
- 1 Project Coordinator
- 1 Researcher
- 2 Data Analysts
- 1 Business Operations Assistant II

### **9.3 Linkages with the March 23, 2017 Status Report**

9.3.1 The March 2017 Report outlined the work completed by the PMAC at that time, as well as, preliminary findings and recommendations. This Volume provides substantial findings and recommendations on the areas covered in the review of the TTPS.

### **9.4 TTPS and its Stakeholders**

9.4.1 The TTPS, like all other institutions, does not exist in a vacuum or in isolation. Thus, it is important to understand the context or its relationship with key entities in Trinidad and Tobago, e.g. there are institutions that would impact on the TTPS, while there are institutions that the TTPS influences and/or serves. See Figure 1 for an illustrations of key relationships.

---

<sup>2</sup> Cabinet Minute Nos. 648 and 963 dated April 12, 2017 and May 25, 2017, respectively

9.4.2 The PMAC in its review noted that there are at least five (5) institutions that impact the TTPS. These are:

- i. **Bicameral Parliament:** this is the Legislative arm of the State that makes and amends laws that govern Trinidad and Tobago. The TTPS is there to uphold all of the laws so they are directly affected by the works of this institution;
- ii. **Government and by extension the Cabinet:** a subset of the Executive branch of the State that makes policies and decisions to govern Trinidad and Tobago on issues such as crime, law and order, security and safety, etc. These matters directly impact the TTPS;
- iii. **Ministry of National Security and its many Divisions:** the Ministry of National Security is the line Ministry to which the TTPS reports, as such, there is a direct relationship between these two institutions. Further, the Ministry is responsible for setting policy for the TTPS, as well as, providing the relevant funds for the TTPS to undertake its activities. Some of the Divisions within the Ministry of National Security such as the SSA, the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (TTDF), and the Immigration Division are responsible for specific aspects of law and order and would often have to refer matters to the TTPS for action;
- iv. **Ministry of Finance:** this institution allocates the funding to the TTPS. The funds allocated will determine to a large extent what the TTPS can and cannot do. It is thus a key stakeholder that impacts on the performance of the TTPS;



- v. **PSC:** the Commission is responsible for monitoring and evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of the Commissioner of Police and the Deputy Commissioners of Police in the execution of their duties. By extension, therefore, this impacts on the TTPS.

9.4.3 In addition, the TTPS is also an influencing or impacting agency. Many of its works do have an effect on several institutions as highlighted in Figure 1. These include the Communities/Citizens, Non-Governmental Organizations, Community-Based Organizations, Faith-Based Organizations, Private Sector, Social Services, the Children’s Authority, Prisons, and the Judiciary.

9.4.4 The Judiciary is an interesting institution in this relationship chart, in other words, a two-way relationship exists. While the TTPS sends matters to the Judiciary for action, the Judiciary also impacts on the TTPS in terms of making of rulings, among other things, that will impact on the TTPS’s operations.


## **9.5 Contents of Volume 2**

9.5.1 **Volume 2** contains the description of the Methodology, as well as, fuller details and data related to the content in Volume 1. This Volume is broken down into the undermentioned **Sections (9 – 23)**:

- Overview of Volume 2
- Methodology
- Review of Past Studies
- Public Opinion: Newspaper Articles
- Analysis of the Human Resource Unit, TTPS
- Analysis of Official Police Records
- Information Technology (IT) and the TTPS

- Analysis of Focus Groups Sessions
- Town Hall Meetings
- Analysis of PMAC Police Survey
- Analysis of Stakeholder Consultations
- Civilian Oversight Agencies
- Challenges Encountered by the Manpower Audit Committee
- Selected References
- Appendices

Figure 1: Relationship Chart between TTPS and its Stakeholders



## 9.5 Areas for Further Investigation

9.5.1 Despite the many challenges experienced throughout the lifespan of this Audit, the PMAC endeavoured to produce a Report that was accurate and informative. Despite such, the Audit Committee notes that with additional time and a suitable qualified support staff, the undermentioned could have been conducted:

### 9.5.2 A deeper review of several important factors that affect manpower or reveal manpower issues:

9.5.2.1 **Overtime:** while summary overtime totals were supplied and significant recent overtime payment increases were noted, there is a need to review detailed overtime payments. This would serve to identify Divisions, Branches, and Units, etc., that suffer from manpower problems and therefore require excessive overtime hours;

9.5.2.2 **Leave:** all feedback from stakeholder consultations, focus groups and the PMAC Survey indicate that the abuse of leave is a problem within the TTPS. In spite of such, detailed leave data was not readily available for analysis to verify this feedback and identify what can be done about it;

9.5.2.3 **Complaints:** at present, the disciplinary process within the TTPS can result in individuals being placed on suspension that often lasts for years. The implications of having Officers away from the job for several years has impacts on manpower as well as the psyche of the Officer and his/her colleagues;

9.5.2.4 **Civilization of the TTPS:** Civilians have been used within the TTPS for over 20 years but an in-depth analysis of the impact of civilians within the TTPS needs to be conducted with a view of determining whether the objective of releasing sworn Officers to exclusively perform policing duties has been met.

At present there are sworn Officers in Divisions such as Human Resources and IT. A review of the duties performed by these and other such Officers and whether further civilization is required should be conducted.

### **9.5.3 Validation of the Data provided by the TTPS:**

9.5.3.1 Due to the lack of data standardization within the TTPS along with the use of paper based systems and therefore inefficient updating of their databases, the data provided from the TTPS should be validated. The PMAC was unable to fully valid the data received due to the life given to its Implementation Team, that being, four (4) months.

### **9.5.4 Activity Analysis of the TTPS:**

9.5.4.1 To identify problem areas within the TTPS and to suggest ways to improve productivity, a detailed activity analysis of the various work areas must be undertaken. This would serve to identify what activities are performed by an Officer during any average day and how many man hours are spent on them. Additionally, a thorough activity analysis will review the geographic spread of activities throughout the TTPS, including the cost of said actions.

### **9.5.5 Improved Representation of the TTPS in the PMAC's Survey and Focus Groups:**

9.5.5.1 Due to the short period allowed for planning and notification of the focus groups and surveys, there was poor representation from Police Officers as they could not be notified in time. This also resulted in a lack of preparation on their part for the focus groups with potentially decreased participation and accuracy.

## **9.5.6 Feedback from Client, the TTPS:**

- 9.5.6.1 One of the late steps in a properly conducted audit would be a discussion of the findings and recommendations with the client to jointly draft a way forward. This encourages buy-in from the client and increases the likelihood of the recommendations being actually implemented. Due to the pressures of time, this important step was not undertaken.

**SECTION 10:  
METHODOLOGY**

# METHODOLOGY

## 10 Introduction

10.1 This section briefly describes the overall methodology adopted by the PMAC to fulfil its mandate listed in its Terms of Reference. The general principle that guided the PMAC's work is that the best method should be utilised to get the facts and / or views on the situation that actually exist in the TTPS with regard to manpower issues. As a result, a combination of several quantitative and qualitative research tools and techniques were utilised.

## 10.2 Research Methods

10.2.1 Overall, four (4) main approaches constituted the data collection and analysis. These were:

- a. Document/data analysis
- b. Stakeholder Consultation Interviews
- c. PMAC Police Survey
- d. Focus Group Sessions

10.2.3 The specific research methods employed by the PMAC in the collection and analysis of data over the period February to July, 2017 were.

- i. Analysis of Previous Reports / Studies done on the TTPS



- ii. Analysis of Newspaper Articles on policing matters for the last five months
- iii. Analysis of Relevant Policies in the TTPS
- iv. Analysis of Official Police Records
- v. Interviews with TTPS Personnel and National Stakeholders
- vi. Focus Group Sessions with TTPS, Divisions of the Ministry of National Security and other Stakeholders
- vii. Town Hall Meetings
- viii. Surveys of all Ranks of Officers, Divisions, Units, Branches, Sections

10.2.4 Upon completion of the findings and recommendations for each of the aforementioned, a presentation and discussion on their related methodologies will be conducted.

### **10.3 Software Used**

10.3.1 In the conduct of its data analysis, the following software were utilised:

- a. Microsoft Excel 2013
- b. Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS)
- c. Tableau 10.x

**SECTION 11:  
REVIEW OF PAST STUDIES  
& REPORTS**

# REVIEW OF PAST STUDIES & REPORTS

## 11 Overview

11.1 This section deals with a review of the five (5) recent past reports and studies done on the TTPS. The documents reviewed were:

- i. Report of Senior Planning Group (2006)
- ii. Dr. Stephen D. Mastrofski, George Mason University (2006)
- iii. National Security Sector Review of Trinidad and Tobago (2009)
- iv. SAUTT Implementation Team Final Report (2011)
- v. The Multi-Sector Review Team on the Police Service Commission (2013)

11.1.2 Past studies or reports from 2006 onwards were used in this review exercise. Why 2006? In that year, the new Police Service Act (Act No. 7 of 2006) came into effect and it seemed a fair starting point to assess the TTPS from. It must be noted that there were many other studies and reports that were done on the Police Service prior to this period. However, 2006 was deemed to be the baseline year to commence this evaluation. Some of these older reports were:

- i. Lee Committee Report (1959)
- ii. Barby Report (1964)
- iii. The Carr Committee Report (1972)

- iv. Victor Bruce (1984)
- v. BRICE Committee Report (1984)
- vi. Police Executive Research Forum Report (1990)
- vii. O’Dowd Report (1991)

## **11.2 Objective**

- 11.2.1 The main purpose of this exercise is to examine these past studies, note what were the main issues identified within the TTPS, identify key recommendations related to police manpower, and note to what extent they were implemented, where possible.

## **11.3 Findings**

- 11.3.1 Overall, the reviewed reports showed that there is no shortage of recommendations to improve the TTPS and Table 1 presents a list of the major recommendations from each study and their current status. These recommendations touched on several aspects of the TTPS from the executive level, supervisory/middle management down to Constables. Additionally, these reports highlighted matters of policy and operations as they addressed issues of structure, function and the extent to which the Service is meeting the needs of the public. See Appendix 1 for further details.

**Table 1: Review of Past Studies/Reports into the TTPS: Matrix of Main Recommendations and Their Status**

#	REPORT / STUDY	MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS	STATUS / REMARKS
1	Senior Planning Group (2006)	Place necessary administrative support systems for COP, e.g., organisational structure, job designs, manpower planning, needs assessment, succession planning, etc.	Status of implementation unknown.
2	Senior Planning Group (2006)	Create and staff appropriately a Human Resource Management in TTPS	Unit was created. Status of staff status unknown.
3	Senior Planning Group (2006)	Create contemporary HR policies, procedures and manuals	Status of all policies unknown. Some were created and implemented. Others are in draft form.
4	Senior Planning Group (2006)	Establish a new Planning Unit to conduct full research and planning duties for a contemporary police service	Unit established but status whether it is undertaking full duties as envisaged unknown.
5	Senior Planning Group (2006)	Establish a number of Units in Finance and Accounting to assist in administration of the TTPS	Several units established but status if fully staffed and are achieving the desired effects unknown.
6	SAUTT (2011)	Merge and link several SAUTT units with TTPS Units, e.g., Homicide, K9, CSI	Some of the merging were done.
7	Mastrofski (2006)	Place great emphasis on customer service from the recruitment level, changing the curriculum, have monthly awards for officers demonstrating exceptional customer service, involve private sector, install customer receipt system, etc.	Some changes were made; others are outstanding.
8	Mastrofski (2006)	Create a more positive working environment for officers re facilities, equipment, processes, etc.	Some improvements were made; more needed across the TTPS.
9	Mastrofski (2006)	Strengthen disciplinary process	Discipline process is in line with 2006 Act but need for stricter adherence.
10	Mastrofski (2006)	Implement new performance appraisal system, promotion system, etc.	This has been implemented but there is need for stricter adherence.
11	Mastrofski (2006)	Create number of new units, e.g., CAPA, Homicide Bureau, Physical Evidence Team. Unsolved Case Review team, etc.	Some of these new units created. Unsure if others were done.

**Table 1 cont'd: Review of Past Studies/Reports into the TTPS: Matrix of Main Recommendations and Their Status**

#	REPORT / STUDY	MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS	STATUS / REMARKS
12	Mastrofski (2006)	Improve complaints process of matters against police	Some improvements were made but status of its full implementation unknown
13	Mastrofski (2006)	Establish system to make decisions to allocate officers and track their allocation	No proper system has been put in place to date
14	Mastrofski (2006)	Conduct audit of current personnel in June 2016 to track transfers, work status changes, etc.	Status if audit was conducted unknown.
15	Mastrofski (2006)	Implement number of training programmes like supervision, incident command, change management, etc.	Some of these were implemented; Status on how much was rolled out etc is unknown.
16	Mastrofski (2006) & Ross (2009)	Introduce civilianisation in service and conduct evaluation of it	Civilianisation was done; Evaluation to be done
17	Ross (2009)	Delegate authority with accountability	Some delegation was done; Status on adequate delegation not unknown.
18	Ross (2009)	Engage in long-term strategic planning and investment	Some long term planning was done. Status on long term investment not known.
19	Multi-Sector Review Team (2013)	Legislate for the Police Service Commission to have jurisdiction over ACPs also	This has not been implemented.

## 11.4 Conclusion and Recommendations

11.4.1 It can be concluded that many attempts were made to address some worrisome areas in the TTPS. Experts from many fields and persons internal and external to Trinidad and Tobago conducted inquiries and made many recommendations for the improvement of the Service. It should be noted that some reviews proposed timelines to implement the recommendations, nonetheless, the PMAC also observed that there were many similar assessments and recommendations across the various inquiries.

11.4.2 In this regard, the PMAC concludes that the main problem has been a lack of implementation of the vast number and varied recommendations put forward over the years. This lack of implementation has prevented the TTPS in particular, and the country in general, from deriving the much needed benefits from the suggestions provided by the various experts. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent over the years to examine the problems of the Service and for recommendations to be generated. Despite such, has the TTPS and the nation really received value for the monies spent? If not, one must ask why? In this regard, there is need for a more detailed examination of why we generally, and the TTPS in this specific instance, fall short here.

**SECTION 12:  
PUBLIC OPINION –  
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES**



# PUBLIC OPINION – NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

## 12 Overview

12.1 The assistance of the public is vital to the proper functioning of any Police Service. Tips and information regarding crime and nefarious activities, as well as, general information about a community are important to help solve crime. The erosion of trust between the public and the police can therefore result in a reduction in the level of crime detection. In an effort to measure public opinion about the TTPS, a review of local newspaper articles was conducted spanning a four (4) month period, i.e., December 16, 2016 to April 18, 2017.

## 12.2 Data Collection

12.2.1 Over a period of four (4) months, the Chairman, PMAC, compiled articles from the three (3) daily newspapers, namely, the Daily Express, Trinidad Guardian and the Trinidad & Tobago Newsday. These articles, which totalled 190 clippings, all focused on the TTPS. After compilation, the articles were collated and reviewed by the Implementation Team, and the undermentioned information recorded in a Microsoft Excel dataset:

- Newspaper
- Article page
- Article's Author
- Specifics of Article
- Overall Article Opinion
- Date
- Title of Article
- General Category regarding contents
- Sub Category regarding article contents

The complete dataset can be found in [Appendix 2](#).

## 12.3 Data Analysis

12.3.1 After compilation, the dataset was analysed using the software – Tableau 10.2. Of the 190 articles reviewed, 43% were from the Daily Express, 29% from the Trinidad and Tobago Newsday and 28% from the Trinidad Guardian. Table 2 below shows the distribution of articles by newspaper.

**Table 2: Distribution of Articles by Newspaper**

Newspaper	Number of Records	Percent of total
Express	82.0	43.2
Newsday	55.0	28.9
Guardian	53.0	27.9
Grand Total	190.0	100.0

12.3.2 Review of the articles identified 16 general categories with several sub-categories. . The most frequent categories were *Challenges with Crime*, *Crime Measures* and *Leadership* covering 73% of the categories with *Policing* adding an additional 10%.

**Table 3: Most Frequent Topic Categories for Newspaper Articles**

Overall Opinion	Challenges with crime	Crime measures	Leadership	Policing
Negative	16.84%	5.79%	11.05%	7.37%
Neutral	7.37%	13.16%	2.63%	0.53%
Positive	1.58%	5.26%	3.68%	1.05%
Mixed	0.53%	3.68%	1.58%	1.05%
Grand Total	26.32%	27.89%	18.95%	10.00%



12.3.3 Examples of articles classified under the most popular general categories can be found below while the graph in Figure 2 displays all 16 categories:

**Table 4: Examples of Articles from the Most Popular Categories**

General Category	Article Topic
Challenges with Crime	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Lack of trust in the Police by the public</li> <li>- Inability of the Commissioner of Police to deal with spiralling crime</li> <li>- Lack of accountability regarding money spent on crime plans, purchase of tools and &amp; equipment etc.</li> </ul>
Crime measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Discussion on the death penalty</li> <li>- Allocation of manpower resources</li> <li>- Reform of TTPS to motivate officers</li> </ul>
Leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Senior officers forced to retire due to poor performance</li> <li>- Commissioner of Police is focusing on the efficiency of the TTPS Executive</li> <li>- Commissioner of Police asked to step down due to lack of crime reduction</li> </ul>
Policing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Improper qualification of police officers is a problem</li> <li>- Victimization of members of the public by police officers</li> <li>- Mentally ill person shot dead by police officer. Appeal made and reinforced for non-lethal weapons to be used in the performance of duties.</li> </ul>

12.3.4 Overall opinions expressed by the articles were divided into *negative*, *positive*, *mixed* and *neutral* categories with negative opinions being significantly higher as can be seen below. The categories were allocated based on both the content and the tone of the article. [Figure 2](#) below presents a picture of this.

**Figure 2: Overall Opinions by Newspaper**




12.3.5 Below are examples of the main topic for articles with varying overall opinions.

**Table 5: Examples of Article Topics with Varying Overall Opinions**


Article Opinion	Article Main Topic
Positive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Despite the perceived failure of the TTPS to protect the nation, it is important to take note of their efforts;</li> <li>- The TTPS is doing everything with its power to bring crime under control;</li> <li>- Ag Commissioner of Police Williams should be appointed to the position since this will boost morale and provide a sense of comfort and security among officers and engender higher regard and respect from the community.</li> </ul>
Negative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- There is an inability of the Heads, e.g. Commissioner of Police and the Prime Minister, to deal with domestic violence and they are resorting instead to victim blaming;</li> <li>- The Commissioner of Police reiterated the call for the public to support the police but the public has voiced that the police are the reason for the lack of cooperation;</li> <li>- The leaders of the government and the law enforcement should resign as they cannot handle the crime epidemic.</li> </ul>
Mixed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Senior Superintendent of Police Archie expressed concern about the rise in murders in Tobago, however, serious crimes are down by 19%;</li> <li>- Roadblocks are successful but the Central Division schedule for warrant exercises was leaked. An Investigation of the leak is ongoing;</li> <li>- The Prime Minister not satisfied with crime management, crime detection and crime suppression. To have success citizens must be held accountable for their behaviour. The role of TTPS is to respond to criminals. Corruption in the Service must be dealt with so the population can trust and officers can trust colleagues.</li> </ul>
Neutral	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Commissioner of Police, TTPS, stated that there is no reason for him to resign. His performance is not based on murders alone and the public needs to look at the lowering of serious crime;</li> <li>- Statistics for the period January 2015 to December 2016 reflect approximately 56,744 domestic cases. It is important for all authorities, especially the police, to ensure protection orders are enforced;</li> <li>- Minister Dillon made it clear there was no political pressure placed on Commissioner of Police, TTPS, to make the decision to send Senior Officers into early retirement. Commissioner of Police, TTPS, explained he was exercising his authority under Section 74(2)(b) of the Police Service Act</li> </ul>

**Figure 3: General Categories of Newspaper Articles along with the Distribution of Positive or Negative Opinions within each category**



12.3.6 For the three main general categories the sub-categories were Recommendations, Discipline, Ineffective Leadership and Ineffective Policing.

**Figure 4: Sub Categories for the 3 most popular general categories expressed in the newspaper articles**



- 12.3.7 Recommendations sourced from the newspaper articles were made both *by* the police and *to* the police. Some examples are:
- 12.3.7.1 Strengthen the Cold Case Unit and DNA database to aid in Homicide investigations;
  - 12.3.7.2 Restructure the Municipal Police Service;
  - 12.3.7.3 Strengthen law enforcement towards intelligence-led and problem-oriented policing;
  - 12.3.7.4 Increase sensitivity training for police officers;
  - 12.3.7.5 Civilianize of the TTPS;
  - 12.3.7.6 Implement harsher penalties for serious crimes;
  - 12.3.7.7 Simplify fire arm license approval – the Commissioner should not be the one to approve a firearm license;
  - 12.3.7.8 Use motorcycle police from west Trinidad to the stadium to stem lawless driving;
  - 12.3.7.9 Adopt particular elements of the ‘*broken window*’ theory to our local situation to assist in crime fighting;
  - 12.3.7.10 Amend the Cybercrime Bill to deal with social media abuse;
  - 12.3.7.11 Increase street patrol;
  - 12.3.7.12 Include the following in the Manpower Audit:
    - a. Recruitment;



- b. Organizational Structure of the Service;
- c. Deployment of Officers;
- d. Contemporary Policing and vs. Discipline.

**SECTION 13:**  
**ANALYSIS OF THE**  
**HUMAN RESOURCE UNIT**

# ANALYSIS OF THE HUMAN RESOURCE UNIT

## 13 Functions of the Human Resource Unit

13.1 The Human Resource Unit operations within the TTPS can be effectively segregated into the following functions:

- a. Personnel Administration – responsible for maintenance of personnel records, recruitment and certain employee development functions;
- b. Training and Development;
- c. Employee Relations/Industrial Relations;
- d. Absence Management – processes all categories of Leave, e.g., Extended Sick Leave, Injury Leave, Vacation Leave;
- e. Performance Management Appraisal System – this system is used for assessing uniformed as well as non-uniformed employees.

13.1.2 The primary objective of this audit of the Human Resource Unit was to assess the design and effectiveness of its internal controls to determine the following:

- a. Whether the existing human resource policies and procedures effectively address the activities engaged by the TTPS and are formally documented;

- b. Whether the policies and procedures are adequate and are communicated to all managers and employees of the TTPS;
- c. Whether the data and information maintained by the various Sections of the Human Resource Unit accurate, timely and secured;
- d. Whether the policies and procedures are being applied as designed consistently across the nine (9) Police Divisions of the TTPS;
- e. To identify potential areas for improvement.

## **13.2 Manpower of Civilian Staff in the Human Resource Division**

13.2.1 Currently there is a total of nine hundred and thirty-two (932) civilian personnel functioning in the TTPS as indicated below:

- **550** permanent established positions, i.e.: 550 Posts under the Public Service Commission, reflected as 192 – Permanent, 240 – Temporary, 118 – Vacancies
- **500** Contract positions

13.2.2 Thus, the Civilian complement in the Service is made up of **192** Permanent + **240** Temporary + **500** Contract = **932** personnel.

13.2.3 Civilians have come to play significant roles in the TTPS over the last twenty (20) years. As the number of civilians increased, their roles have expanded as well. Originally occupying clerical and support positions, civilians have

increasingly been working in higher profile jobs and leadership positions and carrying out tasks that were traditionally reserved for sworn Police Officers. They now function in some key skilled positions as identified hereunder:

- a. Human Resources Management
- b. IT Management
- c. Research and Planning Support
- d. Administrative Support
- e. Media Relations
- f. Finance Management

13.2.4 Cabinet by Minute No. 3043 dated November 25, 1993, approved, *inter alia*:

- i. The reform of the structure of the TTPS;
- ii. The civilianisation of the TTPS;

13.2.5 The recruitment of civilians into the TTPS was initiated to augment the corps of sworn personnel with the aim of the uniformed officers performing the critical public safety functions that only they can perform.

13.2.6 Keeping in line with the civilianisation process, Cabinet, by Minute No. 2701 dated September 23, 2004, agreed, *inter alia*, to the restructuring of the Human Resource Management Unit of the TTPS by creating the following human resource positions on the permanent establishment:

- One (1) Director, Human Resource

- Six (6) Senior Human Resource Officers
- Five (5) Human Resource Officers III
- Six (6) Human Resource Officers II
- Four (4) Human Resource Officers I

13.2.7 and to, the decentralization of the Human Resource positions as outlined in Appendix 3.

13.2.8 In creating the above positions, Cabinet duly noted that the TTPS is currently organized into four (4) Administrative Divisional Headquarters headed by a Senior Superintendent with responsibility for Human Resource Management and these Senior Superintendents are assisted by uniformed personnel.

13.2.9 Cabinet therefore agreed that the Human Resource Management staff at the Police Headquarters should administer policy and financial matters while the other components of the Human Resource Management function will be initiated in the Divisions as the Senior Superintendents, as Division Heads, will require professional Human Resource Management support to ensure Divisional human resource functions are efficiently executed.

13.2.10 Cabinet further noted that the TTPS operates in a highly decentralised system encompassing the geographical spread of Trinidad and Tobago and saw the need to decentralise the human resource positions and approved them accordingly.

13.2.11 To date, the Human Resource Unit, which is a key component of the civilianisation plan of the TTPS, operates with a sum total of one hundred and seventy (170) employees, all functioning at the Police Headquarters. In fact,

key functioning positions such as IT, Finance Management and Data Entry are also concentrated at the Police Headquarters.

- 13.2.12 With this level of civilianisation, one may assume that there now exists a very highly effective, well-structured and efficient performing TTPS with its Human Resource Unit and supporting arms well-positioned to play an instrumental role in helping the TTPS achieve its goals.
- 13.2.13 However, what has been observed is that the Human Resource Unit and some of the arms have been performing below an acceptable standard in the organization and this may be due to the fact that they are operating in a very highly centralised environment. That is, almost 65% of the staff function at the Police Headquarters. As a consequence, all of the Human Resource Systems and Processes are also highly centralised resulting in extreme delays and inability to meet deadlines.
- 13.2.14 It has been fully noted that to date the Human Resource Unit of the TTPS has not implemented the decisions approved by Cabinet as noted in the Minute above, inclusive of the approved organizational structure.

### **13.3 Human Resource Policies and Procedures**

- 13.3.1 The Human Resource Unit together with the management of the TTPS have been engaged with effect from 2016 in an initiative to update and rewrite relevant Policies in order to provide clarity and cohesiveness.
- 13.3.2 The following policies and procedures have been received by the Committee:
  - a. Policy Manual on Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) completed and approved by the Commissioner on April 01, 2016

- b. Employee Assistance Programme (EAP) Policy – Draft Working Document
- c. Absence Management Policy and Procedures Manual – Draft Working Document
- d. Code of Ethics and Conduct for Contract Employees – Draft working document

13.3.3 Key policies governing functions are yet to be developed or reviewed, such as:

- a. Orientation
- b. Workforce Planning Recruitment
- c. Dress Code

#### **13.4 Manpower of the Sworn Officer**

13.4.1 As of February 13, 2017, the information provided by the TTPS showed the sanctioned strength of the Service as **7,884**. It should be noted that the sanctioned strength reflects the number of positions approved by Government for the TTPS over time. The actual strength, however, was stated as **6,768** and the number of vacant positions cited as **1,116**. The number listed as vacant positions represent the difference between the sanctioned strength and the actual strength.

13.4.2 When the PMAC examined the numbers provided by the TTPS, they realised that the number of vacancies shown was greatly exaggerated, since within the vacant posts there was a number of positions that were filled in an acting capacity and therefore should not be seen as vacant. It should be noted that a



*real vacancy* only occurs when there is no one acting in the vacant position. Efforts were made to regularize this situation with the Human Resource Unit of the TTPS so that a realistic picture could be obtained, however, the Committee was unable to achieve such before the preparation of this Report.

13.4.3 Because positions will become vacant on a continuing basis as officers resign, retire, die, or are dismissed, the organization will always have some positions that are vacant since it takes some time to fill vacancies. Apart from the positions which are vacant (i.e., without bodies, where no one is acting in the position) the strength is further depleted because at any point in time officers may be absent from duty for a number of different reasons, *viz* –

- a. Between 10 – 15% of staff will be on Vacation Leave at any time;
- b. Another 10 – 15% is either on Injury Leave, Sick Leave, Extended Sick Leave, Study Leave, No-pay Leave, and Suspension owing to criminal charges against them or pending disciplinary proceedings.

13.4.4 It was brought to the attention of the Committee that officers are also allowed to be absent from work as a result of being granted “*Exemption*” for various illnesses which are supported by Medical Certificates. As a result of these factors, the real manpower available for service on any given day is below the Service’s actual strength. The Police Service is one of those organizations that is required to work 24 hours x 365 days annually. The nature of the work is also psychologically taxing and could cause “*burn-out*” of officers very quickly.

13.4.5 The present system for managing Leave in the TTPS is woefully inadequate and facilitates officers abusing the system with impunity. This has resulted in

50

officers being able to take long periods of extended Sick Leave without approval leading to salary overpayments.

- 13.4.6 Officers are required to work the shifts as identified in Appendix 4.
- 13.4.7 The evidence shows that there needs to be more effective utilization of the available manpower resources.

### **13.5 Recruitment Process for Sworn Officers**

- 13.5.1 The TTPS continues to be challenged by the number of recruits which it can accommodate on a yearly basis. With an average of 250 Officers separating from the Organization on an annual basis from 2014 - 2016, the TTPS needs to accommodate at least 300 recruits annually over a five to ten-year period if it is to fill the shortfall of officers.
- 13.5.2 Some stakeholders have suggested that a new system of recruiting may assist. For example, persons who are interested in policing as a career can pursue training in security services (e.g., a Diploma in Security Services) prior to recruitment making the actual recruitment training period shorter. This can deal with the Police Academy's limited accommodation ability at this time to train more recruits. As a result, the TTPS can get more recruits trained per year.
- 13.5.3 Recruitment in the TTPS has traditionally been from the level of a Recruit Trainee, a Constable and those persons are promoted up the Ranks. The new Legislation of 2007, makes provision for the Commissioner of Police to appoint persons on fixed term contracts where the police service does not have the skill or competence level required.

13.5.4 Another area of concern raised by stakeholders during the data-gathering phase of the exercise was the system of recruitment now utilized by the TTPS. Concerns ranged from the selection process, the quality of the training provided to recruits as well as the supervision of recruits who have graduated from the Police Academy. Generally, it was felt that a significant percentage of the persons applying to join the TTPS are motivated mainly by “*getting a job*” and not for love of the profession and/or commitment to serve the country.

## **13.6 TTPS Recruiting Process**

13.6.1 When the issue of recruitment was raised with the Provost, Police Academy, TTPS, he posited the view that the pool from which persons are recruited was a reflection of the society as a whole and that the TTPS had strict guidelines governing how the recruiting process was administered. To emphasize the thoroughness of the process, the Provost advised that the recruiting process consisted of the following steps:

- i. Advertise in the media identifying dates and location of TTPS recruiting initiative;
- ii. Pre-screen candidates by Recruiting Unit to meet the minimum qualifications;
- iii. Write Police Entrance Examination;
- iv. Complete Prescribed Application Form;
- v. Complete Medical Examination;

- vi. Perform Agility Test;
- vii. Conduct Background Investigation;
- viii. Appear before Panel Interview;
- ix. Administer Psychological Test;
- x. Administer Dangerous Drugs Test;
- xi. Perform Polygraph Test;
- xii. Conduct Pregnancy Test (Females);
- xiii. Prepare Final Review of Applications by the Recruiting Officer for the suitability of the Candidate;
- xiv. Enrol qualified candidate as a trainee in the Induction Programme.

13.6.2 Also, the Provost indicated that the present system utilized in the recruitment process succeeds in “weeding out” about sixty percent (60%) of the persons applying for entry to the TTPS.

13.6.3 Although officers graduating from the Police Academy are expected to undergo supervision and mentoring by a Field Liaison Officer and a supervising officer, the evidence indicates that this process is not adhered to because of poor monitoring. Adherence to the existing process will certainly enhance the quality of officers that are produced.

## 13.7 Training and Development

- 13.7.1 In a paper titled “*Embracing the Challenge: The Future of Law Enforcement Training and Development at the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service*” prepared by the Provost, TTPS Academy, it states:

***“The Police Academy, traditionally, has been the main provider of training and development to officers of the TTPS at all levels and ranks – Police Trainee to the Commissioner of Police.”***

- 13.7.2 In recognition of the fact that Training and Development is germane to the successful execution of the various policing services which are demanded of police officers in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Academy has been undergoing a transformation in its quest to be a modern law enforcement education and training institution.

- 13.7.3 To this end the organization has taken steps to expand its capabilities and effectiveness to ensure that it remains responsive to the needs of police officers. Some of the actions taken to date have been identified as:

- a. Conduct of Training Needs Assessment
- b. Expansion of Advanced Programmes Training
- c. Enhancement of Training Methodologies utilized
- d. Registration with the Accreditation Council of Trinidad and Tobago
- e. Curriculum Development, Review and Evaluation

- f. Expansion of Research, Monitoring and Evaluation capacity
- g. Development of Policies to guide operations
- h. Establishment of a Quality Management System

13.7.4 In developing training programmes the Provost advised that analyses are done at three (3) levels, *viz*:

- a. Organizational
- b. Task; and
- c. Individual

13.7.5 The following are some of the Courses administered by the Academy:

- i. Induction Programme (Training)
- ii. Field (Training) Programme
- iii. Defensive Driving (Training) Programme
- iv. Advanced In-Service (Training) Programme
- v. Simulation (Training) Programme
- vi. Special Reserve (Training) Programme
- vii. External Law Enforcement (Training) Programme

13.7.6 Given the changing nature of criminal activities as well as changes in the social environment in which law enforcement officers are required to operate, the Academy has identified the need for its curriculum to be modified on a continuing basis. The following areas have been identified as high-priority course offerings which must be included in the Academy's Training Programme in the future:

- a. Cybercrime Training
- b. Transnational Crimes
- c. Human Trafficking
- d. Financial Investigation
- e. Anti-corruption Investigations
- f. Homicide Investigation
- g. Community Policing
- h. Customer Service, and
- i. Dealing with the Differently-abled

13.7.7 In December 2016, eight (8) Diploma Programmes were approved by the Programme Approval Committee of the Police Academy for offering in 2017 and beyond as the need arises:

- Community Policing Programme
- General Policing
  - i. Level II (Trainee Constables)
  - ii. Level III (Corporal/Sergeant)
  - iii. Level IV (Inspector)
- Child Protection Programme
- Police Draughts Technician Programme
- Traffic Management and Road Safety Programme
- Crime Scene Management and Investigation Programme
- Investigations of Serious Crime Programme; and
- Intelligence Gathering and Analysis Programme

13.7.8 In addition to training programmes offered by the Police Academy, it was noted that Officers also receive overseas training in various aspects of policing.

13.7.9 In its Strategic Plan 2017 – 2019 (with rolling feature to 2021) the TTPS has as one of its four (4) Strategic Goals “*Strengthening of the Organization*”. To achieve this goal, the TTPS has identified two (2) necessary actions as being:

- a. Strengthened Institutional Capacity through Training
- b. Strengthened Leadership and Management.



- 13.7.10 One of the performance targets under this Strategic Goal is having at least 25 FDOs and Inspectors trained in a core leadership programme.
- 13.7.11 The Provost advised the Committee that notwithstanding the critical role which the Police Academy has to play in the transformation of the TTPS as well as in developing Officers to being more equipped to execute their duties and responsibilities, the lack of sufficient physical and financial resources continues to stymie the plans for expanding the role and function of the Academy.
- 13.7.12 The Provost was convinced that if the required funds for infrastructure and other developmental works were made available to the TTPS for the Academy, the outcomes from the Training provided will have a much greater impact.

### **13.8 Areas for Improvement**

- 13.8.1 Although the Committee is aware of the fact that the Academy has initiated some post training evaluation, this programme should be enhanced and the results of the evaluations must inform future training programmes. To highlight this point, reference is made to the fact that the results of the Promotional Examination, together with the marks and comments from examiners, are not made available to the Provost. The PMAC considers this information as vital in assisting the Academy in developing remedial programmes. Monitoring and Evaluation of all training for impact on performance must be on a continuous basis.
- 13.8.2 Because of the very poor level of personnel at the supervisory level in the TTPS, there is a need for more exposure to continuous training at this level.

## 13.9 Performance Management

### 13.9.1 Performance of the Individual Officer

13.9.1.1 The PMAC observed that the consensus among police officers was that the Performance Management Appraisal System (PMAS) of the TTPS has not been successful. In a report submitted to a Joint Select Committee on Ministries, Authorities and State Enterprises (Group 2) under the hand of the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of National Security, it states:

*“The current Performance Management and Appraisal System was introduced to the TTPS in 2009 with the intent of developing a merit based, performance driven organization that demonstrates transparency in its promotions and commendations. The system was designed to:*

1. *Identify the current level of job performance of an Officer*
2. *Identify the strengths and weaknesses of an Officer to inform training and development*
3. *Identify potential performers*
4. *Provide information for succession planning*
5. *Enable Officers to improve their performance*
6. *Provide a basis for rewarding Officers, for promotion or transfer, in relation to their contribution to the organization’s goals; and*
7. *Motivate individuals.”*

13.9.1.2 The PMAS now utilized in the TTPS is modelled along the system used in the General Public Service. The system is geared towards measuring performance

at an individual level and examines the level of competence officers display in the performance of their duties.

13.9.1.3 In the same report identified above, the following challenges in measuring the performance of officers were stated:

- i. Officers can be transferred after a relatively short period of time which creates issues regarding the periods to be covered by the Supervisor;
- ii. Officers are not utilizing the system as a development tool for continuous assessment;
- iii. All supervisors not fully conversant/trained in PMAS;
- iv. PMAS Liaison Officers are transferred rapidly which affects continuity in the system;
- v. The paperwork associated with PMAS combined with the daily duties of the Liaison Officers appears to be overwhelming for some;
- vi. Cultural resistance to the PMAS;
- vii. A lack of commitment to the PMAS monitoring and evaluation process;

- viii. Tardiness in submitting reports which can result in senior Officers retiring without completing PMAS Forms for supervisees;
- ix. The use of soft copies of forms from the intranet allows for modification which can prove problematic when verifying the completeness of the document;
- x. Non adherence to PMAS can prevent/delay the early detection, possible re-training and rehabilitation of errant Officers.

13.9.1.4 Having identified these various challenges, the report also mentioned some measures which were to be implemented by the TTPS to address them, *viz*:

- i. The establishment of a Monitoring and Evaluation Committee for all PMAS Liaison Officers to meet monthly to discuss issues and challenges and to give progress reports on PMAS;
- ii. Workshops/Seminars/Refresher Courses are conducted on an on-going basis at all Stations/Divisions/Branches/Units throughout the TTPS;
- iii. Human Resource Officers are available on a full-time basis to offer advice and clarify issues relevant to PMAS;
- iv. Increased planning to create a heightened awareness within the organization of what needs to be accomplished and how all members are to contribute to the achievement of the set goals.

- 13.9.1.5 The information provided to the PMAC indicates that despite the identification of the measures there is no evidence that implementation of these measures actually took place. Consequently, the PMAS of the TTPS has not been satisfying the purposes for which it was intended.
- 13.9.1.6 The PMAC is of the view that decentralisation of the Human Resource function, as was originally intended when the Human Resource Management structure was designed, would significantly improve the execution of the PMAS.

## **13.9.2 Performance of the Organization**

- 13.9.2.1 In addition to the PMAS for individual officers, the TTPS has proposed a number of Performance Targets and Measures of Success for the organization based on the organization's four (4) major Strategic Goals as outlined in its Strategic Plan 2017 – 2019 and Operating Plan 2017. These are to:
- i. Reduce and Detect Crime
  - ii. Improve Safety on Our Roadways and Other Public Places
  - iii. Strengthen Community Engagements, Citizen-Centred Service and Shareholder Partnerships
  - iv. Strengthen the organization.
- 13.9.2.2 Appendix 5 outlines the Organization's goals, targets and success measures. The extent to which these targets are achieved would determine the level of performance of the TTPS.

## 13.10 Promotional Process

13.10.1 Prior to the establishment of the Police Service Act of 2006 and its subsequent amendments in Act No. 13 of 2007, Promotions within the TTPS were based on the following criteria:

- a. Within the First Division, Promotions were based on seniority
- b. Within the Second Division, Promotions were based on a qualifying examination in addition to seniority.

13.10.2 With the establishment of the Acts as mentioned above, the procedures for promotion as outlined in Sections 17 and 18 state, *inter alia*:

*“...promotions to and within the First Division shall be made by the Commissioner only on the basis of the results of a promotional assessment process.*

*17A. (1) Where there is a vacancy in the First Division, the Commissioner shall, in accordance with the procedure prescribed, cause to be contracted from time to time a person to design and implement a promotional assessment process in accordance with internationally accepted promotional assessment standards to determine the suitability for promotion of a police officer to and within the First Division.*

*(2) The person shall conduct the Promotional Assessment process to determine the suitability for promotion to and within the First Division to the next higher rank of a police officer from the rank of Inspector through to Senior Superintendent and shall submit its results, taking*

*into account the points attained by the officer under section 16 (2), in the form of an Order of Merit List to the Commissioner in relation to his functions under section 123A (2) (a) of the Constitution.”*

- 13.10.3 Enclosed at Appendix 6 is a process map of the Promotional Assessment for the FDOs and the Promotional Advisory Board (PAB) process for the SDOs.
- 13.10.4 Since the inception of the Act, the TTPS has conducted four (4) promotional assessments for the First Division with the last assessment being held over the period 2013 – 2014. The TTPS is now in the process of preparing for the conduct of another promotional assessment, scheduled to be held over the period August to December, 2017.
- 13.10.5 The PAB also conducted interviews within the Second Division as follows:
- a. For the Rank of Sergeant to Inspector over the period December 06, 2010 – December 02, 2011;
  - b. For the Rank of Constable to Corporal over the period November 24, 2014 – May 29, 2015;
  - c. For the Rank of Corporal to Sergeant over the period November 09, 2015 – January 29, 2016.
- 13.10.6 It is noteworthy that the PAB process as outlined in the Act, only allows the PAB to treat with one (1) rank of officer at a time and this process must be completed before the Board can consider engaging the process for another rank. The Act, in its present form, lends to the tardiness of the process and makes it extremely difficult to reduce these delays. This is exacerbated by the fact that if any officer raises any objections through the court, the entire process must be ceased until the court matters are resolved.

13.10.7 It should be further noted that the composition of the Board requires top managers of the TTPS to be away from their duties and responsibilities for the entire period of the process and no one is assigned to perform their duties and responsibilities. This seriously affects the operation of the organization. These top managers are as follows:

- a. The Deputy Commissioner of Police (Administration)
- b. An Assistant Commissioner of Police
- c. The Director, Human Resource Management

13.10.8 Since the conduct of interviews highlighted above, there has been no sitting of the PAB. As a consequence, there are some officers who have been waiting for the last six (6) years to appear before the PAB. (*The Rank of Sergeant above refers*).

13.10.9 Given the above mentioned facts, in order to improve the process and remove the delays, the TTPS should consider a review of the Police Service Act with a view to eroding delays and anomalies in the system or alternatively, consider outsourcing the promotional process.

## **13.11 Top Structure of the TTPS**

13.11.1 The existing organizational structure of the TTPS shows that there are three (3) Deputy Commissioners of Police reporting to the Commissioner of Police, TTPS, *viz*:

- The Deputy Commissioner of Police Administration



- The Deputy Commissioner of Police Operations
- The Deputy Commissioner of Police Crime and Support

13.11.2 The Commissioner of Police also has responsibility for Complaints, Executive Management Services, Finance and Accounts, Corporate Communications and Internal Audit. Organizational charts showing the functional areas under the Commissioner of Police and the Deputy Commissioners of Police can be seen at Appendix 7.

13.11.3 Although time did not allow the PMAC to do an in-depth investigation and analysis of the functional areas that report to these offices, the Committee is of the view that based on its critical examination of the organizational charts identified above, there is need for some reorganization which could lead to greater effectiveness in the TTPS, e.g., the Planning, Research and Project Implementation Unit falls under the direction of the Deputy Commissioner of Police Administration. The Unit's areas of responsibility have been given as:

- a. Direct the Research and Planning for Policy Development and Implementation – involving collecting, collating and analysing socio-economic data in general and in particular policing data and statistics.
- b. Advise on matters of strategy and policy direction, institutional strengthening needs and structural or transformational reforms;
- c. Manage the Strategic Planning process for the TTPS;
- d. Define the Police Service's objectives in the Public Sector Investment Programme project and lead in preparation of project budgets and draft estimates;

- e. Develop, implement and monitor the Public Sector Investment Programme projects aligned to the strategic objectives of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service;
- f. Function as liaison between Divisions, the Ministry, Project Consultants Contractors and other Government Agencies for Project Implementation;
- g. Provide technical assistance to Units, Sections, Branches and Divisions of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

13.11.5 The PMAC is of the view that the Planning, Research and Project Implementation Unit has a critical role to play in leading the transformational efforts of the TTPS on a continuing basis. As such, the Unit should be the driver in conducting research on environmental issues which impact the operations of the TTPS and providing evidential data that would influence decisions taken at the organizational and operational levels.

13.11.6 The PMAC recommends that this Unit should be renamed “*Policy Planning, Research and Development*” and that it should be involved not only in Research but also in Policy Development, Policy Review, Policy Execution and Monitoring and should work closely with the CAPA. The restructured Unit should also work closely with the Human Resource Unit in developing standards and policies that would impact the assignment of officers to various Branches/Units of the TTPS. The PMAC has noted that the Commissioner of Police had identified this role as a necessary one in the transformation thrust of the organization.

13.11.7 At present, there is no scientific approach to determine how officers are assigned to work areas. The PMAC feels certain that by playing the role now

proposed for this Unit the TTPS would be able to better utilize its manpower resources.

- 13.11.8 The existing organizational chart shows that Corporate Communications reports directly to the Commissioner of Police. There is also a Public Affairs Unit which falls under the Deputy Commissioner of Police Administration. Since the functions performed by these two Units are similar and complementary, the PMAC suggests that Public Affairs should be merged with Corporate Communications under the Commissioner of Police and that there should be a rationalisation of the functions to be executed.
- 13.11.9 Given the proposed expanded role of the Planning, Research and Project Implementation Unit, the Public Management Consulting Division (PMCD) of the Ministry of Public Administration should be requested to determine the appropriate staffing levels and numbers.

## **13.12 Observations and Findings**

- 13.12.1 The existing policies and procedures do not fully address all of the activities in which the TTPS is engaged. Draft policies and procedures are works in progress and have not yet been communicated to managers or the members of staff who will be responsible for the implementation of such policies. In some instances, no clear procedures have been developed to support the policies. Outside of the Departmental Orders and Standing Operating Procedures of the TTPS, the only other policy that is formally documented is the OSH Policy. As a consequence, there are varying interpretations by members of staff of the processes and procedures by which they operate daily resulting in delays, inaccuracies, ineffectiveness and inefficiencies.

- 13.12.2 The PMAC also noted that data and information maintained by the Human Resource Unit are inaccurate, with limited or untimely follow up and are not secured. The Human Resource Unit operates in a paper-based environment and maintains hard copy personnel files for over 8,000 current and terminated employees. It also noted that access to the personnel files is generally not restricted, thus creating a risk that documents are misfiled, lost or the confidential information is inadvertently distributed. In the Human Resource Unit of the TTPS there are boxes with personnel files on top of cabinets lined along the corridors and the very cabinets are kept unlocked. It should be noted that this area is easily accessible by persons who are not assigned to the Human Resource Unit at all times.
- 13.12.4 There is a need to deploy and utilise manpower effectively to achieve the organizational goals. The Unit operates in a highly centralised environment with all the Senior Managers and support staff located in the Administrative building. This set-up contributes greatly to the inefficiencies in the Unit since the uniformed personnel of the TTPS are distributed throughout Trinidad and Tobago. Because of this centralisation, officers are unable to input information/data accurately and on a timely basis.
- 13.12.5 The two dominant Human Resource Management Systems are Versadex and iHRIS. Versadex is mainly used by the uniformed personnel within the Human Resource Unit and iHRIS is utilized by the civilian staff of the said Unit. However, they operate independently of each other, even though they are inputting the very same data. Yet neither of these systems can produce accurate and timely data.

### **13.13 Human Resource Unit Recommendations**

13.13.1 Having identified the challenges discussed in Section 13.11, the PMAC has identified some measures which can be implemented by the TTPS to address them:

13.13.1.1 Implement the decisions contained in Cabinet Minute No. 2701 dated September 23, 2004, approving the decentralisation of the human resource function with all offices located in this Unit;

13.13.1.2 Implement a paperless system for maintaining employee personnel files. Such a conversion would provide the following benefits:

- a. Significant efficiencies and cost savings related to the generation, handling and processing of hard copy documents;
- b. Simplification of the entire process;
- c. Enhanced security of classified/confidential data – Access to personnel files can be restricted;
- d. Reduction in costs related to storage of personnel files of current and past employees.

13.13.1.3 It is noted that such a system has been developed by the IT Department of the TTPS. A Human Resource Portal was developed and customized to suit the human resource needs of the TTPS. To date the Human Resource Unit has not adopted the system;

- 13.13.1.4 Design system to effectively communicate to all employees and line managers the existing rules, regulations, policies and manuals and the relevance to their areas of responsibilities;
- 13.13.1.5 Implement a system to regularly review its policies and procedures to ensure quality and relevance as well as to assess whether its requirements are clearly understood and implemented;
- 13.13.1.6 Strengthen Human Resource Management oversight controls to track and monitor the receipt and submission of related documents in order to follow-up on outstanding issues;
- 13.13.1.7 Create a system that allows line managers in the Human Resource Unit to be held accountable for their people-management responsibilities. The system should also monitor, review and report on their implementation of all related policies.

#### **13.14 Role of the Municipal Police within Law Enforcement**

- 13.14.1 In auditing the manpower of the TTPS, the PMAC took cognisance of the fact that the government is critically looking at the overall role of the Municipal Police in Law Enforcement. The Committee therefore noted the Government's plan to increase the Municipal Police in the fourteen (14) Municipal Corporations by an additional 1,107 Officers and its impact on law enforcement manpower numbers.
- 13.14.2 The PMAC is mindful of the fact that it would take some time before the full complement of officers in all the Corporations are recruited and trained. However, given the role which the Municipal Police is intended to play in the

Municipalities, the Municipal Police can provide the TTPS with support in communities.

13.14.3 The PMAC was advised that there is still a number of governance issues to be finalised to enable the Municipal Police to become fully functional and that these issues are being addressed by the relevant agencies with a view to arriving at early resolutions.

13.14.4 In accordance with the Act, Municipal Police will be expected to discharge the following duties:

- a. Mobile and Foot Patrols
- b. Breath Analyser
- c. Escort Duties
- d. VIP Escort
- e. Assist Litter Wardens
- f. Regulatory Functions i.e. markets, buildings, beaches, tickets/traffic, savannah squatting
- g. Land Adjudication – Ombudsman
- h. Court Appearances

**SECTION 14:**  
**ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL**  
**POLICE RECORDS**



# ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL POLICE RECORDS

## 14 Introduction

- 14.1.1 In an attempt to identify and investigate the various factors that influence manpower effectiveness and efficiency within the TTPS several databases were acquired and analysed. Appendix 8 lists all the datasets requested and dates that they were delivered along with comments regarding limitations of the datasets, etc. All analyses were performed with the aim of highlighting factors or issues that are linked to or influence the manpower of the TTPS.
- 14.1.2 While a variety of issues were identified with the majority of datasets received, the importance of the nominal rolls and the delays experienced due to the problems with the data cannot be overemphasised. Nominal Rolls are lists of all the officers assigned to a particular Division/Section/Unit etc. These lists are sent each month to the Human Resource Unit and theoretically represent the most accurate source of the actual manpower of the TTPS. The document contains information such as the officer's badge (regimental) number, rank and/or acting rank, assignment, if present or on leave etc.
- 14.1.3 However, rather than being presented with one nominal roll, the Committee received separate nominal rolls for each Unit/Branch and in some cases, for each sub unit with the data in various formats. The lack of standardisation among the documents meant that combining them into one usable document was extremely time-consuming and resulted in a document with limited accuracy. For example, there was no standard method used for sub unit assignments. Some nominal rolls included Division and Police Station while others just gave the Division. In another instance, some had separate fields for Substantive and Acting Rank and other did not reflect this information. As many as ten (10) different abbreviations for each rank could be found on the

received Nominal Rolls. Efficiency demands the standardisation of data collection forms with the TTPS.

14.1.4 Additionally, the number of officers tallied from the Nominal Rolls (6,086 officers) do not coincide with the total number of officers in the TTPS as supplied by summarized data as at February 2017 (6,768). Due to the varying manpower totals supplied by the TTPS along with the varied information attached to those manpower figures (rank, assigned posting, gender etc.), the analyses contained within this section use different manpower totals depending on the topic being analysed. For example, the nominal rolls did not contain gender information, therefore any gender analysis conducted were done using summarized totals supplied by the TTPS.

14.1.5 The Committee believes that the use of the Human Resource Portal to enter, track and process all human resource documents, requests, leave, transfer, etc., will help eradicate many of these issues.

## **14.2 Demographics of the TTPS**

### **14.2.1 Manpower Overview**

14.2.1.1 Based on the United Nations World Population Prospects 2017<sup>3</sup>, Trinidad and Tobago's population is 1.369 million. To allow for comparison with other countries worldwide, only the number of Regular Officers was used to calculate the country's Police Manpower/Country Population Ratio. Using a manpower actual strength of 6,768 Officers, a ratio of 494 Officers per 100,000 Population was derived.

---

<sup>3</sup> United Nations World Population Prospects 2017 Revision [https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2017\\_KeyFindings.pdf](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2017_KeyFindings.pdf)

14.2.1.2 Table 6 below compares the Police Manpower/Population Ratios of several countries with varying socioeconomic standings that have relatively similar population sizes to Trinidad and Tobago.

***Table 6: Police Manpower /Population Ratios for Select Countries***

<b>Country</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Police Manpower per 100,000 persons</b>
Grenada	106,825	871
Singapore	5,535,260	713
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	109,462	628
<b>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</b>	<b>1,369,265</b>	<b>494</b>
Swaziland	1,320,356	367
Estonia	1,305,755	336
Jamaica	2,813,285	315
Panama	4,051,284	314
New Zealand	4,604,871	232
Fiji	902,547	227
Barbados	284,215	215
Rhode Island	1,056,426	25

**Data Source: List of Countries and dependencies by Number of Police Officers<sup>4</sup>**

14.2.1.3 The 2010 “*Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice*” indicates 300 police officers per 100,000 inhabitants as the median value in the global ranking of police manpower per 100,000 population. It should be noted however, that citizen population is but one factor that determines police manpower requirements and other factors, such as crime

<sup>4</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_countries\\_and\\_dependencies\\_by\\_number\\_of\\_police\\_officers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_and_dependencies_by_number_of_police_officers)

levels, citizens' request for services, population density, etc. must be taken into consideration.

14.2.1.4 *The challenge lies not with the number of officers, because when the international standard of police officers to population is applied, i.e. No. of officers per 100,000 population, the TTPS is more than adequately staffed with a ratio of 494 officers per 100,000 Population. The evidence has shown that there needs to be more effective utilisation of the available manpower resources.*

### **14.3 Manpower Distribution**

#### **14.3.1 Regular Officers**

14.3.1.1 Based on the nominal rolls data supplied by the TTPS for the end of April 2017, Table 7 shows the breakdown of police officers and SRP assigned to the various Police Divisions. There is a total of 3,732 Regular Officers, 1,477 Full time SRPs and 626 Part Time SRPs giving a total of 5,835 officers assigned to the nine (9) Police Divisions. The remaining 3,399 officers are assigned to the various special Units and Branches within the Service, 2,354 Regular Officers, 1,019 Full time SRPs and 26 Part Time SRPs as can be seen in Table 8.

14.3.1.2 Approximately 61% of the Regular Officers are deployed to the nine (9) Police Divisions and approximately 39% are deployed to 25 Units/Branches/Sections, etc. It should be noted that the Units/Branches etc. listed in Table 8 were sourced from 38 nominal roll datasets supplied in early May 2017. No organizational structure of the Units and Branches and their sub units were provided; therefore, it is possible that some of the Units listed in Table 8 are sub units of larger Units/Branches. This might explain why some Units are listed as only having SRPs assigned to them, (e.g. Multi-Option Police Service

– MOPS, Police Hospital). The number of officers will remain consistent but the organizational structure requires clarification.

*Table 7: Manpower Distribution for Police Divisions*

DIVISION/UNIT	Regular Officers & SRPs			TOTAL
	REGULAR	SRP FULL TIME	SRP PART TIME	
CENTRAL	431	169	74	<b>674</b>
EASTERN	385	193	64	<b>642</b>
NORTH EASTERN	326	119	56	<b>445</b>
NORTHERN	629	291	127	<b>1,047</b>
PORT OF SPAIN	338	205	53	<b>596</b>
SOUTH WESTERN	427	65	57	<b>492</b>
SOUTHERN	613	192	92	<b>897</b>
TOBAGO	280	123	73	<b>476</b>
WESTERN	303	120	30	<b>453</b>
<b>TOTAL FOR DIVISIONS</b>	<b>3,732</b>	<b>1,477</b>	<b>626</b>	<b>5,722</b>

Data Source: TTPS Nominal Rolls Supplied May 2017 as of April 2017

*Table 8: Manpower Distribution for Police Branches/Units/Task Forces*

DIVISION/UNIT	SRP/REGULAR			TOTAL
	REGULAR	SRP FULL TIME	SRP PART TIME	
ACIB	31	20	-	51
Air Support Unit	-	2	-	2
AKU	-	6	-	6
Audio Visual	-	2	2	4
Background Investigations	-	31	-	31
CAPA	37	4	3	44
CCTV	-	22	-	22
CGIU	61	2	-	63
Child Protection Unit	115	4	-	119
CID/CRO	85	42	-	119
Community Policing	27	5	-	32
Complaints	44	21	-	65
Court and Process	122	96	-	218
CTU	12	-	-	12

Data Source: TTPS Nominal Rolls supplied May 2017 as of April 2017


*Table 8 cont'd: Manpower Distribution for Police Branches/Units/Task Forces*

DIVISION/UNIT	SRP/REGULAR			TOTAL
	REGULAR	SRP FULL TIME	SRP PART TIME	
E999	57	11	-	68
FIB	26	-	-	26
Finance	41	33	-	74
Fraud Squad	69	7	-	76
Guard & Emergency Branch	203	79	-	282
Homicide	260	54	-	314
Human Resource Branch	77	75	12	164
IATF	160	119	-	279
MOPS	-	3	-	3
Mounted and Canine	90	8	-	98
OCNFU	98	3	-	101
Police Academy	94	42	2	138
Police Band	62	-	-	62
Police Hospital	-	2	-	2
Professional Standards Bureau	18	-	-	18
Rapid Response Unit	-	223	-	223
Retirees Association	-	1	-	1
Special Branch	231	15	-	246
Traffic & Highway Patrol Branch	278	63	7	348
Transport & Telecom	56	24	-	80
Total for Units/Branches	2354	1019	26	3399
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>6086</b>	<b>2496</b>	<b>652</b>	<b>9234</b>

Data Source: TTPS Nominal Rolls supplied May 2017 as of April 2017

14.3.1.3 Figure 5 and 6, as well as, Tables 9 and 10 show the percentages of the total Regular Police Officer population that serve in the various Divisions, Units/Branches, etc. A comparison with the number of SRPs is shown in the following section.

**Figure 5: Manpower Distribution of Regular Police Officers by Percentage (%)**




Data Source: TTPS Nominal Rolls supplied May 2017 as of April 2017

**Table 9: Manpower Distribution of Regular Police Officers by Percentage**

DIVISION/UNIT	REGULAR OFFICERS	% OF ALL REGULAR OFFICERS
Northern	629	10.3%
Southern	613	10.1%
Central	431	7.1%
South Western	427	7%
Eastern	385	6.3%
Port of Spain	338	5.6%
North Eastern	326	5.4%
Western	303	5%
Tobago	280	4.6%

Data Source: TTPS Nominal Rolls supplied May 2017 as of April 2017

**Figure 6: Manpower Distribution of Regular Police Officers by Percentage within the Units/Branches/Sections**





**Table 10: Manpower Distribution of Regular Police Officers by Percentage within the Units/Branches/Sections**

<b>DIVISION / UNIT</b>	<b>REGULAR OFFICERS</b>	<b>% OF ALL REGULAR OFFICERS</b>
ACIB	31	0.5%
CAPA	37	0.6%
CGIU	61	1.0%
CHILD PROTECTION UNIT	115	1.9%
CID/CRO	85	1.4%
COMMUNITY POLICING SECRETARIAT	27	0.4%
COMPLAINTS	44	0.7%
COURT AND PROCESS	122	2.0%
CTU	12	0.2%
E999	57	0.9%
FIB	26	0.4%
FINANCE	41	0.7%
FRAUD SQUAD	69	1.1%
GUARD & EMERGENCY BRANCH	203	3.3%
HOMICIDE	260	4.3%
HUMAN RESOURCE BRANCH	77	1.3%
IATF	160	2.6%
MOUNTED AND CANINE	90	1.5%
OCNFBU	98	1.6%
POLICE ACADEMY	94	1.5%
POLICE BAND	62	1.0%
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BUREAU	18	0.3%
SPECIAL BRANCH	231	3.8%
TRAFFIC & HIGHWAY PATROL BRANCH	278	4.6%
TRANSPORT & TELECOM	56	0.9%

**Data Source: TTPS Nominal Rolls supplied May 2017 as of April 2017**

## 14.3.2 Special Reserve Police

14.3.2.1 The TTPS comprises Regular Police Officers in both First and Second Divisions as well as SRP Officers. The First Division has six (6) Ranks of police officers, while the Second Division has four (4) Ranks. SRP has three (3) Ranks in the First Division and four (4) Ranks in the Second Division. Tables 11 and 12 give the list of Regular Police Ranks and SRPs by Division.

**Table 11: Regular Police Ranks by Division**

FIRST DIVISION	SECOND DIVISION
Commissioner of Police (CoP)	Inspector (Insp)
Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP)	Sergeant (Sgt)
Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP)	Corporal (Cpl)
Senior Superintendent (Snr. Supt)	Police Constable (PC)
Superintendent (Supt)	
Assistant Superintendent (Asst. Supt)	

Data Source: Trinidad and Tobago Police Service

**Table 12: SRP Ranks by Division**

FIRST DIVISION	SECOND DIVISION
Senior Superintendent (Snr. Supt)	Inspector (Insp.)
Superintendent (Supt)	Sergeant (Sgt)
Assistant Superintendent (Asst. Supt)	Corporal (Cpl)
	Police Constable (PC)

Data Source: Trinidad and Tobago Police Service

14.3.2.2 Regular Police Officers and SRPs perform the same duties during a forty (40) hour week but are governed by different Acts. Regular Police are governed by the Police Service Act Chapter 15:01, (Act 7 of 2006, Amendment 11 of 2014) and SRPs are governed by the Special Reserve Police Act Chapter 15:03

(Amendment 2 of 2013). Table 13 gives a comparison of the requirements between Regular Officers and SRPs.

**Table 13: Comparison of the Requirements between Regular Officers and SRPs**

<b>REGULAR OFFICERS</b>	<b>SRPs</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Applicants must be a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago and of good character.</li> <li>● Applicants should be no less than eighteen (18) and no older than thirty-five (35) years of age on the 1st of January of the year in which the appointment is made.</li> <li>● Males must be of good physique and at least one hundred and sixty-seven (167) cm in height</li> <li>● Females must be of good physique and at least one hundred and fifty (150) cm in height</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Be 18 years and over</li> <li>● Be ably bodied</li> <li>● Be of good character</li> <li>● Possess a valid Trinidad and Tobago Identification Card</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Write and pass an Entrance Examination</li> <li>● Attend a medical examination which would include the following: HIV and STD Tests, Drug Test, Chest X-Ray and Optical Tests, Pregnancy Test (female)</li> <li>● Undergo polygraph and psychological tests</li> <li>● Pass an agility test</li> <li>● If successful, an interview will be conducted before a select panel</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Write and pass an Entrance Examination</li> <li>● Undergo a Medical Examination Background Investigation and Psychological Tests and</li> <li>● Pass a Physical Ability Test</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Possession of five (5) CXC subjects, General Proficiency, including English Language, Grades 1, 2 and 3</li> <li>● Or Possession of five (5) CXC subjects, Basic Proficiency, including English Language, Grade 1's only</li> <li>● Or Possession of five (5) G.C.E Ordinary Level passes including English Language, Grades A, B and C.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● According to the SRP Act, there are no specific educational requirement</li> </ul>

**Data Source: Trinidad and Tobago Police Service**


14.3.2.3 According to the nominal rolls data provided, the actual population size (N) of the TTPS, inclusive of Regular Officers, Full Time and Part Time SRPs by Divisions and Branch/Unit/Section is 9,234. The entry requirements for SRPs

differs from regular Police Officers, however Full Time SRPs perform the same duties as regular police officers but their compensation is lower. SRPs, including part time SRPs represent approximately 35% of the TTPS.

14.3.2.4 SRPs do not get the same benefits as regular police officers nor are they allowed to work outside of their normal work hours and are not entitled to overtime allowance or any additional allowances.

14.3.2.5 Figure 7 depicts a comparison of the number of Regular Officers in the TTPS to the number of SRP Officers by Divisions according to the Nominal Rolls data as at April 30, 2017.

**Figure 7: Comparison of TTPS Regular Officers to Full Time & Part Time SRPs by Division**



**Data Source: Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, Nominal Rolls Data as at April 2017**

14.3.2.6 The population sizes of Officers for the respective Divisions are listed in Table 14.

**Table 14: Population Size of Officers by Division**


<b>Officers</b>	<b>Population Size (N)</b>
Regular	3,732
Full Time SRP	1,477
Part Time SRP	626

14.3.2.7 It should be noted that the Northern Division has the highest population size with 1,047 officers, i.e. Regular, Full Time and Part Time SRPs, followed by the Southern Division with 897. The Tobago Division with a complement of 453 Officers has the smallest population of the nine (9) Divisions.

14.3.2.8 Figure 8 depicts a comparison between the numbers of Regular Officers in the TTPS to the number of SRP Officers by Branch/Unit/Section. According to the data provided, the Traffic and Highway Control Branch is the most populated followed by the Homicide Branch.

14.3.2.9 The Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF) has the highest number of Full Time SRPs followed by the Court and Process Unit. The Human Resource Unit has the highest number of Part Time SRPs followed by Traffic and Highway Patrol. Table 15 gives a further breakdown of the population sizes for the respective Branches/Units/Sections.

**Figure 8: Comparison of TTPS Regular Officers to Full Time & Part Time SRPs by Branches/Units/Sections**



Data Source: Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, Nominal Rolls Data as at April 2017

**Table 15: Population Size of TTPS Regular Officers to Full Time & Part Time SRPs by Branches/Units/Sections**


<b>Branch/Unit/Section</b>	<b>Regular Officers</b>	<b>Full Time SRPs</b>	<b>Part Time SRPs</b>
ACIB	31	20	
CAPA	37	4	3
CGIU	61	2	
Child Protection Unit	115	4	
CID/CRO	85	42	
Community Policing Secretariat	27	5	
Complaints	44	21	
Court and Process	122	96	
CTU	12		
E999	57	11	
Finance Branch	41	33	
Financial Investigations Bureau	26		
Fraud Squad	69	7	
Guard and Emergency	203	79	
Homicide	260	54	
Human Resource Branch	77	75	12
IATF	160	119	
Mounted and Canine	90	8	
OCNFBU	98	3	
Police Academy	94	42	2
Police Band	62		
Professional Standards Bureau	18		
Special Branch	231	15	
Traffic and Highway Patrol	278	63	7
Transport and Telecom	56	24	
<b>Total</b>	<b>2354</b>	<b>727</b>	<b>24</b>

**Data Source: Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, Nominal Rolls Data as at April 2017**

14.3.2.10 Figure 9 depicts Full Time and Part Time SRPs by Unit/Section that were separate from the listing of Branches/Units/Sections provided by the TTPS. It should be noted that some of the Units/Sections shown may form part of a

bigger Unit or Branch within the TTPS so the numbers represented here may not be a complete representation. However, a request for a further breakdown of Branches/Units/Sections was made but the information has not been provided to the PMAC to date. The Rapid Response Unit (RRU) has the highest number of Full Time SRPs by Unit/Section.

**Figure 9: Full Time & Part Time SRPS by Unit/Section**



**Data Source: TTPS, Nominal Rolls Data as at April 2017**



14.3.2.11 Table 16 gives the population sizes depicted in the graph.

**Table 16: Population Full Time & Part Time SRPS by Units/Sections**

<b>Branch/Unit/Section</b>	<b>Full Time SRPs</b>	<b>Part Time SRPs</b>
AIR SUPPORT	2	
ANTI KIDNAPPING UNIT	6	
ASSOCIATION RETIREES	1	
AUDIO VISUAL	2	2
BACKGROUND INVESTIGATORS	31	
CCTV	22	
MOPS	3	
POLICE HOSPITAL	2	
RRU	223	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>292</b>	<b>2</b>

**Data Source: TTPS, Nominal Rolls Data as at April 2017**

### 14.3.3 Conclusion

14.3.3.1 Based on the analysis of SRP the following main points are highlighted:


- i. SRPs consists of 35% of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service,
- ii. Entry requirements are different for Regular Police and SRPs, although they both perform the same duties.
- iii. SRPs are stipulated to work 40 hour weeks and not allowed to work overtime as Regular Police.
- iv. SRPs are paid less than Regular Police.

## 14.4 Overall Gender Distribution of Officers

14.4.1 Summarized gender information for the TTPS as at February 2017 was available for 6,788 Officers (as supplied by the TTPS) and is shown in Figure 10. There were 74% males (5,046) and 26% females (1,742) within the TTPS at this date. These percentages compare very favourably to gender distributions for the police forces of other countries: England and Wales (2015)<sup>5</sup> – 28% female, 72% male; United States (2013)<sup>6</sup> – 12% female, 88% male; Canada (2016)<sup>7</sup> – 21% female, 79% male.

14.4.2 Though the overall gender distribution of the TTPS is to be commended, an important aspect is the distribution of females within the various Divisions, Branches, Units to ensure that female officers are available as needed in specialized situations, such as, rape and child abuse cases, raids where women are involved, etc.

**Figure 10: TTPS Officers by Gender**



**Data Source: Summarized data from the TTPS as of February 2017**

<sup>5</sup> GOV.UK <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-march-2015/police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-march-2015>


<sup>6</sup> FBI Crime in the US [https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table-74/table\\_74\\_full\\_time\\_law\\_enforcement\\_employees\\_by\\_population\\_group\\_percent\\_male\\_and\\_female\\_2013.xls](https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table-74/table_74_full_time_law_enforcement_employees_by_population_group_percent_male_and_female_2013.xls)

<sup>7</sup> Police Resources in Canada <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2017001/article/14777-eng.htm>

## 14.5 Gender Distribution by Rank

- 14.5.1 The data that is presented below are from the summarised data provided by the TTPS. It is for those officers in their substantive ranks only and not in their acting ranks, e.g. data for the Commissioner of Police, TTPS, will be zero as there is no substantive Commissioner of Police. It should be noted that the same process will be used for the other ranks.
- 14.5.2 When gender of officers was looked at for those who were in their substantive ranks, for each of the ranks, the numbers of males were higher than females. This is not surprising, see Figure 11, however, there were some variations in proportions from rank to rank and even from the overall TTPS average of 74% males and 26% females. *(It should be noted that gender information exists only for substantive ranks).*
- 14.5.3 For the substantive officers in the rank of Deputy Commissioner of Police, it's 100% male, that is, one (1) officer. In the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police, it's 90% males (66 officers) and 10% females (7 officers). For five (5) other ranks, the proportions of males are in the eighties (80s), viz, Assistant Commissioners of Police, Senior Superintendents, Inspectors, Sergeants and Corporals. For the ranks Superintendent and Police Constable, 71% each of the officers were males. In other words, these last two (2) ranks of officers (Superintendents and Constables) were closest to the TTPS's overall gender distribution.
- 14.5.4 A further examination is needed of gender information by rank for actual officers and by the various Police Divisions, Stations, Branches, Units, Sections, etc. This is especially so as some policing activities may require the presence of a particular gender, e.g., child protection, sexual crimes, etc.

**Figure 11: TTPS Officers Gender by Substantive Rank**




**Data Source: Summarized data from the TTPS as of February 2017**

## 14.6 Age Distribution of Officers

14.6.1 Based on summarized data provided by the TTPS as of February 2017, [Figure 12](#) shows the overall age distribution of the TTPS. The majority of the officers fall within the age range of 30 to 44 years. This represents 66% of the total population of the TTPS, i.e. 3,948 out of 6,005 officers. The reduced numbers in the lower age groups indicate potential succession issues within the next 20 to 30 years with respect to manpower strength. Interestingly 10% of the police officers (591 officers) are fifty years and older and all of these will be exiting the TTPS within the next five to ten years. Of importance for the TTPS is the development and implementation of an appropriate succession plan to capture and utilise the expertise of these senior officers.

**Figure 12: Age Structure of the TTPS as of February 2017**




Data Source: Summarized data from the TTPS as of February 2017

## 14.7 Succession Planning

### 14.7.1 Number of Officers Retiring in Next Five Years

14.7.1 Figure 13 shows that of the 50 – 54 years’ age group that will be retiring in the next five years, the highest proportion - 41% (or 217 officers) are Police Constables – the lowest ranked police officer. This was followed by Corporals (25%), Sergeants (22%), Inspectors (9%) and ASPs (2%).

**Figure 13: Number of Officers (in Substantive Rank) Aged 50-54 Years Retiring in the next Five Years**




Data Source: Summarized data from the TTPS as of February 2017

## 14.7.2 First Division Officers for Compulsory Retirement over the Next Five Years

14.7.2.1 Figure 14 indicates that over the next five years (2017-2021) the FDO Rank with the highest number of officers that are due to exit the TTPS is the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police, that is, 49 out of the 107 officers or 46% of this Division’s officers. This is due, of course, to a relatively higher number of Assistant Superintendents of Police than other FDOs Ranks. *(This is according to sanctioned strength data provided by the TTPS).*

14.7.2.2 Further, the average number of FDOs to retire annually for the next five years is 21. The graph shows that out of the five years for which data is provided, in 2020 there will be the highest number of exits (that is, 33 Officers) from the current batch of FDOs. The other years that are above the average are 2017 and 2021 with 23 FDOs each set to retire. In 2018 and 2019, below the average number of FDOs are set to retire, that is, 15 and 13 respectively.

**Figure 14: First Division Officers (Sanctioned Strength) for Compulsory Retirement: 2017 - 2021**




Data Source: Summarized Data from the TTPS as of February 2017

### **14.7.3 Second Division Officers for Compulsory Retirement over the Next Five Years**

- 14.7.3.1 As shown in Figure 15, the total number of SDOs (sanctioned strength) who are due for compulsory retirement by 2021 (or within the next five years) is 732. Further, the average number of officers in the Second Division to retire annually over the next five years is 146.
- 14.7.3.2 In addition, over the next five (5) years, the rank with the highest number of SDOs that are due to exit the TTPS is Constables. This is due, of course, to a relatively higher number of Constables than other ranks in the SDO. The graph below shows that out of the five (5) years for which data is provided, 2017, 2018 and 2019 have fewer than the average with 116, 136 and 137 officers, respectively. The years 2020 and 2021 are above the average.
- 14.7.3.3 This data highlights the need for the Police Service to use available data in its succession planning process. At present there is no evidence that this is being done. The following graph also shows that for each rank of SDOs, the number of officers who are due to retire in five (5) years increased from 2017 to 2021 to varying degrees. Figure 15 reflects such.



**Figure 15: Second Division Officers (Sanctioned Strength) for Compulsory Retirement: 2017-2021**




Data Source: Summarized data from the TTPS as of February 2017

#### 14.7.4 Separation

14.7.4.1 Figure 16 depicts the number of Officers who separated from the TTPS during the period 2014 to 2016. This data was provided in hard copy to the PMAC and was digitized for analysis purposes. According to the data provided, over the 2-year period, the category of compulsory retirement had the highest number officers who separated in 2016 (330 officers). The second highest category of separation from the TTPS was optional retirement. This was highest in 2015 (160 officers). Separations by resignations, medical grounds and death were the lowest over the period. Table 17 gives a breakdown of the figures for each year and separation category.

**Figure 16: Number of Officers Separated from the TTPS by Separation category for the Period 2014 to 2016**



Data Source: Summarized Data from the TTPS as of February 2017

**Table 17: Number of Officers by Separation for the Period 2014 to 2016**

TYPE OF SEPARATION	YEAR		
	2014	2015	2016
COMPULSORY RETIREMENT	129	160	330
OPTIONAL RETIREMENT	22	11	13
RESIGNED	10	17	10
MEDICAL GROUNDS	3	4	1
DECEASED	18	11	13
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>182</b>	<b>203</b>	<b>367</b>


Data Source: Summarized Data received from the TTPS as at March 31<sup>st</sup>, 2017

## 14.7.5 Vacancies in the TTPS

- 14.7.5.1 Figure 17 shows the vacancies in the TTPS as at February 2017. These vacancies are the differences between sanctioned strength and actual number of officers therein. As can be seen, the largest number of vacancies is for Police Constables, that is, the foot soldiers in the TTPS. Further, out of the ten ranks of officers in the TTPS, there were no vacancies in six (6) ranks. The remaining three (3) ranks have very small numbers of vacancies ranging from two to six.
- 14.7.5.2 It should be noted that despite there being a low number of vacancies in the TTPS, there is a notable number of “Acting” appointments, see Figure 18 for this information.
- 14.7.5.3 It should be noted, however, that some discrepancies exist with some of the data provided by the TTPS. Figure 17 shows that there is a sum total of 853 vacancies within the Service. This information is based on summarized data as of February 2017 supplied by the TTPS. However, when the sanctioned strength is compared to the actual strength for the Units listed below in Table 18, a total deficit of 1,830 officers was identified.
- 14.7.5.4 The nine (9) Units highlighted in the table were selected due to their importance regarding crime fighting. Of these, three (3) Units (Court & Process Branch, E999/RRU and OCNFU) have deficits greater than 50%. Notably, is the fact that the SRP Nominal Roll lists 223 full time SRP officers as being assigned to the Rapid Response Unit, indicating that in some instances, large percentages of a Unit are bolstered by SRPs. Potentially, not all officers within the TTPS were accounted for in the nominal rolls. This might account for a portion of the difference between the summarized data and the nominal rolls data.

14.7.5.5 *The discrepancies between Figure 17 and Table 18 highlights a major problem within the TTPS where accurate numbers of how many officers are actually within the Service and where they are assigned is surprisingly difficult to come by. This is a result of inefficient Human Resource Processes and the lack of a proper file and record management system that is used throughout the service.*

**Figure 17: Vacancies in the TTPS (as at February 2017)**



**Data Source: Summarized data from the TTPS as of February 2017**

**Table 18: Manpower Deficit per Division/Section/Unit within the TTPS**

Division/Branch/Unit	Sanctioned Strength	Actual Strength	Deficit	Deficit %
ANTI-CORRUPTION INVESTIGATIONS	45	27	18	40%
POLICE BAND	80	64	16	20%
CENTRAL DIVISION	462	403	59	13%
CHILD PROTECTION UNIT	169	114	55	33%
CID / CRO	247	267	-20	-8%
COMMUNITY POLICING SECRETARIAT	19	31	-12	-63%
COMPLAINTS DIVISION	57	42	15	26%
COURT & PROCESS BRANCH	274	109	165	60%
CRIME & PROBLEM ANALYSIS	30	35	-5	-17%
CRIMINAL GANG & INTELLIGENCE	54	61	-7	-13%
E-999 RRU	177	57	120	68%
EASTERN DIVISION	411	385	26	6%
EXECUTIVE	15	15	0	0%
FINANCE BRANCH	82	41	41	50%
FINANCIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION	45	37	8	18%
FRAUD SQUAD	106	70	36	34%
GUARD & EMERGENCY BRANCH	354	203	151	43%
HOMICIDE	308	263	45	15%
HUMAN RESOURCE BRANCH	264	116	148	56%
INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE	190	177	13	7%
MOUNTED & CANINE BRANCH	125	90	35	28%
NORTH EASTERN DIVISION	324	321	3	1%
NORTHERN DIVISION	644	628	16	2%
OCNFU	197	95	102	52%
PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT UNIT	0	0	0	
POLICE ACADEMY	81	94	-13	-16%
PORT OF SPAIN DIVISION	465	333	132	28%
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BUREAU	55	19	36	65%
SOUTH WESTERN DIVISION	450	322	128	28%
SOUTHERN DIVISION	647	613	34	5%
SPECIAL BRANCH	290	222	68	23%
TOBAGO DIVISION	371	252	119	32%
TRAFFIC / HIGHWAY PATROL	397	255	142	36%
TRANS / TELECOM BRANCH	96	50	46	48%
WESTERN DIVISION	353	243	110	31%
			<b>1830</b>	


**Data Source: TTPS Nominal Rolls supplied May 2017 as of April 2017**

## 14.7.6 Acting Appointments in the TTPS

14.7.6.1 Figure 18 shows the acting appointments in the TTPS as at February 2017. Of the ten (10) ranks of officers in the TTPS, there were acting appointments in the nine (9) ranks of officers where acting appointments are possible, that is, all ranks except Police Constables.

14.7.6.2 Corporals had the highest number of acting appointments followed by Sergeants and Inspectors, however, when percentages are examined, the ranks of Deputy Commissioner of Police and Commissioner of Police have 91% and 100% acting appointments, respectively. Interestingly, there were also 37% acting appointments for Senior Superintendents and 24% for Inspectors. **There needs to be a more effective promotion process whereby many of these acting appointments are confirmed.**

**Figure 18: Acting Appointments in the TTPS (as at February 2017)**



Data Source: Summarized data from the TTPS as of February 2017

## **14.8 Analysis of Financial Records of the TTPS**

### **14.8.1 Overview**

14.8.1.1 The PMAC looked at various aspects of Finance in the TTPS with particular focus on Overtime Allowance, Extra Duty Payments to officers, Fleet Management, Facilities (Buildings), Audit Reports, Budgetary Releases and overall Financial and Record Keeping.

14.8.1.2 In particular, Overtime payments have been a growing concern as total overtime disbursements have significantly increased over the past years.

### **14.8.2 Overtime and Manpower**

14.8.2.1 According to the TTPS, the Commissioner of Police determines the working/shift hours in the nine (9) Police Divisions. The various shifts are identified in Appendix 4. It should be noted that the document omitted two (2) shifts that were then verbally confirmed by the TTPS:

- 24 hours on / 48 hours off
- 48 hours on / 48 hours off

14.8.2.2 The TTPS was able to provide the Committee with a Departmental Order No. 273/01 dated 28/11/2001 on overtime, which lists the following information:


***“Police Officers in the Second Division, generally are not required to work in excess of 40 hours per week; however, exigencies may require officers to work beyond that normal requirement:***

- i. When an officer exceeds 40 hours of work in a week, the excess hours shall be classified as overtime and the officer will be compensated with the grant of time off or with payment;*
- ii. There are provisions, however, which address excess hours of work done by detectives and Special Branch of the Second Division;*
- iii. These officers are accommodated by a fixed monthly commuted overtime arrangement, which is paid at specific rates, based on their rank;*
- iv. In spite of these guidelines, there has been a clear neglect of the many administrative directives issued for the prudent management of the process pertaining to the working of overtime. This neglect has resulted in abuse of the system leaving the department with an overtime bill, which far exceeds the budgetary allocation for that item.”*

14.8.2.3 The intent of the Departmental Order was to emphasise the importance of complying with the Service’s Instructions as they relate to overtime, in order to bring an immediate end to the abuse of this allowance. Notwithstanding the Departmental Order, the situation continues. The process diagram below ([Figure 19](#)) explains the administration of overtime payments.



**Figure 19: Process Diagram of the Administration of Overtime Payments**



### 14.8.3 Challenges in Collecting Overtime Data

14.8.3.1 The PMAC was faced with numerous challenges in obtaining Overtime Expenditure data from the TTPS. Data was provided by the TTPS in a

summarized hard copy which was later digitised by the Committee for analytical purposes. Also, Commuted Overtime Expenditure was obtained from the iHRIS Section of the Ministry of Finance. Overtime payments are only paid to officers in the Second Division.

14.8.3.2 Several meetings were held with staff at the iHRIS and Accounts Sections in the TTPS as well as the iHRIS Section of the Ministry of Finance with regards to obtaining overtime data. Based on these discussions the following were derived:

- That overtime information is provided via abstracts (specific documents within the TTPS) and calculated overtime values are recorded on paper. There was no digitised system of the overtime values;
- That due to the way the data was stored and because of the lack of staffing, it would take approximately two (2) weeks to retrieve one (1) month of overtime data;
- That in order to pull the overtime data from the iHRIS database, it would require running queries which would be too time consuming due to how slow the system operates;
- That overtime payments were lumped into salary payments and recorded as one (1) monthly payment per officer. To retrieve this information, it would have been necessary to return to the manual pay sheets;
- That only data for commuted overtime allowance was available on the Ministry of Finance database.


14.8.3.2 As a consequence only the summarised hard copy data that was provided by the TTPS was used in this report of Overtime Payments for Regular SDOs.

#### 14.8.4 Overtime Analysis

14.8.4.1 According to summarised data submitted by the TTPS prior to April 2017, the total overtime funds expended for the financial years 2013/2014 and 2014/2015 was **\$288,864,708.60** as seen in Figure 20 below. This represents an increase in overtime expenditure of approximately 56% over the two (2) year period. It can be assumed that this amount represents regular officers who do not get a commuted overtime allowance.

14.8.4.2 The data obtained from the Ministry of Finance on Commuted Overtime Allowance for the period 2014 to June 2017 amounted to **\$174,352,667.65**. Commuted Overtime Allowance is included in certain officers' salary in various Divisions/Branches/Units and is not across the board in the TTPS. Commuted Overtime Allowance will be analysed further below.

**Figure 20: Total Overtime Expenditure for Financial Years 2013/2014 and 2014/2015**




Data Source: Summarised Data received from the TTPS as at March 31<sup>st</sup>, 2017

14.8.4.3 Figure 21 shows a summary of funds expended in overtime over a 2-year period for the Second Division ranks of the TTPS. According to the data provided for the period, the rank of Constables received the highest overtime expenditure followed by Corporals, Sergeants and Inspectors. While overtime expenditure increased across all ranks over the period, payments made to Sergeants increased by 58.83% and Inspectors by 38.48% for the period 2014/2015.

14.8.4.4 To get a better understanding of how overtime hours accumulate, a comprehensive audit is required to ascertain the reasons for increased man hours in the TTPS. This would involve obtaining a copy of the station diary in which overtime is recorded, examining the duties performed during overtime hours and a further analysis on the number of officers who worked overtime.

**Figure 21: Summary of Funds Expended for Overtime by Rank for the Financial Years 2013/2014 and 2014/2015**



Data Source: Summarised Data received from the TTPS as of March 31, 2017


14.8.4.3 Figure 22 gives an analysis of the Estimated Per Capita Expenditure for the various ranks in the Second Division. This estimation was analysed using the summarised Sanctioned and Actual Strength of the TTPS as at February 13, 2017, against the summarised data provided by the TTPS for the financial years 2013/2014 to 2014/2015. From the previous graph, the rank of Constables had the highest overall overtime expenditure. However, when per capita of overtime expenditure by rank was considered, there was an increase of 59% per Sergeant in financial year 2014/2015 with an estimated monthly overtime of \$6,979.18 followed by an increase of 38% per Inspector with an estimated monthly overtime of \$11,272.88. This can be attributed to the number of hours worked by Sergeants and Inspectors as well as the Overtime rate per hour for these ranks are higher.

14.8.4.4 Even though Corporals and Constables accumulated the most overtime hours over the period, the rates per hour for these respective ranks are much smaller. Each Corporal received an estimated overtime payment of \$3,499.80 and each Constable received an estimated \$1,620.60 in the financial year 2014/2015. Table 19 gives a breakdown of the hourly Overtime Rate per hour by Rank.

**Table 19: Overtime Rate per Hour by Rank**

<b>RANK</b>	<b>OVERTIME RATE PER HOUR</b>
Inspector	\$116.25
Sergeant	\$100.38
Corporal	\$83.33
Constable	\$66.71

**Figure 22: Estimated Per Capita Expenditure by Rank for the Financial Years 2013/2014 & 2014/2015**




**Data Source: Summarised Overtime Expenditure and the No. of Officers per Rank**

14.8.4.5 Figure 23 depicts data that was received for Commuted Overtime Allowance from the Ministry of Finance, iHRIS Section for the period 2014 to June 2017 for persons who are entitled to Commuted Overtime Allowance in the TTPS. The total commuted overtime allowance paid to officers over the period was **\$174,352,667.65**.

14.8.4.6 As stated above, commuted overtime allowance is afforded to officers who are entitled to the allowance and it is not across the board for all police officers. From the data provided and as seen in the graph, Commuted Overtime Allowance represents approximately 53% of the total base salary of the officers over the period.

14.8.4.7 Table 20 lists the Divisions and Branches/Units in which SOME officers receive Commuted Overtime Allowance as recorded by the data provided by the Ministry of Finance. It should be noted that as at June 30, 2017, based on the payroll data of the TTPS provided by the Ministry of Finance, approximately 1,300 officers received Commuted Overtime Allowance. This represents approximately 21% of the manpower of the TTPS.

**Figure 23: Total Expenditure for Commuted Overtime and Base Salary for Commuted Police Officers the period 2014 to June 2017**



**Data Source: Payroll Data of the TTPS from the iHRIS Unit of the Ministry of Finance**

**Table 20: Divisions/Branches/Units/Sections that received Commuted Overtime Allowance**

<b>DIVISION</b>	<b>BRANCH/UNIT/SECTION</b>
Central	Task Force
Eastern	Mounted and Canine
North Eastern	E999 Response
Northern	Homicide
Port of Spain	Special Branch
South Western	Police Band
Southern	OCNFU
Tobago	CID/CRO
Western	Police Academy
	Fraud Squad


**Data Source: Payroll Data, iHRIS Unit of the Ministry of Finance**

14.8.4.8 Figure 24 shows the growth in Commuted Overtime and Base Salary for commuted police officers for the period 2014 to June 2017. The graph depicts a steady growth in commuted overtime allowance over the period with the highest payment in commuted overtime in 2016 and the lowest payment in 2014.

14.8.4.9 Salary also showed a steady growth trend over the period. In June 2016, a portion of back pay arrears was paid to police officers which showed the drastic increase in base salary for the year 2016. Data was also provided up to June 2017, which also showed a large expenditure for mid-year, but this was also attributed to back pay arrears paid in March 2017.



**Figure 24: Growth in Commuted Overtime and Base Salary for Commuted Police Officers the period 2014 to June 2017**



**Data Source: Payroll Data of the TTPS from the iHRIS Unit of the Ministry of Finance**

### 14.8.5 Irregularities of Overtime within the TTPS

14.8.5.1 The Finance Branch of the TTPS submitted a written correspondence to the PMAC on Overtime claims. Based on a previous study on overtime payments, the TTPS listed the following irregularities which were observed as well as requirements for its proper administration:

**Table 21: Irregularities of Overtime within the TTPS**

<b>IRREGULARITY</b>	<b>REQUIREMENT</b>
Divisional Commanders were forwarding claims from SDOs beyond the six (6) month period as stipulated in the Police Service Regulations 2007	Only claims that fall within the time frame will be entertained, except in special circumstances with the reason for late submission written and forwarded through the Divisional or Branch Commanders to the Senior Superintendent Finance Branch
Difficult to establish the identity of signatures of First Division Officers on the claims	When signature is affixed, the Officer must write his name in block letters, affixing the official stamp. Divisions/Branches/Sections must provide specimen signature of officer authorized to sign claims and notify the Senior Superintendent of Finance Branch where there are changes
No authority was granted in the approval for officers to work overtime on the claims submitted or written in the remarks column	FDOs must grant approval for officers to work overtime and should be recorded in the station diary and refer to as the authority. Also ensure hours correspond with Abstract Book and the officer was not granted compensatory leave for such hours before signing claims
Signatures of SDOs were missing	Ensure all signatures should be affixed to claims
Claims not bearing the official stamp, full name of officer and regimental number	All claims must be stamped, have full name and regimental number
Overwriting of dates and hours worked	There should be no overwriting in accordance with financial instructions and regulations
Officers were submitting Overtime for the same period more than once	A register must be kept to record the names of the officers and overtime claimed. The practice was being monitored and officers will be subjected to disciplinary action and court proceedings

## 14.8.6 The Necessity of Overtime in a Police Force

14.8.6.1 A report for the US National Institute of Justice highlighted that it is not unusual for a police service to spend up to 6% of its budget on overtime (Bayley & Worden, 1998). This report also emphasises that a police service must develop the capacity to monitor and control overtime usage as well as to continually explore ways to reduce overtime by becoming more effective and efficient in the delivery of police services. Even with improvements in overtime management, it is in many instances an unavoidable cost of policing.

14.8.6.2 The primary objective of an overtime analysis in the police service should do the following:

1. Identify the main causes of overtime, what drives overtime?
2. Review the police service policy on overtime and overtime usage reports
3. Identify best practices regarding overtime management and controls
4. Recommend changes to enhance overtime management

14.8.6.3 ***It can be concluded that the TTPS has to make greater efforts to manage overtime, which has become institutionalized. The performance of Officers who work overtime on a continuing basis will eventually deteriorate thus increasing the risk to society by having sleep-deprived, overworked Officers performing their duties.***

## 14.8.7 Extra Duty Allowance

14.8.7.1 Extra Duties are categorized as duties performed outside of an officer's normal work hours and duties and responsibilities. Extra Duty Allowance is paid in compliance to Regulation (61) of the Police Service Regulations, 2007. The regulations reproduced for information states:

*“Subject to sub-regulation (2), the Commissioner may, at the written request of the organizer of such entertainment, bazaars, private assemblies or other occasions or functions as are approved by the Commissioner, provide for the services of officers for the purpose of preserving order at such events and for performing such extra duties determined by the Commissioner and prescribed by the Minister of Finance,*

- 1. An officer shall not be deputed for extra duty unless he voluntarily undertakes such duty*
- 2. An officer may only perform extra duty outside his official duty hours*
- 3. An officer shall be paid for his service at the rate of 90% of the charges levied under the sub-regulations and the remaining 10% to be paid to the Award Fund.”*

14.8.7.2 Officers are paid in advance for extra duties by the organizers of events via cash or a cheque made out to the Senior Superintendent of the Division and the Station Clerk is responsible for recording this payment. Table 22 gives an indication of the hourly rate of extra duty for police officers.

**Table 22: TTPS Hourly Rate of Extra Duties by Rank**

<b>RANK</b>	<b>EXISTING RATE (PER HOUR)</b>	<b>REVISED RATE (PER HOUR)</b>
Assistant Commission of Police	\$142.00	\$160.00
Senior Superintendent	\$119.00	\$134.00
Superintendent	\$104.00	\$118.00
Assistant Superintendent	\$97.00	\$110.00
Inspector	\$86.00	\$98.00
Sergeant	\$74.00	\$84.00
Corporal	\$61.00	\$70.00
Constable	\$50.00	\$57.00

Data Source: Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, Cabinet Minute No. 649 of February 27, 2014

14.8.7.3 Further research into extra duties by police officers in other jurisdictions showed that other jurisdictions have differing rates/ratios. According to the Essex Police Federation, the rate of pay for “*Unsociable Hours Allowance*” an officer shall be paid is at an hourly rate of 10% of the officer’s hourly rate of pay.<sup>8</sup>

14.8.7.4 In Salt Lake City Corporation, the rate of pay for a Sergeant is one and a half times the hourly wage rate<sup>9</sup> and in the Republic of Mauritius, officers who receive Extra Duty/Special Duty Allowance is paid at the rate of 5% of their monthly salary provided:

- (i) they put in 30 to 50 excess hours of work in a month; and Conditions of Service Special Duty and Extra Duty Allowances and
- (ii) they do not derive any other form of allowance for putting in the extra hours of work.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Essex Police Federation website <http://www.essex.polfed.org/?type=allowances>

<sup>9</sup> Salt Lake City Corporation, Annual Compensation Plan [http://www.slcdocs.com/HR/FY17\\_Compensation.pdf](http://www.slcdocs.com/HR/FY17_Compensation.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> Pay Research Bureau, Mauritius <http://prb.pmo.govmu.org/English/Pages/default.a.spx>

14.8.7.5 In comparing the rates used for Extra Duty Allowances with other jurisdiction, one must take into consideration that the salary, duties and responsibilities and legislation for police officers vary. Attention should also be paid to the exchange rate of currencies, however, the determination and regulation for extra duty allowances as well as overtime allowance in Trinidad and Tobago was conceptualized out of international standards and applied according to the public service instructions and regulations and the rate of pay for extra duty was adjusted as such.

### **14.8.8 Fleet Management**

14.8.8.1 The PMAC was provided with a listing of the vehicular fleet of the TTPS. It can be assumed that that there are approximately 1,123 functional vehicles within the TTPS based on the information provided by the Deputy Commissioners of Police with responsibility for Operations and Administration. The data revealed that there are approximately 300 vehicles that are not functional in the Service.

14.8.8.2 According to the data provided, Table 23 gives an indication of the number of vehicles purchased by the TTPS for the period 2010 to 2016. The data provided however gave the annual cost for the period 2012 to 2016 and the amount incurred for the purchase of vehicles over the four (4) year period amounted to **\$174,226,262.53**.

14.8.8.3 The PMAC was not provided with any information on how much is spent annually on maintenance of vehicles. Despite such, the Committee was informed that all new vehicles are maintained by the service provider.

**Table 23: Number of Vehicles Purchased for the Period 2010-2016**

<b>Year</b>	<b>No. of Vehicles Purchased</b>	<b>Annual Cost (TT\$)</b>
2010	169	
2011	91	
2012	77	14,060,762.53
2013	383	79,659,735.00
2014	223	48,093,692.34
2015	59	12,878,176.00
2016	121	19,533,896.66
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,123</b>	<b>174,226,262.53</b>

**Data Source: Trinidad and Tobago Police Service**

- 14.8.8.4 Taking into consideration the total number of vehicles on fleet of the TTPS, the ratio of police officers to vehicles based on the actual strength of the TTPS as at February 2017 is approximately 6 to 1.
- 14.8.8.5 Information arising from the focus groups held with police officers, indicate that the manpower within the TTPS is not affected by the shortage of vehicles but rather by a shortage of Drivers within the Service.

### **14.8.9 Facilities**

- 14.8.9.1 The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service provided a list of Buildings that are Owned, Leased and Rented by the TTPS as well as the monthly cost per lease/rent as at May 2017. According to the information provided, there are presently 116 Buildings occupied by the TTPS with an approximate monthly lease/rental cost of \$4,919,273.61. A copy of the Listing of Facilities is attached in Appendix 9.

- 14.8.9.2 Based on the focus group discussions which were conducted by the PMAC, police officers raised the issue that some of the buildings are in a deplorable state.
- 14.8.9.3 It is recommended that the TTPS take the necessary steps to reduce its rental/lease costs as approximately TTD\$59 million is spent annually on this item. Serious attention should also be placed on occupational health and safety issues at its various locations as well as ensuring that there is the appropriate continuous maintenance of all of its facilities.

#### **14.8.10 Audited Reports**

14.8.10.1 The PMAC was provided with the Audited Management Letters of the TTPS on the Audit of the Appropriation Account of the TTPS for Financial Years ending 2015/2016 which was audited by the Auditor General, Ministry of Finance. The Auditor General made the following recommendations:

- i. The Accounting Officer should pay accurate attention to the Appropriation Accounts and Comptroller of Accounts Circular Memorandum No. 20 which sets out the main causes of overpayments, unauthorized payments and remedial measures to mitigate such, e.g., Number of cases of overpayments discovered in the Appropriation Account was not in agreement with what was reported to the Auditor General;
- ii. The Accounting Officer should ensure all books are currently posted and kept up to date in accordance and comply with Financial Regulations and Financial Instructions, e.g., keeping



of all Vote Books up to date and Submission of all relevant documents to be audited;

- iii. The Accounting Officer should comply with Financial Instructions and Comptroller of Accounts Circular Memorandums e.g., overpayments to pensions and gratuities, void cheques, receipts and disbursements.

14.8.10.2 On reviewing the audited management letters for 2015 and 2016, although the TTPS has been consistent in having their accounts audited annually, it has been unable to comply with recommendations laid out by the Auditor. The audited management letter of 2015 was comparable to that of 2016 due to non-compliance.

14.8.10.3 One item that has been consistent in both management letters is the issue of overpayments. It can be assumed that inconsistencies in record keeping and the inability to process records in a timely manner have led to overpayments. A greater emphasis must be placed on having all financial records up to date and in compliance with Financial Regulations.

#### **14.8.11 Releases: Estimated vs. Actual**

14.8.11.1 The TTPS continues to receive a large sum of the budgetary allocation from the GORTT as National Security remains a top priority for the government and the citizens.


14.8.11.2 Expenditure for the TTPS was pulled from the Ministry of Finance's Estimates of Expenditure for Financial Years for the 3-year period 2013/2014, 2014/2015 and 2015/2016 as shown in [Figure 25](#). Actual Releases for all heads/sub heads were steady, however, there was a decrease in 2015/2016 of actual releases

because of a change in administration in 2015 as the Government embarked on reducing public expenditure due to economic conditions.

14.8.11.3 There were decreases in the Development Fund (52%) and the Infrastructure Development Fund (23%) for financial 2015/2016. More monies were estimated for Minor Equipment in 2015/2016, in which approximately 95% were actually released for that Head of Expenditure. Overall, Actual releases for Personal Expenditure remained consistent.

14.8.11.4 It should be noted that Table 24 was pulled from the Estimates of Expenditure from the Ministry of Finance. Table 25 gives an annual summarised breakdown from data on releases of expenditure from the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. This will be analysed further below.

**Figure 25: Comparison of Releases for the Various Head/Sub Head in the TTPS for financial years 2013/2014 to 2015/2016**



**Data Source: Estimates of Expenditure, Ministry of Finance**

**Table 24: Breakdown of Releases for Financial Year 2013/2014 to 2015/2016**

Head/Sub Head	2013/2014			2014/2015			2015/2016		
	Estimated (TT\$)	Actual (TT\$)	Returned to Treasury (TT\$)	Estimated (TT\$)	Actual (TT\$)	Returned to Treasury (TT\$)	Estimated (TT\$)	Actual (TT\$)	Returned to Treasury (TT\$)
Personal Expenditure	1,769,971,000	1,508,584,239	261,386,761	1,542,938,000	1,496,070,798	46,867,202	1,543,827,000	1,529,854,948	13,972,052
Goods and Services	415,658,550	396,237,810	19,420,740	523,163,300	386,731,075	136,432,225	551,570,150	470,699,882	80,870,268
Minor Equipment	45,314,500	38,980,630	6,333,870	54,900,000	23,691,883	31,208,117	78,350,000	72,425,818	5,924,182
Current Transfers	18,917,300	17,793,935	1,123,365	33,176,750	26,267,752	6,908,998	30,164,504	28,731,224	1,433,280
Development Programme	146,600,000	142,837,079	3,762,921	116,454,000	101,537,524	14,916,476	60,689,000	53,274,718	7,414,282
Infrastructure Development Fund	128,400,646	149,742,405	0	181,300,000	181,444,029	0	50,671,000	41,188,611	9,482,389
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,524,861,996</b>	<b>2,254,176,098</b>	<b>270,685,898</b>	<b>2,451,932,050</b>	<b>2,215,743,061</b>	<b>236,188,989</b>	<b>2,315,271,654</b>	<b>2,196,175,201</b>	<b>119,096,453</b>

Data Source: Estimates of Expenditure, Ministry of Finance

**Table 25: Breakdown of Releases from the TTPS**

Year	Estimated (TT\$)	Actual (TTS)	Expenditure (TTS)	Unspent Monies (TT\$)
2013/2014	2,309,680,900.00	2,122,367,479.00	2,034,299,031.60	275,381,868.40
2014/2015	2,431,926,800.00	2,234,128,449.00	2,154,986,590.35	276,940,209.65
2015/2016	3,288,618,000.00	2,400,854,244.00	2,388,144,591.96	900,473,408.04

Data Source: Summarised Releases from the TTPS

14.8.11.5 Table 25 above represents summarised data of a breakdown of releases submitted by the TTPS. According to the data provided, the PMAC was provided with Unspent Monies that was returned to Treasury. The TTPS verbally indicated that Unspent Monies was calculated by subtracting the Expenditure from the Estimated Releases for the fiscal year.

14.8.11.6 It would be inappropriate of the Committee to analyse the data submitted by the TTPS as there was insufficient time to validate the data. As such, Table 25 indicated that in 2015/2016 approximately TTD 1 Billion was returned to the Treasury, however in comparison to the Estimates of Expenditure, approximately TTD 120 Million was returned.

14.8.11.7 While it can be assumed that the TTPS is practicing prudent financial management it is recommended that further studies be done on each head/sub head to see whether funds or monies can and should be used between votes to improve manpower issues within the TTPS.

## **14.8.12 Financial and Record Keeping**

14.8.12.1 A meeting was held with the Head of Finance at the TTPS to have a greater understanding of the financial processes and record keeping within the TTPS. The following is the current status with regards to financial record keeping:

1. All Financial Recording Keeping is paper based and conducted in accordance with Public Service Regulations on the TTPS Vote Book.
2. Purchasing of Items/Minor Equipment is done by the Procurement Unit, sent to the Accounting Officer (the

Commissioner of Police) for approval and then to the Finance Department for payment.

3. There is no proper Fixed Asset Register or depreciation of Assets.
4. Paper Based records and files are stored in fire proof cabinets. No records are destroyed.
5. There is no remote storage facility for records and files.

14.8.12.2 Some of the challenges the TTPS is currently facing due to the current status include:

- a. There is no accounting software used in financial record keeping.
- b. There is an apparent shortage of manpower to facilitate the development of a Fixed Asset Register. Each Division / Branch / Unit has a list of assets at its respective site. It has been stated that a proper Fixed Asset Register is presently being worked on.
- c. The IT Manager stated there is an Asset Register Software which is not being utilised.
- d. Because record keeping is highly paper based, there is lack of storage space.
- e. A remote area for storage facility is presently being explored.

14.8.12.3 A greater emphasis should be placed on the administration and record keeping in the TTPS as there exists currently an archaic paper based system. There is need for greater compliance with financial instructions and regulations.

### **14.8.13 Finance Recommendations**

14.8.13.1 From the analysis above, there is a clear indication that throughout the years, the TTPS has expended a large sum of its budgeted allocation on the payment of Overtime. Based on the data and findings above, the following recommendations are made:

1. Conduct a comprehensive audit on the entire Overtime System e.g. look at station diaries, determine the reasons for increased man hours, whether the same officers are continuously working overtime hours etc.;
2. Develop a digitised system for entering overtime information, and recording keeping within the TTPS;
3. Review the Overtime Policy to streamline and formalize the payment structure for overtime;
4. Standardize data collection within the TTPS. Develop a proper Fixed Asset System for vehicles listing;
5. Ensure compliance with prudent financial management procedures, e.g., ensure utilization of budgetary releases allocated, maintenance of relevant vote books as specified by the audited report;

6. Introduce the use of accounting software and procedures in recording and storing financial and accounting data;
7. Develop a proper Fixed Asset Register (furniture and equipment) in accordance with Financial Regulations.

## **14.9 Manpower Utilization**

14.9.1 In terms of man hours used, minor incidents such as road traffic accidents (RTA) and minor offenses absorb significant quantify of time. To increase the manpower available for more serious crime/incidents, the PMAC is suggesting that minor incidents be moved from under the purview of the Police to that of other relevant agencies, e.g., non-injury road traffic accidents could be handled by insurance companies than the Police Service.

### **14.9.1 Minor Offenses**

14.9.1.1 Minor criminal offenses occupy significant man hours within both the police and the judicial system. The decriminalisation of these offenses could potentially greatly increase available hours for more serious criminal offenses.

### **14.9.2 Road Traffic Accidents**

14.9.2.1 RTAs in Trinidad and Tobago are classified based on the level of injury sustained during the accident. As can be seen in Table 26 and even more clearly in Figure 26, the number of non-injury accidents is more than a hundred times greater than all other accidents.



- 14.9.2.2 Over ninety percent (94%) of all accidents that occur on the roads of Trinidad and Tobago result in no injuries. While this is good for the citizens of the country, the loss of police manpower in addressing these non-injury accidents is significant.
- 14.9.2.3 Within the United Kingdom, RTAs that do not result in the injury of an individual are not required to be reported to the police. Vehicle owners can make a report to their insurance company who will conduct their own investigations. This has the potential of saving significant manpower hours within the TTPS but will require legislative changes.


**Table 26: Road Traffic Accidents from 2010 to 2016**

<b>Divisions</b>	<b>Fatal RTA</b>	<b>Serious/Major Injury</b>	<b>Slight/Minor Injury</b>	<b>Non-Injury</b>	<b>Government Vehicle</b>	<b>Total</b>
Port of Spain	11	5	63	3909	45	4033
Southern	25	24	274	6198	30	6551
Western	14	12	107	2883	20	3036
Northern	12	29	300	6025	38	6404
Central	44	28	258	5517	10	5857
South Western	10	8	125	1888	7	2038
Eastern	14	11	152	1202	10	1389
North Eastern	31	12	80	2795	13	2931
Tobago	7	8	136	1503	31	1685
<b>Total</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>137</b>	<b>1495</b>	<b>31920</b>	<b>204</b>	<b>33924</b>

**Data Source: TTPS Crime and Problem Analysis Unit**

- 14.9.2.2 Please note that the values shown in Table 26 and Figure 26 refer to the number of accidents and not to the number of persons impacted by the accident. For this reason, the number of fatal road traffic accidents can be much lower than the number of persons who died in road traffic accidents for the same time period.

**Figure 26: Road Traffic Accidents 2010-2016**



Data Source: TTPS Crime and Problem Analysis Unit

## 14.10 Complaints Against Police Officers

### 14.10.1 Overview

14.10.1.1 *“While the TTPS aspires to be transparent and accountable and deliver the highest standard of service to citizens there has been an increase in the number of allegations and complaints made against police officers by members of the public. In 2016, at the end of December, the number of allegations made against police officers stood at three thousand two hundred and eleven (3,211) compared to two thousand two hundred and sixty seven (2,267) for the same period last year, this, notwithstanding training for officers in customer service, caravans to promote discipline among police officers and a swift response from the Professional Standards Bureau to prosecute errant officers. It is apparent*

*therefore that the Service must continue to exert its best efforts in introducing initiatives to improve police conduct.”*

14.10.1.2 This statement in the TTPS Strategic Plan 2017 – 2019 represents the feeling of the TTPS with respect to the conduct of some of its members.


## **14.10.2 PCA Data Analysis**

14.10.2.1 The PCA is the civilian oversight body mandated to independently investigate complaints against police officers involved in criminal offences, police corruption and serious police misconduct. This section will look at the data provided by the PCA in analyzing the allegations made against police officers.

14.12.2.2 Figure 27 and Table 27 give a comparison of Complaints made against police officers for the period 2010 to 2015. It should be noted that the PCA was established in 2010 and as such this data was sourced from the PCA’s *Annual Reports* over the five (5) year period.

14.12.2.3 From the graph and table below, over the period, the PCA received 1,877 complaints against police officers. The graph shows an increasing trend of allegations made with the highest in the year 2013/2014.

**Figure 27: Comparison of Complaints against Police Officers for the period 2010 to 2015**



**Data Source: Secondary Data, Police Complaints Authority**


**Table 27: Comparison of Complaints against Police Officers for the period 2010 to 2015**

<b>Reporting Periods</b>	<b>Number Of Complaints</b>
2010/2011	255
2011/2012	340
2012/2013	470
2013/2014	491
2014/2015	321
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,877</b>

**Data Source: Secondary Data, Police Complaints Authority**

14.12.2.4 As at 2015, 60% of the complaints were under active investigations, 12% were before the courts and 28% of complaints had their investigations completed by the PCA (See Figure 28 and Table 28).

**Figure 28: Status of Complaints for the period 2010 to 2015**



**Data Source: Secondary Data, Police Complaints Authority**


**Table 28: Status of Complaints for the period 2010 to 2015**

Status of Complaint	No. of Complaints
Active investigations	1279
Before courts of law	254
Completed investigations	606
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,139</b>

**Data Source: Secondary Data, Police Complaints Authority**

14.12.2.5 Figure 29 and Table 29 indicate the number of investigations completed by the PCA for the period 2010 to 2015. They showed that 179 required no further action, 42 were sent to the Commissioner of Police and 10 were sent to the DPP.

**Figure 29: Number of Investigations Completed for the period 2010 to 2015**



**Data Source: Secondary Data, Police Complaints Authority**

**Table 29: Number of Investigations completed for the period 2010 to 2015**


Status of Complaint	No. of Complaints Completed
Sent to DPP	10
Sent to COP	42
No further action	179
<b>Total</b>	<b>231</b>

**Data Source: Secondary Data, Police Complaints Authority**

14.12.2.6 Figure 30 and Table 30 give an indication of the number of complaints made against police officers by Divisions and Specialist Sections over the two (2) year period 2014 and 2015. The trends suggest that the Northern Division had the highest number of complaints followed by the Southern Division. The South-Western Division has the lowest number of complaints lodged with the PCA for the period.

14.12.2.7 Overall, the number of complaints received by the PCA decreased approximately 38% from 2014 to 2015. Importantly, it should be noted, there was no data provided for Specialist Sections for the year 2015.

**Figure 30: Complaints by Division for the period 2014 to 2015**



**Data Source: Secondary Data, Police Complaints Authority**

**Table 30: Complaints by Division for the period 2014 to 2015**

<b>Division</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
Northern	103	49
Port of Spain	44	45
Central	44	43
Southern	57	36
Western	39	35
Eastern	54	28
Tobago	33	28
North-Eastern	46	25
South-Western	20	12
Unknown	9	20
Specialist Section	70	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>519</b>	<b>321</b>

**Data Source: Secondary Data, Police Complaints Authority**

14.12.2.8 Table 31 and Figure 31 below provides the types and numbers of Allegations of Disciplinary Offences against Police Officers for the period 2014 to 2015.

14.12.2.9 Overall, the number of allegations decreased by approximately 34% over the period. From the graph, it can be observed that Discreditable Conduct had the highest number of complaints followed by Neglect of Duty and Unlawful/Unnecessary Exercise of Authority for both years.




**Table 31: Allegations of Disciplinary Offences for the period 2014 to 2015**

<b>Allegation of Disciplinary Offences</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
Neglect of Duty	127	108
Discreditable Conduct	304	191
Unlawful/ Unnecessary Exercise of Authority	169	75
Falsehood/ Prevarication	7	0
Corrupt Practice	51	32
Using Property of Service Without Consent	2	0
Breach of Confidence	1	1
Failure to acc. for Gov't Property	1	0
Accessory to a Disciplinary Offence	2	0
Oppressive Conduct	1	1
Breach of Police Service Regulations	0	34
<b>Total</b>	<b>665</b>	<b>442</b>

**Data Source: Secondary Data, Police Complaints Authority**


**Figure 31: Allegations of Disciplinary Offences for the period 2014 to 2015**



**Data Source: Secondary Data, Police Complaints Authority**

- 14.12.2.9 Figure 32 and Table 32 provides the types and numbers of Allegations of Criminal Offences made against police officers for the period 2014 to 2015. Overall, the number of complaints for criminal offences decreased by approximately 39%.
- 14.12.2.10 The trend showed that Assault had the highest number of complaints, followed by Larceny and Related Offences and Harassment overall for the two years.

**Figure 32: Allegations of Criminal Offences for the period 2014 to 2015**



**Data Source: Secondary Data, Police Complaints Authority**

**Table 32: Allegations of Criminal Offences for the period 2014 to 2015**

<b>Allegation of Criminal Offences</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
Fatal Shooting	29	7
Non-fatal Shooting	17	4
Causing Death by Dangerous Driving	2	1
Murder	2	7
Assault	119	90
Assault occ. Actual Bodily Harm	16	4
Wounding with intent to do Grievous bodily harm	0	3
Assault and Battery	0	2
Common Assault	29	9
Harassment	34	18
Threat	10	7
Killing or Wounding Animals	2	3
Money Laundering	0	1
Rape	1	1
Indecent Assault	3	1
Incest	0	1
Grievous Sexual Assault	1	1
Sexual Harassment	1	1
Serious Indecency	0	1
Unlawful and unnecessary use of force	0	14
Larceny and Related Offences	42	16
Malicious Damage	19	11
Trespass and Unlawful Entry	1	1
Possession of Marijuana	0	1
Perverting Course of Justice	9	2
Wrongful Arrest	0	1
Shooting with Intent	0	5
Misbehaviour in Public Office	23	11
Dangerous Driving	1	1
Domestic Violence	0	2
Use of Obscene Language	0	4
Death in Police Custody	3	0
Illegal Quarrying	1	0
Kidnapping	1	0
Sex with a Female 14-16	3	0
Cruelty to Children	1	0
Unlawful Arrest and Detention	2	0
Impersonation of Police	1	0
Failure to account for Government Property	1	0
Malicious Prosecution	3	0
Discharge firearm 40m of road	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>378</b>	<b>231</b>

**Data Source: Secondary Data, Police Complaints Authority**

### **14.13 Conclusion**

14.13.1 The PCA is the oversight body for complaints against police officers. It is governed by the PCA Act which stipulates how it should operate. Once investigations are completed by the PCA, the Authority can take no further action and the file is sent with recommendations either to the Commissioner of Police or the DPP for further action. The PMAC is of the view that the following recommendations will assist in making the complaints process more effective.

### **14.14 Police Complaints Authority Recommendations**

14.14.1 Review the PCA Act to allow the Authority more autonomy on actions against errant police officers;

14.14.2 Ensure that the use of technological equipment is utilised to assess the conduct of police officers, e.g. body cameras, GPS devices on vehicles etc.;

14.14.3 Ensure police officers are properly assessed during the recruitment process;

14.14.4 Review the types of training courses offered at the Police Academy and evaluate the impact of training.

## 14.15 Suspensions

### 14.15.1 Overview

14.15.1.1 Alleged infractions committed by a police officer that are brought to the attention of the Complaints Division of the Police Service or the independent PCA can result in the suspension of said officer depending on the outcome of the investigation of the matter. If the matter becomes a criminal case then the officer is interdicted from duty.

14.15.1.2 As Table 33 below shows, the rank of Constables has the greatest number of officers suspended as of February 2017. This is not surprising as the Constable rank is the largest rank in the TTPS. What is noteworthy however, is the duration of the suspension associated with the various ranks. There are officers on suspension for 10+ years and in some cases as many as 15 years. The impact of this on manpower cannot be overstated. The remaining officers in any work Unit are now assigned the duties of the officers on suspension while the suspended officers are mentally affected by the uncertainty for such a long period of the eventual suspension outcome.


**Table 33: Number of Officers on Suspension as of February 2017**

No.	Categories	No. of Officers	Duration to Date (Feb 2017)
1.	Assistant Commissioner of Police	1	2 years
2.	Senior Superintendent	1	5 years
3.	Assistant Superintendent	2	1-2 years
4.	Inspector	4	1-2 years
5.	Sergeant	7	2-7 years
6.	Corporal	22	1-11 years
7.	Constable	257	1-15 years
8.	Woman Police Constable	13	2-10 Years
	Total	307	

**Data Source: TTPS Complaints Division**

14.15.1.3 Table 33 above was sourced from summarised data supplied by the TTPS. However, the data used for Figure 33 and Table 34 detail the number of officers suspended each year from 2008 to 2017, were created from individual officer suspension information supplied by the TTPS. There were pros and cons to both sources of data. The summarised data supplied duration ranges but did not give the causes of suspension, while the individual suspension cases gave the reason for the suspension but not how long the officer was on suspension. As already noted, the rank of Constables has the highest number of suspensions as seen in Figure 33. It is also noteworthy that although the annual totals fluctuate, the general trend shows an increase in suspensions over the past 10 years as shown by the dashed blue trend line.

**Figure 33: Number of Officers Suspended in the TTPS from 2008 to 2017**



Data Source: TTPS Complaints Division, July 2017

**Table 34: Number of Officers Suspended in the TTPS from 2008 to 2017**

Rank	Year										TOTAL
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
PC	17	25	10	25	17	26	29	36	29	10	224
CPL	3		4	2	1	2	3		3		18
SGT		2	2	2				1			7
INSP								1		1	2
ASP								1			1
SUPT											
S/SUPT					1				1		2
ACP								1			1
DCP											
COP											

**Data Source: TTPS Complaints Division, July 2017**

14.15.1.4 Table 35 lists the categories of offences that resulted in suspension of officers as supplied by the Complaints Division of the TTPS. The date range was not specified by the TTPS but suspensions dating back to 1992 were included in the document. ‘*Misbehaviour in Public Office*’, ‘*Assault*’ and ‘*Corruptly obtaining Money*’ were the three most prevalent reasons for suspension.

14.15.1.5 Figure 34 shows summarised data supplied by the TTPS regarding the number of officers suspended by Division. Though the Northern Division is the largest Division, Central and particularly Southern Division have significantly higher number of suspensions. Southern Division has a 59% increase compared to Northern Division. Further investigation into the causes of suspensions in Central and Southern Divisions should be conducted by the TTPS.




**Table 35: Categories of Offences resulting in Suspension within the TTPS**

<b>CATEGORY</b>	<b>FREQ.</b>	<b>CATEGORY</b>	<b>FREQ.</b>
MISBEHAVIOUR IN PUBLIC OFFICE	79	MISBEHAVIOUR BY MAKING THREATS TO FALSELY CHARGE	6
ASSAULT	67	CORRUPTLY RECEIVING MONEY	5
CORRUPTLY OBTAINING MONEY	34	HAVING SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITH A MINOR	5
OBSCENE LANGUAGE	22	SHOOTING WITH INTENT	4
ROBBERY WITH VIOLENCE	16	INDECENCY	4
PERVERTING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE	15	MISBEHAVIOUR RELATIVE TO A FALSE IMPRISONMENT	4
RAPE	15	UNNECESSARY VIOLENCE TO A PRISONER IN CUSTODY	4
NEGLECT OF DUTY	14	CORRUPTION	4
DANGEROUS DRIVING	13	GRIEVOUS SEXUAL ASSAULT	3
LARCENY	13	ASSAULT OCCASIONING ACTUAL BODILY HARM	3
MALICIOUS DAMAGE	13	INDECENT ASSAULT	3
PURJURY	13	MANSLAUGHTER	3
LOSS OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY	13	INCEST	2
RESISTING ARREST	12	MALICIOUS WOUNDING	2
FRAUD	12	COMMON ASSAULT	2
KIDNAPPING	11	DEMANDING MONEY BY MENACE	2
MURDER	11	DISORDERLY BEHAVIOUR	2
POSSESSION OF DRUGS	10	ATTEMPT TO PERVERT THE COURSE OF JUSTICE	2
POSSESSION OF AMMUNITION	9	DISCREDITABLE CONDUCT	2
FALSE IMPRISONMENT	9	BUGGERY	2
WOUNDING WITH INTENT	8	CAUSING DEATH BY DANGEROUS DRIVING	1
FAILURE WITH RESPECT TO TAKING BREATHALIZER TEST	7	ATTEMPTED RAPE	1
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL	7	FAILING TO SUPPLY A BREATH SPECIMEN FOR TESTING	1
TRAFFIC OFFENCES	7	CONSPIRACY TO PERVERT THE COURSE OF PUBLIC JUSTICE	1
GROSS MISCONDUCT	6	POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA	1
POSSESSION OF FIREARM	6	TENDENCY TO PERVERT THE COURSE OF JUSTICE AND MAKING A FALSE ENTRY IN THE STATION DIARY	1
CORRUPTLY SOLICITING MONEY	6	DRIVING WITHOUT DUE CARE AND ATTENTION	1
MISBEHAVIOUR RELATIVE TO ROBBERY WITH VIOLENCE	6		

**Data Source: TTPS Complaints Division, July 2017**

**Figure 34: Officers Suspended within the TTPS by Police Division**



**Data Source: TTPS Complaints Division, July 2017**

## **14.15.2 Suspensions Recommendations**

14.15.2.1 The following are recommended to address the main challenges that exist within the Complaints Division:

14.15.2.1.1 Implement stricter accountability for each aspect of the suspension process to reduce the excessive delays experienced within the system. Mandated timelines for each aspect of the process should be exacted to improve the efficiency of the system.

14.15.2.1.2 Investigate the causes for the significantly higher number of suspensions within the Central and Southern Divisions.

## 14.16 Extended Sick Leave

- 14.16.1.1 The Sick Leave Policy states that all TTPS employees, except daily rated employees are entitled to fourteen (14) sick days after a continuous twelve (12) month period provided that a medical certificate from a duly registered Medical practitioner is tendered with every application in excess of two (2) consecutive days' sick leave (Police Service Regulations Chap. 15:01 (Section 89) and Civil Service Regulations Chap. 23:01 (Section 85).
- 14.16.1.2 Any sick days taken beyond these 14 days is considered Extended Sick Leave. The PMAC requested Extended Sick Leave data from the Human Resource Division but not did receive said information.
- 14.16.1.3 The Registry Unit, which records all sick leave requests for the TTPS, supplied the Committee with the sick leave requests for 2016 (inclusive of regular sick and extended sick leave). These Sick Leave requests were then grouped by Officers' Regimental Numbers. Using the software Tableau 10.3 and then Extended Sick Leave days were calculated by subtracting the 14 normal sick days allocated for each officer.
- 14.16.1.4 If an officer had more than 14 days Sick Leave for the year, the excess days were classified as Extended Sick Leave. The statistics of these results are shown in Table 33 below. The number of extended sick leave requests for 2016 ranged from a minimum of 1 day to a maximum of 298 days. The average number of Extended Sick Leave days taken by officers was 55 days, while the median (the mid-point value) was 42 days and the mode (the most frequent value) was 14 days as seen in Figure 36.

**Table 36: Statistical information for Extended Sick Leave Requests for 2016**

<b>Extended Sick Leave</b>	<b>Number of Days</b>
Minimum	1
Maximum	298
Average	55
Median	42
Mode	14

**Data Source: TTPS Registry Unit**

14.16.1.5 Though the data for 2016 shows that the most frequent requests were less than one month, information gleaned from the police officers through the focus groups and the PMAC survey indicate that absences due to extensive sick leave is a problem within the Service. Eighty-three percent (83%) of survey respondents said “*much*” and “*very much*” in response to the question “*To what extent they thought the abuse of sick and injury leave existed within the TTPS?*” Additionally, focus group discussions indicated that malingerers (persons who pretend to be ill in order to escape duty or work) are plentiful but go unpunished by the Police Service.

14.16.1.6 From the data above, one can infer that the number of Sick Leave taken by officers, especially at the lowest rank, can potentially have a negative impact on manpower availability and can adversely affect the quality of service provided by the TTPS.

## **14.16.2 Extended Sick Leave Recommendations**


14.16.2.1 The main problem with the management of the Extended Sick Leave process is the same problem that exists within much of the Human Resource Unit – an

inefficient system that results in extensively long delays. The recommendations from the PMAC are:

- i. Utilize the technology available within the TTPS (HR Portal) to improve record keeping within the Human Resource Division;
- ii. Decentralize the Human Resource Division and its processes to increase the efficiency of the work flow process;
- iii. Create a Medical Board exclusively for the TTPS with a view to improving the efficiency of the medical clearance process.

14.16.2.2 The combination of a proper record keeping system along with the decentralisation of the Human Resource Unit and the subsequent increase in efficiency would help identify and prevent malingerers with the TTPS. An up-to-date, readily available Human Resource Management System will allow for real time verification of how many days leave an officer is entitled to at any point during the year as well as his/her current leave status and the verification of supporting medical documents.

**Figure 35: Histogram of the Number of Extended Sick Days Requested for 2016**



**Data Source: TTPS Registry Unit, May 2017**

## 14.17 Comparison of Crime Categories and Manpower Distribution


14.17.1 The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service is comprised of 9 Police Divisions, 69 Police Stations, 9 Police Posts and 1 Sub Station. Table 37 shows the manpower (Regular Officers and Full time SRPs) for the Police Divisions as of April 2017 and the Crime data for 2016. Three crime categories, **Minor Crime**, **Serious Crime** and **Homicide**, are used as provided by CAPA. The geographic distribution of these values can be seen in Figure 36. The Total Manpower and Total Crime values for each Police Division was tallied and used to calculate correlation coefficients as seen in Figure 37.

**Table 37: Manpower and Crime Statistics for the 9 Divisions of the TTPS**

Divisions	Number of Officers	Number of Full Time SRPs	Total Manpower	Minor Crime	Serious Crime	Homicide	TOTAL CRIME
Tobago Division	280	123	403	500	885	4	1389
South Western Division	427	65	492	831	760	29	1620
Eastern Division	385	193	578	869	813	37	1719
Western Division	303	120	423	596	757	28	1381
Southern Division	613	192	805	1674	1666	55	3395
North Eastern Division	326	119	445	421	1018	45	1484
Port of Spain	338	205	543	859	1687	61	2607
Central Division	431	169	600	737	1477	79	2293
Northern Division	629	291	920	1139	1746	124	3009

Data Source: TTPS Crime and Problem Analysis Division


Figure 36: TTPS Manpower for April 2017 and Crime Statistics for 2016



Data Source: TTPS Crime and Problem Analysis Unit



**Figure 37: Correlations between TTPS Manpower (April 2017) and Crime (2016)**



<b>Correlation to Manpower</b>	<b>r<sup>2</sup></b>
Homicide	0.6818
Serious Crime	0.5823
Minor Crime	0.6827
Total Crime	0.79

**Data Source: TTPS Crime and Problem Analysis Unit**

14.17.2 As seen in Figure 37, manpower allocation is most closely correlated to total crime values ( $r^2 = 0.79$ ) than to any specific crime category. Though additional factors may place a role in manpower allocation, a correlation of almost 80% with total crime is quite strong.

**SECTION 15:**  
**INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY &**  
**THE TTPS**

# INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & THE TTPS

15 The Information Technology Unit within the TTPS is responsible for software, hardware and network infrastructure. The technological issues and recommendations described below were identified throughout the life of the project through observations by the PMAC as well as through conversations with members of the TTPS.

## 15.1 IT Challenges

### 15.1.1 Data Standardisation and Availability

15.1.1.1 There is no standardisation for document or data submission within the TTPS, e.g. Each Division/Unit/Branch uses a different format for its monthly nominal roll submission.

15.1.1.2 Basic human resource data such as transfers, separation from the Police Service due to retirement etc. is not up-to-date in the Versadex System. Data entry into the system is incomplete and inconsistent and is worsened by the above problem of lack of data standardisation. Proper strategic analysis and decision making will be difficult due to the lack of accurate data.

15.1.1.3 The TTPS is in the process of implementing a system called the ‘HR Portal’ throughout the organisation. This system will allow for decentralised data entry into the system allowing for more rapid data entry and tracking, standardisation of data and increased efficiency throughout the Service. The Information Technology Unit at the TTPS indicated that the HR Portal was purchased by the TTPS for **\$993,600** and customized by the IT Unit to meet the Human Resource needs of the TTPS. Test Scripts were forwarded to the Human Resource Unit on January 27, 2017 for the future users of the system to test the

157

processes and workflows. This phase is mandatory before customization can be completed and the system can be rolled out throughout the TTPS. Despite such, as of July 2017, the Human Resource Unit had not yet responded to the request for testing of the system and therefore the system is not in use.

- 15.1.1.4 Asset management software exists within the TTPS but is currently not being used. Management of assets is limited due to a lack of up-to-date data. Strategic decision making is also limited due to a lack of information.

## **15.1.2 Equipment and Infrastructure**

- 15.1.2.1 Systems are often bought/acquired without a committed budget for continued maintenance/license renewal resulting in degradation of the system and loss of usability. Information Technology Expenditure information can be found in Appendix 10.
- 15.1.2.2 Many of the street CCTV cameras are not working due to incomplete installation and/or lack of maintenance. However, they are currently under the jurisdiction of the SSA and the TTPS has no control over their maintenance or operation.
- 15.1.2.3 CCTV footage is not available via live feed to the TTPS and the timeframe for the retrieval of the data from the CCTV Unit often deters criminal capture.

## **15.1.3 Mass Communication**

- 15.1.3.1 Each police officer within the TTPS has an email account created for them (@ttps.gov.tt). However, at present the use of said emails is not mandatory and

the Service still relies on telephone messaging (TM) for almost all communication with its officers. This method is slow and inefficient and directly limited the success of several of the PMAC's efforts throughout this audit, such as the focus groups and survey as officers were not notified of the activities in time.

#### **15.1.4 IT Manpower Resources**

15.1.4.1 There are currently only seven (7) IT Technicians and three (3) Helpdesk personnel in the IT Unit with the responsibility to cover the entire country. Due to the wide distribution of the TTPS buildings and infrastructure, having limited technicians pose different problems compared to Ministries who may utilize one (1) or two (2) buildings.

### **15.2 IT Recommendations**

#### **15.2.1 Data Standardisation and Availability**

15.2.1.1 The TTPS should implement the HR Portal by June 30, 2018. Completion of the testing phase must be mandated to the Human Resource Unit to allow for further customisation, training etc. The use of this system will significantly address the issues of data standardisation and data availability, decrease the timeframe taken for approvals etc., as all documents will be digitised and automatically forwarded through the supervisory chain.

15.2.1.2 Conduct training of all relevant personnel in the use of the system. This will, most likely, be Service-wide and would require a tiered training process.

15.2.1.3 Enforce mandatory use of the Asset Management System through a Direct Order as well as training in the use of the Asset Management system. 'TMA

Systems' is the Asset Management System used by the TTPS over the past two (2) years, however, it is not currently being used by all the relevant work areas and therefore the proper management of physical, vehicular and technological assets is not being conducted.

## **15.2.2 Equipment & Infrastructure**

- 15.2.2.1 Ensure that funding for projects include maintenance/licence renewal etc. for the software and hardware of Information Systems.
- 15.2.2.2 Allocate adequate resources for installation and maintenance of the CCTV cameras.
- 15.2.2.3 Directly provide a live feed of real time CCTV footage to the TTPS.

## **15.2.3 Mass Communications**

- 15.2.3.1 In order for the use of mass communication such as emails to be effective, it must become a habit with the officers of the TTPS. This is best done by supplying information to officers via email (such as salary information, information regarding assignments, transfers, duties, etc.). In addition to ensuring that all officers have access to their emails via work phones and/or work computers, this process will also require that information providers such as the Human Resource and Payroll Units, facilitate ready access to work emails for the dissemination of information.

## **15.2.4 IT Manpower Resources**

- 15.2.4.1 Increase civilian staffing within the IT Unit to maximize deployment and maintenance of systems and technology.



**SECTION 16:**  
**ANALYSIS OF FOCUS**  
**GROUP SESSIONS**

# ANALYSIS OF FOCUS GROUP SESSIONS

## 16 Introduction

16.1 Twenty two (22) focus groups were conducted throughout Trinidad and Tobago between June 01 and June 16, 2017. Attendees were divided between police officers (First and Second Division), TTPS Civilian Staff, Divisions of the Ministry of National Security and external stakeholders. The list below identifies all invited groups:

### 16.1.1 Officers of the TTPS:

- i. Tobago – Sergeants & Corporals
- ii. Tobago – First Division (w/ Inspectors)
- iii. Tobago – Constables
- iv. Superintendents
- v. Female Police Officers
- vi. First Division – SRP
- vii. Central and South – Police Corporals
- viii. South – Sergeants (South)
- ix. North – Second Division SRPs
- x. Assistant Superintendents
- xi. North – Sergeants
- xii. Inspectors
- xiii. Northern Division – Constables
- xiv. Western Division – Constables
- xv. South – Second Division SRPs
- xvi. Northern Division – Corporals

**16.1.2 Civilian Staff of the TTPS:**

- i. Civilian Staff
- ii. Civilian Managers

**16.1.3 Divisions of the Ministry of National Security:**

- i. TTDF
- ii. Probation Services

**16.1.4 External Stakeholders:**

- i. Municipal Police
- ii. TTPS Retirees Association

16.1.5 It should be noted that two (2) additional focus group sessions were planned but had to be cancelled due to lack of attendees:

- i. Assistant Commissioners of Police
- ii. Traffic Wardens, Transit Police and Licensing Officers

**16.2 Methodology**

**16.2.1 Attendee Selection**

16.2.1.1 Representative Officers from the TTPS were selected randomly across the Divisions and Units and regimental numbers, dates, times and locations were communicated to the TTPS for officers to be noted.

16.2.1.2 For groups external to the TTPS, letters of invitation were forwarded to the head of the organization and a request was made for fifteen (15) officers who interact with the TTPS in their daily activities. With regard to Traffic Wardens, Transit Police and Licensing Officers, five (5) officers were requested per organization.

16.2.1.3 Two hundred and sixteen (216) persons attended the 24 focus groups.

## **16.2.2 Focus Group Questions**

16.2.2.1 Questions were customized for the four groupings. Sample questions can be found at Appendix 11.

## **16.3 Results**

16.3.1 Detailed notes were taken at each focus group and these notes were then used to compile the main topics/themes that were discussed as well as the challenges and recommendations that arose from the attendees. The majority of questions were repeated throughout the groups.

16.3.2 Appendix 11 details the main challenges within the TTPS that were identified by the attendees and any recommendations they might have suggested.

16.3.3 The questions for the TTPS are given first, followed by any customized questions for the additional groups.

## **16.4 Recommendations Arising from Focus Group Sessions**

16.4.1 The recommendations below are compiled by the PMAC as a result of its analyses of the various contributions of participants.

### **16.4.1.1 Recruitment**

- i. Adjust recruitment packages for applicants with varying educational qualifications.

- ii. Improve training programme that increases exposure to specialized fields relevant to Officers duties such as court matters, mediation and conflict resolution, customer service, dealing with mentally challenged individuals.
- iii. Improve vetting/background checks

#### 16.4.1.2 **Career Training**

- i. Improve officer selection for Training across all ranks and Divisions.
- ii. Increase frequency of Firearms training.

#### 16.4.1.3 **Manpower**

- i. Consolidate redundant special units/branches to avoid duplication of work and wastage of manpower.
- ii. Design transparent manpower deployment policy to ensure better manpower allocations across Divisions and Units.

#### 16.4.1.4 **Data & Intelligence Sharing**

- i. Improve formalized intelligence and data sharing between special units, divisions and external stakeholders with a systemic security framework that determines access privileges.

#### 16.4.1.5 **Customer Service**

- i. Conduct training in and continuous evaluation of an officer's customer service skills with subsequent consequences for poor results and rewards for excellent results.

#### 16.4.1.6 **Appointment of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners**

- i. Remove the Government's veto powers over the selection of the Commissioners. An independent body should have the final say on the appointments.

#### 16.4.1.7 **Wellness**

- i. Review of remuneration package to facilitate fewer overtime hours worked and increased family time.
- ii. Review of shift system to ensure officers are not overworked and have a proper work/family life balance.
- iii. Improve dissemination of appropriate information about the Employee Assistance Programme in the TTPS.
- iv. Adjust the police uniform material to be better suited for a tropical climate.

#### 16.4.1.8 **Abuse of Leave**

- i. Have an improved, digitized officer and file management system to more accurately and efficiently record, update and track leave information for officers.
- ii. Implementation of the HR Portal System, which is in the testing phase at the TTPS, will facilitate this need.
- iii. Enforce penalties for the abuse of the various types of leaves.

#### 16.4.1.9 **Information Technology and Facilities Management**

- i. Standardise forms, data abbreviations, etc., across the TTPS to improve the efficiency and accuracy of record keeping.

- ii. Improve maintenance of tools, equipment and supplies.

#### 16.4.1.10 **Promotion**

- i. Design promotional points system for a fairer process that encourages a wider selection of educational pursuits by officers.
- ii. Increase frequency of promotional processes, e.g. employee evaluations.

#### 16.4.1.11 **SRPs**

- i. Incorporate full training for SRPs prior to absorption into the TTPS,
- ii. Apply equivalence in academics. SRPs should be required to have the same academic qualifications as regular police constables as they are required to perform the same duties of regular police.

**SECTION 17:  
ANALYSIS OF TOWN HALL  
MEETINGS**



# ANALYSIS OF TOWN HALL MEETINGS

## 17 Overview

17.1 The PMAC embarked on a series of Public Town Hall Meetings as an avenue for members of the public to express their views as well as any issues and challenges they may have had with the TTPS. The meetings were held on June 05, 12 and 13, 2017, in the undermentioned areas:

- i. Tobago
- ii. Chaguanas, and
- iii. Siparia.

17.1.1 A town meeting was scheduled for June 08, 2017, in Port of Spain but due to poor attendance and insufficient advertising, the meeting was cancelled.

17.1.2 The Committee intended to host Town Meetings in Tunapuna and Sangre Grande, however, due to insufficient funds and other circumstances beyond its control, these meetings were postponed to a date to be determined.

17.1.3 Although there were various challenges that affected the town meetings, the three (3) meetings that occurred brought a wealth of public opinion, as well as, recommendations to the Committee. The opinions expressed range from a variety of issues such as manpower, crime, and internal control within the TTPS.

## 17.2 Approach

17.2.1 The approach used in bringing the Public Town Meetings to fruition included the following:

- 17.2.1.1 Letters were written to the Mayors and Chairmen of the City, Borough and Regional Corporations for their assistance in obtaining venues for the town meetings as well as to invite key stakeholders in their respective communities to the meetings;
- 17.2.1.2 Email contacts were made to the TTPS Senior Superintendents as head of the nine (9) Police Divisions to invite key stakeholders in their respective communities to the meetings;
- 17.2.1.3 Alternate forms of social media advertising were utilized e.g. Facebook and Email;
- 17.2.1.4 Printed Flyers, Loud Speaker and Radio were utilized to market the town meeting in Tobago;
- 17.2.1.5 Two thousand (2,000) Flyers were inserted in the Trinidad Express for the town meeting in Port of Spain;
- 17.2.1.6 In the communities of Chaguanas and Siparia, Loud Speaker Announcements in addition to the insertion of two thousand (2,000) Flyers, per area, in the Trinidad Express was utilized.
- 17.2.1.7 Town meetings were held in an open forum.

### **17.3 Challenges**

- 17.3.1 The PMAC was allocated a budget for the audit exercise by Cabinet, under the Ministry of National Security. As a consequence of lack of releases from the Ministry, funding for the audit was a grave concern. The Committee was also

faced with various challenges which hindered the success of the town meetings. These included:

- 17.3.1.1 The Committee was stymied by the lack of releases from the Ministry of National Security. This affected the advertising and marketing of the Public Town Hall Meetings as well as associated costs such as accommodation, rental of equipment, newspaper advertisements, and loudspeaker. As at July 12, 2017, there was an estimated cost of approximately \$40,000.00 in outstanding payments.
- 17.3.1.2 Due to time constraints and lack of releases for advertising, there was poor attendance at the meetings.
- 17.3.1.3 Due to lack of responses from persons at respective venues to facilitate the town meetings, the other scheduled town meetings were postponed.

## **17.4 Recommendations from the Town Meetings**

17.4.1 The recommendations below were compiled in themes as a result of the comments and recommendations from the opinions expressed by members of the public at the town hall meetings.

### **17.4.1.1 Manpower**

- a. Review of the recruitment process in the TTPS to ensure that persons are properly evaluated such as psychometric testing, fitness.

- b. Review of the rationale for deploying officers in the police stations and units, to ensure that there is adequate staffing per shift.
- c. Review the policy on training to ensure that officers are trained in specialized fields (e.g. Praedial Larceny, Mental Illness) as well as look at scenario and problem-based training.

#### 17.4.1.2 **Customer Service**

- a. Customer Service should be a focus of the TTPS to regain the public's trust and confidence. The TTPS could look at proposing a Customer Service Charter as part of its policy.

#### 17.4.1.3 **Internal Control within the TTPS**

- a. Review of the organizational culture and structure within the TTPS. The service should be institutional strengthened to revamp the core processes and procedures.
- b. Review of the performance appraisal system and the process for promotion of Officers

#### 17.4.1.4 **Corruption**

- a. Focus should be placed to investigate corrupt practices within the TTPS

#### 17.4.1.5 **Community Policing**

- a. Community policing should be encouraged within communities. Police Officers need to be more visible as well as there should be better relationships between the police and members of the community.

#### 17.4.1.6 **Crime**

- a. Crime continues to be a major concern for the public. It was expressed that there are low crime detection and conviction rates. It was noted that there seems to be a disregard for minor crimes. There were many calls for further joint patrol between the police and the Regiment (TTDF). Further, it was noted that the TTPS should review its crime solving initiatives with a special focus on technology (e.g. CCTV cameras, Port Scanners), DNA Testing and Forensics to name a few.

#### 17.4.1.7 **Court and Process**

- a. Police Officers should attend court more regularly as it was expressed that cases are dismissed because officers do not show up to court.

#### 17.4.1.8 **Commissioner of Police**

- a. The Commissioner of Police should be hired by an independent body as well as be able to manage performance and evaluate officers.
- b. Review the role and function of the Police Service Commission

#### 17.4.1.9 **Government**

- a. There should be strict legislation to assist the police in crime detection and conviction.
- b. A recommendation was made to have the Tobago House of Assembly Chief Secretary to be a member of the National Security Council.

## **17.5 Town Meeting Discussions**

17.5.1 The Public Town Meetings gave the members of the public an opportunity to assist the PMAC. Listed below is a summary of the comments and recommendations of the Public Town Hall Meeting by themes.

### **17.5.1.1 Manpower**

- a. There is a lack of manpower in the TTPS;
- b. Look at the entry qualifications and skills sets in recruiting officers; the recruitment process should be revisited in the psychological, physical, and social aspects as well as the fitness of the police officers to perform their duties;
- c. Police Officers should be compensated appropriately especially in terms of their job requirements;
- d. Officers should be trained in various fields (Specialized training) e.g. Praedial Larceny;
- e. Manpower is not utilized efficiently due to lack of training;
- f. Officers are not performing their regular duties but are doing more extra duties;
- g. Police Stations are technologically challenged, not maintained and are unable to do searches/traces;
- h. The Audit should also look into attitudinal behaviour and the culture in the TTPS;

- i. What is the rationale for deploying officers? Determine how many police officers are needed to do the job and the skills required;
- j. Look at the Singapore recruitment process of police officers;
- k. Officers should be re-trained every 3 years in firearms and customer service;
- l. Trainers should be brought to Trinidad to conduct training instead of sending officers abroad; it will be more cost effective;
- m. Look at scenario and problem based training and evaluate the effectiveness of training;
- n. There should be job psychometric evaluations as exams alone cannot evaluate persons

#### 17.5.1.2 **Customer Service**

- a. There is a lack of appropriate communication skills displayed by police officers;
- b. Officers need to show a more humanitarian approach;
- c. There is a disconnect between the Police Service and the population;
- d. The police have a systematic way of frustrating the public;
- e. TTPS should apologize to the public for things done in the past; they should state a new vision and mission and come clean with the man in the street

### 17.5.1.3 Internal Control of the TTPS

- a. There should be more effective communication between police officers and civilians;
- b. The issue of confidentiality needs to be addressed;
- c. Greater commendation and recognition should be given by Senior Officers to their Juniors when they perform well;
- d. Greater adherence should be placed to the Police Standing Orders;
- e. The police seem frustrated;
- f. There is an institutional collapse in the TTPS where there is no management and leadership;
- g. There is need for good governance systems in the TTPS;
- h. Why did the appraisal system change? Seniority vs. Merit should be looked into as there appears to be no oversight in performance management. There should be a clear merit system for promotion and awards should be given for the best performing police station;
- i. Managers are not pressured by those who should grant oversight;
- j. There should be an accelerated promotional process as well as revamp the core components and processes;
- k. There should be a Central Command Station for Police in Tobago;



- l. There should be a PBX to transfer to police stations;
- m. The structure of the service needs to be changed as it has been in existence since colonial days;
- n. Division/Station Head changes too frequently that disrupts progress plans for the community;
- o. Look at Human Resource planning and management;
- p. Hold seniors accountable and promote officers on the basis of integrity;
- q. Look into a public safety audit to assess the role of police in issues and challenges;
- r. The Beyond the Tape programme needs restructuring;
- s. Take a scientific approach to policy tasks by major and minor tasks, consider Smart Policing;
- t. The organizational culture of the TTPS should be reviewed and changed;
- u. Municipal Police should be trained before they are absorbed in the service

#### 17.5.1.4 **Corruption**

- a. There are Officers in the service who are corrupt and involved in illicit activities;
- b. Rogue police officers should be uprooted from the Service;

- c. The core of the TTPS is corrupt;
- d. Corruption hinders performance as well as the performance appraisal system

#### 17.5.1.5 **Community Policing**

- a. There should be greater connections in communities, more interactions with businesses, persons and walkabouts;
- b. There should be greater visibility and proactive policing;
- c. In Tobago, police officers are confined to Crowne Point and not in areas such as Castara, Englishman Bay. More focus should be placed on Tourism Policing;
- d. The police should connect with churches and engage members
- e. The Police Youth Club is a good avenue for appropriate youths to join the service

#### 17.5.1.6 **Crime**

- a. TTPS should have its own forensic lab and legislation for DNA Testing;
- b. Have an Operational Investigations Manual;
- c. Tourists and visitors are being robbed;
- d. There is need for more police stations in Tobago;
- e. The TTPS is grossly inadequate in terms of crime detection and conviction;

- f. Crime trickles into the southern region of Trinidad when the hot spot areas in other areas are being monitored;
- g. Police takes too long with investigations and nothing materialises;
- h. Lack of will to enforce the law e.g. Selling of pirated material, PH taxis and Loud music in residential areas;
- i. More border protection is needed;
- j. Dismantling of SAUTT was a political motive;
- k. Police Decoy in areas like Beetham;
- l. There is low confidence in the police service due to crime;
- m. There is a high percentage of visitors who do not report crime to the TTPS;
- n. There should be more CCTV Cameras and Sea Port Scanners to protect the borders;
- o. Should have a video recorder in charge room;
- p. There is illegal gambling not being addressed by the police;
- q. The Senior Superintendent in Chaguanas doesn't respond to complaints;
- r. There should be joint patrols with police and army;
- s. The law should be enforced;

- t. The police should consider using the “*Broken Window*” Theory;
- u. Charge person for community endangerment;
- v. Trinidad &Tobago lacks justice and there is a fear of inequality;
- w. Persons in authority at the TTPS are not being held accountable for crime

#### 17.5.1.7 **Court and Process**

- a. The court system is in a disarray;
- b. There should be consistency in taking reports;
- c. Cases are dismissed because police officers do not show up for court.

#### 17.5.1.8 **Commissioner of Police**

- a. The powers of commissioner must be able to manage performance and evaluation of officers;
- b. There should be an independent body to hire the Commissioner of Police and the Deputy Commissioner of Police;
- c. Roles and Functions of the PSC need to be reviewed.

#### 17.5.1.9 **Government**

- a. There is a disconnect between the Tobago House of Assembly and the TTPS;

- b. Past and the present governments have been unable to secure the citizens;
- c. Ongoing investigations on Members of Government have not been solved e.g. Emailgate;
- d. Police service is being maligned by Politicians;
- e. Establishment of a Tobago Police with management and governance directives to be followed by the THA Act;
- f. Chief Secretary of the THA should have a seat in the National Security Council;
- g. Rewards for whistleblowing;
- h. There is need for reform in the education system to study the cost of crime;
- i. There should be legislation to support the police in crime detection and conviction.

**SECTION 18:**  
**ANALYSIS OF PMAC**  
**POLICE SURVEY**

# ANALYSIS OF PMAC POLICE SURVEY

## 18 Introduction

18.1 No manpower audit into the police service can be conducted without getting the direct views of the police officers themselves. One of the methods the PMAC implemented to obtain these views was a survey of police officers of all ranks and across all police divisions, stations, branches, units, sections, etc.

### 18.2 Research Design and Methodology

18.2.1 The aim of the survey was to gather the views of police officers on many diverse manpower issues affecting the efficient and effective functioning of the TTPS. The overall research design and methodology are as follows:

- i. The survey consisted of 51 questions with a combination of close-ended and open-ended questions;
- ii. The proposed sample was:
  - 1,034 Second Division Officers including SRPs were randomly selected from the TTPS
  - 132 First Division Officers
  - Total Proposed Sample: 1,166 officers
- iii. The survey was administered in various locations throughout Trinidad and Tobago during the period June 29 - 30, 2017;

- iv. The survey data was analysed using the SPSS Software.

### **18.3 Challenges**

18.3.1 This section discusses some of the major challenges in the conduct of the survey. These include but are not limited to:

- a. The relatively low turnout by SDOs at the various locations;
- b. Officers who showed up stated that they were only given the message approximately 15 minutes prior;
- c. The TTPS provided a list of locations to the PMAC where the survey was to be conducted, however, officers were given other locations for the survey of which the Implementation Team who conducted the survey had no knowledge of;
- d. Completed questionnaires from FDOs were received up to one week after the survey period.

### **18.4 Proposed vs. Actual Samples: Equivalence**

18.4.1 A total of 500 completed questionnaires were received. This represented an approximately 42% response rate of the survey. Table 38 shows a breakdown of the proposed and actual samples and their equivalence.

18.4.2 A correlation was done on the proposed sample and the actual sample obtained. The statistics revealed a high significant finding between both groups,  $r = .912$ ,  $p = .011$ . As such, the sample obtained closely matched the one proposed.



**Table 38: Proposed vs. Actual Samples and Equivalence**

<b>RANK OF OFFICER</b>	<b>PROPOSED SAMPLE</b>	<b>% OF PROPOSED SAMPLE</b>	<b>ACTUAL SAMPLE</b>	<b>% OF ACTUAL SAMPLE / EQUIVALENCE</b>
POLICE CONSTABLE	599	52%	270	54%
CORPORAL	135	12%	85	17%
SERGEANT	84	7%	35	7%
INSPECTOR	16	1%	18	4%
FIRST DIVISION OFFICERS	132	11%	81	16%
SPECIAL RESERVE OFFICERS	200	17%	6	1%
DID NOT STATE			5	1%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,166</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>500</b>	<b>100%</b>

## **18.5 Ten Themes of Survey Results & Analyses**

18.5.1 The results and analyses of this survey are presented under the following ten (10) themes/areas:

- i. Description of Survey Sample
- ii. Overall Staffing View & Organization of the TTPS
- iii. Supervision & Leadership
- iv. Deployment of Officers, Work shifts & Overtime Payments
- v. Resources
- vi. Communication
- vii. Leave Abuses, Corruption & the Disciplinary Process

- viii. Performance Standards, Appraisals & Compensation
- ix. Officer Satisfaction, Motivation and Physical & Welfare/Well-Being
- x. Officers' Views on System, Policies & Other Issues

## **18.6 Presentation of Policy Related Manpower Findings**


- 18.6.1 We present the findings and analyses for thirty-two (32) questions plus five (5) demographics under the above themes that are directly relevant to police manpower policy issues as a matter of prioritization and importance.

## **18.7 Description of Survey Sample - Demographics**

### **18.7.1 Age**

- 18.7.1.1 The highest proportions of police officers were 31 to 40 years old (31%) and 41 to 51 years old (30%). This was followed by those who were 21 to 30 years old (20%) and 51 and more years old (18%). Only 1% of the sample was under 20 years of age. See Figure 38.

**Figure 38: Age of Officers**



## **18.7.2 Gender**

18.7.2.1 Overall, almost seventy percent (69%) of the officers were males and 31% were females. This was relatively close to the gender ratio in the TTPS of 74% males and 26% females.

## **18.7.3 Current Rank of Officers**


18.7.3.1 Police Constables comprised the highest proportion of officers in this study with 54%. They were followed by Corporals (17%), Assistant Superintendents of Police (9%) and Sergeants (7%). The remaining 12% of the officers were from the other ranks. See [Figure 39](#) for details.

## **18.7.4 Divisions / Branches / Units / Sections**

18.7.4.1 Officers were from a wide cross section of police divisions, branches, units and sections across the police service. The highest percentages were from Southern Police Division (14%), Northern and Eastern Police Divisions (8% percentage each), and Port of Spain and Tobago Police Divisions as well as Homicide

Bureau (5% each). These comprised 45% of the sample. The remaining 55% were spread across thirty-three other branches, units and sections.

**Figure 39: Rank of Officers**



\* Note, SRP is not a rank but they were part of this survey exercise.

### 18.7.5 Number of Years in Service


18.7.5.1 Overall, there were police officers in the survey with years of experience spanning from under five years to over forty years. The highest proportion of officers (27%) had five and less years policing experience. This was followed by 14% who had 11 to 15 years’ experience and 13% each who had 6 to 10 years and 16 to 20 years’ experience. [Figure 40](#) provides further details.

### 18.7.6 Highest Level of Education Achieved


18.7.6.1 The highest proportion of police officers in the survey had CSEC/CXC/O’ Level (44%) as their highest academic qualification obtained. This was followed by 25% who had a University qualification and a further 11% with Post Graduate university qualifications. This 36% “*university-level*” qualification is quite commendable. The remaining 20% of police officers had

CAPE/A' Levels as well as Technical/Vocational qualifications which is also notable. Figure 41 refers.

**Figure 40: Number of Years' Experience in the TTPS**



**Figure 41: Highest Level of Education Attained**



18.7.6.3 The following paragraphs/results provide (a) overall results as well as (b) more detailed descriptive (e.g., cross tabulations) and (c) statistical analyses (e.g.,

correlations) on the manpower issues are shown according to gender, age, rank, education level, and number of years in the police service. In other words, what were the trends when these key variables are considered?

18.7.6.4 Also, please note the following classifications used in the analysis.

### **18.7.7 Rank of Officer**

18.7.7.1 For Rank of Officer, we merged some ranks where logically possible for ease of comparison. We created three (3) categories. For instance, Police Constables remained on its own as one category; Corporals and Sergeants were combined into the second category; and Inspectors, Assistant Superintendents of Police, Superintendents, Senior Superintendents and Assistant Commissioners of Police were combined into the third.

18.7.7.2 These were also combined accordingly so that there will be adequate numbers to enable a fair comparative statistical analysis among the groups of police officers.

### **18.7.8 Number of Years in the TTPS**

18.7.8.1 For Number of Years in the Service, we created five (5) categories for our analysis. These were officers who were there (1) Under Five Years, (2) 6-10 Years, (3) 11-20 Years, (4) 21-30 Years, and (5) 31 and more years.

### **18.7.9 Educational Background of Officers**

18.7.9.1 For Educational Background of Officers, we created three (3) categories:

- (1) CSEC/CXC/O'Levels,
- (2) CAPE/A' Levels/Technical/Vocational qualifications and

- (3) University including undergraduate degree and post graduate qualifications.

### **18.7.10 A Note on the Correlation**

18.7.10.1 In this survey, some relatively low but statistically significant correlations were found for many of the analyses. These will be shown. This can be in part due to the normal distribution of some of the variables (where it is denser in the centre and less dense in the tails) as well as the relatively large sample size.


## **18.8 Overall Staffing View & Organization of the TTPS**

### **18.8.1 View of Staffing within the TTPS**

18.8.1.1 *How would you rate the staffing within the TTPS?*

18.8.1.2 Police officers were asked to rate the staffing within the TTPS. More than half of them (59%) said that it was Very Unsatisfactory/Unsatisfactory while 41% said it was Very Satisfactory/Satisfactory. See Figure 42. These results point to a worrisome perspective that the TTPS should seriously address especially as it is coming from the officers themselves.

**Figure 42: Overall Rating of Staffing within the TTPS**



- 18.8.1.3 When gender was taken into consideration, a higher proportion of the males (61%) than of the females (45%) said the staffing in the TTPS was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”.
- 18.8.1.4 What were the trends by age of officers? Interestingly, a slightly higher proportion of officers from two age groups (31-40 and 41-50 years – over sixty percent each) than the other age groups (under sixty percent) rated staffing within the TTPS as “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. See [Appendix 12:1](#) for details.
- 18.8.1.5 When the various ranks of officers were examined on how they felt about staffing within the TTPS, we found that the highest proportions of the lower ranks, that is, Police Constables (60%) and Corporals-Sergeants (65%) felt staffing within the TTPS was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. However, the highest proportion of the higher ranks (Inspectors-Assistant Commissioners of Police) said staffing was the opposite that is, “*very satisfactory/satisfactory*” (52%). See [Appendix 12:2](#) for this information. Further, there was a positive



correlation between rank and officers' view of staffing,  $r = .105$ ,  $p = .020$ . This means that as officers' rank got higher, feelings of satisfaction on staffing within the police service increased as well.

18.8.1.6 When the data were analysed by the number of years' officers spent in the police service, it showed that more than half of the officers from each category said that staffing in the TTPS was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. In fact, it was as high as 66% in the 6-10 years and 11-20 years' categories. Appendix 12:3 shows these details.


18.8.1.7 There were mixed results when we analysed the educational background of officers and their rating on staffing within the TTPS. While almost seventy percent (69%) of officers with CAPE/A' Levels/Technical/Vocational qualifications said it is “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”, the proportions were much lesser for those with CSEC/CXC/O' Levels (58%) and University (54%).

## **18.8.2 Organization of the TTPS to Address Crime**

18.8.2.1 *To what extent do you think the TTPS is organized to address crime?*

18.8.2.2 Dealing with crime is the fundamental function of the TTPS. As such, the TTPS as an organization must be organized to deal with this troubling issue facing Trinidad and Tobago. The survey revealed that over half of the police officers (58%) were “*very unsatisfied/unsatisfied*” with the TTPS' organization to address crime. However, 42% felt “*very satisfied/satisfied*”. It shows that the officers feel that much more internal/organizational work is needed to tackle crime. See Figure 43.

**Figure 43: Satisfaction that TTPS is Organised to Deal with Crime (%)**



- 18.8.2.3 When the gender of the officers were considered, a similar proportion of the males (58%) and of the females (56%) said they were “*very unsatisfied/unsatisfied*” with the way the TTPS was organized to deal with crime.
- 18.8.2.4 However, when age of officers and their responses were examined, there was a clear trend that indicated a higher proportion of older officers (51+ years age group) than the other age groups said the police service’s organization to address crime was “*very satisfactory/satisfactory*”. [Appendix 12:4](#) shows these details. There was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .211$ ,  $p < .001$  What does this mean? As age of officers increased, so too did their satisfaction in the organization to deal with crime increased.
- 18.8.2.5 Analysing the data by rank of officer revealed that higher proportions of lower ranked officers than higher ranked officers felt that the organization of the TTPS to address crime was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. See [Appendix 12:5](#) for this data. There was a positive correlation between these two variables,

$r = .181, p < .001$  It means, therefore, that as rank of officer increased, the level of satisfaction that the police is organized to deal with crime also increased.

18.8.2.6 When the data was analysed by the number of years' officers spent in the service, it showed that the highest proportion of them who spent less than five years to those who spent up to 21-30 years said that the organization of the TTPS to address crime was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. However, the highest proportion of officers (55%) who spent 31 years and more in the service said that the organization of the TTPS was “*very satisfactory/satisfactory*”. Appendix 12:6 highlights these trends. There was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .168, p < .001$  It means that as officers years in the service increased, their level of satisfaction that the TTPS was organized to deal with crime also increased.

18.8.2.7 There was a trend that showed officers with university level education had a lower percentage (49%) than the other officers with other educational backgrounds saying that they were “*very unsatisfied/unsatisfied*” that the TTPS is organized to address crime. Those with O' Levels had 63% and those with A' Levels/Technical/Vocational had 61%.


### **18.8.3 Civilians in the TTPS**

18.8.3.1 *Do you think the use of civilians in the TTPS has been effective in helping the police?*

18.8.3.2 The use of civilians in the TTPS was meant to relieve some officers of some administrative duties and free them up for other key policing functions. In addition, some civilians were meant to bring some specialist skills to the TTPS. How did the officers see the effect of civilians in the TTPS? More than two-thirds of them (69%) said civilian's effectiveness has been “*very little/little*”

and 31% said “*much/very much*”. If the majority of police officers do not see the value of civilian use, should this strategy be reviewed, discontinued and/or enhanced? See [Figure 44](#).

**Figure 44: Effectiveness of Use of Civilians in the TTPS to Help Police (%)**



- 18.8.3.3 Overall, when gender of officers was considered, a relatively higher proportion of females (75%) than males (67%) said the use of civilians in the TTPS had “*very little/little*” effect in helping the police.
- 18.8.3.4 There were no notable differences among the various age groups. The highest proportions in each age group said “*very little/little*”.
- 18.8.3.5 The trends were clear when it came to rank of officer and how they felt about the use of civilians in the TTPS. It was shown that higher proportions of lower ranked officers than higher ranked officers felt that the use of civilians in the TTPS had “*very little/little*” effect in helping the police. Or stated another way, more of the higher ranked officers than lower ranked officers said civilians in the TTPS were useful “*very much/much*”. See [Appendix 12:7](#) for these results.

There was a positive correlation between these variables,  $r = .127$ ,  $p = .005$ . It suggested that as the rank of officers got higher so too were their feelings that civilians in the TTPS were effective in helping the police.

18.8.3.6 How did officers who spent various numbers of years in police service view the use of civilians in the TTPS? Those who spent 11-20 years in the service had the lowest proportion (57%) who said that civilians in the TTPS had “*very little/little*” impact in helping the police. All of the other officers had percentages from 69% to 73%.

18.8.3.7 Just over sixty percent (63%) of those officers with a University education said that the use of civilians in the TTPS had “*very little/little*” effect in helping the police. However, higher proportions of officers with O’ Levels (73%) and A’ Levels/Technical/Vocational (73%) gave this response as well. There was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .104$ ,  $p = .023$ . It means therefore that as education level of officers increased, so too did their feelings that civilians are more useful in helping the TTPS.

## **18.9 Supervision and Leadership:**


### **18.9.1 Relationship with Current Supervisor**

18.9.1.1 *How would you rate your relationship with your current supervisor?*

18.9.1.2 A quite positive finding from the survey was that almost ninety percent (88%) of the police officers said that they had a “*very satisfactory/satisfactory*” relationship with their current supervisor while 12% said their relationship was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. This result may make it easier for supervisors to do what they ought to as the relationship seems good. Without a good relationship with a supervisor, it may be difficult to get things done properly. See [Figure 45](#).

- 18.9.1.3 There were similar proportions of male (89%) and female (88%) officers who said that their relationship with their current supervisor were “*very satisfactory/satisfactory*”.
- 18.9.1.4 When age was looked at, we found that high proportions of police officers from all age groups (range from 86% to 92%) indicated that the relationship with their current supervisor was “*very satisfactory/satisfactory*”. We found a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .108$ ,  $p = .018$  that is, as age increased, so too did the relationship with their supervisors get better.
- 18.9.1.5 When rank of officers was looked at with this data, it was consistent across all ranks that the highest proportion of officers felt that their relationship with their current supervisors was “*very satisfactory/satisfactory*”. In fact, the percentages ranged from 87% to 92%. A positive correlation existed between these two variables,  $r = .108$ ,  $p = .017$  It means that as rank of officer got higher, the relationship with their supervisor also got better.

**Figure 45: Level of Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction with Current Supervisor (%)**




- 18.9.1.6 The vast majority of officers with the various numbers of years in the police service felt their relationship with their current Supervisor was “*very satisfactory/satisfactory*” – over 85% in all categories. In fact, there was a positive correlation between the two variables,  $r = .108$ ,  $p = .017$ . It means that as the number of years officers spent in the police service increased, their relationship with their supervisor were better.
- 18.9.1.7 When analyses were done by educational background of officers, there were no major differences. The highest proportion of officers said “*very satisfied/satisfied*” across the board – 86% to 89%.

## **18.9.2 Leadership of the TTPS**

- 18.9.2.1 *How would you rate the leadership in the TTPS?*
- 18.9.2.2 Leadership of any organization is essential for its success. How did the officers view the leadership of the TTPS? More than fifty percent (55%) said the current leadership is “*very satisfactory/satisfactory*” while 45% said “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. This overall mixed result should be of some concern. See [Figure 46](#).

**Figure 46: Leadership of the TTPS**



- 18.9.2.3 The results were similar when gender of officers was looked at, that is, there were no difference on how male and female officers felt, e.g. 45% of the males and 46% of the females said the leadership of the TTPS is “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”.
- 18.9.2.4 When age of officers and rating of the leadership were examined, a notable clear trend was found. As the age of the officers increased, so too did the percentage of them who said “*very satisfactory/satisfactory*”. See [Appendix 12:8](#). This was confirmed by a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .308$ ,  $p < .001$  suggesting that as age of officer increased, ratings of satisfactory leadership of the TTPS increased as well.
- 18.9.2.5 The data showed that a higher proportion of the higher ranked officers than lower ranked officers rated the leadership of the TTPS as “*very satisfactory/satisfactory*”. It was 79% of the Inspectors-Assistant Commissioners of Police as compared to 55% of Corporals-Sergeants and 47%



of Constables. This relationship was confirmed by a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .266$ ,  $p < .001$ .

18.9.2.6 It was interesting to find that those officers who spent the longest time (31+ years) in the TTPS to have the lowest percentage who said the leadership of the TTPS is “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*” (27%) while all of the other officers gave “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*” ratings of 50% to 57%. There was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .310$ ,  $p < .001$ . This means that as the number of years’ officers spent in the TTPS increased, so too did their positive rating/satisfaction in the leadership of the TTPS increased.

18.9.2.7 The data showed that while almost sixty percent each of those officers with O’ Levels (58%) and University education (57%) said that leadership in the TTPS is “*very satisfactory/satisfactory*” only 41% of them with A’ Levels/Technical/Vocational said so. In fact, the highest proportion of officers with A’ Levels/Technical/Vocational said that leadership in the TTPS is “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*” (59%).

## **18.10 Deployment of Officers, Work Shifts & Overtime Payments:**


### **18.10.1 Deployment of Officers Based on Training, Qualifications & Experience**

18.10.1.2 *To what extent is deployment to divisions/stations/branches/units etc. based on training, qualifications and experience?*

18.10.1.3 They were asked to what extent are officers deployed to divisions, units, branches and sections based on their training, qualifications and experience. Two-thirds of them (66%) said that this was done “*sometimes*” while 21% said “*very often/often*”. However, 13% said deployment in this way does not take

place at all. While 66% said “*sometimes*”, shouldn’t this be a much lower percentage? See [Figure 47](#). Deployment should always be based on training, qualifications and experience. Clear policies and guidelines with transparency need to be established and adhered to on the deployment of officers. The responses were quite similar when gender of officers was examined.

**Figure 47: Deployment of Officers based on Training, Qualification and Experience (%)**



18.10.1.4 When the various age groups of officers were looked at, the highest proportion of them said that deployment of officers based on training, qualifications and experience were done “*sometimes*” (range 64% to 67%). Further, while 27% of the officers who were 51+ years said this was done “*very often/often*”, it ranged from 19% to 22% for the other age groups. [Appendix 12:9](#) shows these results in more detail. There was a negative correlation between these two variables,  $r = -.092$ ,  $p = .042$  meaning that as age of officer increased, deployment based on training, qualifications and experience decreased.

18.10.1.5 The analysis by each rank of officer revealed that the highest proportion of them said that deployment of officers based on training, qualifications and experience were done “*sometimes*”, that is, 63% to 68% of officers. This is

not quite as good as one will expect that deployment in this way should be done “*very often/often*”. In fact, there was a negative correlation between these two variables,  $r = -.182$ ,  $p < .001$ . This suggests that as rank of officer got higher, feelings that deployment based on training, education and experience was reduced.


- 18.10.1.6 The highest proportion of officers from the various years of experience in the TTPS said that deployment of officers based on training, qualifications and experience takes place “*sometimes*”. It ranged from 60% to 68%. This is too high. In fact, over ten percent in each category said that deployment does not take place based on these criteria at all. There was in fact a negative correlation between these two variables,  $r = -.097$ ,  $p = .031$ .
- 18.10.1.7 The data showed that for officers from each of the educational backgrounds, the highest proportions of them said that deployment of officers based on education, training and experience takes place “*sometimes*”. See Appendix 12:10 for details.

## **18.10.2 Favouritism in Assigning Officers to Divisions/Units/Sections:**

- 18.10.2.1 *To what extent do you think favouritism exists in assigning officers to the various units/divisions/departments?*
- 18.10.2.2 When deeper questioning was conducted on the assignment of officers, an unpleasant finding was revealed. Approximately two-thirds (68%) of the police felt that favouritism in the assignment of officers to the various divisions/units/sections took place “*very often/often*”. A further 29% said this practice took place “*sometimes*”. However, 3% felt that this biasness “*did not happen at all*”. See [Figure 47](#). These opinions must be treated with much seriousness and again clear guidelines and processes must be enforced. Again, there were no differences between the responses of male vs. female officers.

18.10.2.3 When age of officers was examined, there were interesting results. Higher proportions of younger officers than older officers said that favouritism in assigning officers to the various divisions, units, sections, etc. took place “*very often/often*”. [Appendix 12:11](#) shows these trends. When statistical analyses were conducted, there was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .159$ ,  $p < .001$  in that as age of officer got higher, so too did feelings of favouritism in assigning officers to various divisions, units, etc.

**Figure 48: Favouritism in Assigning Officers to Divisions/Units/Sections (%)**




18.10.2.4 With regard to rank of officers, the highest proportion of Constables to Sergeants said that favouritism in the assigning of officers took place “*very often/often*”. However, while 50% of the Inspectors to Assistant Commissioners of Police said it took place “*very often/often*”, 44% said Sometimes. [Appendix 12:12](#) gives these details. There was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .167$ ,  $p < .001$  suggesting that as rank of officer increased so too did feelings of favouritism in assigning officers.

- 18.10.2.5 Interestingly, the data revealed that a lower proportion of officers who spent over thirty years in the police service said that favouritism in assigning officers to the various divisions, units and sections took place “*very often/often*” than officers who had a lesser number of years in the police service. In other words, a higher proportion of officers who had lesser number of years in the police service said that favouritism in assigning officers took place “*very often/often*”. See [Appendix 12:13](#) for these details. There was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .164$ ,  $p < .001$ . This means that as officers spent more years in the service, they felt that more favouritism takes place in deploying officers.
- 18.10.2.6 The data showed that officers with A’ Levels/Technical/Vocational qualifications had the highest proportion (78%) when compared to officers with other academic qualifications (65% for University education and 68% for O’ Level) who said that favouritism in the assigning of officers to divisions, units, sections, etc., take place “*very often/often*”.

### **18.10.3 Work Shift Lengths & Job Efficiency**

- 18.10.3.1 *What shift length do you think allows officers to be most efficient in their jobs?*
- 18.10.3.2 Officers work a variety of shift systems in the TTPS. There have been reports that some of these shift systems contribute to a higher than usual overtime payment bill for the TTPS, worn-out officers, officers being away from their families for an extended time, etc. In this survey, officers were asked which shift system they think can be most efficient to their job. Almost half of them (48%) said an 8-hour shift system is best while almost one-third (32%) said a 12-hour shift system. Further, 16% said a 24-hour shift system will be most efficient and 4% said a 14-hour system. See [Figure 49](#). This is a finding that should be looked at by the Human Resource Unit of the TTPS urgently as well as by the TTPSSWA.

**Figure 49: Work Shift Lengths & Job Efficiency (%)**



18.10.3.3 There was a negative correlation between age and most efficient shift length,  $r = -.147$ ,  $p = .001$ . It means that as age of officers increased, a shorter shift length was indicated as most efficient.

18.10.3.4 There was a negative correlation between rank of officer and most efficient shift length,  $r = -.196$ ,  $p < .001$ . It means that as rank of officers got higher, a shorter shift length was indicated as most efficient.

18.10.3.5 There was a negative correlation between number of years in service and most efficient shift length,  $r = -.171$ ,  $p < .001$ . It means that as the number of years officers spent in the service increased, a shorter shift length was indicated as most efficient.

#### **18.10.4 Overtime Levels**

18.10.4 *What do you think are the factors that are driving the current levels of overtime in the TTPS?*

18.10.4.1 The current overtime bill in the TTPS has risen significantly over the past few years. We asked the officers to indicate what factors they thought were contributing to this. The highest proportion of them (61%) said it was the Exigencies of the Job. This was followed by 51% who said it was the Structure of the Working Hours and 27% said Absenteeism. This suggests that a deeper analysis of police manpower allocation is needed with an emphasis also on absenteeism. A review of the Absence Management Policy in the TTPS is also recommended.


#### **18.11 Resources**

##### **18.11.1 Availability of Tools and Equipment to Perform Duties**

18.11.1.2 *To what extent are the tools and equipment that you require to perform your duties available?*

18.11.1.3 Just over three-quarters (76%) of the officers said that there was “*very little/little*” availability of tools and equipment that are required to perform their duties. However, 24% said they were available “*very much/much*”. See Figure 50. The lack of resources can hamper officers in the fulfilment of their duties. This must be addressed with a deep sense of urgency especially as the public expects proper service by the TTPS. The responses did not vary by gender of officers.

**Figure 50: Availability of Tools and Equipment to Perform Duties (%)**



18.11.1.4 Overall, we found that higher proportions of younger officers than older officers said that the availability of tools and equipment required to perform their jobs were “*very little/little*”. See [Appendix 12:14](#). There was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .241$ ,  $p < .001$ . What does this mean? The older the officer, the more available were tools and equipment to perform the jobs.

18.11.1.5 Higher percentages of lower ranked officers than higher ranked officers said that the tools and equipment required to perform their duties are available “*very little/little*”. It means, therefore, the tools and equipment required for the senior officers seems to be more available than to the junior officers. See [Appendix 12:15](#) for these results. There was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .269$ ,  $p < .001$ . This shows that the higher the rank of officer, the more available are the tools and equipment to perform their job.

18.11.1.6 How did the officers who spent various numbers of years in the TTPS view the availability of tools and equipment to perform their duties? Not surprisingly, those who spent the longest in the TTPS (31+ years) had the lowest percentage (61%) that said it’s available “*very little/little*”. The other officers had much



higher percentages that gave this response (range: 76% to 86%). This was confirmed by a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .264$ ,  $p < .001$ . In other words, the longer the years in the TTPS, the more available are tools and equipment to do your jobs.

18.11.1.7 The data showed that the officers who had A' Levels/Technical/Vocational qualifications had the highest proportion (85%) who said there was “*very little/little*” availability of tools and equipment to perform their jobs. It was much lower for the other officers with other educational backgrounds, e.g., O' Levels (78%) and University (70%).


### **18.11.2 Time Spent Doing Paper Work**

18.11.2.1 *On average, about how many hours do you spend doing paper work per day?*

18.11.2.2 It has been reported that some police officers spend a considerable amount of time on their work shifts doing paper work that may prevent them from doing other policing duties. When asked about how many hours per day they usually spend doing paper work, the highest proportion of officers (45%) said they spend 4 to 6 hours. See [Figure 51](#). Imagine officers working on an 8-hour or 12-hour shift, this results in almost half of their day being spent on paper work. Further consideration should be given to the use of civilian staff to replace officers doing some paper work as well as the greater use of technology to reduce if not eliminate so much paper work. Of course, there will be the need to change several of the police and other regulations.

18.11.2.3 When gender of officers was looked at, while 39% of the males said they spent less than 3 hours per day doing paper work, 25% of females gave this response. Further, 56% of the males spent 4 to 9 hours per day doing paper work while 67% of females spent this time. In other words, more females spent longer time doing paper work than males in the police service.

**Figure 51: Number of Hours Spent on Paper Work Per Day (%)**



18.11.2.4 Analysis by age produced some useful findings. For those officers who were younger, that is, 21-30 years old, the highest proportion of them did 1-3 hours of paper work per day. However, for the older officers, the highest proportion of them spent 4-6 hours per day doing paper work. See [Appendix 12:16](#) for these results.

18.11.2.5 The data also shows that for each of the ranks of officers, the highest proportion of them said that they spent about 4-6 hours doing paper work daily. In fact, as the rank of officer got higher, the percentages that did 4-6 hours of paper work per day increased. See [Appendix 12:17](#) for these details.

18.11.2.6 What were the results when the number of years in the service was analysed? Consistently, despite the number of years in the service, the highest proportion of officers said they spent 4-6 hours per day doing paper work. It was over fifty percent for those officers with over 30 years in the service.


18.11.2.7 Mixed results were found when we analysed the data by educational background of officers. The highest proportion of officers with O' Levels (41%) said that they do 4-6 hours of paper work per day. This was the same trend for those with University education (53%). However, the highest proportion of those who had A' Levels/ Technical/Vocational (41%) said they spend 1-3 hours per day doing paper work.

### 18.11.3 Impact of Technology on Performance of Duties:

18.11.3.1 *To what extent has the introduction of current technology impacted your ability to perform your duties?*

18.11.3.2 Organizations introduce technology to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations. How did officers feel about this in the TTPS? Almost forty percent (38%) of them said that the introduction of current technology in the TTPS had “*very little/no impact*” on their ability to perform their duties. This is too high a proportion to be feeling this way. However, 44% said it had a “*moderate impact*” and almost twenty percent (18%) said the impact was “*very much*”. See [Figure 52](#). The finding suggests that the TTPS takes a review of its technology in the organization as it seems not to be having the desired impact.

**Figure 52: Impact of Technology on Performance of Duties (%)**



- 18.11.3.3 When gender of officers was looked at, while 43% of females said that the introduction of current technology had “*very little/no impact*” at all on their ability to perform their job, 36% of males gave this response. In other words, a higher proportion of males than females said technology impacted on their job.
- 18.11.3.4 What were the trends by age of officer? Only for the 21-30 years’ age group that the highest proportion of officers said the introduction of technology had “*no/very little impact*” on their ability to perform their duties, that is, 52% of them. However, for the other age groups, the highest proportions of officers said there was “*moderate/very much impact*” by the introduction of technology. Interestingly, the proportions of officers that said the technology impacted on them “*moderately/very much*” increased with age of officer. See [Appendix 12:18](#). There was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .299$ ,  $p < .001$ . This indicates that as officers age increased, the impact that the introduction of technology had on their ability to perform their job increased as well.
- 18.11.3.5 How did the various ranks of officers feel about the impact that the introduction of current technology had on their ability to perform their duties? The data showed that a higher proportion of higher ranked officers than lower ranked officers said the technology had a “*very much/much impact*” on their job. See [Appendix 12:19](#) for these trends. Does this mean, therefore, that there needs to be more effective technology for the lower ranks of officers as well? There was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .307$ ,  $p < .001$  in that as rank of officer got higher, so too the impact of technology on their ability to perform their job was greater.
- 18.11.3.6 It is not too surprising that those officers who spent more years in the police service had higher proportions that said the introduction of technology impacted their ability to perform their job “*moderately/very much*”. It is a bit worrisome

that more than fifty percent of officers who spent Less than 5 years (51%) and 6-10 years (53%) said there was “*no impact at all/very little impact*”. [Appendix 12:20](#) shows these very clear trends. There was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .325$ ,  $p < .001$ .

18.11.3.7 Officers with University education (68%) had the highest proportion that said the introduction of technology in the TTPS had a “*very much/much impact*” on their ability to perform their job as compared to the other officers with other educational backgrounds (O’ Levels-57% and A’ Levels/Technical/Vocational – 59%).


#### **18.11.4 Availability of Transportation Vehicles to Perform Duties**

18.11.4.1 *How would you rate the availability of transportation vehicles to perform your duties?*

18.11.4.2 Transportation for any police service is critical for its effective and efficient functioning. Over sixty percent (63%) of the officers said that the availability of transportation vehicles in the TTPS is “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. This proportion seems too high. Almost one-third (32%) said it is “*satisfactory*” while a further 5% said “*very satisfactory*”. See [Figure 53](#). This is a serious issue in policing that should be urgently addressed.

18.11.4.3 While 75% of female officers said that the availability of transportation vehicles is “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*” in the TTPS for them to do their job, a much lower proportion of males (56%) gave this response. In fact, 44% of males said “*satisfactory/very satisfactory*” and 25% of females gave this response.

**Figure 53: Availability of Transportation Vehicles to Perform (%)**



18.11.4.4 What did the data by age show? It highlighted that higher proportions of officers from the older age groups than the younger age groups said that the availability of transportation for them to perform their duties were “*very satisfactory/satisfactory*”. Appendix 12:21 shows this data. In fact, there was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .383$ ,  $p < .001$ . Is it that older officers are generally higher ranked officers who may have access to adequate vehicles to do their jobs but the younger officers do not have such access? All in all, whether younger or older, all officers should have access to transportation to perform their job when needed.

18.11.4.5 It is very noteworthy to reveal that while almost eighty percent (79%) of Constables said the availability of transportation to perform their job is “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”, the trend was the opposite for the higher ranked officers. In fact, 52% of Corporal-Sergeant and 68% of Inspector-Assistant Commissioner of Police said it was “*very satisfactory/satisfactory*”. A positive correlation existed for these two variables,  $r = .372$ ,  $p < .001$ . It means that as the rank of officer was higher, the availability of transportation to perform their jobs was more available.

18.11.4.6 The data revealed that as the length of officers stay at the TTPS increased, lesser proportions of them said that the availability of transportation for them to perform their duties was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. In other words, as officers’ length of service increased, a higher proportion of them said transportation services were “*very satisfactory/satisfactory*”. See [Appendix 12:22](#). This was confirmed with a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .409, p < .001$

18.11.4.7 What were the results according to the educational background of officers? While almost seventy percent each (68%) of officers with O’ Levels and A’ Levels/Technical/Vocational said that transportation vehicles in the TTPS for them to perform their duties were “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”, 56% of those with University education gave this response. Further, there was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .162, p < .001$


### **18.11.5 Training and Development Opportunities:**

18.11.5.1 *How would you rate the Training and Development opportunities in the TTPS?*

18.11.5.2 Training and Development for any organization is critical for its success. More than half of the police officers (59%) indicated that training and development opportunities within the TTPS are “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. This is quite worrisome. In addition, 39% said such opportunities are “*satisfactory*” and 2% said “*very satisfactory*”. See [Figure 54](#). A review of all training and development opportunities within the TTPS is needed as a matter of high priority to ensure that the right persons are provided with the right training to take the TTPS forward.

18.11.5.3 When gender of officers was looked at, a higher proportion of the females (65%) said Training and Development opportunities in the TTPS were “*unsatisfactory/very unsatisfactory*” than male officers (56%).

**Figure 54: Training and Development Opportunities (%)**



18.11.5.4 A clear trend also existed when age of officers was looked at. A higher proportion of younger officers than older officers said that the Training and Development opportunities in the TTPS were “*very unsatisfactory*” or “*unsatisfactory*”. See [Appendix 12:23](#). In fact, there was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .255$ ,  $p < .001$ . Could it be that more of the older officers would have spent more time in the TTPS and thus be exposed to more Training and Development opportunities than the younger officers? It also suggested that many of the younger officers were crying out for more Training and Development opportunities and this is something that the TTPS needs to address urgently.

18.11.5.5 How did the various ranks of officers responded to this question? As the ranks of officers got higher, a lesser proportion of them said that the Training and Development opportunities in the TTPS were “*very unsatisfactory*” or



“*unsatisfactory*”. In other words, higher proportions of the higher ranked officers chose “*very satisfactory/satisfactory*”. See [Appendix 12:24](#) for these trends. This relationship was confirmed by a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .222, p < .001$

18.11.5.6 A clear trend emerged when the number of years’ officers had been in the police service and their views on the Training and Development opportunities in the TTPS. The data showed that higher proportions of officers who spent lesser years in the service than those who spent more years in the service said that the Training and Development opportunities were “*very unsatisfactory*” or “*unsatisfactory*”. There was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .260, p < .001$  Is it that those with more years in the service know of and benefit from these opportunities more than those with fewer years? See [Appendix 12:25](#).

18.11.5.7 Almost two-thirds (66%) of officers with A’ Levels/Technical/Vocational qualifications said that Training and Development opportunities in the TTPS is “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. However, a lower proportion of those with O’ Levels and University qualifications – 58% each - gave a similar response.


## **18.11.6 Use of Non-Lethal Equipment in Execution of Duties**

18.11.6.1 *To what extent do you support the use of non-lethal equipment such as pepper spray, tasers, rubber bullets etc in the execution of your duties?*

18.11.6.2 This is a quite topical point especially in the public domain. Should police officers be allowed to use non-lethal equipment in the execution of their duties? What did the officers think about this? More than two-thirds of them (69%) said they support non-lethal equipment “*very much*”. A further 22% said they supported it “*moderately*”. However, 9% said they “*did not support it at all /*

*very little*”. See [Figure 55](#). This is a matter that the relevant persons need to address urgently as there are many instances where police officers used deadly force (via firearms) where non-lethal equipment may have been a better option if available.

**Figure 55: Use of Non-Lethal Equipment in Execution of Duties (%)**



18.11.6.3 With regard to gender, there were similarity in the responses by both male and female officers – 93% of males and 89% of females said they supported the use of non-lethal equipment “*very much/moderately*”.

18.11.6.4 There was a positive correlation between age and the use of non-lethal equipment,  $r = .095$ ,  $p = .036$  This means that as age of officer increased, there was greater preference for the use of non-lethal equipment.

18.11.6.5 There was a positive correlation between rank of officer and the use of non-lethal equipment,  $r = .089$ ,  $p = .049$  This means that as rank of officer increased, there was greater preference for the use of non-lethal equipment.

18.11.6.6 There was a positive correlation between number of years in service and the use of non-lethal equipment,  $r = .093$ ,  $p = .041$  This means that as number of years

in service increased, there was greater preference for the use of non-lethal equipment.

18.11.6.7 While 96% of officers with a university education said that they support the use of non-lethal equipment in the execution of their duties, the proportions were lower for those with O' Levels (87%) and A' Levels/Technical/Vocational (93%). In fact, there was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .153$ ,  $p = .001$

### **18.11.7 Officers' Non-Attendance of Court Matters**

18.11.7.1 *What are the factors contributing to officers' inability to attend court?*

18.11.7.2 A critical component of policing is taking legal action against alleged criminals. This requires attendance to court. Over the years, there have been many statements on officers' non-attendance at court. We asked officers what were some of the factors that contributed to their non-attendance at court. The highest proportion of officers (65%) said the main reason was "*Court Postponements and Trial Delays*". This was followed by "*Conflicting Schedules*" (42%), "*Loss of Days*" (41%), and that it's "*Time Consuming*" (30%). This is a serious matter that deserves deeper attention as officers should always attend court.

## **18.12 Communication**


### **18.12.1 Internal Communication in TTPS:**

18.12.2 *How would you rate the efficiency of the internal communication with regards to orders, assignments, specialist equipment, etc. within the TTPS?*

18.12.3 Two-thirds of the officers said that internal communication in the TTPS was "*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*" (68%). This is with regards to orders,

assignments, specialist equipment, etc. This is too high a proportion of officers. An organization can be crippled without an effective internal community system. It means, therefore, that much more work needs to be done in this area starting from a review of the processes. About one-third of officers (31%) said that it was “*satisfactory*” and only 1% said “*very satisfactory*”. See [Figure 56](#).

**Figure 56: Internal Communication in TTPS (%)**



18.12.4 When the results were looked at by gender, a higher proportion of females (74%) than males (65%) said that internal communication within the TTPS was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”.

18.12.5 According to the age of officers, a higher proportion of younger officers than older officers said that the internal communication in the TTPS was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. [Appendix 12:26](#) shows this. There was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .199$ ,  $p < .001$ . It means that the higher the age of the officers, the more favourable they viewed the internal communication in the TTPS. Is it that the younger officers want a new modern system of internal communication?

- 18.12.6 Higher proportions of lower ranked officers than higher ranked officers felt that the efficiency of internal communication in the TTPS was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. The proportions were 73% of the Constables, 67% of Corporals-Sergeants and 56% of Inspectors-Assistant Commissioners of Police. This was confirmed with a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .211, p < .001$
- 18.12.7 It was clear from the results that the officers who spent the longest time in the TTPS (31+ years) had the lowest proportion who said that the internal communication within the TTPS was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*” (56%) than all of the other officers (range: 69% to 77%). A positive correlation between these two variables confirmed this relationship,  $r = .249, p < .001$
- 18.12.8 There were similar results from officers with the various educational backgrounds on their rating of the internal communication process in the TTPS. Overall, between 67% and 72% from the three educational backgrounds said it was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”.


## **18.13 Leave Abuses, Corruption & The Disciplinary Process:**

### **18.13.1 Abuse of Sick & Injury Leave**

- 18.13.1.1 *To what extent do you think the abuse of sick and injury leave exists within the TTPS?*
- 18.13.1.2 More than half of the officers (52%) indicated that Sick and Injury Leave was abused “*very much*” in the TTPS. A further 31% said it was abused “*much*”. This amounts to 83% of the officers saying this leave was abused “*very much/much*”. This proportion is quite alarming. An additional 17% said “*very little/little*”. See [Figure 57](#) below. Deeper investigations are needed on this abuse as it negatively affects the availability of police manpower.

18.13.1.3 When gender was considered, almost ninety percent (87%) of females in comparison to 80% of males said that the abuse of sick and injury leave existed “*very much/much*” in the TTPS.

**Figure 57: Abuse of Sick & Injury Leave (%)**



18.13.1.4 Likewise, across all age groups, the highest proportion of officers said sick and injury leave within the TTPS was abused “*very much/much*”. Slightly higher proportions of officers gave this response as age increased. See [Appendix 12:27](#).

18.13.1.5 The data showed that the proportions of officers who said that there was “*very much/much*” abuse of sick and injury leave within the TTPS increased as rank of officer got higher. It increased from 80% of Constables to 87% of Inspectors-Assistant Commissioners of Police.

18.13.1.6 Over eighty percent of officers from all of the numbers of years’ experience in the police service said that the abuse of sick and injury leave takes place “*very much/much*”.


18.13.1.7 Officers with a University education had the highest proportion (86%) that said abuse of sick and injury leave in the TTPS was “*very much/much*”. This is followed by 81% of those with O’ Levels and 78% of those with A’ Levels/Technical/Vocational qualifications.

### 18.13.2 Abuse of Study Leave

18.13.2.1 *To what extent do you think the abuse of study leave exists within the TTPS?*

18.13.2.2 The data revealed that almost forty percent (39%) of the officers felt that Study Leave was being abused “*very much/much*” in the TTPS. Again, this is too high a proportion. A further 40% said this was abused a “*little*” and 21% said “*very little*”. Again, this issue should be further examined and the problem capped. See [Figure 58](#).

**Figure 58: Abuse of Study Leave (%)**



18.13.2.3 A higher proportion of the male officers (41%) than the female officers (33%) said that the abuse of study leave existed “*very much/much*” in the police service.

- 18.13.2.4 When age of officers was examined, it revealed that as the age of officers increased, higher proportions of them said that study leave was abused “*very much/much*” in the police service. Appendix 12:28 shows these trends.
- 18.13.2.5 What were the trends when rank of officers was examined? It showed that more than half of the Corporals-Sergeants (53%) felt that the abuse of study leave in the TTPS was “*very much/much*” a problem. It was much lower for the other two ranks. See Appendix 12:29 for these results.
- 18.13.2.6 It is interesting that higher proportions of officers with more years of experience in the police service said the abuse of study leave takes place “*very much/much*”. In fact, over fifty percent of those with over twenty years of experience gave this response. See Appendix 12:30.
- 18.13.2.7 Similar to the abuse of sick and injury leave, officers with a University education had the highest proportion (66%) that said abuse of study leave in the TTPS was “*very much/much*”. This was followed by 60% of those with A’ Levels/Technical/Vocational qualifications and 59% with O’ Levels.

### **18.13.3 Abuse of Medical Exemptions**


- 18.13.3.1 *To what extent do you think medical exemptions are being abused within the TTPS?*
- 18.13.3.2 More than two-thirds of the officers (72%) indicated the abuse of Medical Exemptions in the TTPS was “*very much/much*”. This compares to 28% who said this was done “*very little/little*”. See Figure 59. This adds to the other two types of abuses within the TTPS that needs high-level attention.



18.13.3.3 When gender was looked at, almost eighty percent (78%) of the females said that medical exemptions were abused “*very much/much*” when compared to 69% of males.

18.13.3.4 Further, the highest proportions of officers from each age group said that the abuse of medical exemptions in the TTPS was taking place “*very much/much*”. In fact, as much as 82% of officers who were 51+ years old said so. Also, as officers ages increased in the survey, higher proportions of them said “*very much/much*”. [Appendix 12:31](#) gives full details by age.

**Figure 59: Abuse of Medical Exemptions (%)**



18.13.3.5 The trends showed that as the rank of officer got higher, there were higher proportions of them that said the abuse of medical exemptions in the TTPS was “*very much/much*”. [Appendix 12:32](#) highlights this data.

18.13.3.6 When analysed by the number of years’ officers spent in the police service, an interesting trend emerged. While 80% of officers who spent over thirty years in the TTPS said that the abuse of medical exemptions took place “*very*

*often/often*”, between 63% and 69% of officers with the lower number of years’ experience gave a similar response – much lower proportions. See [Appendix 12:33](#) for these figures.


18.13.3.7 Again, officers with a University education had the highest proportion (77%) that said abuse of medical exemptions in the TTPS was “*very much/much*”. This was followed by 70% of those with O’ Levels and 63% with A’ Levels/Technical/Vocational qualifications.

#### **18.13.4 Corruption within the TTPS:**

18.13.4.1 *To what extent do you think there is corruption within the TTPS?*

18.13.4.2 Officers were asked to what extent corruption existed within the TTPS. Three-quarters of them (75%) said “*very much/much*” while 25% said “*very little/little*”. More specifically, 40% said “*very much*”. See [Figure 60](#). This is a bothersome finding and measures should be instituted to not only reduce these incidences but also deal with those who engage in such activities. It also calls for increased support to be provided to the Professional Standards Bureau of the TTPS.

**Figure 60: Corruption within the TTPS (%)**



- 18.13.4.3 When the data was looked at by gender, we found that a higher proportion of females (84%) than males (70%) said that corruption within the TTPS was “*very much/much*”.
- 18.13.4.4 In each of the age groups of officers in this study, the highest proportion of officers said that there was “*very much/much*” corruption within the TTPS. However, as age increased, the percentages which gave this response decreased. Appendix 12:34 shows this trend.
- 18.13.4.5 Of those officers who were Constables, over eighty percent (82%) said that corruption in the TTPS was “*very much/much*”. However, as the ranks of officers increased, lesser proportions said “*very much/much*”, for instance, 76% of Corporals-Sergeants and 55% of Inspectors-Assistant Commissioners of Police.
- 18.13.4.6 Those officers who were in the police service for the longest period of time (31+ years) had the lowest proportion that said corruption within the TTPS was present “*very much/much*” as compared to those who were there for lesser years. Appendix 12:35 shows these results.
- 18.13.4.7 Overall, officers who had a university education had the lowest proportion (71%) who said corruption within the TTPS was “*very much/much*” when compared to officers with O’ Levels (78%) and A’ Levels/Technical/Vocational (76%).

### **18.13.5 Disciplinary Process**


18.13.5.1 *How would you rate the disciplinary process within the TTPS?*

18.13.5.2 The highest proportion of officers indicated that the disciplinary process in the TTPS was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*” (69%). This does not send a

strong message to all of its officers. The TTPS needs to act on this information urgently as it means that infractions committed by officers were not satisfactorily dealt with. In addition, 28% said the process was “*satisfactory*” while only 3% said it was “*very satisfactory*”. See [Figure 61](#). There was no difference in the results when gender was considered.

18.13.5.3 When the analysis was done by age of officers, with the exception of the officers who were Under 20 years old, we found that a higher proportion of older officers than younger officers found the Disciplinary Process within the TTPS “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. See [Appendix 12:36](#). When statistical tests were conducted, there was a negative correlation between these two variables,  $r = -.251$ ,  $p < .001$  which means that as the age of the officer increased, they viewed the disciplinary process as less satisfactory in the police service.

**Figure 61: Disciplinary Process**



18.13.5.4 The data revealed there was a higher proportion of higher ranked officers than lower ranked officers that said the disciplinary process within the TTPS was

“*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. It was 82% of the Inspector-Assistant Commissioner of Police, 79% of Corporals-Sergeants and 59% of Constables. This was confirmed with a negative correlation between these two variables,  $r = -.233, p < .001$

18.13.5.5 A clear trend emerged for years in service. There were higher proportions of officers who spent more years in the police service than those who spent fewer years who said that the disciplinary process within the TTPS was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. See [Appendix 12:37](#) for these trends. And, statistically, there was a negative correlation between these two variables,  $r = -.246, p < .001$

18.13.5.6 The data revealed that while 62% of officers with O’ Levels education said that the disciplinary process in the TTPS was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”, higher proportions of those with A’ Levels/Technical/Vocational qualifications (70%) and University (74%) education gave this result. Again, a negative correlation was found between these two variables,  $r = -.118, p = .009$

## **18.14 Performance Standards, Appraisal & Compensation**


### **18.14.1 Performance Standards / Targets:**

18.14.1.2 *How would you rate the performance standards/targets developed for your duties?*

18.14.1.3 Among other things, performance standards/targets are there to guide officer on their jobs. Over seventy percent (71%) of officers said the performance standards/targets set for them were “*very realistic/realistic*” while 29% said “*very unrealistic/unrealistic*”. This 29% proportion is worrisome as these officers will be frustrated on the job. See [Figure 62](#). More discussions between parties are needed in the establishment of realistic targets.

18.14.1.4 When the results were looked at by gender, we found a higher proportion of males (74%) than females (65%) said the performance standards/targets were “*very realistic/realistic*”.

**Figure 62: Performance Standards / Targets (%)**



18.14.1.5 When the data was analysed by age, we found a notable trend. As the age of officers increased, the percentage that said “*very realistic/realistic*” also increased. See [Appendix 12:38](#) for these results.

18.14.1.6 How were the trends according to rank of officer? The highest rank officers (that is, Inspector-Assistant Commissioner of Police) had the highest proportion that said the performance targets/standards developed for their duties were “*very realistic/realistic*” - 84% when compared to 69% of the Constables and 66% of Corporals-Sergeants.

18.14.1.7 A clear trend emerged for years in service - there were higher proportions of officers who had more years in the service that said the performance standards/targets set for them were “*very realistic/realistic*” than those with

lesser number of years in the police service. This should be the case for all officers not just those with more years in the service. See [Appendix 12:39](#) for these results.


- 18.14.1.8 Just over three-quarters (77%) of officers with O' Level qualifications said that the performance targets/standards set for them were “*very realistic/realistic*”. However, lesser proportions of officers with A' Levels/Technical/Vocational (60%) and University education (69%) said so.

### **18.14.2 Last Appraisal or Performance Review**

18.14.2.1 *When last did you have an appraisal or individual performance review?*

18.14.2.2 Performance appraisals or reviews should be done on a timely basis and as per an organisation's regulation. When officers were asked when last they had one done on them, almost one in five of them (18%) said “*Never*”. A further 8% said “*more than five years ago*”. Additionally, 41% said “*Within the Last Year*”, 23% said “*1-2 Years Ago*”, and 10% said “*3-4 Years Ago*”. Normal human resource practice recommends that performance reviews be done at least once per year. See [Figure 63](#).

**Figure 63: Last Appraisal of Performance Review**



18.14.2.3 Interesting results were found when the data was looked at by gender. Almost twice the proportion of females (26%) than males (14%) said they “Never” had an appraisal or individual performance review since they were in the police service. In addition, a higher proportion of males (45%) than females (34%) had one done “within the last year”. There were not any major differences between the proportions of males and females who had theirs done in the last “1-2 years”, “3-4 years”, “5-6 years”, and “6 and more years”.

18.14.2.4 Analysis by age produced two interesting results. For those officers who were 21-30 years of age, the highest proportion of them (47%) “Never” had an appraisal or individual performance review done. For the other age groups, the highest proportion of them had their last appraisal done “within the last year”. However, within each of these age groups, there are still over fifty percent each who had appraisals done “many years ago”. See [Appendix 12:40](#) for details. Statistically, there was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .212$ ,  $p < .001$  meaning that as age of officer increased, the more recent the last appraisal was done.



- 18.14.2.5 It was interesting to find that the highest proportion of Corporals-Sergeants (42%) said they had their last performance appraisal within the “*last year*”. Further, 66% of the Inspectors-Assistant Commissioners of Police gave the same response. However, only 31% of the Constables said within the “*last year*”. In fact, 30% of the Constables said they “*Never*” had one done. On the other end of the scale, there were 14% of Corporals-Sergeants that said they never had one done for them for “*more than five years*”. See [Appendix 12:41](#) for these figures.
- 18.14.2.6 The following are some of the results when we examined the data by the number of years an officer was in the service and when they said they had their last performance appraisal system done. For instance, of those who were in the service for less than 5 years, the highest proportion of them (53%) said they “*Never*” had one done. For those in the service for 21-30 years, 51% had one done “*within the last year*” and for those in the service for 31+ years, 54% said “*within the last year*” as well. [Appendix 12:42](#) gives further details. In fact, there was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .212, p < .001$
- 18.14.2.7 While almost half of the officers (47%) who had a university education said their last performance appraisal was done “*within the last year*”, 37% and 38% of those with O’ Levels and A’ Levels/Technical/Vocational respectively said they had one done “*within the last year*” too. There were about 8% of officers from each of the educational backgrounds who said they “*didn’t have one done over 5 years*”. Further, while 13% of those with university education said they “*never*” had one done, 17% and 23% of those with A’ Levels/Technical/Vocational and O’ Levels respectively said so.


### 18.14.3 Overall View on Performance Appraisal System

18.14.3.1 *How would you rate the overall performance appraisal system of the TTPS?*

18.14.3.2 An adequate performance appraisal system for any organization not only gages the current performance of its employees but also offers an opportunity to plan for their stay in the organization. When officers were asked about the overall performance appraisal system in the TTPS, 70% rated it as “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*” while 29% said “*satisfactory*” and 1% said “*very satisfactory*”. See [Figure 64](#). This is a matter that the TTPS needs to take a serious look at as it has serious implications for promotion among other things. There was no major difference in the results when gender was examined.

18.14.3.3 In each of the age groups, the highest proportion of officers felt the performance appraisal system in the TTPS was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. Interestingly, while 60% of officers who were 51+ years old said it was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”, all of the other age groups had higher proportions that gave this response (70% to 75%). See [Appendix 12:43](#) for these results.

**Figure 64: Overall View on Performance Appraisal System**




- 18.14.3.4 The data showed that similar proportions of officers from each of the ranks said the overall performance appraisal system in the TTPS was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. It ranged from 66% to 72% of the ranks. In fact, there was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .111$ ,  $p = .014$
- 18.14.3.5 The highest proportions of officers from all of the numbers of years of experience in the police service said that the overall Performance Appraisal system in the TTPS were “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. The percentages ranged from 64% to 78%. More specifically, this dissatisfaction was highest by those who had been in the service 6-10 years and 11 to 20 years with 78% each. There was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .110$ ,  $p = .015$
- 18.14.3.6 There were not too much of a difference between the educational background of officers and their opinion on the overall performance appraisal system in the TTPS. Overall, between 68% and 73% of officers from all educational backgrounds said it was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”.

#### **18.14.4 Rewards and Recognition Policies**

- 18.14.4.1 *How would you rate the rewards and recognition policies within the TTPS?*
- 18.14.4.2 These types of policies are essential to motivate officers to excel at their job. Disturbingly, over eighty percent (83%) of the officers said the current rewards and recognition policies in the TTPS were “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*” while 16% said “*satisfactory*” and 1% “*very satisfactory*”. See [Figure 65](#). Much work needs to be done in this area. The analysis by gender showed that there was no notable difference in the results between male and female officers.

**Figure 65: Rewards and Recognition Policies (%)**



18.14.4.3 Analysis by age of officers produced a clear trend. A higher proportion of younger officers than older officers said the rewards and recognition policies in the TTPS were “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. See [Appendix 12:44](#). Further, there was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .226$ ,  $p < .001$ , that is, as age of officer increased, so too did their satisfaction in the rewards and recognition policies of the TTPS. Why were more of the younger officers feeling this way? The TTPS needs to address this area of concern. Is it that only when an officer reaches a particular age that he/she starts benefitting from the rewards and recognition that the TTPS offers? There should be appropriate and adequate rewards and recognition policies for all ages of officers.

18.14.4.4 Higher proportions of lower ranked officers than higher ranked officers said the rewards and recognition policies within the TTPS were “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*” by a notable margin. See [Appendix 14:45](#) for these results. We found a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .229$ ,  $p < .001$

18.14.4.5 With regard to the number of years of service officers had and satisfaction in the TTPS's rewards and recognition policies, there was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .252$ ,  $p < .001$ . It means that officers with more years in the service had greater satisfaction in the rewards and recognition policies of the police service.


18.14.4.6 While 90% of officers with A' Levels/Technical/Vocational qualifications said that the Rewards and Recognition Policies in the TTPS were "*Very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*", it was much lower for those with University education (80%) and slightly lower for those with O' Levels (84%). In fact, when statistical analyses were done, there was a positive relationship between these two variables,  $r = .097$ ,  $p = .033$  meaning as officers education level got higher, so do their satisfaction level in the TTPS' rewards and recognition policies.

### **18.14.5 Compensation Package**

18.14.5.1 *How would you rate the current compensation package for the TTPS?*

18.14.5.2 Over three-quarters (77%) of the officers said the current compensation package in the TTPS is "*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*" while 22% said that it is "*satisfactory*" with a further 1% saying "*very satisfactory*". This 77% proportion is not at all encouraging. See [Figure 66](#).

**Figure 66: Compensation Package**



18.14.5.3 When gender was looked at, a slightly higher proportion of males (78%) than females (72%) said that the compensation package in the TTPS was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”.

18.14.5.4 The highest proportion of officers from each of the age groups said that the current compensation package in the TTPS was “*very unsatisfactory*” or “*unsatisfactory*”. However, there were some variations in the data by age, for example, while 83% of the 31-40 years’ age group felt this way, 66% of the 51+ years age group also felt similarly. See [Appendix 12:46](#) for these trends. In fact, there was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .091$ ,  $p = .046$

18.14.5.5 How were the results according to rank of officer? It was clear that higher proportions of lower ranked officers than higher ranked officers said that the current compensation package for the TTPS was “*very unsatisfactory*” or “*unsatisfactory*”. More specifically, it was 79% and 81% of the Constables and Corporal-Sergeants respectively as compared to 61% of the Inspector-Assistant

Commissioner of Police. This was confirmed with a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .189$ ,  $p < .001$

18.14.5.6 Overall, the data revealed that over seventy percent of officers who spent the various numbers of years in the TTPS felt that the current compensation package was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. It was as high as 87% of those who were in the service for 6-10 years and as low as 71% of those who were there for 31+ years. A positive correlation between these two variables were found,  $r = .106$ ,  $p = .019$  meaning that as the number of years in the police service officers spent increased, so too did their satisfaction with the compensation package.

18.14.5.7 An interesting trend emerged when educational background was considered. A higher proportion of officers with O’ Levels (81%) than with A’ Levels/ Technical/Vocational (77%) and University education (72%) said that the compensation package in the TTPS was “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*”. In fact, there was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .125$ ,  $p = .006$  suggesting that as educational background of officers got higher, so too did their satisfaction with the compensation package.

## **18.15 Officer Satisfaction, Motivation, Physical & Welfare & Well-Being**


### **18.15.1 Satisfaction with Current Job**

18.15.1.2 *Taking everything into account, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your present job?*

18.15.1.3 Officers were asked to rate their level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their current job. On a positive side, over sixty percent of them (64%) said that they were “*very satisfied/satisfied*”. This is a good proportion of the TTPS’ officers with this result. A further 24% said that they were “*neither satisfied/nor*

*dissatisfied*". However, 12% said that they were "very dissatisfied" or "dissatisfied". See [Figure 67](#). The analysis by gender did not show any major differences.

**Figure 67: Satisfaction with Current Job**



18.15.1.4 It should be noted that when the analysis was done by ages of officers, a clear trend was seen. Firstly, in each of the age groups, the highest proportion of officers felt "very satisfied/satisfied" with their current job. Second, as the age groups got older, a higher percentage of officers felt "very satisfied/satisfied" with their job. See [Appendix 12:47](#).

18.15.1.5 The data revealed that higher proportions of higher ranked officers than lower ranked officers felt "very satisfied/satisfied" with their present job. In fact, while 87% of Inspectors-Assistant Commissioners of Police felt this way, 62% of Corporals-Sergeants and 56% of Constables gave this response.

18.15.1.6 How were the responses according to the number of years' officers spent on the job? There was a clear trend that showed that while almost eighty percent



(79%) of the officers who were at the TTPS for 31+ years were “*very satisfied/satisfied*” with their current job; the percentages were much lower for those spent lesser time at the TTPS (range: 52% to 62%).

18.15.1.7 Those officers who had a university education (68%) had the highest proportion who were “*very satisfied/satisfied*” in their current job when compared to those with O’ Levels (62%) and A’ Levels/Technical/Vocational (58%).

## **18.16 Officers’ Views on Systems, Policies and Other Issues**

### **18.16.1 Public Confidence in the TTPS**


18.16.1.2 *To what extent do you think the public has confidence in the TTPS?*

18.16.1.3 Public confidence in the police service is important for several reasons, for example, when such confidence is high, persons will feel more comfortable to provide information to the police. How do police officers see the level of public confidence in the TTPS? Almost fifty percent of them (47%) said they felt public confidence in them was “*very low*”. A further 35% said it was “*low*” and an additional 14% said there was “*no confidence at all*” in the police service. However, 4% of the officers said that there is “*high public confidence*” in the TTPS. See [Figure 68](#). This is an area where the TTPS must be able to build the public confidence in them as 96% held that the public had a negative view of the TTPS. The data according to gender did not produce any key differences.

18.16.1.4 When the data was looked at by age of officers, it showed that in each of the age groups, the highest proportion of officers (79% to 90%) said that the public has “*very low/low confidence*” in the TTPS. This is not a good thing. It’s good that the members of the TTPS recognize this but they must have an action plan to win back more public confidence. See [Appendix 12:48](#) for these figures. In

fact, there was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .194$ ,  $p < .001$

**Figure 68: Public Confidence in the TTPS (%)**



18.16.1.5 The data revealed that while almost eighty percent (78%) of the Constables felt that the public has “*very little confidence*” in the police, higher proportions of the Corporals-Sergeants (87%) and Inspectors-Assistant Commissioners of Police (88%) felt this way too. In fact, almost 20% of the Constables said the public has “*no confidence*” in the police. There was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .152$ ,  $p = .001$

18.16.1.6 There were mixed results when we examined the data of the number of years’ officers spent on the job and their view on the level of public confidence in the police service. The range of officers who said “*very little/little public confidence*” was from 76% to 86% - quite high. Further, the officers who spent the most years in the service (31+ years) had the lowest proportion who said there is “*no public confidence*” in the police (that is, 8%) while it was 12% to

25% for the other officers with lesser years' experience in the TTPS. There was a positive correlation between these two variables,  $r = .216$ ,  $p < .001$

18.16.1.7 There were similar proportions of officers from each of the educational background who said that the public confidence in the TTPS was “*very low/low*” (range: 81 to 82%).

## **18.16.2 System to Appoint a Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners of Police**


18.16.2.1 *Do you think the present system of appointing a Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners of Police is satisfactory?*

18.16.2.2 The data revealed that over eighty percent (84%) of the police officers felt that the current system to appoint the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners of Police is “*not satisfactory*” while 16% said it is “*satisfactory*”. See [Figure 69](#) below. This is, therefore, not a healthy feeling among the police population especially when it comes to appointing their four most senior officers.

18.16.2.3 When gender was looked at, we found that a higher proportion of males (86%) than females (79%) said they think the current system to appoint the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners of Police was “*not satisfactory*”.

18.16.2.4 Overall, for each of the age groups of police officers, the highest proportion of them said that the present system of appointing the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners of Police was “*not satisfactory*”. The range was from 75% to 87% of all age groups. Interestingly, the age group with the lowest percentage that said “not satisfied” was the youngest, that is, 21-30 years old with 75%.

**Figure 69: System to Appoint a Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners of Police**



18.16.2.4 When ranks of officers were looked at for this question, we found that the higher ranked officers had higher proportions that said the present system to appoint the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners of Police was “*not satisfactory*”. See [Appendix 12:49](#) for these trends.

18.16.2.5 The data showed that the vast majority of officers who spent the various number of years in the TTPS expressed that they were “*not satisfied*” with the current system of appointing the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners of Police. The percentages ranged from 76% to 90%. There was a negative correlation between these two variables,  $r = -.101$ ,  $p = .026$  meaning that as officers spent more years in the service increased, their satisfaction with the current system decreased.

18.16.2.6 According to the educational background of officers, between 83% and 89% of them from the various educational backgrounds were “*dissatisfied*” with the current system to appoint the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners of Police.

### **18.16.3 Suitability of One Association to Represent First and Second Division Officers**


18.16.3.1 *Do you think it is suitable to have one Association (TTPS Social and Welfare Association) representing both First Division and Second Division Officers?*

18.16.3.2 When police officers were asked how they felt about one Association (TTPSSWA) representing both First and Second Division officers, 60% said that it was “*very suitable/suitable*” in comparison to 40% who said “*very unsuitable/unsuitable*”. See [Figure 70](#). A further look at this is needed in terms of potential conflict of interests with one association representing senior and junior officers, etc.

18.16.3.3 A higher proportion of males (63%) than females (53%) said that it was “*very suitable/suitable*” with one Association representing both Divisions of officers. When ages of officers were looked at, it revealed that the highest proportion of officers in each group said that they found it “*very suitable/suitability*” for one Association to represent both Divisions of officers. In fact, the 21-30 years’ age group had the highest proportion that gave this response (67%).

18.16.3.4 While similar proportions of lower ranked officers said that it was “*very suitable/suitable*” for one Association to represent both First and Second Divisions officers, a much less proportion of the higher ranked officers felt this way. Further, it was very interesting that there was an almost an even split among the Inspectors-Assistant Commissioners of Police officers who found it suitable and not suitable. [Appendix 12:50](#) shows these very interesting findings.

**Figure 70: Suitability of One Association to Represent First and Second Division Officers (%)**



18.16.3.5 It was interesting to find out that while almost seventy percent (69%) of officers who spent less than 5 years in the service felt it was “*very suitable/suitable*” for one Association to be representing the two Divisions of police officers, much lesser proportions of officers who spent a longer time in the TTPS felt this way. See [Appendix 12:51](#).


18.16.3.6 While over fifty percent of officers from each of the three educational backgrounds said that they found one Association to represent both Divisions of officers to be “*very suitable/suitable*”, it was much higher for those with O’ Levels (64%) and University (61%) education than those with A’ Levels/Technical/Vocational (52%).

## 18.16.4 Entry and Promotion Processes in the TTPS

18.16.4.1 *How would you rate the entry and promotion processes in the TTPS?*

18.16.4.2 More than two-thirds (68%) of the police officers said that the entry and promotional processes in the TTPS were “very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory” while 32% said that they were “very satisfactory/satisfactory”. See [Figure 71](#). Again, this points to two critical areas (entry and promotion) in the policing system that should be urgently reviewed. No major differences in the responses between males and females were found. Likewise, responses were similar across all age groups.

**Figure 71: Entry and Promotion in the TTPS**



18.16.4.3 When rank of officers was looked at in relation to this question, while the highest proportions of officers from each rank said that they were “*very unsatisfied/unsatisfied*” with the entry and promotion processes in the TTPS, it was much higher for the Corporals-Sergeants. It’s interesting that the highest proportion came from these middle managers. [Appendix 12:52](#) shows these trends.

18.16.4.4 The data showed that officers from all of the number of years of experience in the TTPS said that the entry and promotion processes in the TTPS were “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*” with over sixty percent of each category. In fact, it was as high as 75% for those who had 6-10 years’ service and 72% of those with 31+ years.

18.16.4.5 Overall, there were not any major differences in how officers with various educational backgrounds rated the entry and promotion processes in the TTPS. Those saying the policies were “*very unsatisfactory/unsatisfactory*” by the various educational backgrounds were between 65% and 70%.

## 18.17 **Recommendations**

18.17.1 The following are some of the main recommendations based on the responses of the police officers.

- i. Increase the availability of resources such as tools, equipment, technology, etc. so that officers can perform their duties with greater efficiency and effectiveness.
- ii. Improve several policies and procedures in the TTPS that deal with Performance Appraisal, Promotion, etc.
- iii. Strengthen the internal communication system in the police service.
- iv. Institute systems to deal with several wrongs taking place such as abuse of sick, injury, and study leaves as well as corruption in the police service.
- v. Have a more transparent, fair and meritorious way to deploy officers to the various divisions, branches, sections, units, etc.



- vi. Adopt a more effective way to assign officers to the various work shift systems.
- vii. Build on the positive finding that officers have with their supervisors to deliver better policing to the public, e.g., in rolling out policies, etc.
- viii. Enable systems for the reduction in the amount of paper work that officers do on a daily basis with the introduction of the right technology, etc.
- ix. Re-examine the use and role of civilian staff in the police service to ensure that they have the impact that they were brought in for.
- x. Re-examine the Training and Development opportunities that currently exist in the TTPS to ensure that the right training is provided to the right officers across the board and that all officers are provided with continuous training while in the TTPS.
- xi. Take steps to amend the disciplinary process as many officers see it as poor.
- xii. The relevant authorities should review the process for appointing a Commissioner of Police as most officers are against the current system.
- xiii. Improve the compensation package as well as rewards and recognition practices in the TTPS.
- xiv. The relevant authorities should seriously consider the introduction of the use of non-lethal equipment in the TTPS.

- xv. Take into consideration several of the demographic factors like age, sex, education level and number of years in service when devising policies and strategies for manpower issues as all officers are not the same.

**SECTION 19:**  
**ANALYSIS OF STAKEHOLDER**  
**CONSULTATIONS**

# ANALYSIS OF STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS

## 19.1 Introduction

19.1.1 In light of the current socio-economic climate of Trinidad and Tobago, the Government has been making significant strides to ensure that it receives value for money in all its state apparatus. This is evident in the increased funding allocated to the Ministry of National Security and the TTPS as they seek to renew public's confidence in the Service and in its ability to secure the nation's borders. Despite continued emphasis on providing the tangible variables for the police to maintain law and order and public safety, stakeholder perception of the TTPS can have a direct impact on their performance as decreased trust by the public can result in a lack of support and damper officers' abilities to succeed and thrive in their fight against crime.

19.1.2 Having regard to the aforementioned and considering the number of Reports conducted on the TTPS since its inception, with intent to reform, the PMAC noted the importance of engaging stakeholders from varying sectors, as well as, soliciting buy-in on the Audit exercise. By this approach, the Committee intended to:

- i. obtain information on pertinent issues of relevance to the public;
- ii. solicit views on areas of reform in the TTPS;
- iii. facilitate the direct involvement of stakeholders in the conduct of the Audit; and
- iv. maintain an apolitical environment while engaging stakeholder.

19.1.3 Maxson, Hennigan and Sloane (2003)<sup>11</sup> further justify the argument that public perception has a direct correlation to Police performance, thus, solidifying the rationale to involve stakeholders as:

- a. public acceptance of police authority is essential to maintaining public order;
- b. public confidence in Police can lead to cooperation that is needed for effective policing;
- c. public support is crucial to maintaining and expanding police funding;
- d. public engagement fosters police-community partnerships that can be tailored to specific community concerns.

19.1.4 According to Johnson, King, Katz, Fox and Goulette (2008), effectively policing a democracy requires the cooperation and involvement of its citizens as the absence of citizen cooperation can lead to oppressive policing or police becoming ineffective agents of social control. Unfortunately, in Trinidad and Tobago, both outcomes are becoming evident. Thus, it is imperative to note that this scenario does not facilitate nation building and that strategic attempts must be taken to continually improve stakeholder perception of the TTPS in order to chart the way forward for the birth of a reformed Service.

## **19.2 Benefit of Stakeholder Consultations to the Manpower Audit Exercise**

19.2.1 The following benefits were derived from the stakeholder consultation process:

---

<sup>11</sup>Maxson, C., Hennigan, K. & Sloane (2003) *"Factors that Influence the Public Perception of Police"*, Research for Practice - National Institute for Justice, Office of Justice Programs, United States Department of Justice

1. provision of an avenue for numerous persons to be engaged in the exercise;
2. facilitated the Committee with access to critical information on the past experiences of others involved in similar projects;
3. supplied additional data outside the realm of the TTPS;
4. inclusion of diverse perspectives from crucial sectors and consideration of implications for policy initiatives or proposals to inform reform development;
5. fostered an environment that minimized the possibility of the Committee being blindsided by concerns that lacked clarity or on areas where they had insufficient knowledge;
6. strengthened the PMAC's positions on recommendations;
7. presented opportunities for further collaborations and the formalization of existing connections;
8. gave organizations an opportunity to express challenges facing their institutions;
9. increased the credibility of the Audit by ensuring transparency and accountability in the process;
10. improved the PMAC's chances for the success of their effort.

### **19.3 Description of Stakeholders**

- 19.3.1 Over the period March to August, 2017, the PMAC engaged a total of eighty (80) individuals as highlighted below:

- i. seventeen (17) persons in One on One Interviews;
- ii. sixty-three (63) representatives from thirty-five (35) Agencies;
- iii. fifty-seven (57) persons were located in Trinidad;
- iv. twenty-three (23) were from Tobago.


It should be noted that the PMAC held Stakeholder Consultations after August 31, 2017, however, those sessions are not included in this summary analysis.

19.3.2 These individuals are further classified as follows:

**Table 39: Stakeholder Classification by Number of Individuals**

<b>Classification</b>	<b>No. of Individuals</b>
TTPS	15
Public Officials: Trinidad	12
Public Officials: Tobago	12
Other Law Enforcement Agencies	13
Business Sector: Trinidad	10
Business Sector: Tobago	11
Prominent Citizens	7

**Figure 72: Stakeholder Classification by Number of Individuals**




19.3.4 For the purpose of analysis, the stakeholders were grouped into six (6) categories:

**Table 40: Stakeholder Categories**

Category	No. of Individuals
TTPS	15
Other Law Enforcement Agencies	13
Public Officials – Trinidad	12
Business Sector – Trinidad	10
Prominent Citizens	7
Organizations in Tobago*	36

*\* All organizations in Tobago with the exception of the representatives from the TTPS were engaged through an open consultation meeting.*

**Figure 73: Stakeholder Categories by Individuals (%)**





## 19.4 Description of the Six (6) Categories

- i. **TTPS:** representatives of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, namely, the Commissioner of Police (Ag.), Officers of the Tobago Division, Representatives from the Social and Welfare Association, Homicide Bureau and Police Standards Bureau and the Provost, Police Academy;
- ii. **Other Law Enforcement Agencies:** Organizations that exists to maintain law and order, advise and educate on laws that impact public safety, border control and intelligence gathering in Trinidad and Tobago. These include the Customs and Excise Division, Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service, Immigration Division, Strategic Services Agency (SSA), and the Office of Law Enforcement and Policy (OLEP);
- iii. **Public Officials:** holders of public office with roles in governance, criminal justice, judiciary, police oversight and management, forensic science and local municipalities. These office holders comprise of the Minister in the Ministry of the Attorney General and Legal Affairs, Chief Secretary, Tobago House of Assembly (THA), Members of the Opposition, Chief Magistrate (former), Director of Public Prosecution, Chairman, Police Service Commission (PSC), Director, Police Complaints Authority (PCA), Representatives from the Forensic Science and the Ministry of Rural Development and Local Government;
- iv. **Business Sector – Trinidad:** representatives from Chambers of Commerce in Trinidad. They are the Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Industry and Commerce, the American Chamber of Commerce of Trinidad and Tobago, Chaguanas Chamber of Industry and Commerce and the Couva Point Lisas Chamber of Commerce;

- v. **Prominent Citizens:** former holders of public office in the areas of police oversight and management, governance, security management and policing. These persons are: Dr. Kenneth R. Lalla, SC. CMT, Mr. Basdeo Panday, Mr. Overand Padmore, Mr. Gary Griffith, Mr. Trevor Paul, Mr. Everal Snaggs, Mr. James Philbert and Mr. Clive Dottin;
  
- vi. **Organizations in Tobago:** an amalgamation of the public office holders and the Business Sector in Tobago. Representatives were from the following agencies: Tobago House of Assembly (THA), Minority Party – THA, Airports Authority of Trinidad and Tobago, Tobago Emergency Management Authority (TEMA), Port Authority of Trinidad and Tobago, Eco-Industrial Development Company of Trinidad and Tobago, Citizens Security Programme, Comprehensive Economic Development Plan, Pigeon Point Board, Tobago Chamber of Commerce, the Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Industry and Commerce, All Tobago Fisherfolk Association, Tobago Hotel and Tourism Institute, Tobago Hospitality and Tourism Association and the Tobago Lawyers Association.

## **19.5 Limitations of the PMAC’s Stakeholder Categories**

- 19.5.1 Due to the enormity of the exercise and the Committee’s desire to maximise on attaining as much ground work as possible in the allotted time frame, they were unable to consult with persons from the following groups:
  - a. **Non-Governmental Organizations and Community based Groups:** these organizations are critical as they share certain interests in the community;

- b. **Local Councils:** City, Borough and Regional Corporations play an active role in community development and partnering with law enforcement agencies;
- c. **Religious Organizations:** these entities are key in educating the public on social evils and instilling moral values;
- d. **Media:** the media plays a pivotal role in educating the population. A significant portion of public perception of the police, crime problems and reactions to crime are cultivated by these communications.

## 19.6 Overview of Consultations

19.6.1 According to Harriott (2000)<sup>12</sup>, the TTPS, like their other counterparts of the Caribbean, have struggled to maintain the confidence of the public and surveys conducted by MORI International in Trinidad and Tobago in 2003<sup>13</sup> and 2005<sup>14</sup> highlight that the general public view the police service as inefficient, corrupt and brutal. Responses from the participants reinforced these theses as they revealed remarkable parallels in stakeholder's perceptions of the TTPS and crime. The majority of the stakeholders agreed that the Police Service or any other singular agency cannot effectively tackle the scourge of crime and unlawful behaviour in Trinidad and Tobago. It was continually reiterated that the adoption of a holistic approach at a micro and macro level by all entities of the society will go a long way in putting a dent in the propensity to fall on the wrong side of the law. It is recommended that this holistic approach include

---

<sup>12</sup> Harriot, A. (2000). *Police and crime control in Jamaica: Problems of reforming ex-colonial constabularies*. Barbados: University of the West Indies Press.

<sup>13</sup> Market and Opinion Research International (2003, December) *Opinion Leaders Panel 2003: Wave 3 Report*. Research conducted for the Government of Trinidad and Tobago.

<sup>14</sup> Market and Opinion Research International (2005, April) *Opinion Leaders Panel 2005: Wave 5 Report 1*. Research conducted for the Government of Trinidad and Tobago.

structured input from, but not limited to, the family, the education system/school and religious organizations. Additionally, the need for an increase in established voluntary partnerships between the TTPS and agencies was cited as a possible avenue to tremendously strengthen the efforts of the Service.

19.6.2 Having regard to the aforementioned, the general consensus of those interviewed was that a radical change must occur for the TTPS to attain its full potential. This reform must come from within and the Government/Ministry of National Security, as well as, the Executive of the Service must be willing to undergo serious introspection and amputate or resuscitate any element that impairs or can improve its efficiency. This principle is supported by the Government's policy on a "*Whole of Government Approach to Crime*"; however, two (2) years into administration, there appears to be little evidence to support the implementation of such.

19.6.3 Despite some participants being daunted by other attempts to reform the TTPS, overall, stakeholders were appreciative of the opportunity to contribute to making Trinidad and Tobago a better country.

## 19.7 Methodology

19.7.1 The Stakeholder Consultation process was conducted in two (2) phases utilizing the undermentioned approaches:

- i. **Open Consultation:** various groups were invited to a meeting to discuss matters related to the TTPS that affect their organizations and offer suggestions to the PMAC for improvement and Police reform. This method was utilized in Tobago as the Committee was based in Trinidad and the continuing challenges with the air and sea bridge posed

significant problems to conducting a series of targeted interviews on the sister isle;

- ii. **Targeted Interviews:** the PMAC identified questions from the areas of interests relevant to the participant's engagement with the TTPS and varying themes pertinent to the Audit. It should be noted that two (2) targeted interviews were conducted in Tobago;

### **19.7.2 Phase One**

19.7.2.1 This occurred during the month of March 2017 and involved interactions with thirty-two (32) persons as follows:

- a. **Targeted Interviews:** eighteen (18)
  - sixteen (16) interviews in Trinidad: 29 individuals
  - two (2) interviews in Tobago: 3 individuals
- b. **Open Consultation:** One (1)
  - forum with a record of eighteen (18) agencies and twenty-one (21) participants.

### **19.7.3 Phase Two**

19.7.3.1 Phase two was conducted over the period June to August 2017 in Trinidad and saw the PMAC engaging twenty-five (25) individuals through seventeen (17) targeted interviews.

19.7.3.2 It should be noted that the Commissioner of Police, TTPS, and the TTPSSWA, were the only two (2) groups engaged in both phases of the Consultations.

## **19.8 Stakeholder Listing**

19.8.1 Recommendations were forwarded for discussions by the Committee and a list was generated and subsequently prioritized. After consensus by the PMAC, contact was made with each entity and a proposed date and time was identified for the consultation. This contact was initiated through telephone message, electronic mail and a formal letter.

## **19.9 Guiding Themes for the Consultations**

19.9.1 The interviews and open consultations were guided by the undermentioned structural headings and their emerging subthemes:

i. **Manpower Utilization and Strength of the TTPS:**

- manpower: is the strength adequate or is it a matter of quality?
- recruitment and training
- allocation of manpower;
- utilization of SRPs
- Municipal Police
- civilianization of the TTPS
- Overtime and Leave
- staff morale/attitude/dress
- organizational culture
- recruitment at First Division
- clarity of roles
- detection rate

ii. **Systems and Process:**

- lack of resources / maintenance of facilities / finance /equipment / vehicles/ technology

- extra duty allowance
  - abuse of overtime and leave
- iii. **Community Policing and Partnership:**
- external assistance
  - inter-agency collaboration
  - relations with the community
  - community policing as a role of police
  - high visibility
- iv. **Governance and Disciplinary Structure / Public Confidence / Consultations:**
- disciplinary action, performance appraisals and promotions
  - legislative/administrative framework
  - management/leadership/supervision of Officers
  - appointment of a Commissioner of Police
  - Civilian Oversight Body
  - corruption and integrity
  - knowledge of judicial procedures

## **19.10 Limitations to the Process**

19.10.1 Though the listing's scope was comprehensive, the Committee was limited by a number of factors:

- i. Though the Cabinet decision of January 05, 2017, noted that the Ministry of National Security would provide the PMAC with the necessary budgetary allocations for the exercise, an approved budget was granted to the Committee following the decision of Cabinet on April 12, 2017;

- ii. The Committee's members are all employed on a full time basis, as such, there was never a full complement at any given consultation;
- iii. The Committee's Implementation was fully operational by May 01, 2017, however, they were also tasked with completing other critical elements of the Audit exercise, thus there was a limited amount of persons to glean from to host the sessions;
- iv. The Implementation Team was established for the period April 01 to July 31, 2017, resulting in the PMAC working under rigid conditions;
- v. Challenges with the air and sea bridge stymied the Committee's ability to hold more meetings in Tobago;
- vi. The Committee was unable to engage the Tobago Stakeholders in one-on-one interviews;
- vii. The Open Consultation did not allow each individual / organization present to address matters related to the TTPS that directly affect them;
- viii. All groups/individuals present at the Open Consultation did not indicate their presence on the register, as such; the Committee's attendance record of the event does not highlight all persons present.

## **19.11 Data Analysis – Findings by Categories**

19.11.1 This section seeks to highlight the responses of the six (6) stakeholder categories and form some preliminary analysis of same:

### **19.11.2 Stakeholder Categories:**

- a. TTPS
- b. Other Law Enforcement Agencies
- c. Key Public Officials



- d. Business Sector – Trinidad
- e. Prominent and Former High-level Officials
- f. Organizations in Tobago


**19.12 Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS)**

19.12.1 The responses of the engaged persons in the TTPS on the Structural Headings are highlighted as follows:


**Table 41: Structural Headings and Responses – TTPS**

<b>Structural Headings</b>	<b>Response</b>
Manpower Utilization and Strength of the TTPS	18
Systems and Process	8
Community Policing and Partnerships	17
Governance and Disciplinary Structure/Public Confidence/Consultations	15

**Figure 74: Structural Headings and Responses – TTPS**



**Figure 75: Structural Headings by Percentage (%) – TTPS**



## **19.12.2 Synopsis of Responses**

### **19.12.2.1 Manpower Utilization and Strength of the TTPS:**

- i. once the TTPS attains its sanctioned strength, it would have the required manpower to effectively perform its duties;
- ii. the TTPS is desirous of recruiting more trainees, however, it is constrained by finances and accommodation;
- iii. the allocation of manpower is influenced by a range of factors – political expediency (e.g., setting up of Police Posts and Units), spikes in crime in different localities, extra duty requests;
- iv. there is no methodology to determine how officers are deployed;
- v. Officers are given ample opportunities for training, however, the TTPS is constrained by budgetary cuts;
- vi. the TTPS is plagued by officers who do not possess the desire to make Policing their career. This is evident in attitude and dress;

- vii. No comments were made on recruitment at the First Division and civilianization of the TTPS can only occur once funds are available for hiring;
- viii. The role of Municipal Police and other Supplemental Policing entities must be revisited;
- ix. When new units are created, no additional officers are assigned to replace the lost strength;
- x. Many Part-Time SRP officers do not report for months on end;
- xi. Middle management in Tobago is ineffective;
- xii. SRPs are not meeting the standards, thus, absorption is not the solution;
- xiii. Officers do not receive adequate training in the duties of the rank above their substantive before they are promoted;
- xiv. Field Training Officers are assigned to Recruits to mentor them over a period of three (3) months prior to them passing out of the Academy;
- xv. Training Priority is based on the immediate needs/contemporary issues/and political climate, e.g., Children Court Project, Criminal Procedure Act, Cyber Security, Dealing with LBGT persons, etc.;
- xvi. Explore recruitment at middle management similar to the Commissioned Officer Model of the TTDF;
- xvii. Review skill bank of the TTPs and match academic qualification to duties;
- xviii. SRP is supposed to function as police support;
- xix. In the instance of a fatal police shooting, a FDO is immediately assigned to the investigation and the PSB provides oversight to the process;
- xx. PSB Structure not approved by Cabinet but operates under authorization of the Commissioner of Police;

- xxi. When a matter is forwarded to the TTPS subject to a Commission of Inquiry, etc., the TTPS has to go and conduct their own investigations

#### **19.12.2.2 Systems and Processes**

- i. the officers engaged felt that the TTPS suffered from a lack of resources and that there were insufficient funds to address acquisition/maintenance of resources;
- ii. abuse of Overtime and Sick Leave needs to be addressed;
- iii. there is no methodology in the TTPS to mitigate the abuse of Overtime and Sick Leave;
- iv. there is room for improvement in the Systems and Processes of the TTPS;
- v. the TTPS has technology for distance learning in Tobago, however, there is lack of trained personnel in Tobago to facilitate same;
- vi. Research conducted by the Police Academy on Cohort June 2013 to December 2014;
- vii. Development of a Quality Assurance Examination Section of the Police Academy;
- viii. Need for more classrooms at the Academy to support international partners

#### **19.12.2.3 Community Policing and Partnerships**

- i. the TTPS has favourable relationships with other law enforcement agencies though most of it is facilitated through relationships;
- ii. positives of community policing were noted, e.g., Police Youth Clubs, etc.;
- iii. Hot Spot Policing allows the TTPS to build relations with the community;

- iv. The Bicycle Patrol was noted as an outstanding initiative in Tobago;
- v. Collaborate with the Government of the United States of America for training in the areas of/from the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Anti-Terrorism, Narcotics, Information Technology, Leadership Management and Commander based training;
- vi. Training provided by Franklin University of the United States of America (USA) through ROYTEC, University of the West Indies (UWI), in Forensic Examination;
- vii. The Police Academy provides training for the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) through the Regional Counter Drug Intelligence Training School;
- viii. Engage the National Training Academy (NTA) for training;
- ix. Persons involved in a Commission of Inquiry, etc., may be reluctant to provide the TTPS with evidence for their investigation as they would have already done so to the Commission

#### **19.12.2.4 Governance, Disciplinary Structure, Public Confidence & Consultations**

- i. The TTPS has a good working relationship with the PCA and the PSC;
- ii. The Executive of the TTPS keeps Officers engaged in the direction of the organization;
- iii. The Strategic Plan of the TTPS is developed following input from varying Ranks and is actively reviewed on an annual basis through an Operational Plan;
- iv. More can be done to strengthen public confidence;
- v. The Public often has unrealistic expectations of the TTPS;
- vi. Regular Town Meetings are held in Police Divisions;

- vii. Weekly Press Conferences are held to update the population on matters of policing;
- viii. TTPS issues daily Media Releases to update the public on developing involving the Police;
- ix. Officers are aware of their Role and have an excellent grasp of judicial procedures;
- x. Performance Appraisals is behavioural and remedial and has an influence on training at the Police Academy;
- xi. Intelligence is critical to regaining public's trust;
- xii. Review Police Regulations;
- xiii. The role of the Police Inspectorate and the Police Service Commission (PSC) should not overlap;
- xiv. The PCA has more powers, by virtue of their Act, to get information from institutions that the PSB of the TTPS;
- xv. PSB is the Police Liaison for the PCA;
- xvi. Misbehaviour in Public Office is the most prevailing investigation by the PSB, TTPS;

### **19.12.3 Synopsis of TTPS' Response Ratings**

19.12.3.1 Below is a synopsis of the TTPS' Stakeholder Responses by Ratings – positive/negative/mixed and neutral:

#### **19.12.3.2 Positive**

- 1. Officers are allowed to embark on training relevant to their area of function/personal development;
- 2. The TTPS has a favourable relationship with other law enforcement agencies
- 3. Hot Spot Policing
- 4. Community Policing initiatives;

5. Management, Leadership and Supervision of the TTPS was strong, however, there is room for improvement
6. Officers had a great grasp and knowledge of judicial procedures
7. The TTPS has a good relationship with the PCA and PSC
8. Bicycle Patrol Unit in Tobago
9. Officers are engaged in the strategic direction of the organization and give input to the strategic plan
10. Strategic Plan is revisited each year through an Operational Plan
11. Attempts are made to improve public confidence through town meetings, advertisements, weekly press conferences, etc.
12. Regular Town Meetings are held in Police Divisions
13. Officers are aware of their Role and have an excellent grasp of judicial procedures
14. Field Training Officers are assigned to Recruits to mentor them over a period of three (3) months prior to them passing out of the Academy
15. Training Priority is based on the immediate needs/contemporary issues/and political climate
16. Collaborations with foreign and local institutions for the provision of training
17. Police Academy provides training for CARICOM through the Regional Counter Drug Intelligence Training School
18. Performance Appraisals is behavioural and remedial and has an influence on training at the Police Academy
19. Intelligence is critical to regaining public's trust
20. PSB is the Police Liaison for the PCA
21. Research conducted by the Police Academy on Cohort June 2013 to December 2014
22. In the instance of a fatal Police Shooting, a FDO is immediately assigned to the investigation and the PSB provides oversight to the process

### 19.12.3.3 Negative

1. Budgetary cuts prevent the TTPS from acquiring and maintaining necessary equipment, recruiting new Officers, providing more opportunities for training, offering appropriate remuneration for persons with specialist skills requires by the Service
2. Too many Officers do not see Policing as a career
3. The Public often has unrealistic expectations of the TTPS
4. The TTPS is often blamed for the failings of other agencies in law enforcement, e.g., Customs & Excise Division, Immigration Division, Forensic Science Centre, etc.
5. Allocation of Officers is influenced by ad-hoc variables
6. Many Officers abuse Overtime and Sick Leave
7. No approach to address abuse of Overtime and Sick Leave
8. Engagement with other law enforcement agencies are facilitated through relationships and not from a national strategy approach
9. Public confidence in the TTPS is low
10. When new units are created, no additional officers are assigned to replace the lost strength
11. Many Part-Time SRP officers do not report for months on end
12. Middle management in Tobago is ineffective
13. SRPs are not meeting the standards, thus, absorption is not the solution
14. Officers do not receive adequate training in the duties of the Rank above their substantive before they are promoted
15. The PCA has more powers, by virtue of their Act, to get information from institutions that the PSB of the TTPS
16. TTPS has technology for distance learning in Tobago, however, there is lack of trained personnel in Tobago to facilitate same
17. PSB Structure not approved by Cabinet but operates under authorization of the Commissioner of Police



18. Misbehaviour in Public Office is the most prevailing investigation by the PSB, TTPS
19. When a matter is forwarded to the TTPS subject to a Commission of Inquiry, etc., the TTPS has to go and conduct their own investigations
20. Persons involved in a Commission of Inquiry, etc., may be reluctant to provide the TTPS with evidence for their investigation as they would have already done so to the Commission

#### 19.12.3.4 **Mixed**

1. The role of the Municipal Police with the TTPS
2. Perceived corruption of the TTPS
3. Detection rate of the TTPS
4. Change in Organizational Culture;

#### 19.12.3.5 **Neutral**


1. Recruitment at the First Division
2. Civilianization of the TTPS
3. Appointment of a Commissioner of Police
4. Abuse of Overtime and Sick Leave needs to be strategically addressed
5. There is room for improvement in the Systems and Processes of the TTPS
6. Explore recruitment at middle management similar to the Commissioned Officer Model of the TTDF
7. Review skill bank of the TTPS and match academic qualification to duties
8. SRP is supposed to function as Police Support
9. Development of a Quality Assurance Examination Section of the Police Academy

### 19.12.3.6 Synopsis of Stakeholder Response Ratings Analysis

**Table 42: Ratings by Percentage (%) – TTPS**

Rating	Frequency of Response	Percentage (%)
Positive	22	40
Negative	20	37
Mixed	4	7
Neutral	9	16

**Figure 76: Ratings by Percentage (%) - TTPS**



### 19.12.3.7 Additional Matters Raised by TTPS

- i. the Police Academy is currently moving towards accreditation status by the Accreditation Council of Trinidad and Tobago ;

- ii. Areas for Research:
  - a. Persons exposed to the training in the following methods: 16 months, 6 months, and SRP absorption;
  - b. Comparative Study on Pre-service vs. In-service Recruitment;
- iii. The PSB currently does not have Cabinet approval but has approval under the Commissioner of Police. The TTPS was in the process of approaching Cabinet for the relevant authority to approve the PSB's structure, however, the intent of government (past and present) to grant the PCA more powers forced the TTPS to halt its process, lest their proposal to Cabinet had overlaps with the increased role of the PCA.

#### **19.12.3.8 Recommendations Given by the TTPS**

- i. Increase the manpower strength of Regular Police in Tobago;
- ii. Increase strength of Stations in Tobago Division;
- iii. Develop a Policy to mitigate abuse of Overtime and Sick Leave;
- iv. Creation of a Medical Board for the TTPS to deal with the backlog of persons waiting to be seen by the current Board;
- v. Training for supervisory ranks while serving in lower ranks;

#### **19.13 Other Law Enforcement Agencies**

19.13.1 The undermentioned highlights the views expressed by the Officials of other Law Enforcement Agencies, namely:

- a. Strategic Services Agency (SSA)
- b. Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service
- c. Customs and Excise Division
- d. Immigration Division


- e. Office of Law Enforcement (OLEP), Ministry of National Security

19.13.2 The responses of the engaged persons from Other Law Enforcement Agencies on the Structural Headings are highlighted as follows:


**Table 43: Structural Headings & Responses – Other Law Enforcement Agencies**

Structural Headings	Response
Manpower Utilization and Strength of the TTPS	11
Systems and Process	3
Community Policing and Partnerships	11
Governance and Disciplinary Structure/Public Confidence/Consultations	13

**Figure 77: Structural Headings & Responses – Other Law Enforcement Agencies**



**Figure 78: Structural Headings by Percentage (%) – Other Law Enforcement Agencies**



### 19.13.3 Synopsis of Responses

#### 19.13.3.1 Manpower Utilization and Strength of the TTPS

- i. The adequacy of the TTPS' strength would be determined by the needs of the population;
- ii. Some agencies felt that the manpower strength of the TTPS was adequate while others felt it was inadequate;
- iii. Room for merger of Units in the TTPS;
- iv. Issues of training should be addressed on a regular basis, e.g., what skills are being developed as Officers go through the Ranks?
- v. The Police Academy should expand its scope beyond the recruitment of Constables;
- vi. The issue isn't adequacy of manpower but management of same;

- vii. Superior subordinate relationships within the TTPS are ill defined;
- viii. Recruit at the lowest level of the First Division;
- ix. Pluralisation of policing occurs as there are multiple agencies performing traditional policing functions, e.g., Municipal Police, Praedial Larceny, Traffic Wardens, etc.;
- x. There is greater propensity for SRPs to be deviant;
- xi. Change in the organizational culture of the TTPS is required;

### **19.13.3.2 Systems and Processes**

- i. lack of an Automated Finger Printing Identification System in the TTPS;
- ii. Technology has left the TTPS behind;
- iii. Is there a system/inventory in place to manage the TTPS' fleet of vehicles, equipment and tools (e.g., bulletproof vests, firearms, etc.), hardware and software;

### **19.13.3.3 Community Policing and Partnerships**

- i. Inter-agency collaboration exists; however, same occurs on a level of familiarity;
- ii. the TTPS does not have an Automated Finger Printing Identification System, however, the Immigration Division does. Immigration Division allows the TTPS to utilize their system and there is now information sharing between the Criminal Investigations Department (CID), TTPS, and Immigration in this area;
- iii. intelligence among law enforcement agencies is not willingly shared as there are issues of turf and trust;
- iv. trust is eroded when shared intelligence ends up in the public domain or is not followed up;
- v. need for a single point of contact (SSA was recommended) for intelligence sharing;

- vi. need for structured protocols for Police Officers who are seconded to other law enforcement agencies;
- vii. due to the role of varying law enforcement agencies and the legislations that govern their operations, certain areas of responsibility may overlap between them and the TTPS. This overlap often creates friction as several jurisdictions are crossed when dealing with serious crime;
- viii. the TTPS may request the use of equipment from other law enforcement agencies but may not request the provision of their services to improve policing;
- ix. simple meetings of inter-agencies to plan for the safety of the country becomes public knowledge and the date and time given over varying social media platforms, along with the names of the persons attending the meetings;
- x. collaborate with the Police Academy for the provision of training to entities under its remit;
- xi. following successful collaborations with the TTPS, the publicised story often gives praise to the Police, however, many times the intelligence leading to the success story comes from another law enforcement agency;

**19.13.3.4 Governance, Disciplinary Structure, Public Confidence & Consultations:**

- i. A review of all legislation pertaining to Public Safety needs to take place;
- ii. Public perception of the TTPS is critical to their operations and to law enforcement on a whole;
- iii. Public perception of the TTPS was low;
- iv. There was a perception of corruption within the TTPS;

- v. There was an opinion that Police Officers exist behind each criminal activity in Trinidad and Tobago as public corruption was at the centre of gravity of crime not narcotics as is commonly believed;
- vi. Some agencies noted that they have intelligence to support the TTPS substituting arresting offenders in return for the retrieval of firearms;
- vii. There is evidence to support under reporting of crime by citizens;
- viii. Integrity testing of the entire TTPS should be done regularly and at random intervals;
- ix. The TTPS should move away from the Performance Appraisal System and utilize a Performance Management System;
- x. There appears to be lack of leadership in the TTPS;
- xi. Conclusions to investigations and actions/recommendations must occur after the investigations to recapture public confidence;
- xii. There is need for a robustly legislated Police Inspectorate;
- xiii. The PSC does not have a sophisticated understanding of the TTPS' operations to hold wrongdoers accountable and often has to rely on information given to it by the Service, often through persuasion, to achieve its duties;

#### **19.13.4 Synopsis of Other Law Enforcement Agencies Response Ratings**

19.13.4.1 Below is a synopsis of stakeholder responses by ratings:

##### **19.13.4.2 Positive**

- i. Inter-agency collaboration exists
- ii. Immigration Division allows the TTPS to utilize their Automated Finger Printing Identification System and there is information sharing between the CID, TTPS and Immigration in this area
- iii. OLEP collaborates with the Police Academy for the provision of training to entities under its remit



### 19.13.4.3 Negative

- i. Superior subordinate relationships within the TTPS are ill defined
- ii. The issue isn't adequacy of manpower but management of same
- iii. Pluralisation of policing occurs as there are multiple agencies performing traditional policing functions, e.g., Municipal Police, Praedial Larceny, Traffic Wardens, etc.
- iv. Lack of an Automated Finger Printing Identification System in the TTPS
- v. Technology has left the TTPS behind
- vi. Inter-agency collaboration exists is based on familiarity
- vii. Intelligence among law enforcement agencies is not willingly shared as there are issues of turf and trust
- viii. Trust is eroded when shared intelligence ends up in the public domain or is not followed up
- ix. Duplicity in legislative role of agencies resulting in friction as several jurisdictions are crossed when dealing with serious crime
- x. Simple meetings of inter-agencies to plan for the safety of the country becomes public knowledge and the date and time given over varying social media platforms, along with the names of the persons attending the meetings
- xi. Following successful collaborations with the TTPS, the publicised story often gives praise to the Police, however, many times the intelligence leading to the success story comes from another law enforcement agency
- xii. Public perception of the TTPS was low
- xiii. The PSC does not have a sophisticated understanding of the TTPS' operations to hold wrongdoers accountable and often has to rely on information given to it by the Service, often through persuasion, to achieve its duties
- xiv. There is evidence to support under reporting of crime by citizens

- xv. There was a perception of corruption within the TTPS
- xvi. TTPS may request the use of equipment from other law enforcement agencies but may not request the provision of their services to improve policing

#### **19.13.4.4 Mixed**

- i. Some agencies felt that the manpower strength of the TTPS was adequate while others felt it was inadequate
- ii. There is greater propensity for SRPs to be deviant
- iii. There appears to be lack of leadership in the TTPS
- iv. Some agencies noted that they have intelligence to support the TTPS substituting arresting offenders in return for the retrieval of firearms
- v. There was an opinion that Police Officers exist behind each criminal activity in Trinidad and Tobago as public corruption was at the centre of gravity of crime not narcotics as is commonly believed

#### **19.13.4.5 Neutral**

- i. Change in the organizational culture of the TTPS is required
- ii. The adequacy of the TTPS' strength would be determined by the needs of the population
- iii. Is there a system/inventory in place to manage the TTPS' fleet of vehicles, equipment and tools (e.g., bulletproof vests, firearms, etc.), hardware and software
- iv. Room for merger of Units in the TTPS
- v. Recruit at the lowest level of the First Division
- vi. The Police Academy should expand its scope beyond the recruitment of Constables


- vii. Need for a single point of contact (SSA was recommended) for intelligence sharing
- viii. Need for structured protocols for Police Officers who are seconded to other law enforcement agencies
- ix. Issues of training should be addressed on a regular basis, e.g., what skills are being developed as Officers go through the Ranks?
- x. Review of all legislation pertaining to Public Safety needs to take place
- xi. Public perception of the TTPS is critical to their operations and to law enforcement on a whole
- xii. Integrity testing of the entire TTPS should be done regularly and at random intervals
- xiii. The TTPS should move away from the Performance Appraisal System and utilize a Performance Management System
- xiv. Conclusions to investigations and actions/recommendations must occur after the investigations to recapture public confidence
- xv. There is need for a robustly legislated Police Inspectorate

### 19.13.5 Synopsis of Stakeholder Response Ratings Analysis

**Table 44: Ratings by Percentage (%) – Other Law Enforcement Agencies**

<b>Rating</b>	<b>Frequency of Response</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Positive	3	8
Negative	16	41
Mixed	5	13
Neutral	15	38

**Figure 79: Ratings by Percentage (%) – Other Law Enforcement Agencies**



#### **19.13.6 Additional Matters Raised by Law Enforcement Agencies**

- i. Immigration Division does not have the requisite manpower to achieve its mandate;
- ii. Review and amend the Immigration Act;
- iii. The Chief Immigration Officer should have a seat at the National Security Council as they Immigration Division is primarily tasked with border protection;
- iv. Improvements to the Immigration Detention Centre (IDC);
- v. Provision under the law for Immigration Officers to carry arms and for their vehicles to have sirens. At present, Immigration Officers often have to transport detainees from the IDC in Ariepo to various Courts throughout Trinidad and doing such in traffic jams, etc., is a risk to the Officers and the unsuspecting public;
- vi. Increase in manpower required for the Customs and Excise Division as the sanctioned strength is 600, however, the actual staffing complement is approximately 235 Officers;

- vii. There is a need for Specialist Officers in Customs;
- viii. The Courier Industry needs to be regulated so that there can be more stringent checks and balances;
- ix. The collapse of Chemistry Food and Drugs has given rise to food fraud and the Division does not have the capacity to determine whether imported food products are legitimate or not;
- x. Analytical Laboratory required;
- xi. Amendments required to the Customs Act;
- xii. The Commissioner of Prison should be included in the National Security Council as the Prison Service is responsible for detention and rehabilitation of criminals;
- xiii. Need for greater understanding and respect by Police Officers to Prison Service Officers;
- xiv. Review and amendment to the Prisons Act;
- xv. Development of a Post Imprisonment Programme to address issues of reintegration;
- xvi. Implementation of Drug Rehabilitation and Behaviour Modification Programmes in the nation's Prisons;
- xvii. Prioritization of Prison Reform;
- xviii. Creation of Prison institution in Tobago as the lack of such a facility often leads to the contamination of Tobagonian offenders in Trinidad while incarcerated;
- xix. Reintroduction of the Morning Report between Officers of the TTPS and Prison Service when handling prisoners to and from the Prison

#### **19.13.7 Recommendations Given by Other Law Enforcement Agencies**

- i. Inter-agency collaborations should be formalized through legislation and Memorandum of Understandings;
- ii. There is room for structured intelligence sharing in Trinidad and Tobago;

- iii. Commerce, education and other aspects of life cannot take place in an unstable environment, as such, a whole of government approach is required to return Trinidad and Tobago to a form of normalcy. Until this is achieved, the cost of crime would not be reduced;
- iv. Patrols should be driven by strategic, operational and tactical intelligence;
- v. The PSC should be given the teeth required for it to be effective;
- vi. Explore collaboration between the TTPS and Customs to complement the Customs Marine Unit;
- vii. Further development of the spectrum under the Proceeds of Crime Act regarding imports and exports;
- viii. The role of national security agencies need to be strengthened in Trinidad and Tobago and on a regional level;
- ix. Customs and Excise Division should have a separate management system from the Service Commission as they role differs from the wider public service. Their role is revenue collection and law enforcement/national security;
- x. Recognise input from other law enforcement agencies;
- xi. TTPS should provide feedback to law enforcement agencies that share intelligence with them so that they would know if the information was helpful, etc.;
- xii. Greater protocols in the handing and taking over of prisoners between the TTPS and the Prison Service;
- xiii. Greater opportunities for collaborated training between law enforcement agencies;
- xiv. More severe penalties for attacking a Law Enforcement Officer

## 19.14 Public Officials

19.14.1 The views expressed by the undermentioned Public Officials engaged in Consultations are highlighted in this section:


- a. The Honourable Fitzgerald Hinds, Minister in the Ministry of the Attorney General and Legal Affairs;
- b. The Honourable Mr. Kelvin Charles, Chief Secretary, Tobago House of Assembly (THA)
- c. Senator Wade Mark – Opposition;
- d. Mr. Rodney Charles, M.P. – Opposition;
- e. Mr. Roger Gaspard, SC. – Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP);
- f. Mrs. Marcia Ayers-Caesar – former Chief Magistrate;
- g. Dr. Maria Therese Gomes – Chairman, Police Service Commission (PSC);
- h. Mr. David West – Director, Police Complaints Authority (PCA);
- i. Ms. Arlette Lewis – Director, Forensic Science Centre;
- j. Mr. Glen Parmessar – Deputy Director, Forensic Science Centre;
- k. Mr. Peter Richards – Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Rural Development and Local Government;
- l. Mr. Motilal Ramsingh – Chief Executive Officer, Mayaro Rio Claro Regional Corporation;
- m. Mr. Churchill Pacheco – Inspector (Ag.), Municipal Police, Mayaro Rio Claro Regional Corporation

**19.14.2 Summary of Cumulative Responses by Structural Headings**

**Table 45: Structural Headings & Responses – Public Officials**


<b>Structural Headings</b>	<b>Response</b>
Manpower Utilization and Strength of the TTPS	29
Systems and Process	22
Community Policing and Partnerships	8
Governance, Disciplinary Structure / Public Confidence / Consultations	26

**Figure 80: Structural Headings & Responses – Public Officials**





**Figure 81: Structural Headings by Percentage (%) – Public Officials**



### **19.14.3 Synopsis of Responses**

#### **19.14.3.1 Manpower Utilization and Strength of the TTPS**

- i. The Municipal Police can relieve the TTPS of some in their duties in public offices, e.g., Guarding Court Houses, Government Buildings, etc.;
- ii. Possible merger of supplemental policing units under the Municipal Police to allow for two main policing groups – TTPS and Municipal Police. The supplemental policing units in question are: Estate Police, Environmental Police Unit, Traffic Wardens, Praedial Larceny, etc.;
- iii. Police Officers many times do not communicate to the public via their attitude that they are ‘friends of the citizenry’;

- iv. The Police Recruit comes out of the society that is broken. This impacts on the standard of recruit, attitude of the potential officer, etc.;
- v. Recruitment process of the TTPS is flawed;
- vi. The TTPS often functions like a fraternity;
- vii. Acting for long periods facilitates the loss of authority that can be wielded;
- viii. The Special Reserve Police (SRP) is often used as a platform to enter the TTPS through the '*back door*';
- ix. The organizational culture of the TTPS needs to change;
- x. Officers are not always assigned to specialist units on competence and mentorship;
- xi. Issue isn't adequacy of manpower but of management;
- xii. Greater reliance should be placed on scientific evidence and manpower to a lower extent;
- xiii. Officers need to work smart;
- xiv. SRPs are often expected to function as Regular Police, however, they are not trained to as such;
- xv. In house training of SRPs can be seen as a euphemism of on-the-job training;
- xvi. Need for improvements in the fingerprint evidence submitted by the TTPS;
- xvii. The TTPS lacks requisite experience in complex legal matters;
- xviii. Improvements to the Witness Protection Program will improve Police Detection Rate;
- xix. Irregularity in Officers attending Court and there appears to be a lack of ambition, unwillingness to learn, and to take advantage of the experience of the Court;
- xx. Absence of Officers at Court result in dismissals / adjournments, settling of matter in favour of the person before the Court, order of Summons for Complainants by the Court and not the Police, etc.;

- xxi. Bicycle Police in Tobago was noted as exception;
- xxii. Expansion of the use of undercover Police Officers and utilize Officers from Trinidad in Tobago and vice versa, to mitigate family relation issues and familiarity with communities;
- xxiii. Transferring of Tobago Police to Trinidad to allow for some level of anonymity, vice versa;
- xxiv. Requires not only job skill compatibility but job attitude compatibility;
- xxv. Merger of similar units as there is an overabundance of institutional arrangements (disparate units);
- xxvi. Greater use of Supervisory Leadership Training;
- xxvii. Identify an alternative manner of training and career development of Officers;
- xxviii. Women taking over the TTPS and this may pose a challenge in the future;
- xxix. Lengthen recruitment process for persons who may not have met the basis requirements for entry into the Service;
- xxx. Recruit into the First Division as all skills are required at this level;
- xxxi. TTPS too dependent on SRP;
- xxxii. No incentive for Officers to venture into Specialist Units;
- xxxiii. Different types of crime require different methods of policing;
- xxxiv. Raise entry requirements of the TTPS to an Associate Degree;
- xxxv. Eliminate Contract employment of specialist professionals in the TTPS and hire same on a permanent level;
- xxxvi. Reintroduction of the Police Marine Unit;
- xxxvii. Develop a White Collar Crime and Forensic Capability in the Service

### **19.14.3.2 Systems and Processes**

- i. Not enough emphasis is placed on the presentation of files to the Office of the DPP and the PCA;
- ii. Implementation of more non Use of Force tools by the TTPS, e.g., Pepper Sprays, Tasers, etc.;
- iii. Acquisition of Body Cameras in all Divisions;
- iv. Abuse of Sick Leave is an issue in the TTPS;
- v. Vetting aspect of the TTPS should be more stringent;
- vi. Need for the implementation of standards and measures in the areas of DNA and Fingerprinting Evidence;
- vii. The Administration System of the TTPS is contaminated;
- viii. Review of the Performance Appraisal System;
- ix. Lands identified in Tobago for kennels for the Canine Division however concerns were noted;
- x. Status of CCTV Cameras and maintenance;
- xi. Development of a robust safety and security infrastructure that utilizes a holistic approach;
- xii. Establishment of physical fitness standards for all Officers;
- xiii. Human Resource structure weak;
- xiv. Implementation of stipulated limited for Overtime;
- xv. Establishment of a Firearms Retrieval Program;
- xvi. Development and implementation of a Police Response Time;

### **19.14.3.3 Community Policing and Partnerships**

- i. There is a need for greater policing presence in communities;
- ii. Greater collaboration should occur between the TTPS and the Municipal Police to allow for transfer of knowledge and information;

- iii. TTPS can work with the Regional Corporations, especially those in the rural areas, when they are conducting works in communities as contractors are often bullied by miscreants;
- iv. Municipal Police can assist the TTPS in reaching communities and building relationships with burgesses;
- v. Quality of interactions between the TTPS and PCA depends on the maturity of the Police Officer working with the PCA Investigator;
- vi. The TTPS can be obstructionist in investigations of the PCA;
- vii. Establishment of formal protocol for interactions between the TTPS and the PCA;
- viii. The Professional Standards Bureau (PSB), TTPS, has an excellent relationship with the PCA;
- ix. SRP interaction with the public leaves much to be desired;
- x. Backlogs at the Forensic Science Centre hamstrings prosecution;
- xi. Community Policing was noted as one of the areas of success for the TTPS, especially their Heart and Minds Programme;
- xii. Community Policing should not be the mandate of a specialist unit but the role of all Officers;
- xiii. Bicycle Police in Tobago was noted as exception;
- xiv. Preventative role of the TTPS extends beyond Youth Cubs and some include wholesome alternative activities for youth;
- xv. Greater collaborations between schools, community groups, faith based organizations and the TTPS;
- xvi. Link Education System and Police Career Development. There is a need for professionals in the TTPS in the areas of Health, Economics, Education, Criminal Justice and Law

#### **19.14.3.4 Governance, Disciplinary Structure, Public Confidence & Consultations:**

- i. Citizens are underreporting crimes;
- ii. Citizens' complaints on Police Officers often reflect an abuse of powers;
- iii. There is evidence to support Police Officers being in cohorts with criminal elements;
- iv. The TTPS Social and Welfare Association should not be the representative body for both First and Second Division Officers;
- v. Police Complaints Authority Act should be amended to:
  1. grant the PCA prosecutorial powers;
  2. allow the PCA to be at a crime scene at least four (4) hours after to mitigate the number of allegations by the public on the Police;
- vi. The Statute of Limitations as noted in the Summary Offences Act places constraints on the investigations of the PCA as the Authority many times does not get information in a timely manner;
- vii. The current legislative framework is difficult as the PCA must rely on a third party in the execution of its duties;
- viii. The public often times cannot identify Operational Units of the TTPS as their uniforms do not bear regimental numbers;
- ix. The appointment of a Commissioner of Police is critical as the current situation provides a window for political interference, undermines the authority of the Acting Commissioner of Police and affects moral of the Officers;
- x. The Association's interests significantly affects the ability of the TTPS to achieve its mandate;
- xi. Public perception is that serious crimes has not decreased as reported by the TTPS;
- xii. Public confidence in the TTPS is low;

- xiii. Performance appraisals are not done effectively;
- xiv. Fractured leadership at the helm of the TTPS;
- xv. Reform legislation regarding Minor Offences;
- xvi. Process of appointing a Commissioner of Police is too cumbersome and convoluted;
- xvii. Need for a robust, independent oversight body for the TTPS;
- xviii. Promotions is a recurring issue;
- xix. TTPS being called upon to be a policy maker, implementer and executioner. This is unfair and places excessive and unnecessary strain on the leadership of the Service;
- xx. Need for a Strategic Development Plan to govern the Police Service;
- xxi. TTPS is viewed as a political tool for the government of the day;

#### **19.14.4 Synopsis of Public Officials Response Ratings**

**19.14.4.1** Below is a synopsis of stakeholder responses by ratings:

##### **19.14.4.2 Positive**

- i. Bicycle Police in Tobago
- ii. Professional Standards Bureau (PSB), TTPS, has an excellent relationship with the PCA
- iii. Community Policing

##### **19.14.4.3 Negative**

- i. Police Officers many times do not communicate to the public via their attitude that they are ‘friends of the citizenry’
- ii. The standard of a Police Recruit is impacted by the broken society
- iii. Recruitment process of the TTPS is flawed

- iv. TTPS often functions like a fraternity
- v. Acting for long periods facilitates the loss of authority
- vi. SRP is often used as a platform to enter the TTPS through the ‘*back door*’
- vii. Officers are not always assigned to specialist units on competence and mentorship
- viii. Issue isn’t adequacy of manpower but of management
- ix. SRPs are often expected to function as Regular Police
- x. In house training of SRPs can be seen as a euphemism of on-the-job training
- xi. TTPS lacks requisite experience in complex legal matters
- xii. Irregularity/Absence of Officers attending Court
- xiii. Too dependent on SRPs
- xiv. No incentive for Officers to venture into Specialist Units
- xv. Not enough emphasis is placed on the presentation of files to the Office of the DPP and the PCA
- xvi. Abuse of Sick Leave is an issue in the TTPS
- xvii. Administration System of the TTPS is contaminated
- xviii. Human Resource structure weak
- xix. Quality of interactions between the TTPS and PCA depends on the maturity of the Police Officer working with the PCA Investigator
- xx. TTPS can be obstructionist in investigations of the PCA
- xxi. SRP interaction with the public leaves much to be desired
- xxii. Backlogs at the Forensic Science Centre hamstrings prosecution
- xxiii. Citizens are underreporting crimes
- xxiv. Citizens’ complaints on Police Officers often reflect an abuse of powers
- xxv. Evidence to support Police Officers being in cohorts with criminal elements



- xxvi. Statute of Limitations as noted in the Summary Offences Act places constraints on the investigations of the PCA as the Authority many times does not get information in a timely manner
- xxvii. Current legislative framework is difficult as the PCA must rely on a third party in the execution of its duties
- xxviii. Public confidence in the TTPS is low
- xxix. Association's interests significantly affects the ability of the TTPS to achieve its mandate
- xxx. Performance appraisals are not done effectively
- xxxi. Fractured leadership at the helm of the TTPS
- xxxii. Promotions is a recurring issue
- xxxiii. TTPS being called upon to be a policy maker, implementer and executioner. This is unfair and places excessive and unnecessary strain on the leadership of the Service
- xxxiv. TTPS is viewed as a political tool for the government of the day
- xxxv. Public often times cannot identify Operational Units of the TTPS
- xxxvi. Public perception is that serious crimes has not decreased as reported by the TTPS
- xxxvii. Process of appointing a Commissioner of Police is too cumbersome and convoluted

#### **19.14.4.4 Mixed**

- i. Women taking over the TTPS and this may pose a challenge in the future
- ii. Lengthen recruitment process for persons who may not have met the basis requirements for entry into the Service
- iii. Status of CCTV Cameras and maintenance
- iv. Lands identified in Tobago for kernels for the Canine Division however concerns were noted

- v. TTPS Social and Welfare Association should not be the representative body for both First and Second Division Officers

#### **19.14.4.5 Neutral**

- i. Officers need to work SMART
- ii. Greater use of Supervisory Leadership Training
- iii. Requires not only job skill compatibility but job attitude compatibility
- iv. Need for improvements in the fingerprint evidence
- v. Greater reliance on scientific evidence
- vi. Identify an alternative manner of training and career development
- vii. Different types of crime require different methods of policing
- viii. Eliminate Contract employment of specialist professionals in the TTPS and hire same on a permanent level
- ix. Reintroduction of the Police Marine Unit
- x. Implementation of more non Use of Force tools
- xi. Vetting aspect of the TTPS should be more stringent
- xii. Need for the implementation of standards and measures in the areas of DNA and Fingerprinting Evidence
- xiii. Review of the Performance Appraisal System
- xiv. There is a need for greater policing presence in communities
- xv. Merger of similar units
- xvi. Reform legislation regarding Minor Offences
- xvii. Need for a Strategic Development Plan to govern the Police Service
- xviii. Police Complaints Authority Act should be amended
- xix. Organizational culture of the TTPS needs to change
- xx. Municipal Police can relieve the TTPS of some in their duties
- xxi. Merger of supplemental policing units under the Municipal Police to allow for two main policing groups – TTPS and Municipal Police
- xxii. Improvements to the Witness Protection Program will improve Police Detection Rate

- xxiii. Expansion of the use of undercover Police Officers
- xxiv. Recruit into the First Division
- xxv. Raise entry requirements of the TTPS to an Associate Degree
- xxvi. Development of a robust safety and security infrastructure that utilizes a holistic approach
- xxvii. Develop a White Collar Crime and Forensic Capability in the Service
- xxviii. Acquisition of Body Cameras in all Divisions
- xxix. Establishment of physical fitness standards for all Officers
- xxx. Implementation of stipulated limited for Overtime
- xxxi. Establishment of a Firearms Retrieval Program
- xxxii. Development and implementation of a Police Response Time
- xxxiii. Greater collaboration should occur between the TTPS and the Municipal Police to allow for transfer of knowledge and information
- xxxiv. Work with the Regional Corporations
- xxxv. Municipal Police can assist the TTPS in reaching communities and building relationships with burgesses
- xxxvi. Establishment of formal protocol for interactions between the TTPS and the PCA
- xxxvii. Preventative role of the TTPS extends beyond Youth Cubs and should include wholesome alternative activities for youth
- xxxviii. Greater collaborations between schools, community groups, faith based organizations and the TTPS
- xxxix. Link Education System and Police Career Development
- xl. Appointment of a Commissioner of Police is critical
- xli. Need for a robust, independent oversight body for the TTPS


19.14.5

Synopsis of Stakeholder Response Ratings Analysis

*Table 46: Ratings by Percentage (%) – Public Officials*

Rating	Frequency of Response	Percentage (%)
Positive	3	3%
Negative	37	43%
Mixed	5	6%
Neutral	41	48%

*Figure 82: Ratings by Percentage (%) – Public Officials*



### **19.14.6 Additional Matters Raised by Public Officials**

19.14.6.1 Additional matters were raised by the Public Officials interviewed in the Consultations are noted below:

- i. There is currently no training in Trinidad and Tobago for Investigators and discussions have been held with the University of Trinidad and Tobago (UTT) to develop a program. This program will be beneficial to statutory bodies, e.g., Environmental Management Authority (EMA), PCA, etc.;
- ii. Witnesses' expectations of the Witness Protection Program is often unrealistic;
- iii. Review of the Witness Protection Program with regard to the length of time one can remain on the program;
- iv. Delays in the Judiciary is caused by insufficient number of Magistrates and Judges, galloping state of crime, inadequacies at the Forensic Science Centre, etc.;
- v. Governments when creating/removing laws must ensure there is sufficient measures in place to support same;
- vi. Increase in manpower at the Office of the DPP;
- vii. Review of the salaries at the Office of the DPP to make it more comparative to the Magistrate and Ministry of the Attorney General and Legal Affairs;
- viii. The crime situation has outgrown the Legal Aid and Legal Advisory Board as not enough Attorneys at Legal Aid are dealing with criminal defence work;
- ix. Need for a Public Defence Office;
- x. The Office of the DPP should have its own budget as it's expected to be independent of the Executive;

### **19.14.7 Recommendations Given by Public Officials**

- i. Development of a Diploma/Degree program for Investigators at the UTT with a duration of six (6) months to one (1) year;
- ii. Possible merger of supplemental policing units under the Municipal Police to allow for two main policing groups – TTPS and Municipal Police;
- iii. Review and Audit of the Witness Protection Program;
- iv. Establishment of the DNA Databank to assist the TTPS in maintaining standards and measures regarding DNA Profiles;
- v. Establishment of a Public Defender Office similar to that of the United States of America;
- vi. Review of the Performance Appraisal System of the TTPS;
- vii. Greater visibility of Police in communities;
- viii. Revisit manner in which Legal Officers in the TTPS are utilized;
- ix. Revisit the structure of Police Press Conferences and explore avenues to make same more effective;
- x. Development of a robust safety and security infrastructure that utilizes a holistic approach;
- xi. Restructure the entry requirements of the TTPS to allow for three streams:
  - a. Officer entry
  - b. Career professional – IT, forensic, etc.
  - c. Island scholars

### **19.15 Business Sector – Trinidad**

19.15.1 The views expressed by the undermentioned representatives of the Chambers of Commerce engaged in Consultations:

- a. American Chamber of Commerce Trinidad and Tobago (AMCHAM T&T):


- Mr. Ravi Suryadevara – President
  - Ms. Aurelia Bruce – Research Officer
- b. Chaguanas Chamber of Industry and Commerce:
- Mr. Richie Sookhai
  - Mr. Vishnu Charran
  - Mr. Z. Ali
- c. Couva Point Lisas Chamber of Commerce:
- Mr. Ramchand Rajbal Maraj – 1<sup>st</sup> President
  - Mr. Mukesh Ramsingh – 2<sup>nd</sup> President
- d. Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Industry and Commerce:
- Mr. Robert Trestrail – President
  - Mr. Gabriel Faria – Chief Executive Officer
  - Mr. Andrew Johnson – Attorney at Law and Member

### 19.15.2 Summary of Cumulative Responses by Structural Headings


**Table 47: Structural Headings & Quantity of Responses – Business Sector (Trinidad)**

Structural Headings	Quantity of Response
Manpower Utilization and Strength of the TTPS	29
Systems and Process	20
Community Policing and Partnerships	11
Governance, Disciplinary Structure /Public Confidence / Consultations	11

**Figure 83: Structural Headings & Quantity of Responses – Business Sector (Trinidad)**



**Figure 84: Structural Headings by Percentage (%) – Business Sector (Trinidad)**





## **19.16 Synopsis of Response**

### **19.16.1 Manpower Utilization and Strength of the TTPS**

- i. Manpower strength of the TTPS is adequate, the issue is one of management;
- ii. Abuse of Leave affects the manpower strength of the TTPS;
- iii. Rogue elements, administrative duties, leave, suspensions, Band and sporting duties all affect manpower strength. The remainder are dealing with policing;
- iv. Despite scepticism, the efforts made to utilize manpower is appreciated;
- v. Two Officers are not required for Patrols – use one officer with a properly equipped vehicle;
- vi. Productivity, quality of output and cost benefit factor must be considered in utilizing manpower;
- vii. Issue of SRPs in Tobago was noted;
- viii. Tobago is understaffed;
- ix. Use civilians to address administrative matters so that Police can do policing;
- x. SRPs seem to be committing most of the misdemeanours;
- xi. Explore what duties of the TTPS can be assigned to other agencies;
- xii. Significant number is lost in the transfer of capacity at sea;
- xiii. Organizational structure of the TTPS requires review in regard to making the Service more decentralized, job description, etc.;
- xiv. Civilianization of the TTPS;
- xv. Police are not equipped to deal with the changing dynamics of communities in Trinidad and Tobago;
- xvi. Regular Police patrols on the country's coastline as there are undocumented instances of illegal entry and exit;
- xvii. Human resource deployment is inefficient thus Officers are overburdened and overworked;
- xviii. Officers in supervisory positions/ranks should have management training;

- xix. Financial planning services should be offered to Officers;
- xx. Senior Superintendents at Divisions are changed too frequently, therefore, no meaningful relationships can be built with the community;
- xxi. Officers condone offenses such as illegal street vending through their continued non-action;
- xxii. Patrolling with blue lights acts as an alert mechanism for those engaging in or planning to engage in criminality;
- xxiii. Excessively bright lights are a distraction for the motoring public, especially at night;
- xxiv. Court takes manpower away from core policing functions;
- xxv. Organizational culture of the TTPS needs to be addressed;
- xxvi. The Financial Investigations Bureau (FIB) is understaffed;
- xxvii. Road blocks are disruptive to the business;
- xxviii. South Trinidad is severely neglected;
- xxix. Continuous training;

### **19.16.2 Systems and Processes**

- i. Develop strategic measures to address abuse of leave;
- ii. Need for transparency in accounting for expenditure;
- iii. Need for responsibility and accountability;
- iv. Lack of working vehicles impede Police ability to perform duties;
- v. Repairs/maintenance of vehicles at the Vehicle Management Company of Trinidad and Tobago (VMCOTT) takes too long;
- vi. Development and implementation of a continuing Police Health and Fitness Program after leaving the Academy;
- vii. The TTPS has enough finances to meet their needs;
- viii. Greater attention should be placed on asset deployment and strategic, intelligence based asset utilization;

- ix. Greater use of integrated technology systems with the TTPS and other law enforcement agencies;
- x. Implementation of Body and Dashboard Cameras throughout the Service;
- xi. Greater use of forensic evidence and proper evidence gathering techniques
- xii. Investigative techniques need to be improved;
- xiii. Continuous drug and psychological evaluations for Officers;
- xiv. No value for money in the TTPS;
- xv. Human Resource System needs an overhaul;
- xvi. Use of KPI's, incentives, disincentives as motivators for Officers;
- xvii. Design systems to protect Police data;
- xviii. Implementation of an effective Performance Appraisal System;
- xix. Improve monitoring and evaluation of Officers and initiatives of the TTPS;
- xx. Automated HR Management System;

### **19.16.3 Community Policing and Partnerships**

- i. Need for a Special Naval Unit comprised of Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard and TTPS;
- ii. Chambers indicated their willingness to help the TTPS;
- iii. Lack of collaboration between State Agencies and the TTPS in the development of communities, e.g., HDC and TTPS in the establishment of a new housing development, etc;
- iv. Community policing should be to the forefront of the TTPS;
- v. Greater emphasis should be placed on Police Youth Groups;
- vi. Whole of Government approach to crime;
- vii. Use of Municipal Police will bring relief to TTPS;
- viii. TTPS should indicate their needs to Chambers/Business Sector so that they can assist accordingly;
- ix. Police should hold regular meetings with community groups/business groups, etc., so that Town Meetings can be adequately promoted;

- x. Monthly meetings under the auspices of the City, Borough and Regional Corporations should be held with the TTPS;
- xi. Law enforcement agencies function like silos;

#### **19.16.4 Governance, Disciplinary Structure, Public Confidence & Consultations**

- i. TTPS has a preventative responsibility;
- ii. Impact of crime on the economy must be studied and addressed;
- iii. Audit function must rest outside of the Executive of the TTPS;
- iv. Need for legislation to address unjust enrichment;
- v. There should be a mechanism that allows for the Board of Inland Revenue to be informed when a person purchases luxury items, e.g., if an individual purchases a Porsche, the system will be trigger to investigate and identify whether the person has been paying taxes;
- vi. Integrity Act is not effective;
- vii. The PSC has limited resources;
- viii. The Judiciary should be truly independent;
- ix. All Service Commissions should be abolished;
- x. Revisit the legal framework of the Commissioner of Police;
- xi. The perception that there is a reduction in serious crime is not realistic;
- xii. Lack of confidence in the Police Service;
- xiii. Leadership of the organization is critical;
- xiv. Lack of response by Police or “no shows” impact on public confidence;
- xv. Concerted efforts required for Public Relations;
- xvi. Town Meetings need to be effectively advertised;
- xvii. Benchmarking of Police performance;
- xviii. Disciplinary procedures and policies fall short due to bureaucracy;
- xix. Acting appointment of the Commissioner of Police assists in eroding public confidence;

- xx. The public believes that the TTPS is unwilling or incapable with addressing White Collar Crime;
- xxi. Civil oversight and public procurement is necessary;

### **19.16.5 Synopsis of Business Sector (Trinidad) Response Ratings**

19.16.5.1 Below is a synopsis of stakeholder responses by ratings:

#### **19.16.5.2 Positive**

- i. Manpower strength adequate
- ii. Efforts to utilize manpower of Officers is appreciated
- iii. Civilianization of the TTPS
- iv. Chambers indicated their willingness to help the TTPS

#### **19.16.5.3 Negative**

- i. Issue is management (quality) and not quantity
- ii. Too many factors impede available manpower strength
- iii. Complaints of SRPs in Tobago
- iv. Tobago Division is understaffed
- v. SRPs seem to be committing most of the misdemeanours involving Police
- vi. Significant number is lost in the transfer of capacity at sea
- vii. Police are not equipped to deal with changing dynamics of the country
- viii. Human resource deployment is inefficient thus Officers are overburdened and overworked
- ix. The Financial Investigations Bureau (FIB) is understaffed
- x. South Trinidad is severely neglected
- xi. Lack of working vehicles impede Police ability to perform duties

- xii. Repairs/maintenance of vehicles at the Vehicle Management Company of Trinidad and Tobago (VMCOTT) takes too long
- xiii. No value for money in the TTPS
- xiv. Human Resource System needs an overhaul
- xv. Lack of collaboration between State Agencies and the TTPS
- xvi. Law enforcement agencies function like silos
- xvii. The PSC has limited resources
- xviii. The perception that there is a reduction in serious crime is not realistic
- xix. Lack of confidence in the Police Service
- xx. Lack of response by Police or “no shows” impact on public confidence
- xxi. Acting appointment of the Commissioner of Police assists in eroding public confidence
- xxii. Town Meetings need to be effectively advertised

#### **19.16.5.4 Mixed**

- i. The TTPS has enough finances to meet their needs
- ii. There should be a mechanism that allows for the Board of Inland Revenue to be informed when a person purchases luxury items
- iii. Integrity Act is not effective
- iv. The Judiciary should be truly independent
- v. All Service Commissions should be abolished
- vi. Revisit the legal framework of the Commissioner of Police
- vii. Concerted efforts required for Public Relations
- viii. Disciplinary procedures and policies fall short due to bureaucracy
- ix. Public believes that the TTPS is unwilling or incapable with addressing White Collar Crime

#### **19.16.5.5 Neutral**

- i. Utilize manpower efficiently
- ii. Productivity, quality of output and cost benefit factor must be considered in utilizing manpower
- iii. Use civilians to perform administrative duties
- iv. Explore what duties can be assigned to other agencies
- v. Review organizational structure of TTPS
- vi. Regular coastal patrols
- vii. Continuous training
- viii. Officers in supervisory positions/ranks should have management training
- ix. Develop strategic measures to address abuse of leave
- x. Need for transparency in accounting for expenditure
- xi. Need for responsibility and accountability
- xii. Development and implementation of a continuing Police Health and Fitness Program after leaving the Academy
- xiii. Greater attention should be placed on asset deployment and strategic, intelligence based asset utilization
- xiv. Greater use of integrated technology systems with the TTPS and other law enforcement agencies
- xv. Implementation of Body and Dashboard Cameras throughout the Service
- xvi. Greater use of forensic evidence and proper evidence gathering techniques
- xvii. Investigative techniques need to be improved
- xviii. Continuous drug and psychological evaluations for Officers
- xix. Use of KPI's, incentives, disincentives as motivators for Officers
- xx. Design systems to protect Police data
- xxi. Implementation of an effective Performance Appraisal System

- xxii. Improve monitoring and evaluation of Officers and initiatives of the TTPS
- xxiii. Greater emphasis should be placed on Police Youth Groups
- xxiv. Police should hold regular meetings with community groups/business groups, etc., so that Town Meetings can be adequately promoted
- xxv. Monthly meetings under the auspices of the City, Borough and Regional Corporations should be held with the TTPS
- xxvi. Impact of crime on the economy must be studied and addressed
- xxvii. Audit function must rest outside of the Executive of the TTPS
- xxviii. Need for legislation to address unjust enrichment
- xxix. Benchmarking of Police performance
- xxx. Financial planning services should be offered to Officers
- xxxi. Community policing should be to the forefront of the TTPS
- xxxii. Whole of Government approach to crime
- xxxiii. Use of Municipal Police will bring relief to TTPS
- xxxiv. TTPS should indicate their needs to Chambers/Business Sector so that they can assist accordingly
- xxxv. TTPS has a preventative responsibility
- xxxvi. Leadership of the organization is critical
- xxxvii. Civil oversight and public procurement is necessary
- xxxviii. Acquisition and implementation of an Automated HR Management System
- xxxix. Need for a Special Naval Unit comprised of Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard and TTPS




### 19.16.5.6 Synopsis of Stakeholder Response Ratings Analysis

**Table 48: Ratings by Percentage (%) – Business Sector**

<b>Ratings</b>	<b>Response</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Positive	4	4
Negative	27	31
Mixed	9	10
Neutral	48	55

**Figure 85: Ratings by Percentage (%) – Business Sector**



### 19.16.5.7 Recommendations Given by Public Officials

- i. Civilianization of the TTPS;
- ii. Routine maintenance of Police vehicles;
- iii. Provision of more vehicles to Officers;
- iv. Change in attitude and behaviour of Officers;
- v. Officers should respect their uniform;

- vi. Show more respect to citizens;
- vii. Greater interaction with community members;
- viii. Greater use of Municipal Police;
- ix. Porous borders need to be addressed;
- x. Automation, accumulation and storage of data that informs management of the Service;
- xi. Integration of HR data available to the Minister of National Security to inform vacation leave, pre-retirement leave, manpower available, etc.;
- xii. Merge units that fulfil similar roles/duties;

## **19.17 Prominent Citizens**

19.17.1 This section highlights the views of Prominent Citizens of Trinidad and Tobago:


- a. Dr. Kenneth R. Lalla, SC. CMT – former Chairman, PSC;
- b. Mr. Basdeo Panday – former Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition;
- c. Mr. Overand Padmore – former Minister of National Security;
- d. Mr. Gary Griffith – former Minister of National Security;
- e. Mr. Trevor Paul – former Commissioner of Police, TTPS;
- f. Mr. Everaldo Snaggs – former Commissioner of Police, TTPS;
- g. Mr. James Philbert – former Commissioner of Police, TTPS;
- h. Mr. Clive Dottin – former Senator and Member of the PSC

### 19.17.2 Summary of Cumulative Responses by Structural Headings


**Table 49: Structural Headings & Responses – Prominent Citizens**

Structural Headings	Quantity of Response
Manpower Utilization and Strength of the TTPS	29
Systems and Process	22
Community Policing and Partnerships	8
Governance, Disciplinary Structure, Public Confidence & Consultations	26

**Figure 86: Structural Headings & Responses – Prominent Citizens**



**Figure 87: Structural Headings by Percentage (%) – Prominent Citizens**



### **19.17.3 Synopsis of Responses**

#### **19.17.3.1 Manpower Utilization and Strength of the TTPS:**

- i. The Officer must understand the law and his function;
- ii. Matter of management and not manpower;
- iii. Can the number of Officers before the Court be a variable of Recruitment or organizational culture?
- iv. No organizational change can occur unless there is a cultural change in the TTPS;
- v. Officers should not appear in public half dressed;
- vi. The desired Police Culture must be shaped through orientation at the Police Academy;
- vii. E999 Unit should be under the remit of the TTPS;
- viii. Increase in manpower is not the solution;
- ix. Recruit the right people and skill sets;
- x. Deployment of Officers must be in a scientific method;

- xi. Move away from the Police Station mentality;
- xii. Issues with SRP Training and Recruitment Requirements;
- xiii. Abuse of Sick Leave and Overtime affects manpower strength;
- xiv. Officers need to identify things that would help them on the job;
- xv. Officers not adequately trained for their assignments;
- xvi. Officers are hesitant to attend to Court duties while on vacation or other leave;
- xvii. Introduction of a Deputy Commissioner of Police for school discipline;
- xviii. Restructure and reengineer all intelligence units;
- xix. Targeted Tourism Policing for Tobago;

#### **19.17.3.2 Systems and Processes:**

- i. Policy perspective is critical and it's the only variable that allows the TTPS to use technology;
- ii. Data is important – qualitative mainly;
- iii. Research is important to provide the scientific methods and empirical evidence for feedback;
- iv. TTPS has more resources but less impact;
- v. Implement systems for qualitative change;
- vi. Mentors are too young and in some cases the trainees are older than the trainers;
- vii. TTPS is behind in technology;
- viii. TTPS must develop its own best practice;
- ix. Study the extent to which policing in the Caribbean impacts Trinidad and Tobago;
- x. Develop and implement a system to keep Officers motivated;
- xi. Development of an effective Performance Appraisal System;
- xii. Police cars should be so equipped that “station work” can be completed on patrol;

- xiii. One door policy – One TTPS;
- xiv. Explore option where citizens don't have to come to a Police Station to make a Report;
- xv. Explore the issue of Probation – on duty vs. off duty;
- xvi. Development and implementation of automated Station Diaries;
- xvii. Extra Duty borders on corruption;
- xviii. Revisit system of Recruitment;
- xix. Restructure Employee Assistance Programme (EAP);
- xx. Grief and Victimhood in the TTPS must be properly dealt with;
- xxi. Review the Witness Protection Programme;
- xxii. VMCOTT takes too long to repair vehicles;

#### **19.17.3.2 Community Policing and Partnerships**

- i. Escalations in crime must be dealt with on a holistic level;
- ii. Community involvement is necessary regardless of manpower strength;
- iii. Beyond the Tape has room for improvement;
- iv. Holistic approach to crime: TTPS, society, Government;
- v. Need for greater participation with the public, e.g., “*We Committees*”;
- vi. Community policing should not be limited to one Unit;
- vii. Manpower analysis of Police Youth Groups needed;
- viii. Targeted recruitment through schools;

#### **19.17.3.3 Governance, Disciplinary Structure, Public Confidence & Consultations**

- i. Constitutional comprehension is important;
- ii. The TTPS has had problems for years;
- iii. The PSC is supposed to protect the Police Service from political interference;

- iv. Political control is a direct issue in the procedure to appoint a Commissioner of Police;
- v. The psychological impact of the acting appointment on the current Commissioner of Police cannot be measured. How does he know if he's going forward or backward?
- vi. Lack of appointment of a Commissioner of Police demoralizes the Service;
- vii. The PSC should be both the manager and the employer;
- viii. The Chairman, PSC, has no powers at the moment;
- ix. The 2006 Amendment to the Police Act was not in the best interest of the country;
- x. Promotional Advisory Board, TTPS, is plagued with nepotism and favouritism;
- xi. Need for amendments to the Police Service Act;
- xii. TTPS must look at the needs of the society;
- xiii. It appears like the Commissioner of Police, TTPS, does not have the support of senior Officers;
- xiv. TTPS should conduct surveys on public opinion;
- xv. Lack of integrity displayed by Officers;
- xvi. Concerted efforts to maintain integrity at each Rank;
- xvii. Civilian oversight necessary;
- xviii. Officers are suspended for too long;
- xix. Reform must come from within the TTPS;
- xx. Perception of Police Corruption;
- xxi. Clear lines of demarcation must be maintained between juniors and seniors;
- xxii. Portrayal of Trinidad and Tobago as a war zone in international documentaries inhibits business, tourism and foreign investment;
- xxiii. Separate Association for First and Second Division;
- xxiv. Revisit Standing Orders and Compliance;
- xxv. Need for Constitutional Change;

xxvi. PSC not relevant;

#### **19.17.3.4 Synopsis of Prominent Citizens Response Ratings**

19.17.3.4.1 Below is a synopsis of stakeholder responses by ratings

##### **19.17.3.4.2 Positive**

- i. Beyond the Tape has room for improvement
- ii. Civilian oversight necessary

##### **19.17.3.4.3 Negative**

- i. Matter of management and not manpower
- ii. Abuse of Sick Leave and Overtime affects manpower strength
- iii. Issues with SRP Training and Recruitment Requirements
- iv. Officers not adequately trained for their assignments
- v. TTPS has more resources but less impact
- vi. TTPS is behind in technology
- vii. Extra Duty borders on corruption
- viii. VMCOTT takes too long to repair vehicles
- ix. The TTPS has had problems for years
- x. Political control is a direct issue in the procedure to appoint a Commissioner of Police
- xi. Lack of appointment of a Commissioner of Police demoralizes the Service
- xii. Promotional Advisory Board, TTPS, is plagued with nepotism and favouritism
- xiii. Lack of integrity displayed by Officers
- xiv. Officers are suspended for too long
- xv. Portrayal of Trinidad and Tobago as a war zone in international documentaries inhibits business, tourism and foreign investment
- xvi. Officers should not appear in public half dressed



#### **19.17.3.4.4 Mixed**

- i. Officers are hesitant to attend to Court duties while on vacation or other leave
- ii. The psychological impact of the acting appointment on the current Commissioner of Police cannot be measured
- iii. The 2006 Amendment to the Police Act was not in the best interest of the country
- iv. It appears like the Commissioner of Police, TTPS, does not have the support of senior Officers
- v. Perception of Police Corruption
- vi. Separate Association for First and Second Division
- vii. PSC not relevant
- viii. Introduction of a Deputy Commissioner of Police for school discipline

#### **19.17.3.4.5 Neutral**

- i. The Officer must understand the law and his function
- ii. Can the number of Officers before the Court be a variable of Recruitment or organizational culture?
- iii. No organizational change can occur unless there is a cultural change in the TTPS
- iv. The desired Police Culture must be shaped through orientation at the Police Academy
- v. E999 Unit should be under the remit of the TTPS
- vi. Increase in manpower is not the solution
- vii. Recruit the right people and skill sets
- viii. Deployment of Officers must be in a scientific method
- ix. Move away from the Police Station mentality
- x. Officers need to identify things that would help them on the job
- xi. Restructure and reengineer all intelligence units

- xii. Targeted Tourism Policing for Tobago
- xiii. Policy perspective is critical and it's the only variable that allows the TTPS to use technology
- xiv. Data is important – qualitative mainly
- xv. Research is important to provide the scientific methods and empirical evidence for feedback
- xvi. Implement systems for qualitative change
- xvii. Mentors are too young and in some cases the trainees are older than the trainers
- xviii. TTPS must develop its own best practice
- xix. Study the extent to which policing in the Caribbean impacts Trinidad and Tobago
- xx. Develop and implement a system to keep Officers motivated
- xxi. Development of an effective Performance Appraisal System
- xxii. Police cars should be so equipped that “station work” can be completed on patrol
- xxiii. One door policy – One TTPS
- xxiv. Explore option where citizens don't have to come to a Police Station to make a Report
- xxv. Explore the issue of Probation – on duty vs. off duty
- xxvi. Development and implementation of automated Station Diaries
- xxvii. Revisit system of Recruitment
- xxviii. Restructure Employee Assistance Programme (EAP)
- xxix. Grief and Victimhood in the TTPS must be properly dealt with
- xxx. Review the Witness Protection Programme
- xxxi. Escalations in crime must be dealt with on a holistic level
- xxxii. Community involvement is necessary regardless of manpower strength
- xxxiii. Holistic approach to crime: TTPS, Society, Government

- xxxiv. Need for greater participation with the public, e.g., “We Committees”
- xxxv. Community policing should not be limited to one Unit
- xxxvi. Manpower analysis of Police Youth Groups needed
- xxxvii. Targeted recruitment through schools
- xxxviii. Constitutional comprehension is important
- xxxix. The PSC is supposed to protect the Police Service from political interference
- xl. The PSC should be both the manager and the employer
- xli. Need for amendments to the Police Service Act
- xlii. TTPS must look at the needs of the society
- xliii. TTPS should conduct surveys on public opinion
- xliv. Concerted efforts to maintain integrity at each Rank
- xlv. Reform must come from within the TTPS
- xlvi. Clear lines of demarcation must be maintained between juniors and seniors
- xlvii. Revisit Standing Orders and Compliance
- xlviii. Need for Constitutional Change


#### 19.17.4 Synopsis of Stakeholder Response Ratings Analysis

19.17.4.1 Below is a synopsis of stakeholder responses by ratings

**Table 50: Ratings by Percentage (%) – Prominent Citizens**

Rating	Response	Percentage (%)
Positive	2	3
Negative	16	21
Mixed	8	11
Neutral	48	65

**Figure 88: Ratings by Percentage (%) – Prominent Citizens**



#### **19.17.5 Recommendations Given by Prominent Citizens**

- i. Improved management of the Police Service is necessary at all levels;
- ii. The Minister of National Security must understand his role in assessing the performance of the Commissioner of Police, TTPS;
- iii. To achieve good governance, all officers at the supervisory level must execute their supervisory functions with fairness;
- iv. Address issues in a scientific manner;
- v. Recruitment of specially skilled personnel;
- vi. TTPS must conduct introspection and brainstorm;
- vii. Greater compliance with rules, regulations and laws that govern police operations;
- viii. Commitment and passion of officers must be seen;
- ix. Greater use of CCTV with proper monitoring;
- x. Image Improvement Campaign;
- xi. Establishment of Police Community Councils;

- xii. Address corruption and integrity in the Service;
- xiii. Demarcation of Rank among Officers necessary for the proper functioning of the Service;
- xiv. Separate Associations for First and Second Divisions

## **19.18 Organizations in Tobago**

19.18.1 As indicated earlier, the PMAC was unable to register all the organization in Tobago that participated in the Open Consultation. Despite such, the undermentioned groups were noted:


- a. Officials of the Tobago House of Assembly (THA)
- b. Minority Party – THA
- c. Airports Authority of Trinidad and Tobago (AATT)
- d. Tobago Emergency Management Authority (TEMA)
- e. Port Authority of Trinidad and Tobago
- f. Eco-Industrial Development Company of Trinidad and Tobago
- g. Citizens Security Programme
- h. Comprehensive Economic Development Plan
- i. Pigeon Point Board
- j. Tobago Chamber of Commerce
- k. Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Industry and Commerce
- l. All Tobago Fisherfolk Association
- m. Tobago Hotel and Tourism Institute
- n. Tobago Hospitality and Tourism Association
- o. Tobago Lawyers Association.

## 19.18.2 Summary of Cumulative Responses by Structural Headings


*Table 51: Structural Headings & Responses – Tobago Stakeholders*

<b>Structural Headings</b>	<b>Response</b>
Manpower Utilization and Strength of the TTPS	15
Systems and Process	9
Community Policing and Partnerships	13
Governance, Disciplinary Structure, Public Confidence & Consultations	13

*Figure 89: Structural Headings & Responses – Tobago Stakeholders*



**Figure 90: Structural Headings by Percentage (%) – Tobago Stakeholders**



### **19.18.3 Synopsis of Responses**

#### **19.18.3.1 Manpower Utilization and Strength of the TTPS**

- i. Police Officers often display an attitude on the public;
- ii. Customer service is poor;
- iii. Officers insensitive to citizen's plights;
- iv. Difficulty in obtaining Bar License;
- v. Bicycle Patrols work well;
- vi. Police Officers often seen as 'smart men';
- vii. Lack of response from Police when reports are made;
- viii. Authorities not acting on information given to them;
- ix. Child Protection Unit was commended;
- x. Need for special Officer training in Victimology;
- xi. Lack of Crime Scene Investigations (CSI) training and awareness;
- xii. Enforce Police Dress Code ;
- xiii. Police do not take domestic offenses seriously;
- xiv. TTPS does not have a real sense of the crime problem;

- xv. Relationship between the Police and the Public is confrontational;
- xvi. Change in police and social culture;
- xvii. Bicycle Patrol Police Unit needs to be expanded;
- xviii. Traffic Wardens to address traffic situation in Tobago;
- xix. Municipal Police needed in Tobago so that TTPS can focus on core policing;
- xx. Need for Litter Wardens;
- xxi. Reintroduction of the TTPS Marine Branch;
- xxii. Honest persons required for the TTPS;
- xxiii. Create a Police Service that follows its mandate;
- xxiv. There are good Officers however, they are few;
- xxv. Breakdown in the TTPS is as a result of the breakdown in society;
- xxvi. Customer Service Training required;
- xxvii. In-service Training to keep and increase Police capacity;
- xxviii. SRP training leaves much to be desired;
- xxix. Utilize plain clothes Police Officers in Hot Spots;
- xxx. Introduction of Police Cadet

#### **19.18.3.2 Systems and Processes:**

- i. One Door Policy not effective;
- ii. Need for proper facilities to address victims of rape;
- iii. Proactive victim support;
- iv. Need for Radar System;
- v. Lack of Scanners and Canine Units at the Scarborough Port;
- vi. Little respect by the TTPS for Protective Orders;
- vii. The TTPS cannot be remedied in isolation as there are a number of other state agencies that need fixing, e.g., Forensic Science Centre, Courts, Prison, etc.;
- viii. Need for a Security Audit in Trinidad and Tobago;
- ix. Citizen Security Programme needs to be re-implemented;



### **19.18.3.3 Community Policing and Partnerships**

- i. Regular patrols of the coastline with the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard is required;
- ii. Need for collaboration between the TTPS and Hoteliers Association;
- iii. Joint Task Force works well;
- iv. Delays at the Forensic Science Centre create backlog in the TTPS completing their tasks efficiently;
- v. Change in Police-Community rule of engagement;
- vi. Police cannot investigate Police, an independent body should do this;
- vii. Trust between Police and Community needs to be fostered;

### **19.18.3.4 Governance, Disciplinary Structure, Public Confidence & Consultations**

- i. Lack of confidentiality;
- ii. Court system does not support the Police;
- iii. Perceived corruption in the TTPS;
- iv. People allegedly selling guns for food;
- v. Police should use their discretion with regard to Dress Code Rules;
- vi. Allegations of Police running drug blocks;
- vii. Close family ties in Tobago impedes law enforcement and the Police's practice of law enforcement;
- viii. Perception of Police corruption may be inflated;
- ix. Lack of leading by example;

#### 19.18.4 Synopsis of Response Ratings – Tobago Organizations

19.18.4.1 Below is a synopsis of stakeholder responses by ratings:

##### 19.18.4.2 Positive

- i. Bicycle Patrols excellent initiative
- ii. Joint Task Force helped with crimes

##### 19.18.4.3 Negative

- i. Customer Service is poor
- ii. One Door Policy not effective
- iii. Police often make situations worse
- iv. Attitude of police
- v. Increase in the number of guns in Tobago
- vi. No confidentiality in the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard
- vii. Difficulty in receiving bar license

##### 19.18.4.4 Neutral


- i. Proper facilitates to deal with rape cases and proactive victim support

##### 19.18.4.5 Synopsis of Ratings

*Table 52: Ratings by Response (%) – Tobago Stakeholders*

<b>Rating</b>	<b>Response</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Positive	2	20
Negative	7	70
Mixed	0	0
Neutral	1	10

**Figure 91: Ratings by Percentage (%) – Tobago Stakeholders**



## **19.19 Conclusion**

19.19.1 The state of crime has a negative impact on the economy and the international reputation of Trinidad and Tobago. In this regard, reputational damage compounded with impunity of infractions have added costs of business both formally and informally. Overall, stakeholders believed that the TTPS required institutional strengthening with particular emphasis on Units and a critical change in management.

**SECTION 20:  
REVIEW OF CIVILIAN  
OVERSIGHT AGENCIES**

# REVIEW OF CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT AGENCIES

## 20 Overview

20.1 The Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (GORTT) in its Draft National Development Strategy 2016-2030 highlighted the need for the strengthening of National Security Structures in dealing with crime. In so doing, it proposed as part of its mandate to establish two (2) crime agencies, a Police Management Agency (PMA) and a Police Inspectorate (PI) to institutionally strengthen the TTPS.

20.1.2 The establishment of the PMA and PI is part of the government's plan to modernize the management of the Police Service, inclusive of capacity building and training of police officers.<sup>15</sup> According to the Strategy, the Police Management Agency would be established to “*develop the necessary leadership expertise, skills and professionalism that will take this arm of our nation's protective services forward*”. The Police Inspectorate would be established to “*develop trust and confidence in the police service*”. The GORTT had allocated in the fiscal budget for 2015/2016, an initial cost of \$2 million (\$1 million each) to meet the requisite expenses in establishing these agencies with additional funds to be allocated.

20.1.3 The PMA, upon establishment will seek to:

1. Develop the necessary leadership expertise;
2. Uphold accountability;
3. Develop the skills and professionalism of the workforce;
4. Enhance the capability to plan and execute police operations;

---

<sup>15</sup> Draft National Development Strategy 2016-2030 (Vision 2030) “Many Hearts, Many Voices, One Vision” March 21, 2017

5. Implement effective operational processes, practice and doctrine;
6. Set and maintain the ethics and values that need to be embedded in the service's professional culture<sup>16</sup>

20.1.4 The PI on the other hand was:

- a. Envisaged to treat with potential abuse of state power and an overreach by the police service in the discharge of their duties
- b. Ensure quality assurance and have oversight of police operations and will be held accountable through annual reporting to Parliament<sup>17</sup>

20.1.5 This section provides some further research on similar oversight bodies such as the Police Management Agencies in Australia, England and Wales and Police Inspectorates in UK, Kosovo and Scotland. In addition, it looks at the current oversight body in Trinidad and Tobago.

## **20.2 Police Management Agencies**

### **20.2.1 Australian Institute of Police Management**

20.2.1.1 The description below regarding the Australian Institute of Police Management (AIPM) was obtained from its website. The AIPM is part of the Australasian Common Police Services. The Institute provides executive leadership and management development opportunities to improve the corporate performance and productivity of Australasian law enforcement and allied agencies.<sup>18</sup>

20.2.1.2 AIPM courses involve police and emergency services personnel from every state and territory of Australia and New Zealand. They also now include senior

---

<sup>16</sup> People's National Movement Manifesto 2015

<sup>17</sup> Richard Lord, Trinidad Guardian Published: Saturday, January 16, 2016

<sup>18</sup> Australia Government website <http://www.australia.gov.au/directories/australia/aipm>

personnel from neighbouring nations in the Pacific and South East Asia. There are also Visiting International Police Fellows to the AIPM's programmes such as senior police officers from the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Metropolitan Police in London, the Scottish Police College at Tulliallan, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Hong Kong Police Force.

20.2.1.3 The AIPM was established over 50 years ago and more than 6,000 senior police officers have attended the AIPM's executive development programs. The Institute is administered by the Australian Federal Police, and reports to a Board of Control that is composed of all the Police Commissioners of Australia and New Zealand. AIPM staff are employed under the Federal Police Act.<sup>19</sup>

20.2.1.4 The AIPM Board of Control (BOC) is the Governing Council of the AIPM. The Institute reports to the BOC on all its core business (higher education and executive development programmes for senior police officers from all police jurisdictions in Australia and New Zealand). The BOC approves the AIPM's Corporate Plan, Annual Business Plans, Annual Reports, Annual Budgets and Financial Reports. The BOC also provides direction on all aspects of the AIPM's operation, and relies on the AFP to provide the corporate governance framework for operation of the corporate services functions of the AIPM.<sup>20</sup>

20.2.1.5 The BOC membership comprises of:

1. Commissioner New South Wales Police Force
2. Commissioner Queensland Police Service
3. Commissioner South Australia Police
4. Commissioner Western Australia Police
5. Commissioner Tasmania Police
6. Commissioner Northern Territory Police

---

<sup>19</sup> AIPM Website <http://www.aipm.gov.au/about-the-aipm/>

<sup>20</sup> AIPM website <http://www.aipm.gov.au/about-the-aipm/organisation/>

7. Commissioner New Zealand Police
8. Chief Commissioner Victoria Police<sup>21</sup>

20.2.1.6 The Board of Studies (BOS) provides advice to the BOC and the AIPM directly on all educational matters at the AIPM. The BOS is composed of nine nominees of the Commissioners (one from each jurisdiction) who are typically the Heads of the relevant jurisdictional Police Academies or Directors of Human Resources for the jurisdiction. In addition, there are three external members of the BOS; these include a senior academic, the Commandant of the Australian Defence Forces Command and Staff College, and a senior representative from the Australasian Fire Authorities Council (AFAC).

## **20.2.2 Police and Crime Commissioners (formerly Police Authority in England and Wales)**

20.2.2.1 The description below regarding the Police Authority in England and Wales were obtained from the Civitas: Institute for the Study of Civil Society's website and an article entitled "*Police Authorities How they were established and their role in policing, September 2012*":

*"Prior to 2012, police forces in England and Wales were strategically managed by a Police Authority or Board, that ensures there is local accountability for policing. Their duties included:*

- a. Negotiating and aligning policing and community safety priorities*
- b. Working with Community Safety Partnership (CSP) partners and other local bodies. CSP partners are the local authority, the police force, the primary care trust, fire and probation services.*

---

<sup>21</sup> AIPM website <http://www.aipm.gov.au/about-the-aipm/organisation/>



- c. *Assessing the success of locally developed strategies to tackle anti-social behaviour volume crime and violent crime at basic command unit and neighbourhood level.*
- d. *Ensuring adjustments are put into place and remedial action taken where necessary.*

*The police accountability of the Police Authority was a tripartite system with responsibilities distributed amongst the Home Office/Home Secretary, the Local Police authority or Police and Crime Panel and the Chief Constable of the Force.*

*The majority of funding for these police authorities came from an annual Home Office grant based on the demographic, social and geographical makeup of the authority's area. In addition, police authorities were able to set a precept on the council tax to raise further funds.”*

### **20.2.3 Replacing Police Authorities with Police and Crime Commissioners**

20.2.3.1 “In 2010, both the Conservative and Liberal Party outlined plans to replace and reform police authorities as part of the general election campaign as concerns were raised on the perceived lack of accountability of police authorities to the communities they served. As such, due to a change in administration, the then coalition government passed an Act to abolish the police authorities.

20.2.3.2 The ‘*Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011*’ abolished police authorities in England and Wales, outside of London on 22 November 2012 replacing them with directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners.

20.2.3.3 In London, from January 2012 the Mayor of London acted as the Police and Crime Commissioner for the Metropolitan Police through the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime. The Common Council for the City of London continues to perform the

role of police authority and therefore does not have a Police and Crime Commissioner.<sup>22</sup>”

## **20.4 Situation in Trinidad and Tobago**

### **20.4.1 Police Service Commission (PSC)**

20.4.1.2 In Trinidad and Tobago there presently exists a system in the Police Service Commission (PSC) for the recruitment and performance of the Commissioner of Police and his Deputies but not the responsibility of the overall management of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. The Commissioner of Police is the Accounting Officer for the TTPS and the overall management of the service.

20.4.1.3 The description for the Police Service Commission was taken from the Public and Police Service Commission’s website. “The *Police Service Commission* was established on June 1, 1956 by the Trinidad and Tobago (Constitution) Amendment Order in Council 1956 (1956 No. 835). The Constitution (Amendment) Act No.6 of 2006, which took effect from January 1, 2007, amended section 122 of the Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago with respect to the procedure to be followed for the appointment of members of the Police Service Commission.

20.4.1.4 Under the new provisions the President, after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, is required to nominate to the House of Representatives persons who are qualified and experienced in the disciplines of law, finance, sociology or management.

20.4.1.5 The President is further required to make appointments to the Police Service Commission after the House of Representatives approves the Notification issued by the President in respect of each nomination. The present Police Service

---

<sup>22</sup> Police Authorities How they were established and their role in policing, September 2012

Commission of Trinidad and Tobago comprises of a Chairman and four (4) members.”

20.4.1.6 “The method of functioning of the Commission is determined by its constitutional mandate, inter alia, (section 123 (a):

1. appoint persons to hold or act in the office of Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police;
2. make appointments on promotion and to confirm appointment to offices of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police;
3. remove from office and exercise disciplinary control over persons holding or acting in offices of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police;
4. monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of the discharge of their functions;
5. prepare an annual performance appraisal report in such form as may be prescribed by the Police Service Commission respecting and for the information of the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of Police; and
6. hear and determine appeals from decisions of the Commissioner of Police, or of any person to whom the powers have been delegated, as a result of disciplinary proceedings brought against a police officer appointed by the Commissioner of Police.<sup>23</sup>

20.4.1.7 The role and responsibilities of the Commission include:

1. Monitoring the efficiency and effectiveness of the performance of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police,

---

<sup>23</sup> Police Service Commission website [http://www.policesservicecommission.org.tt/method\\_of\\_functioning.html](http://www.policesservicecommission.org.tt/method_of_functioning.html)

2. Preparing performance appraisal reports on the work of those executive officers,
3. Receiving bi-annual reports from the Commissioner of Police on his management of the resources made available to him/her.
4. Hearing and determining appeals by Police officers up to the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police on decisions of the Commissioner on promotion and discipline. Exercising disciplinary control over the Commissioner of Police and the Deputy Commissioner of Police including removal of those officers from office.
5. Appointing Acting Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police as in the judgment of the Commission, the circumstances require.
6. Selecting persons for the offices of Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police, submitting the names and relevant information of those selected persons to the President of the Republic for nomination to the House of Representatives of the Parliament; and
7. Appointing those persons to the respective offices on the approval of their nomination by the House of Representatives of the Parliament.
8. The Police Service Commission may, on its initiative, request a special report and to examine documents from the Commissioner of Police at any time on any matter, relating to the management of the Police Service to which the Commissioner shall respond in a timely manner.”

20.4.1.8 For further information on Governance and the PSC, see Appendix 13, as well as, Appendix 14 for the Report of the Multi-Sector Review Team on the PSC.

#### **20.4.2 Police Complaints Authority (PCA)**

20.4.2.1 Currently Trinidad and Tobago does not have a Police Inspectorate but it has been in the mandate of the GORTT to have an established Inspectorate.

20.4.2.2 However, Trinidad and Tobago as in most Commonwealth Countries (including Jamaica, the Police Civilian Oversight Authority, which assists the transformation of the Jamaican Constabulary Force) has a Police Complaints Authority (PCA) governed by the Police Complaints Authority Act, 2006 to provide civilian oversight on law enforcement. The PCA operates as an independent corporate body to investigate complaints against police officers involved in criminal offences, police corruption and serious police misconduct.<sup>24</sup> The staff of the PCA does not belong to or is a member of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS). The description on the PCA was taken from the PCA's website.

20.4.2.3 “The functions of the PCA includes<sup>25</sup>:

1. To investigate criminal offences involving police officers, police corruption and serious police misconduct.
2. To undertake inquiries into or audits of police activities to ascertain whether there is police corruption or serious police misconduct or circumstances that may apply to both.

---

<sup>24</sup> PCA website <http://www.pca.org.tt/about-us/>

<sup>25</sup> Police Complaints Authority Act, 2006

3. To monitor an investigation being conducted, in relation to criminal offences involving police officers, police corruption and/or serious police misconduct and to undertake audits of these investigations.
4. To advise and make recommendations to the Police Service and other authorities, for example, the Police Service Commission, on ways in which police corruption and serious police misconduct may be eliminated.
5. To gather evidence which may be admissible in the prosecution of a person who is not a police officer for a criminal offence in relation to the Police Service and to furnish that evidence to the Director of Public Prosecutions, or in the instance where an authority outside the State is concerned, the Attorney General.
6. To gather evidence that may be used in investigating serious police misconduct and furnish such evidence to the Commissioner of Police or the Police Service Commission for appropriate action.
7. To gather evidence that can be used in the prosecution of a police officer involved in a criminal offence and furnish such evidence to the Director of Public Prosecutions.
8. To perform any other functions that may be conferred on the Authority by any other written law.

20.4.2.4 At the end of every financial year the PCA has to submit reports about their activities for that year as well as audited financial statements. These documents are laid in the Trinidad and Tobago Parliament and are subject to public scrutiny.”

## **20.5 Conclusion**

20.5.1 Police governance and citizen oversight are integral constituents for any police service and democracy. Both international, regional and the local systems were examined in this section. However, these matters are comprehensively discussed in Volume 1.

**SECTION 21:  
CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED  
BY THE PMAC**



# CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED BY THE PMAC

21 The PMAC experienced numerous challenges to the execution of the project. The undermentioned summarizes the main issues:

## 21.1 Outstanding Data

21.1.2 The following datasets, requested from the TTPS, are still outstanding and are necessary for continued data analysis. Appendix 8 details all the datasets and documents that were requested from the TTPS, the date received and related comments.

1. Extended Sick Leave for a minimum of 3 years – Human Resource Division
2. Officer Suspension Data for 10 years – Complaints Unit
3. Officer Monthly Payroll Data including overtime for a minimum of 5 years – Accounts Unit
4. Functional and non-functional fleet vehicles – Administration
5. Releases of Estimates vs. Actual 2013/2014 and 2014/2015 – Finance

21.1.3 The following were recently requested:

1. Number of Officers as generated by the Payroll system – Accounts Unit
2. A complete list of all Branches/ Sections
3. Complaints against the Police – Complaints Units

## 21.2 Inaccuracies in the Manpower Complement of the TTPS

21.2.1 The PMAC requested total staffing numbers from the TTPS regarding Regular Officers and Civilian Staff:

- a. **Regular Police:** though sanctioned numbers for TTPS Officers remain consistent, the actual numbers (positions filled – permanently or temporary), varied extensively depending on the data source within the TTPS. For example, official actual strength numbers and actual numbers derived from the Nominal Rolls differ by over one thousand (1,000) officers. As a consequence, data analysis was greatly impeded as firm conclusions on manpower strength could not be drawn.
- b. **Civilian Staff:** three (3) different figures was supplied to the PMAC within a 24-hr period.

### **21.3 Information on Overtime**

21.3.1 Requests made to the Finance and Accounts Unit of the TTPS revealed that information on overtime was not readily available. Despite the information residing in the iHRIS (Payroll), it was communicated to the Committee that retrieving overtime payments for all TTPS officers for a three (3) year period would overburden the system and crash iHRIS. Subsequent attempts to source the information from the pay sheets were also met with the response that this process would be too time consuming and not possible with the necessary time to allow for data analysis. In addition, the PMAC experienced challenges in verifying what financial information was digitally available.

### **21.4 Lack of Centralised Repository of Information regarding Systems and Processes in the TTPS**

21.4.1 Various Units within the TTPS even within the same Division have different understandings regarding Human Resource and Finance processes. In this regard, requests made to varying divisional heads resulted in the receipt of conflicting information, e.g., separate sections of the Finance and Accounts Unit informed the Committee that salary information was both digitized and not digitized. Enquires

made of Officers known to the PMAC revealed that salary information was indeed digitised.

## **21.5 Time Constraints in the Execution of the Project**

21.5.1 Though the TTPS has been generally cooperative with respect to all requests made by the PMAC, it should be noted that the stringent deadlines prevented the TTPS from providing the information in a timely manner. This was particularly an issue when the data/information was not captured in the form requested.

## **21.6 Lack of Data Standardisation**

21.6.1 There is no standardization for data collection or data storage within the TTPS. The PMAC's interactions with the TTPS revealed that the use of data entry forms is limited and, as such, each Division/Branch/Unit creates its own data entry mechanism. A prime example is the Nominal Rolls submitted to the Human Resource Division each month. Due to this dilemma, data driven decision making is severely impaired.

## **21.7 Centralisation of the Human Resource Unit and its Technology**

21.7.1 Cabinet in Minute No. 2701 dated September 23, 2004, agreed *inter alia*, to the establishment of a Human Resource Management Sub-unit in the TTPS with the intent to decentralise the Human Resource Unit throughout the Service. However, to date, the decision of Cabinet with respect to the organization has not been implemented. This results in an ineffective and inefficient system due to the overloading of the existing lone, centralized Human Resource Unit.

21.7.2 At present all human resource transactions and documents are sent in paper format and processed by the Human Resource Unit located at the Police Administration Building, Port of Spain. This system has proven to be atrociously slow and inefficient. The PMAC was informed that a decentralized Human Resource information system was purchased and customized for the TTPS, however, a lack

of cooperation by the Human Resource Unit has resulted in the stalling of implementation of the program in the testing phase.

21.7.3 Currently, the TTPS HR utilizes the Versadex Record Management System to record and track personnel information, however, due to the aforementioned issues, the database is not up to date and is not fully utilised.

## **21.8 Upkeep and Maintenance of Information Technology**

21.8.1 It was noted that budgets are frequently approved for the acquisition of information technology in the Service. Despite such, adequate allowances are not readily approved for the upkeep, maintenance and licensing renewal of acquired software and hardware.

## **21.9 Ineffective and Inefficient Communications Systems**

21.9.1 Despite provisions for each officer to have a TTPS email (@ttps.gov.tt), at present, the Service most heavily relies on telephone messaging (TM) for communication with its officers. This method is slow and inefficient.

**SECTION 22:  
SELECTED REFERENCES**

## SELECTED REFERENCES

- Armstrong, A., Lalla, L., Griffith, A., Ewatski, J., & S. Sookram. Final Report. SAUTT Implementation Team. August 29, 2011.
- Bayley, D. in Modern Policing. Eds. Tonry, M. and N. Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1996.
- Deosaran, R. Police Governance: From Oversight Puzzle to Political Disguise. Paper presented at Annual Conference of Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police. May 16-19, 2016.
- Draft Estimates of Expenditure, Ministry of Finance. 2013/14
- Draft Estimates of Expenditure, Ministry of Finance. 2014/15
- Draft Estimates of Expenditure, Ministry of Finance. 2015/16
- Draft National Development Policy. 2016-2030.
- Johnson, D. et al. Youth Perception of the Police in Trinidad and Tobago. Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago: Ministry of National Security. 2008.
- Mastrofski, S. George Mason University. 2006.
- Moore, H. and W. Wegener. Effective Police Supervision. 6<sup>th</sup> Ed. MA, USA: Anderson Publishing. 2011.
- Multi-Sector Review Team Report on the Police Service Commission. 2013.
- O'Dowd, D.J. Review of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. 1991
- Police Complaints Authority. Annual Report 2014/15
- Police Complaints Authority. Annual Report 2013/14
- Police Complaints Authority. Annual Report 2012/13
- Police Complaints Authority. Annual Report 2011/12
- Police Complaints Authority. Annual Report 2010/11
- Police Complaints Authority Act (Amendment) (No. 12 of 20011)

Police Complaints Authority Act (No. 8 of 2006)

Police Service Commission. Annual Report 2014

Police Service Commission. Annual Report 2013

Police Service Commission. Annual Report 2012

Police Service Commission. Annual Report 2011

Praedial Larceny Squad. Performance Assessment. OLEP, Ministry of National Security. 2016.

Report of Senior Planning Group of Experts for Transnational Arrangements for the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. 2006.

Ross, C., Fraser, J. Hug, G. Murray, P. and S. Newark. National Security Sector Review of Trinidad and Tobago. 2009.

The Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. Amendment Act No. 6 of 2006.

Transit Police. Annual Report, 2016.

Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Act (Amendment) No. 13 of 2007

Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Act (No. 7 of 2006)

Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Operational Plan 2017

Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Operational Plan 2016

Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Operational Plan 2015

Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Operational Plan 2014

Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Regulations. 2007.

Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Strategic Plan 2017-2019

Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Strategic Plan 2014-2016

Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. Use of Force Policy. Departmental Order. No. 92.

# LIST OF WEBSITES

<http://prb.pmo.govmu.org/English/Pages/default.aspx>

<http://www.aipm.gov.au/about-the-aipm/>

<http://www.aipm.gov.au/about-the-aipm/organisation/>

<http://www.aipm.gov.au/about-the-aipm/organisation/>

<http://www.australia.gov.au/directories/australia/aipm>

<http://www.essex.polfed.org/?type=allowances>

<http://www.pca.org.tt/about-us/>

[http://www.policeservicecommission.org.tt/method\\_of\\_functioning.html](http://www.policeservicecommission.org.tt/method_of_functioning.html)

[http://www.slcdocs.com/HR/FY17\\_Compensation.pdf](http://www.slcdocs.com/HR/FY17_Compensation.pdf)

<http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2017001/article/14777-eng.htm>

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_countries\\_and\\_dependencies\\_by\\_number\\_of\\_police\\_officers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_and_dependencies_by_number_of_police_officers)

[https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2017\\_KeyFindings.pdf](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2017_KeyFindings.pdf)

[https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table-74/table\\_74\\_full\\_time\\_law\\_enforcement\\_employees\\_by\\_population\\_group\\_percent\\_male\\_and\\_female\\_2013.xls](https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table-74/table_74_full_time_law_enforcement_employees_by_population_group_percent_male_and_female_2013.xls)

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-march-2015/police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-march-2015>



**SECTION 23:  
APPENDICES**

## Appendix 1 – Recommendations from Previous Reports on the TTPS

Report Title	Manpower-Related Recommendations	Implementation Plan	Proposed Implementation Date
<p>Report of the Senior Planning Group</p> <p>November 2006</p>	<p>Issue #1:</p> <p>Develop, articulate and implement an overall management philosophy for the Police Service</p> <p>Recommendation:</p> <p>Development and promulgation of the desired management philosophy and practices for the Police Service together with appropriate training.</p> <p>Issue #2:</p> <p>Re-design and install administrative support for the Commissioner</p> <p>Recommendations:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Put in place a number of support functions/activities e.g. organizational structure, job design, manpower planning, needs analysis, training, succession planning, etc.</li> <li>2. Administrative functions currently performed in Human Resources and Finance should be developed and removed and placed in a separate Department.</li> <li>3. There is need to establish a complete Internal Audit function within the Police Service, reporting directly to the Commissioner.</li> </ol>		

	<p>4. The overall administrative support structure has to be re-designed and new policy and procedure manuals developed for all areas within the context of the new management style.</p> <p>5. There is also the need to establish a Legal Unit in order to meet the growing needs of the Police Service for legal representation, advice and assistance and to reduce the Police Service’s reliance on external entities.</p> <p>Issue #3:</p> <p>Re-structure and re-focus human resource management</p> <p>Recommendations:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Creation of one Human Resource Management Unit with responsibility for all HR functions for all members of staff</li> <li>2. The new Human Resource Management Unit should be appropriately staffed with persons who have the following mix of skills: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Change management and Process skills</li> <li>b) Human resources knowledge and practical experience from both the public sector and private sector</li> <li>c) General business skills and knowledge</li> </ol> </li> <li>3. Set up structures, systems and procedures to deal with: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) The complete recruitment process for Police Officers</li> <li>b) Appointments of individuals not in the service as Police Officers on contract</li> <li>c) Appointments of civilians on contract</li> <li>d) Appointments to the First Division</li> <li>e) Acting – in the post of Asst. Commissioner</li> <li>f) Promotions – the new Assessment Centre, the revamped Promotion Advisory Board (and Examinations Board)</li> <li>g) Confirmation of appointments for First Division Officers</li> <li>h) All discipline – including removal of persons from office – below the level of Deputy Commissioner</li> </ol> </li> </ol>		
--	--	--	--

	<p>i) Exercise of the power of delegation</p> <p>4. HR Policy and Procedure Manuals must be developed to reflect the requirements for modern human resource management in the Police Service.</p> <p>Issue #4:</p> <p>Strengthen Planning</p> <p>Recommendation:</p> <p>A new unit, appropriately staffed, is required to do research and planning on the full range of the needs of the Police Service.</p> <p>Issue #5:</p> <p>Restructuring the Finance and Accounts Branch of the Police Service</p> <p>Recommendations:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Remove all functions of an administrative nature and place them under the control of the Administration Section.</li> <li>2. Streamline the Finance and Accounts Section.</li> <li>3. Maintain the Human Resource Section separate from the Finance and Accounts Section.</li> </ol>		
--	---	--	--

	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. An external contractor appointed by the Committee named in the Police Service Act should do the canteen operations.</li> <li>5. Create an Internal Audit Department.</li> <li>6. Place the Arsenal under the direct control of the CoP.</li> <li>7. The CoP given delegated authority to make payments up to the amount of \$500,000.</li> <li>8. Appoint a Budget Committee within the Police Service with a representative from the Ministry of National Security.</li> <li>9. Re-organize the Finance and Accounts Branch.</li> <li>10. Re-organize the Administration Branch.</li> <li>11. Remove all revenue collection activity from the Police Service.</li> <li>12. Streamline the Accounting Unit.</li> <li>13. Separate the Finance and Accounts Branch and the Administration Branch physically.</li> <li>14. Appoint a person to head the Finance and Accounts Branch.</li> <li>15. Appoint a person to head the Administration Branch.</li> <li>16. Appoint a person to manage Office Services.</li> <li>17. Establish a Property Management Unit and appoint a Property Manager.</li> <li>18. Establish a Vehicles Management Unit and appoint a Fleet Manager.</li> <li>19. Establish a Procurement Unit and appoint a Procurement Manager.</li> <li>20. Increase the Tailoring Establishment.</li> </ol>		
--	--	--	--

SAUTT Reports	<p>Issue# 1:</p> <p>Improve crime detection rate for serious crimes</p> <p>Recommendation:</p> <p>The Investigations Directorate of SAUTT be merged with the Homicide Bureau of TTPS</p> <p>Status:</p> <p>Homicide Investigation Bureau took operational control of the Homicide Investigation Task Force, the Major Incident Room, the Special Evidence Recovery Unit and the Financial Investigations Unit</p> <p>on July 18, 2011</p> <p>Issue #2:</p> <p>Improve crime detection rate for serious crimes</p> <p>Recommendation:</p> <p>SAUTT K9's to go to TTPS. K9s should not be separated from handlers/trainers.</p> <p>Issue #3:</p>		
---------------	--	--	--

	<p>Improve crime detection rate for serious crimes</p> <p>Recommendation:</p> <p>TTPS K9 standards need to be brought up to the level of SAUTT</p> <p>Issue #4:</p> <p>Improve detection rate for homicides</p> <p>Recommendation:</p> <p>CSI personnel to go to TTPS</p> <p>Issue #5:</p> <p>Ensure effective integration of SAUTT Investigations Directorate into TTPS</p> <p>Recommendation:</p> <p>TTPS take appropriate steps to align its operations, processes and procedures with the Police Reform Legislation</p> <p>Status:</p>		
--	--	--	--

	Draw on best practices for both entities. A strategic plan has been developed which aimed at improving the performance of HBI		
Stephen Mastrofski, George Mason University  Service-Oriented Policing Reform  April 2006	Two overall strategies to change the police manpower to be more customer service-oriented:  1. Change habits of officers by showing them benefits of policing for people and how to do it 2. Provide material consequences for those who fail to embrace this approach and reward those who do an exceptional job  Changing Habits Recommendations:  1. During recruitment process: i. signal that TTPS looking for people committed to serving the public ii. all courses by Police Training College (PTC) should be devised to promote service orientation iii. have courses on how to deal with difficult citizens iv. have courses on basic conflict resolution techniques v. PTC should give awards and recognition for students who display daily policing for people vi. students should be given assignments to better understand pains and problems facing victims of crimes  2. Each division and branch should give award for service employee of the month in recognition for policing for people. These should be publicised in TTPS newsletter and wider press.	1. Top Leadership Commitment: i. Of GORTT for necessary funding ii. From TTPS to show will to follow-through  2. Private sector support for awards and recognition  3. Field Training Officer Curriculum adjustment  4. PTC Curriculum Changes  5. Strengthen Disciplinary Process: Police Complaints Division has software to review complaints quicker and generate reports; correct data entry errors, etc.  6. COP to launch accountability programme	May 2006  May 2006  May 2006  June 2006  July 2006  May 2006



	<p>3. TTPS needs to create a more positive working environment by addressing long term problems of employees to get them to perform better as well. E.g., sanitation, space, structural integrity of facilities, adequate equipment. improve internal communication, faster approval process when requests for approvals are made on strategies to improve police service, first and second division managers should receive training on communication, teach supervisors how to discuss and correct unsatisfactory subordinates performance in a positive way</p> <p>4. Institute an Office of Victim Support in each division. Each office should be headed by ASP.</p> <p>5. Strengthen Witness Protection Programme</p> <p>6. Create teams in police stations (using work shifts) to deal with people problems</p> <p>Material Consequences Recommendations:</p> <p>1. Use performance appraisal system to document service-oriented performance – have a category for customer relations</p> <p>2. First line supervisors should follow up on customer service aspects of subordinates by asking members of the public</p> <p>3. TTPS should install a receipt system to document when constables interact with public</p> <p>4. Explore ways for private sector recognition of outstanding customer relations work by officers</p> <p>5. Strengthen the disciplinary process when dealing with bad customer relations, e.g., discipline imposed must have corrective component,</p>	<p>– each divisional and branch commander to account on what they are doing to change behaviour of officers</p> <p>7. PTC have remedial training as corrective action for officers</p> <p>8. Establish Office of Police Professionalism to track subsequent performance of officers who receive discipline and correction interventions</p> <p>9. Customer Service Training:</p> <p>i. begin with Train the Trainer</p> <p>ii. Roll out to all officers in 8 weeks</p> <p>iii. High priorities areas are IATF, Divisional Task Forces, G&amp;E</p>	<p>July 2006</p> <p>July 2006</p> <p>July 2006</p>
--	---	--	--

	<p>where tribunals find officers have 3 or more reports, subsequent reports with evidence can lead to dismissal, etc.</p>	<p>10. Monthly Division / Branch Customer Services Awards</p> <p>11. Improve Equipment and Facilities: i. Collect needs</p> <p>12. High Impact Supervision Training: Phase 2</p> <p>13. Improve rate at which crime reports are filed: develop monitoring system for supervisors</p> <p>14. Evaluate witness protection programme</p> <p>15. Team building for commitment for service oriented policing: 4 police stations as pilot</p> <p>16. Implement New Performance Appraisal System:</p>	<p>August 2006</p> <p>September 2006</p> <p>June 2006</p>
--	---	--	---

		<p>Trial Basis – Besson St. Police Station</p> <p>Roll out</p> <p>17. Office of Victim Support – trial basis in 4 high crime stations</p> <p>18. Customer receipt system – 4 pilot stations and then full implementation</p>	<p>September 2006</p> <p>September 2006</p> <p>Start: September 2006</p> <p>End: December 2006</p> <p>January 2007</p> <p>April 2006</p>
--	--	--	--

			<p>January 2007</p> <p>Start: March 2007</p> <p>May 2007 (full implementation)</p>
<p>Stephen Mastrofski, George Mason University</p> <p>TTPS Transformation</p> <p>May 2006</p>	<p>Themes:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Improving Crime Control Capacity <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.1 Create a number of Units, teams, etc.: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Crime and Problem Analysis Unit</li> <li>ii. Homicide Prevention Working Group</li> <li>iii. new Homicide Bureau of Investigations</li> <li>iv. Unsolved Homicide Case Review Team</li> <li>v. Physical Evidence Team</li> </ol> </li> </ol> </li> <li>2. Creating a Healthier Organization</li> </ol>		

	<p>2.1 Improve efficiency and effectiveness of processing complaints against the police:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. increase number of investigators</li> <li>ii. increase number of vehicles available to investigators</li> <li>iii. create automated process to track cases</li> </ul> <p>2.2 Improve officer performance appraisal system that will for first time track actual performance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. pilot new system in San Juan</li> <li>ii. train all staff</li> </ul> <p>2.3 Improve Promotion System</p> <p>2.4 Improve Personnel Allocation Decisions and Practices – TTPS has no single information system to know precisely where personnel are assigned, where they are working, their current job status, etc. There is a large number of persons believed to be employed by the TTPS and are not accounted for on personnel management records.</p> <p>In June 2006, an audit of current personnel will be conducted and a system will be developed to track transfers and changes in work status</p> <p>2.5 Increasing Professionalism</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. improve climate of police integrity</li> <li>ii. upgrade training of recruits</li> <li>iii. create Field Training Officer Programme</li> <li>iv. High Impact Supervision Training</li> </ul>		<p>December 2006</p>
--	--	--	----------------------

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>v. Incident Command Training</li> <li>vi. Value-centred Planning and Change Management Training</li>   <li>vii. Improve Executive Decision – Making with an Executive Advisor (Col. Shreve, former DCOP, Kansas City)</li> <li>viii. First Responder Training: developed curriculum</li> <li>ix. Create systematic programme of in-service training for all TTPS officers – TTPS had no in-service training requirement. Task Force was formed to formulate plan.</li> </ul> <p>3. Enhancing Capacity of TTPS to police for people</p> <p>3.1 Develop TTPS capacity to train on customer relations</p>		<p>June 2006</p>
--	---	--	------------------

			To be delivered under existing contract if funds available after other training delivered
Stephen Mastrofski, George Mason University  Civilianisation in the TTPS  July 2008	As the TTPS is considering civilianisation, the following is recommended:  <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Conduct a comprehensive survey of positions eligible for civilianisation</li> <li>2. Prepare documentation to replace clerical and technical sworn personnel with civilians</li> <li>3. Recruit and hire civilian replacements for sworn officers</li> <li>4. Ensure sworn personnel receive sufficient refresher training to fulfill requirements of new assignments</li> <li>5. Conduct an evaluation of civilian efforts</li> </ol>		
Major-General (ret'd) Cameron Ross	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Delegation of authority with associated accountability as there is excessive centralisation of power and authority</li> <li>2. Modernise and implement modern business practices to streamline processes</li> </ol>		

<p>National Security Sector Review of T&amp;T</p> <p>April 2009</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3. Maximise your manpower use to make best use of available limited human resources</li> <li>4. Engage in more long term strategic planning and investment</li> <li>5. The concept that all functions in the service should be carried out by uniformed personnel is not applicable. There is the need to “hire smart.” Civilian employees are often cheaper and offer expertise in non-core areas. Therefore, minimise use of skilled personnel in non-core areas and assign these tasks to cheaper employees</li> </ol>		
<p>The Multi-Sector Review Team on the Police Service Commission</p> <p>March 2013</p>	<p>The Police Service Commission (PSC) is currently responsible for matters pertaining to the Commissioner of Police (COP) and the three Deputy Commissioners of Police (DCP).</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. One of the main recommendations of this Review Team that pertains to manpower of the TTPS is that the PSC should be additionally responsible for the eleven Assistant Commissioners of Police (ACP).</li> <li>2. It further recommended that the appointment of the ACP unlike the COP and DCP should not need Parliamentary approval but be done by the PSC and the COP.</li> </ol>		



## Appendix 2 - Newspaper Articles

	Newspaper	Date	Page	Title of Article	Article Author	General Category	Sub Category	Specifics of article	Overall Opinion
1	Guardian	23/02/2017	A5	Williams for Rogue List	Rhonda Dowlat	Corruption	Police Killing	Alleged killing of a youth from Laventille by Police Officers	Negative
2	Express	23/02/2017	14	We expect our leaders to care	Sarah Nabbie	Policing	Victim Blaming	Inability of heads e.g. COP and P.M. to deal with the issue of domestic violence and resorting instead to "victim blaming"	Negative
3	Express	23/02/2017	7	Gangsters in Police Service	Camille Hunte	Corruption	Police Brutality	Allegation of bribery and brutality by citizens of Laventille	Negative
4	Express	27/02/2017	15	Detect, arrest and convict	Michael Jattan	Policing	Victim Blaming	Negative strategy to deal with crime - victim blaming.	Negative
5	Express	27/02/2017	14	Can Authorities bring crime under control?	Jason Valsint	Policing	Ineffective Leadership	Country's leaders unable to deal with crime issues.	Negative
6	Newsday	22/02/2017	13	Audit must deal with quantity and quality	Errol OC Cupid	Manpower Audit	Recommendations	Manpower Audit must look at: i) Recruitment, ii) Org Structure and iii) Deployment of Officers iv) contemporary policing and v) Discipline.	Positive
7	Express	21/02/2017		Huge rise in guns entering country	Ria Taitt	Illegal Weapons	Firearms Act	Firearms act outdated with respect to air rifles	Negative
8	Express	21/02/2017	16	Relatives: Where's the Justice	Carolyn Kissoon	Unsolved Crime	Unsolved Homicides	Case ignored due to lack of social standing of victims.	Negative
9	Newsday	21/02/2017	10	Williams: Interfaith services intended to motivate officers	Marlene Augustine	Challenges with crime	Recommendations	Interfaith services to be used as motivation for officers	Negative
10	Guardian	21/02/2017	A5	CoP defends divisional interfaith services	---	Challenges with crime	New initiatives	Lifting the spirits of Officers. Engaging all in T&T on a spiritual level in fight against crime. Introducing new initiatives to fight crime.	Positive
11	Express	19/02/2017	12	Repeating the Madness	Martin Daly	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Leadership	Inability of COP to ensure good policing. Inappropriateness of "Interfaith services" as motivation for officers.	Negative

12	Newsday	19/02/2017	10	COP: We have to put God first	Julien Neaves	Challenges with crime	Recommendations	Interfaith services to be used as motivation for officers	Negative
13	Newsday	19/02/2017	15	Answer is cops on the street	Athelston Clinton	Illegal Weapons	Recommendations	Heavy street patrol needs along with civilianization of the Police Service.	Positive
14	Express	18/02/2017	15	Nothing to be proud about, Mr. Williams	Capil Bissoon	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Leadership	Inability of the COP to deal with spiraling crime.	Negative
15	Guardian	17/02/2017	A11	Our best efforts not good enough	Geisha Kowlessar	Challenges with crime	Recommendations	Interfaith services to be used as motivation for officers	Negative
16	Guardian	17/02/2017	a22	Careful steps on Cybercrime Bill		Cyber Crime	Recommendations	Amendment of Cybercrime Bill to deal with Social Media abuse	Mixed
17	Express	14/02/2017	12	Ugly side of T&T projected abroad		Challenges with crime	Ineffective Leadership	International Negative image of T&T. Inability of CoP to deal with spiralling Crime.	Negative
18	Express	14/02/2017	18	Chief Secretary wants public's help in crime fight	Elizabeth Williams	Challenges with crime	Crime measures	Building trust with police and public. Meetings with stakeholders	Neutral
19	Newsday	13/02/2017	12	Only one Police Service	Trevor Sudama	Reform of TTPS	Initiatives	Effective communication Appropriate Training Motivation and viable network	Mixed
20	Newsday	14/02/2017	7	More cold case cops	Clint Chan Tack	Crime measures	Recommendations	Strengthening of Cold Case Unit, DNA database and additional software to aid in Homicide investigations.	Neutral
21	Newsday	13/02/2017	7	Kazim wants 894 local cops	Sean Douglas	Crime measures	Recommendations	Recruitment of 894 Municipal police officers for community safety and security. Training to be executed by OLEP. Intent is to restructure the Municipal Police Service.	Positive
22	Guardian	21/02/2017	A3	Man...shot 7 times. He did not resist - Mom	Rhondor Dowlat	Corruption	Police Killing	Alleged brutal killing of a youth from Picton Rd, Laventille by Police Officers	Negative
23	Express	22/02/2017	14	Now it's down to prayers?	Rudy Chato Paul	Challenges with crime	Ineffective leadership	No accountability re. value for money spent on crime plans, purchase of tools & equipment, etc.	Neutral
24	Newsday	04/02/2017	9	No human trafficking ring in TT	Clint Chan Tack	Misc	Human trafficking	Existence of human trafficking in T&T. Perpetrators charged. Strength of TTPS being assessed via manpower audit.	Mixed

25	Guardian	04/02/2017	A6	Wanted man killed by Police	Jensen La Vende	Misc	Police Killing	Shooting and killing of a wanted man in Santa Cruz in gunfire exchange.	Negative
26	Guardian	04/02/2017	A6	Significant decline in violent crimes	Rosemarie Sant	Crime measures	Initiatives	TTPS doing everything within its power to bring crime under control.	Positive
27	Newsday	02/02/2017	16	Ex-cop: Police using time to study law	Azard Ali	Policing	Improper Qualification	Officers using time on the job to pursue qualifications in Law or HR for the purpose of promotion. Not pursuing discipline that assists them in solving crime.	Negative
28	Express	02/02/2017	20	Guns for citizens a nightmare	Anna Ramdass	Illegal Weapons	Homicide	There is a crisis when it comes to homicides. A limited s.o.e. is not the answer. Citizens having legal firearms plus those with illegal firearms will create havoc for law enforcement.	Negative
29	Express	02/02/2017	14	Police chief needs our help	Lloyd Taylor	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Leadership	T&T in crisis because of the levels of criminal activities and murders.	Neutral
30	Express	02/02/2017	9	Granny awarded \$95,000 in SoE lawsuit	Nikita Braxton-Benjamin	Policing	Victimization	Grandmother wrongfully arrested, charged and taken to court. Seen as malicious act by Police for not revealing whereabouts of sons.	Negative
31	Express	01/02/2017	3	Cops trying to pin it on me	Renuka Singh & Mark Bassant	Policing	Victimization	Contractor claiming victimization from Police connecting him with US\$2M find in plywood shipment. This shipment tied to US\$5M cocaine seizure on board a yacht.	Negative
32	Newsday	01/02/2017	12	Uncle Sam's helping hand	[Editorial]	Crime measures	International Collaboration	Elderly TT/US citizen from Arima murdered. US law enforcement officials intervention. TT collaborating with US & GB in crime prevention.	Neutral
33	Guardian	01/02/2017	A14	Death penalty cannot solve crime	Geisha Kowlessar	Crime measures	Initiatives	Death penalty not the answer to crime. Citizens and Police need to trust and respect each other and buy-in to working together.	Mixed
34	Guardian	01/02/2017	A13	Bring in Scotland Yard Officers	Sascha Wilson	Crime measures	Recommendations	Retired Snr Supt. call for FBI & Scotland Yard to assist TT in addressing crime situation.	Negative

35	Newsday	06/02/2017	7	Two SRPs facing dismissal	News	Corruption	Bribery allegations	Detaining of 2 SRP's in Diego Martin for bribery. SRP's assigned to St. James Police Station.	Negative
36	Express	06/02/2017	14	Time to go Mr. Commissioner	Ronald Huggins	Policing	Ineffective Leadership	Request for CoP to step down because he has not made any input in crime. He is evasive and fails to admit crime crisis. Needs to change strategy.	Negative
37	Newsday	12/02/2017	14	Ready to serve with P.R.I.D.E.	Jamille Broome	Corruption	Corrupted Officers in TTPS	Challenge with crime and inability of Heads to address it. Leaders - blame game with crime.	Negative
38	Express	12/02/2017	60	Career Opportunities	Editorial	Recruitment	Civilians	Advertisement for recruitment of civilians	Neutral
39	Guardian	11/02/2017	A3	CoP: We can't stop domestic murders	Kevin Felmine	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Leadership	Interfaith services used as motivation for Officers.	Negative
40	Express	11/02/2017	16	894 more municipal cops get approval	Kim Boodram	Crime measures	Recommendations	Recruitment of 894 Municipal Police Constables. Part of process of Local Govt reform to improve citizen survey and reduce the incidence of crime.	Neutral
41	Guardian	10/02/2017	A5	Dillon not going to quit	Rhondor Dowlat	Crime measures	Recommendations	Plans to strengthen four main anti-crime pillars of prediction, deterrence, detection and prosecution.	Neutral
42	Guardian	09/02/2017	A11	AG: Acting CoP doing his best	Geisha Kowlessar	Challenges with crime	Effective leadership	Attorney General's position on the performance of CoP whom he said is doing his best. AG indicated that the TTPS is in need of a significant overhaul and must be better managed.	Positive
43	Newsday	09/02/2017	8	Time for public to work with Police	Carol Matroo	Crime measures	Recommendations	Partnership with public and Police to fight crime. Interfaith service used to restore a sense of safety.	Neutral
44	Express	16/12/2016	9	TTPS ordered to promote two corporals	Nikita Braxton-Benjamin	Manpower	Recognition/Promotion	Claims that there is a flaw in the process employed to compile the merit list for promotion.	Negative
45	Guardian	19/02/2017	A13	A tale of two police stations	Kalifa Clyne	Policing	Public perception	Comparison of public and police interaction at two police stations - St. James and Maloney.	Mixed

46	Guardian	18/01/2017	Web	Homicide rate out of control	Rosemarie Sant	Policing	Ineffective Leadership	US Ambassador John Estrada comments on spiraling rate of crime and the FATCA bill.	Negative
47	Newsday	18/01/2017	Web	Police audit committee established		Crime measures	Manpower Audit	Named members of the committee and objectives of the committee.	Neutral
48	Guardian	16/01/2017	A18	Ending our culture of impunity	Editorial	Unsolved Crime	Unsolved Homicides	Perpetrators of homicides and other crimes aware of weaknesses in law enforcement and prosecution systems.	Negative
49	Newsday	05/01/2017	8	Deosaran heads police audit	Clint Chan Tack	Crime measures	Manpower Audit	Objectives of the Committee chaired by Prof. Deosaran.	Neutral
50	Newsday	10/01/2017	5	Williams in firing mood	Nalinee Seelal	Leadership	Discipline	CoP indicated his position of sending home non-performing Officers in the First Division. This is his action plan in place to deal with inefficient First Division Officers as well. He also indicated displeasure with 462 murders and low detection and prosecution of murder suspects.	Neutral
51	Express	11/01/2017	3	First of its kind for TTPS	Asha Javeed	Leadership	Discipline	CoP's advice to Snr Supt John Trim - Eastern Div. of TTPS. CoP not pleased with crime statistics in Division nor with Trim's performance.	Negative
52	Newsday	12/01/2017	9	Top cop going after top cops	Nalinee Seelal	Leadership	Discipline	CoP in efforts to improve efficiency in TTPS is focusing on his executive members, some are deemed to be non-functional, inefficient and abusing senior status.	Negative
53	Express	12/01/2017	3	Four senior cops face 'retirement' requests	Alexander Bruzual	Leadership	Discipline	At least four snr cops expected to be served letters of termination by CoP for failure to perform. CoP came into high praise from TTIC for decision.	Positive

54	Newsday	12/01/2017	13	Strange occurrences in the TTPS	G.A. Marques	Leadership	Discipline	Reference made to CoP's sudden decision to terminate two experienced snr Police Officers for non-achievement. President of TTPSSWA stated the contention is both Officers were given top rating in their performance appraisal.	Negative
55	Express	18/01/2017	21	Deosaran's committee to audit police service	Editor	Crime measures	Manpower Audit	The importance of the manpower audit was to get a good understanding of the manpower and resources required to achieve the strategic aims of the TTPS.	Neutral
56	Express	08/02/2017	16	State to pay for bulldozing home	Rickie Rampersad	Corruption	Ineffective Policing	Presence of Police Officers at illegal demolition site. Judge contended they were there to intimidate.	Negative
57	Express	08/02/2017	11	Support for manpower audit in TTPS	Alexander Bruzual	Crime measures	Recommendations	TTPSSWA reiterated it's support for a manpower audit in TTPS. Audit must look at deployment in creating a more efficient system. Look at policies and procedures with respect to the relationships with Admin. And Managerial perspective.	Neutral
58	Newsday	07/02/2017	3	Tired cops	Nalinee Seelal	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Policing	Police Officers feeling frustrated and disenchanted not being able to arrest rising crime especially murders. Insp. Seales reiterated need for citizens to play a more meaningful role in fight against crime.	Negative
59	Guardian	08/02/2017	A16	Our choice in men	Editorial	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Leadership	Inability of heads e.g. COP and P.M. to deal with the issue of domestic violence and resorting instead to "victim blaming"	Negative
60	Newsday	08/02/2017	14	Take the crime bull by the horns	F. Mouttet	Challenges with crime	Recommendations	The PM and CoP must take 'bull by horns' and make brave decisions. Leaders must consult former reports. Get rid of Police Service Commission. Eliminate overtime. Cut out sick leave.	Negative

61	Newsday	08/02/2017	13	Safety first before giving crime information	Kevin Ram	Crime measures	Corrupted Officers in TTPS	Citizens do not feel safe providing TTPS with information. Many instances where citizens are targeted and threatened by people about whom reports were made. Witnesses being bullied.	Negative
62	Guardian	08/02/2017	A11	Police patrols retard crime detection	Rosemarie Sant	Crime measures	Ineffective Policing	Head of TTPSSWA says crime detection rate being affected by efforts to get illegal guns off the street and demands for increased Police patrols. Investigations are suffering, this is what deters increased detection rate.	Neutral
63	Guardian	06/01/2017	A9	Police body head to CPO today	Geisha Kowlessar	Compensation Negotiation	Outstanding Salary Payments	PCA is in process of wage negotiation on behalf of TTPS Officers. Mr. Seales: Gov't wants incrsd performance from Officers but not saying they are willing to incr. payment.	Neutral
64	Newsday	06/01/2017	14	Kamla: No hope for TT with Rowley	Carol Matroo	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Leadership	Opposition Leader Kamla Persad-Bissessar says little hope for T&T because of ineffective leadership. She alluded to Manpower Audit and indicated this is not new.	Neutral
65	Newsday	08/01/2017	8	Police, not citizens, to fight crime	G.A. Marques	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Policing	Highlighted MNS request for public to help Police fight crime. Mr. Dillon and associates have no crime plan to deal with criminal or potential terrorists.	Negative
66	Newsday	08/01/2017	12	Awaiting the Police Audit	Editorial	Crime measures	Recommendations	Highlighted the M.A. chaired by Prof. Deosaran. Should be key part of (?) thrust. Thrust will show how Police Officers are deployed. Look at the well-being of Officers who operate in this high-stress environment. Must look at EAP. Unit must look at the apptmt of the CoP.	Positive

67	Newsday	08/01/2017	15	Time for Police performance	Arnold Goopeesingh	Compensation Negotiation	Ineffective Policing	Indicated that people who are working should be rewarded for performance. No org. rewards for low performance. TTPS Officers not functioning, evidenced by state of crime in the country.	Negative
68	Guardian	09/01/2017	A5	Cultivate new hope for T&T	Derek Achong	Corruption	Rogue Cops	At inter-faith service priest stated that rogues should be rooted out. Police Officers should find avenue to cultivate new hope for people of T&T.	Mixed
69	Guardian	13/01/2017	A23	Dismissed, but serious crimes down	Rudy Chato Paul	Leadership	Discipline	Two snr cops sent on retirement for lack of performance. Decision appeared strange since dismissal was never aligned with performance before.	Negative
70	Guardian	13/01/2017	A23	Total support for CoP	Sahadeo Ragoonanan	Leadership	Discipline	Ag. CoP must be given full support and commendation for his act of prowess. It cannot be business as usual.	Positive
71	Guardian	13/01/2017	A211	Former Minister: Williams should be fired also	Comments from Facebook follower	Leadership	Ineffective Leader & Discipline	Top CoP has to fire himself first. Williams should resign as well. Would Williams have performed better if he was promoted? If yes, then he allowed things to slide	Negative
72	Guardian	13/01/2017	A5	We're being used as scapegoats	Jensen La Vende	Leadership	Discipline	The two snr Police Officers told to take early retirement because of poor performance say they are being sacrificed by the CoP for political attainment. CoP is using Officers to show he can address crime.	Negative
73	Express	13/01/2017	4	Breach of Police Service Act	Renuka Singh	Leadership	Discipline	Gerald Ramdeen, Attorney at Law for the two snr Officers forced into retirement, is challenging the dismissal. He says it is a breach of the Police Service Act, the Officers were being targeted and unfairly treated.	Negative



74	Express	12/01/2017	12	DOMA welcomed CoP's move	Kim Boodram	Leadership	Discipline	DOMA welcomed holding public officers to account based on performance following CoP's decision to send two snr Officers on early retirement. DOMA highlighted the long terms benefits of promoting public officers on performance rather than service.	Positive
75	Guardian	12/01/2017	A6	We support our CoP	Jensen La Vende	Leadership	Discipline	Three of seven Commanders say that they are in agreement with CoP's decision to terminate two snr Officers for inefficiency and ineffectiveness.	Positive
76	Guardian	14/01/2017	A7	No political pressure on CoP	Geisha Kowlessar	Leadership	Discipline	Dillon made it clear there was no political pressure placed on CoP to make the decision to send snr Officers into early retirement. CoP explained he was exercising his authority under Section 74(2)(b) of the Police Service Act.	Neutral
77	Express	14/01/2017	9	CoP Williams has the power	Ria Taitt	Leadership	Discipline	MNS Minister Dillon has taken hands off approach to decision of CoP to ask snr Officers to give reasons why they should not be retired. The Minister stated that the CoP has done what he did in his own discretion.	Mixed
78	Express	14/01/2017	7	More cops to get walking papers? Williams not saying	Camille Hunte	Leadership	Discipline		Neutral
79	Express	14/01/2017	4	More mobile foot patrols for Carnival	Ria Taitt	Crime measures	Recommendations	The PM promised there would be a significant increase in the joint patrol during the Carnival season to ensure venues have a significant level of security. He said there would be canine patrols. PM Rowley was questioned on whether his Gov't had a crime plan.	Negative

80	Express	13/01/2017	12	Finally, crime fighter called to account	Opinion	Leadership	Discipline	With crime rampant and murders proliferating the impunity assured by low detection rate, the crime fighters were always some day to be held to account. The CoP invoked the Police Act to send on retirement Officers in charge of 2 heavy crime areas where policing responses have appeared to make little difference.	Mixed
81	Newsday	15/01/2017	16	Full support for top cop	Sahadeo Ragoonanan	Leadership	Discipline	Reference is made to Ag. CoP positive action to weed out inefficiencies, ineffectiveness and incompetence. The Ag. CoP must be given full support and commendation for his act of prowess.	Positive
82	Express	15/01/2017	12	Do your job	Martin Daly	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Leadership	M. Daly indicated that law enforcement is at the end of a spectrum. At the beginning were things that shape the minds and influenced the behaviour of young children and lead them to criminality. The detection rate is pathetic.	Negative
83	Express	15/01/2017	5	Queries into Carmona Housing Allowance	Denyse Renne	Internal Communication	Operation	CoP indicated he was unaware of any probe against the President by Ms. Bharatt	Neutral
84	Express	17/01/2017	4	22 homicides for 2017, no one charged	Susan Mohammed	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Policing	Zero is the detection rate for 22 homicides in T&T for 2017 as @ Jan 17. Minister Dillon who was asked about the statistics informed that he does concentrate on statistics. He indicated he prefers to look at the qualitative aspect which focuses on getting rid of the fear of crime.	Negative
85	Express	16/01/2017	14	Good luck, Mr. Cop	Athelston Clinton	Leadership	Discipline	Focused on the attitude and lack of commitment of the Officers of TTPS. Indicated total agreement of the stance of CoP in purging the service of non-performers.	Negative

86	Guardian	16/01/2017	A3	Cops failed to intervene says shooting victim	Radhica De Silva	Policing	Non-responsive Behaviour	The inability of Police to respond to a shooting even though they were present resulting in the death of a young man on Ciper Street.	Negative
87	Express	18/01/2017	12	An appalling flood of blood	Editor	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Policing	Despite the increase in crime the Minister of National Security expounded that more deterrence, more intelligence gathering and detection are what will make the difference. The Editor intimated that the citizenry have been waiting for evidence of these initiatives.	Negative
88	Express	18/01/2017	8	Seecharan back in Court; still no file for DPP's office	Rickie Ramdass	Policing	Delays in the System	The DPP's Office is yet to receive the file containing information to be used to prosecute. The Police prosecutor, in his response, indicated the file was "still in transit" even after a month of the perpetrator being charged.	Negative
89	Guardian	18/01/2017	A3	Capable officers can now shine	Sascha Wilson	Leadership	Disciplinary	AG Faris Al-Rawi has commended Ag. CoP Williams for invoking his power under the constitution to discipline his charges. CoP informed two Snr Supt that their services were being considered for terminatin for non-performance under the Police Service Act.	Positive
90	Guardian	18/01/2017	A5	TTPS Manpower Audit Committee appointed	Editor	Crime measures	Manpower Audit	The Committee charged with the responsibility of conducting the 1st manpower audit of the TTPS established by the National Security Council and chaired by PM Keith Rowley.	Neutral
91	Newsday	17/01/2017	5	Top cop responds to Ramdeen's letter	Nalinee Seelal	Leadership	Disciplinary	Ag. CoP Williams replied to the legal proceedings of two Snr Supt who he intends to send on early retirement for alleged non-performance.	Neutral

92	Express	20/01/2017	13	Killers uncaught	Mark Wilson	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Policing	Highlights of murder rate within the Caribbean and rate of detection. When compared with T&T rate of detection was the lowest considering T&T had more cash to spend on security.	Negative
93	Guardian	20/01/2017	A18	Only tangible results will sway public opinion	Editorial	Crime measures	Recommendations	Gov't's crime plan may not be achieved unless there is reform in TTPS. The shortcomings of the TTPS will be a hindrance. Must have improved crime detection and maintenance of public order and measurable performance markers for Police Officers.	Negative
94	Express	19/01/2017	12	A crime emergency	Opinion	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Policing and Ineffective Leadership	In terms of murders this year TTPS is in a shameful position of not having made a single arrest. Strategy used by TTPS not working.	Negative
95	Newsday	06/02/2017	14	Mr. Commissioner, do the honourable thing	Ronald Huggins	Leadership	Ineffective Policing	The CoP has not made any progress with crime reduction and should therefore step down. CoP fails to admit that the crime situation is a crisis.	Negative
96	Express	20/01/2017	3	War about to begin	A. Bruzual	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Policing	Broad daylight, close to the Police Station two men were gunned down. Police Constable sustained minor injuries. Assaultants got away.	Negative
97	Express	19/01/2017	3	Don't judge cops on murders alone	A. Bruzual	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Policing and Ineffective Leadership	CoP stated that TTPS should not be judged on murder alone but on the other serious crimes. Public, however, is judging performance on the number of murders recorded and the number solved.	Neutral
98	Express	22/01/2017	15	A SAUTT-like unit will help curb crime	Anthony Jones	Crime measures	Ineffective Policing and Ineffective Leadership	A SAUTT-like unit is needed to assist the Police Service to curb runaway crime. The Police Service with its inept leadership, abysmal detection rate and rogue elements appears not to be not up to the challenge.	Negative

99	Newsday	21/01/2017	17	Set targets were not met	Nalinee Seelal	Leadership	Discipline	CoP noted that the targets set for the two snr Police Officers were not met so under Section 123A of the Constitution he asked the Officers to proceed on early retirement as a result of non-performance.	Neutral
100	Express	21/01/2017	8	Cops: Help us do more	Gyasi Gonzales	Crime measures	Recommendations	Partnering with the public can help curb crime.	Neutral
101	Express	30/01/2017	8	Absorb SRP's	Sue-Ann Wayow	Crime measures	Recommendations	Absorption of SRP's to help solve crime.	Neutral
102	Express	31/01/2017	13	Hopelessness, despair in Police Service	Kenneth Lalla	Leadership	Discipline	The decision of the CoP for two snr Officers to proceed on early retirement may not be a panacea to the growing intolerance and increasing escalation of crime. It appears that notwithstanding the managerial powers vested in the Police Service Commission and the CoP the Service continues to be mixed into the abyss of hopelessness and despair.	Negative
103	Express	31/01/2017	15	Get those SRP's up and running	Rachel Gomez	Crime measures	Recommendations	Apsorption of SRP's	Neutral
104	Express	20/01/2017	4	Analysts: Same old crime plan	Anna Ramdass	Crime measures	Recommendations	The initiatives announced by CoP were nothing new. It is a repetition of ideas that have been around for a while	Negative
105	Guardian	12/01/2017	A6	Williams should be fired also	Riton Dowlat	Leadership	Discipline	Sources revealed rumbling in the Executive Management of the TTPS based on the CoP's discussion to send two snr Officers on early retirement. It is believed this may be a political directive. Gary Griffith said that while Williams has the power to hire and fire, why he took so long to do such.	Negative

106	Express	25/01/2017	8	Three accused of contempt	Rickie Ramdass	Policing	Corrupted Officers in TTPS	Contempt of Court proceedings filed against three officers after they failed on two occasions to carry out the order of a High Court judge.	Negative
107	Express	24/01/2017	13	Edge of anarchy	Raffique Shah	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Policing	Two men gunned down in broad daylight outside Maracas Police Station. Show of disregard and disrespect for the Police and law and order.	Negative
108	Express	23/01/2017	3	PM: We are a violent society	Juhel Browne	Leadership	Ineffective Policing	PM said he is "far from satisfied with the results" from the law enforcement.	Negative
109	Newsday	23/01/2017	13	Criminal activity unbounded	Trevor Sudama	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Leadership	The inability of the authorities, but at the level of the security agencies and the political directorate, to stem the tide of lawlessness. The first line of defence for a society under siege is the responsiveness and effectiveness and reliability of the Police Service. Police Service has failed to do this.	Negative
110	Guardian	23/01/2017	A8	Express critical of local policing	Rhondor Dowlat	Crime measures	Recommendations	Intelligence-led and problem-oriented policing will maximize effective allocation of law enforcement resources to reduce crime. Law enforcement has to change its approaches to successfully detect, deter and respond to new trends in crime.	Neutral
111	Express	28/01/2017	15	No charge for our Police Manpower Audit	Prof. Ramesh Deosaran	Crime measures	Recommendations	Professor Deosaran informing citizens that the Manpower Audit is of no charge. There is no payment being made to members of the Committee.	Neutral
112	Newsday	25/01/2017	13	Crime solution beyond Police	Editor	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Leadership	The CoP reiterated his call for the public to support the Police. Public voiced that the Police on the other hand are the reason for the lack of co-operation.	Negative

113	Express	06/01/2017	6	The country has spent \$21B on policing over 10 years	Editorial	Crime measures	Recommendations	The PM said the Committee will tell the Gov't who is there, what they are, how they are deployed and how effective the deployment is.	Neutral
114	Newsday	07/02/2017	7	Enough Police in T&T	Newsday Staff	Crime measures	Recommendations	PM stated there is enough Police Officers in the country and once they effectively do their job, crime will be dealt with. There are 6,000 regular Police Officers and approx. 2,000 SRP's. As a result, the Police to citizen ratio exceeds global standards.	Neutral
115	Express	07/02/2017	13	Conversation with the Prime Minister	Raffique Shah	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Leadership, Corrupted Police Officers	Concept of PM holding conversations across the country is a welcome change. Topics to be discussed - crime, rogue elements in TTPS.	Mixed
116	Newsday	07/02/2017	14	Police overtaken by air-condition comfort	Michael J. Williams	Leadership	Ineffective Policing	Lack of Police presence due to officers remaining in air-conditioned offices. Police force is more a provider of employment than a provider of service.	Negative
117	Newsday	05/03/2017	5	IATF Officers take sick leave	Nalinee Seelal	Crime measures	Dysfunctional Cops	President of PSWA has described a frightening decision of some officers of the IATF to take sick-out action over changes in their working hrs. This stemmed from the withdrawal of some of the equipment used in the performance of their duties.	Negative
118	Newsday	04/03/2017	18	New head for Eastern Division	Nalinee Seelal	Leadership	Discipline	Snr Supt. Trim - One of the two officers who was given an ultimatum to take early retirement for alleged incompetence has been transferred from Eastern Division to Finance Branch.	Negative

119	Express	04/03/2017	3	Moonnilal: Government has failed	Editor	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Leadership	The leaders of Gov't and law enforcement cannot handle the crime epidemic and, as a result, should resign. There is an emphasis on speed guns and breathalysers while a violent crime surge has Negatively impacted the country's image internationally.	Negative
120	Newsday	06/03/2017	9	PM, Dillon, Top cop congratulate Police	Nalinee Seelal	Leadership	Effective leadership	Ag. CoP wrote to all divisional commanders of the TTPS extending his gratitude to the officers who worked tirelessly during Carnival season.	Positive
121	Guardian	06/03/2017	A3	Police can help victims more	Editor	Challenges with crime	Police's role in domestic violence	Statistics for the period Jan 2015 to Dec 2016 reflected approx. 56,744 domestic cases. It is important for all authorities, especially the Police, to ensure protection orders are enforced.	Neutral
122	Express	07/03/2017	5	Debe now a crime hotspot	Sandhya Santoo	Crime measures	Recommendations	MP Moonnilal indicated that Debe should now be considered a hotspot and called the Minister of National Security and Police to treat it as such.	Negative
123	Express	07/03/2017	14	Fix local Government by empowering communities	Editor	Crime measures	Recommendations	CoP should not be the one to approve a firearm license. TTPS to be restructured to allow for community electronic surveillance, community Police patrols.	Neutral
124	Express	11/03/2017	9	SRP held with illegal gun	Editor	Corruption	Rogue Cops	SRP in Police custody after being held with an illegal firearm in Diego Martin.	Negative
125	Newsday	09/03/2017	5	600 cops blanked Carnival	Nalinee Seelal	Leadership	Discipline	Over 600 Police Officers blanked a directive from CoP to report for duty over the Carnival season. This resulted in some ports of entry being unmanned and some Officers having to work excessively long hours.	Negative



126	Express	08/03/2017	13	Crime and Statistics	Andy Johnson	Challenges with crime	Lack of Crime Statistics	The national statistic of a 15% overall reduction in serious crimes means nothing to the citizenry. People are feeling emboldened to show anger and resentment to the high-ranking crime fighters including the CoP.	Negative
127	Express	12/03/2017	8	The soft underbelly	Martin Daly	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Leadership	Inability to make progress in fight against violent crime. Inability of Ag. CoP to curb influx of illegal firearms and secure borders. Writer stated that the oligarchy, comprising special interests of crime, reside in the underbelly of law enforcement and politics.	Negative
128	Express	11/03/2017	14	Use motobike cops to stop road hogs	W. Dopson	Crime measures	Recommendations	Use of motorcycle Police coming from west all along Stadium to stem lawless driving. Increase charge for offenders.	Negative
129	Guardian	11/03/2017	A6	Four held while staking out bar	Kevon Felmine	Crime measures	Misc	Police acting on a report did stakeout and held four suspects. Police Officers directed to perform hotspots patrol.	Positive
130	Express	15/03/2017	7	We won't tolerate central lawlessness	A. Bruzual	Challenges with crime	Rise of Lawlessness	Head of Central Division has warned gangs in his district he will not tolerate any form of lawlessness.	Neutral
131	Express	14/03/2017	13	The Western Division crime initiative	Michael Scott	Crime measures	Recommendations	Need to implement significant strategies to ensure lasting solutions. Sharing of information with Police, promotion of real time networking, need to install GPS system, etc.	Neutral
132	Guardian	13/03/2017	A9	Country at breaking point	Shaliza Hassanali	Crime measures	Recommendations	Appeal to country's strategist to change their approach in investigative and intelligence gathering to fight crime. Law enforcement authorities needed to pay more attention to human trafficking.	Neutral
133	Express	18/03/2017	8	Mentally ill man shot dead by cops	A. Bruzual	Policing	Training Deficiency & Lack of non-lethal weapons	Mentally ill person shot dead by Police Officer. call was made and reinforced for non-lethal weapons for use in the performance of duties.	Neutral

134	Guardian	17/03/2017	A8	100 criminal gangs in T&T	Gail Alexander	Challenges with crime	Rise of Criminal Gangs	Country's high murder rate driven by rise in gang and drug related activities. Violent crime remains a major concern for local security services and the general population.	Negative
135	Guardian	16/03/2017	A12	Crime chasing foreign investors	K. Felmini	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Leadership & Policing	Crime now seen as a deterrent for foreign investors in T&T. TTPS appeared to have "thrown hands in the air in despair". Need for Police intervention with respect to focusing on detection rate.	Negative
136	Guardian	19/01/2017	A3	Williams, no need to resign	Editor	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Leadership & Policing	CoP stated that there is no reason for him to resign. His performance, he stated, is not based on murders alone. Public needs to look at the lowering of serious crime.	Neutral
137	Express	16/02/2017	15	Criminals must not win this war	John Jessamy	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Leadership & Policing	The murders of young women of T&T. The CoP needs to develop new strategies, such as a task force, to deal with the abduction of young women.	Neutral
138	Guardian	16/02/2017	A23	Too much duplication within the TTPS	Athelston Clinton	Challenges with crime	Recommendations	Implementation of a heavy offences operation. Assign officers to stations and employ civilians to do desk jobs now performed by Police.	Neutral
139	Guardian	15/02/2017	A12	Search for 894 municipal police recruits	Rhadia De Silva	Crime measures	Recommendations	Increasing the complement of municipal police will be used to improve citizens' safety.	Neutral
140	Express	19/03/2017	14	Slave masters and sufferahs	Sophia Chote	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Policing	Killing spree of the women of T&T. TTPS inability to keep public abreast of what is happening. TTPS moving from being dysfunctional to non-functional.	Negative
141	Newsday	09/03/2017	3	Cops abused too	Janelle de Souza	Police Wellness	Effect on Police Officers	Both male and female officers in the Police Service experience emotional, physical and psychological abuse. Statistics to support was obtained from the EAP register.	Neutral

142	Guardian	18/03/2017	A8	I have a duty to help T&T	Rosemarie Sant	Crime measures	Recommendations	Former AG, Ramesh Maharaj, is confident that hangings will resume. TTPS, however, must pay emphasis to crime detection. You cannot make a dent in crime without detecting the crime.	Neutral
143	Newsday	09/04/2017	8	Gays are targets for criminals	Janelle de Souza	Policing	Poor Service	Members of the LGBTQI community who were previously robbed for valuables are now being murdered and the rate is increasing. Police accused of dismissing their claims of discrimination or abuse and not taking reports seriously.	Negative
144	Newsday	09/04/2017	20	Give peace deal a chance	Julien Neaves	Crime measures	Initiatives	Citizen Security Programme rep. Mtima Solwazi says gangs in Enterprise turning to peace. Community must support move and give them time to turn around. Chaguanas Police will be engaged by CSP eventually.	Positive
145	Express	09/04/2017	8	West: TTPS needs more training	Alexander Bruzual	Crime measures	Recommendations	PCA Head stated Police Officers required more sensitivity training to deal with public. PCA to address increase of fatal and non-fatal shootings in Eastern Division to reduce the number of occurrences. He commended Snr Supt. Nelson and his Officers for the highest detection rate (serious crimes) in all Divisions.	Mixed
146	Express	09/04/2017	10	Gaspard okays 'less than ideal' DPP Office at South mall	Anna Ramdass	Misc	New initiatives	New DPP South office located in Gulf City Mall. DPP Gaspard stated he gave his ok with reservations given that the location and other aspects were not suitable for such an office.	Negative
147	Express	09/04/2017	12	Coming for someone	Martin Daly	Corruption	Corrupted Officers in TTPS	Citizens live at the mercy of criminals, who shoot recklessly at targets, and not under protection of TTPS. Corruption in different forms is rife in the TTPS.	Negative

148	Express	09/04/2017	14	The ghost of the future	Sophia Chote	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Leadership & Policing	Spoke of mis-use and failure of anti-gang legislation. A look at the country's status with respect to no. of gangs and their activities. The amount of crimes committed by its members while only gang killings are reported. There is false reporting by the media e.g. Minister walking through a hotspot, to alleviate fears of citizenry.	Negative
149	Guardian	09/04/2017	A3	PCA gets most complaints about Northern Division cops	Kalifa Clyne	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Policing	2013-2015 Northern Division, which spans St. Joseph to Cumuto, had the most complaints against Police. Port-of-Spain and Central also came in high on the list for same. All 3 divisions have highest number of recorded crime. Interaction was pinpointed as the problem bet. the public and Officers. Officers are being trained accordingly while the public need to understand the powers held by Police.	Neutral
150	Guardian	24/02/2017	A19	Body cameras for Police now, please	Arnold Goopeesingh	Crime measures	Rogue Cops	An incident of a young man shot in Laventille. It appears to be execution by Police Officer. No witnesses. Officers must wear body camera to avoid this situation.	Negative
151	Guardian	24/02/2017	A16	Find fix to Laventille's cries	Editor	Corruption	Alleged Police Killing, Bribery, Extortion	Shooting of Mikeal "Short Buck" Lancaster by Police Officers in Laventille.	Negative
152	Express	20/02/2017	17	CoP: Too many angry people	Sandhya Santoo	Challenges with crime	Recommendations	Inter-faith services to be used as motivation for Officers.	Neutral
153	Newsday	20/02/2017	12	Beyond Police Service reform	Trevor Sudama	Crime measures	Police reforms	Reform of TTPS should include steps to motivate Officers of TTPS. A properly functional and efficient TTPS is not sufficient to curb crime in the country in the long term.	Neutral

154	Newsday	01/03/2017	19	Top Cop: Citizens can stop crime	Ryan Hamilton-Davis	Challenges with crime	Police Partnering with Citizens	CoP stated that citizens can stop crime completely. He said the Police only play a part in fighting crime. The only person who can stop criminal acts from happening are the citizens.	Neutral
155	Express	01/03/2017	5	Top Cop: Hope still in Asami case	Rickie Ramdass	Challenges with crime	Unsolved Homicides	Ag. CoP, after one year, stated that his Officers have not given up on the case w.r.t. the murder of Japanese pannist Asami Nagakiya. The TTPS is working to pursue the case.	Neutral
156	Guardian	25/02/2017	A25	Criticize, complain, compliment, collaborate with the Police	Hershael Ramesar	Challenges with crime	Police Partnering with Citizens	Despite the perceived failure of the TTPS to protect the nation, it is also important to take note of their efforts by the Highway Patrol Division assisting motorists with difficulties and the risk they themselves are in.	Positive
157	Guardian	09/04/2017	A6	Under the gun in Enterprise	Charles Kong Soo	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Leadership & Policing	A resident's account of daily life in Enterprise and how the shooting and killing of Robocop's relative has changed the family's living arrangements. Having shootings taking place so close to the Police post and not have any intervention makes one afraid to stay in the community. Residents want a clean community.	Negative
158	Guardian	09/04/2017	A16	Rebranding or reforming?		Crime measures	Recommendations	Attempts to create peace between two rival gangs in Enterprise.	Mixed
159	Guardian	05/04/2017	A18	Broken window theory can help T&T fight crime	Editorial	Crime measures	Recommendations	Writer spoke of adapting certain elements of the 'broken window' theory to our local situation to assist in crime fighting. This must be supported by other social and community initiatives as well as other agencies and institutions to be a success.	Neutral

160	Guardian	05/04/2017	A6	Dillon: Special ACP for Central	Gail Alexander	Crime measures	Initiatives	Spoke of the installation of an ACP to head the Central Division as opposed to a Snr Supt as it was in the past. Resources in this Division are sufficient for now, however, they are well equipped to deal with any upsurge in criminal activity in Enterprise. They also have add. manpower from IATF, GEB and Rapid Response Unit. Paula Gopee-Scoon stated	Positive
161	Newsday	05/04/2017	5	Dillon: More security for Central	Clint Chan Tack	Crime measures	Initiatives	TTPS and TTFD have allocated additional resources to Central Division to bolster operations. Therefore more foot and mobile patrols. The Division is well equipped to deal with any eventuality and will now be one of two - instead of three - Divisions that form the Region South. Paula Gopee-Scoon stated that South is still attractive to investors despite challenges posed by crime.	Positive
162	Newsday	09/04/2017	6	West: No politics in PCA	Corey Connelly	Policing	Initiatives	Mr. West stated that since his apptmt in Nov 2014 there has not been any political interference in PCA's operations. PCA will be purchasing a new App to facilitate online complaint submission and is taking steps to have a more efficiently run org. in order to address case load of approx. 1000 matters.	Positive
163	Express	08/04/2017	7	"Krysis" wants peace	Alexander Bruzual	Crime measures	Initiatives	Avinash 'Krysis' Seepersad because of the intervention of Imam Umar Abdullah will instead use his resources to foster peace in Enterprise. He apologized to the nation for previous actions. When confronted by Minister Dillion re. the Facebook postings that scared nationals, Seepersad said he wanted	Mixed

								the nation to know about Police corruption in the area.	
164	Newsday	08/04/2017	9	Enterprise gangs: We have info to bring down TTPS	Kwame Weekes	Corruption	Corrupted Officers in TTPS	Imam Umar Abdullah and Avinash 'Krysis' Seepersad stated they have enough information to bring down the TTPS and revolutionize the way policing is done in T&T. They want to share this information with high ranking Officers who are interested in changing the situation. They cited corruption and brutality as the main contributing factors to the state of the TTPS.	Negative
165	Newsday	08/04/2017	13	Police must also obey the law	Karan Mahabirsingh	Policing	Discipline	The writer related an incident where Police parked alongside another vehicle to converse with the driver for a period of time and in so doing obstructed vehicles and created a line of traffic, affecting law-abiding citizens. It was felt that Officers first needed to observe the same laws to which they hold citizens accountable.	Negative
166	Newsday	06/04/2017	10	Commissioner sends senior officer on leave	Nalinee Seelal	Leadership	Ineffective Policing and Ineffective Leadership	Snr Supt. Ramdhanie - Head of Western Division - sent on 1 month leave by Ag. CoP because of upsurge in murders in the Division. Implemented 24-hr shift system in Maraval PS, add. manpower placed in La Puerta & D/Martin.	Negative

167	Newsday	06/04/2017	13	Country on the brink of chaos	Gordon Laughlin	Leadership	Poor Service and Indiscipline	The writer spoke to the inefficiencies of the public service and lawlessness i.e service rendered at gov't offices, EMA oversight, TTPS unaccountability, vagrancy, etc. Gov't must admit crime situation too big to handle alone and seek assistance from like foreign entities.	Negative
168	Express	17/04/2017	7	State to pay copy \$40,000	Nikita Braxton-Benjamin	Leadership	Ineffective Policing and Ineffective Leadership	Officer cut over left eye and beaten by inmates in San F'do Court cell block. His case stated that rundown facilities at the cell block, a shortfall of adequate and competent officers and other factors resulted in him sustaining injury while removing 2 inmates from the cell.	Negative
169	Express	16/04/2017	19	Who leaked TTPS roadblock schedule?	Alexander Bruzual	Crime measures	Intiatives	Roadblocks throughout T&T apparently successful as reports of serious crimes throughout Divisions were minimal. Central Division schedules for warrant exercises posted on social media. Investigation of the leak continuing. Police targeting youth in community outreach programmes as they are the future's law abiding citizens or criminals.	Mixed
170	Guardian	16/04/2017	A22	Bad management a big problem	Athelston Clinton	Leadership	Poor Service	Fire Service unable to access water to manage the fires at ANSA Building because of defective hydrants. Traffic Wardens ineffective as they look on while traffic piles up.	Negative
171	Express	15/04/2017	3	Cop to face discipline for leaking plan online	Rickie Ramdass	Corruption	Corrupted Officers in TTPS	Central Division schedule of roadblocks to be held over the Easter weekend was leaked to social media. The document gave times, location and snr officers on duty for the exercise. Investigations continuing to pinpoint the Officer to be disciplined.	Neutral



172	Express	15/04/2017	14	Rise above the blight of crime	Simon Wright	Crime measures	Recommendations	Country in a state of crisis due to crime and citizens appealing for restoration of a society of decency and order through harsher penalties for serious crime, instilling respect for the law, etc.	Mixed
173	Express	15/04/2017	7	Manslaughter appeal against cop dismissed	Rickie Ramdass	Misc	Police Killing	Court of Appeal dismissed appeal filed by the Gov't against a Police Officer who was freed on a charge of the unlawful killing of a man.	Neutral
174	Express	15/04/2017	7	Make Stephen Williams CoP	Alexander Bruzual	Crime measures	Initiatives	Ag. CoP Williams should be appointed to the position since this will boost morale and provide a sense of comfort and security among Officers, and engender higher regard and respect from the community for the CoP.	Positive
175	Newsday	15/04/2017	13	Poor work ethic major a problem in country	Rudy Chato Paul, Sr.	Leadership	Poor service	Poor operations in all Gov't agencies. Low detection rate by Police. If Gov't can take credit when crime figures are down it can also take the blame when figures are high.	Negative
176	Newsday	14/04/2017	19	Top cop: Police doing its best	Nalinee Seelal	Policing	Corrupted Officers, Poor Service	Crime detection rate low. PM not satisfied with crime management ie. detection and suppression. PM also stated corruption within Service needs to be eradicated so Officers can trust colleagues and public can trust the TTPS.	Negative
177	Newsday	13/04/2017	8	No Easter holidays for cops		Crime measures	Initiatives	TTPS will be out in full force over the Easter weekend conducting road blocks, DUI, speed exercises, etc. to ensure safety of motorists and pedestrians especially in Tobago.	Positive
178	Newsday	13/04/2017	17	Police engage gay rights groups		Crime measures	Initiatives	NGO's and TTPS to collaborate to identify crimes against members of special groups, e.g. LGBTQI, and assist in initiatives to strengthen how TTPS	Positive


								deals with domestice and bias violence.	
179	Newsday	13/04/2017	5	"I am not satisfied"	Miranda La Rose	Policing	Corrupted Officers	PM not satisfied with crime management, crime detection and crime suppression. To have success citizens must be held accountable for their behaviour. The role of TTPS is to respond to criminals. Corruption in the Service must be dealt with so the population can trust and Officers can trust colleagues.	Mixed
180	Express	13/04/2017	17	Tobago cop: Murder increase worrying	Alexander Bruzual	Crime measures	Initiatives	Head of T'bgo Division, Ag. Snr Supt Joanne Archie, expressed concern about the rise in murders in Tobago. However, serious crimes down by 19%. In relation to larcenies, robberies and break-ins, 30 persons were arrested and taken before the courts. Over the long weekend in T'bgo there will be increased patrols, breathalyser tests and road blocks.	Mixed
181	Express	13/04/2017	7	Colombian among 4 held with \$15M cocaine	Susan Mohammed	Policing	Effective Policing	Colombian among 4 men held for possession of 11 kg cocaine seized in 2 separate raids in La Romaine on the same day.	Positive
182	Express	13/04/2017	18	"Changing minister won't solve crime"	Camille Hunte	Leadership	Ineffective Policing and Ineffective Leadership	PM supporting Minister of National Security despite calls for his resignation stating that changing ministers will not solve crime. PM not satisfied with any area of crime fighting. What is required is a change in the population's attitude and behaviour as well as building the capacity of other agencies, ie. TTDF, TTCG, SSA, to respond as appropriate.	Mixed

183	Newsday	12/04/2017	13	Ask Gary Griffith for help	Elizabeth Perez	Crime measures	Recommendations	The writer claims country in a state of fear and despair because of the level of crime without resolution in sight. Wants the Gov't to stop the blame game and deal with the situation even with the help of former national security minister Gary Griffith.	Negative
184	Guardian	10/04/2017	A12	Councillor wants more patrols after villager killed	Gail Alexander	Misc	Increased Police Presence	Call by Councillor for Reform/Manahambre for increased Police presence in the village where brutal murder of elderly resident occurred. He is to work with NGO's and residents to form community watch groups which will liaise with Municipal Police and other orgs. towards a safer community.	Negative
185	Guardian	05/03/2017	A20	Amend search and seizure laws	Akile Simon	Corruption	Rogue Cops	Abuse of the officers of TTPS during search and seizure exercises particularly in depressed communities.	Negative
186	Guardian	05/03/2017	A22	Crime, water woes in Maracas Valley	Kalifa Clyne	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Policing	Crime in Maracas Valley is a major problem for members of the community.	Negative
187	Guardian	18/04/2017	A18	Together we aspire, together we achieve	Editor	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Leadership	Violence and the causes of violence seen out of control with the Government acknowledging that corruption is endemic in the Police force.	Negative
188	Express	18/04/2017	14	The crucifixion and resurrection of Trinidad	Editor	Challenges with crime	Ineffective Leadership	The primary duty of any Gov't is the safety and security of its citizenry and loss of law and order due to going warfare is the most visible sign that Gov't has failed.	Negative
189	Express	17/04/2017	14	Our Police need big boost	Editor	Challenges with crime	Inefficient Policing	The causes of crime are never really analysed by those who swear to fight it. The reality is the young men have grown confident in the inability of the Police to break their confidence.	Negative

190	Newsday	17/04/2017	3	Cops owe \$.7M	Nalinee Seelal	Leadership	Dishonest Cops	About 1,000 people are owed monies amounting to \$.7M by Western Division Police, after they made payments for extra duty but the Police Officers never showed up.	Negative
-----	---------	------------	---	----------------	----------------	------------	----------------	--	----------

# Appendix 3 – Proposed Decentralized Human Resource Division

APPENDIX II



## Appendix 4 – TTPS Shift Hours

**Re: Working Hours in the Police Divisions**

Reference is made to the caption above.

The following hours shown below are hour of duty in the Divisions.

<b>Divisions</b>	<b>Hours</b>
<b>POS</b>	<b>Daylight 8:00am – 6:00pm Night 6:00pm – 8:00am 2 days rest Task Force 24/24 CID 8:00 am – 6:00 pm Staff 7:00 am – 3:00 pm, 8:00am – 4:00pm, 9:00 am – 5:00pm</b>
<b>Northern</b>	<b>Daylight 8:00am – 6:00pm Night 6:00pm – 8:00am 2 days rest Task Force 24/24 CID 8:00 am- 6:00 pm, 6:00pm – 8:00 am Office 8:00am – 4:00pm</b>
<b>Eastern</b>	<b>Daylight 8:00am – 6:00pm Night 6:00pm – 8:00am 2 days rest Task Force 24/24 CID 24/24 Offices 8:00 am – 6:00pm , 8:00 am- 4:00 pm</b>
<b>Central</b>	<b>Daylight 8:00am – 6:00pm Night 6:00pm – 8:00am 2 days rest Task Force 24/24 Office 8:00 am – 4:00 pm</b>
<b>Southern Western</b>	<b>Daylight 8:00am – 6:00pm Night 6:00pm – 8:00am 2 days rest Task Force 24/24 Monday – Friday 8:00 am – 4:00pm Office 8:00am – 4:00pm</b>

<b>Southern</b>	<b>Daylight 7:00am – 6:00pm Night 6:00pm – 7:00am 2 days rest Task Force 1 day 1 night 1 day off CID Daylight 8:00am – 5pm , 7:00 am -6:00pm, 6:00pm – 7:00pm Office 8:00am – 4:00pm</b>
<b>Northern Eastern</b>	<b>Daylight 8:00am – 6:00pm Night 6:00pm – 8:00am 2 days rest Task Force 24/24 CID 8:00 am- 6:00 pm, 6:00pm – 8:00 am Office 8:00am – 4:00 pm</b>
<b>Western</b>	<b>Daylight 8:00am – 6:00pm Night 6:00pm – 8:00am 2 days rest Task Force 24/24 CID 8:00 am- 6:00 pm, 6:00pm – 8:00 am Maraval 24/48 Operation Room 24/48</b>
<b>Tobago</b>	<b>Daylight 8:00am – 6:00pm Night 6:00pm – 8:00am 2 days rest Task Force 24/48 CID 8:00 am- 8:00 pm</b>

**POS 8:00am – 6:00pm / 6:00pm – 8:00am 2 days rest**  
**Task Force 24/24 CID 8:00 am – 6:00 pm**  
**Staff 7:00 am – 3:00 pm, 8:00am – 4:00pm, 9:00 am – 5:00pm**

**Northern 8:00am – 6:00pm / 6:00pm – 8:00am 2 days rest**  
**Task Force 24/24 CID 8:00 am- 6:00 pm, 6:00pm – 8:00 am**  
**Office 8:00am – 4:00pm**

**Eastern 8:00am – 6:00pm / 6:00pm – 8:00am 2 days rest**  
**Task Force 24/24 CID 8:00 am- 6:00 pm, 6:00pm – 8:00 am**  
**Office 8:00am – 4:00pm**

**Central** 8:00am – 6:00pm /6:00pm – 8:00am 2 days rest

**Task Force 24/24**

**Office 8:00 am – 4:00 pm**

**SWD** 8:00am – 6:00pm / 6:00pm – 8:00am 2 days rest

**Task Force 24/24**

**Monday – Friday 8:00 am – 4:00pm**

**Office 8:00am – 4:00pm**

**Southern** 7:00am – 6:00pm / 6:00pm – 7:00am 2 days rest

**Task Force 1 day 1 night 1 day off CID Daylight 8:00am – 5pm , 7:00 am - 6:00pm, 6:00pm – 7:00pm**

**Office 8:00am – 4:00pm**

**Northern E** 8:00am – 6:00pm / 6:00pm – 8:00am 2 days rest

**Task Force 24/24 CID 8:00 am- 6:00 pm, 6:00pm – 8:00 am**

**Office 8:00am – 4:00 pm**

**Western** 8:00am – 6:00pm /6:00pm – 8:00am 2 days rest

**Task Force 24/24 CID 8:00 am- 6:00 pm, 6:00pm – 8:00 am**

**Maraval 24/48 Operation Room 24/48**

**Tobago** 8:00am – 6:00pm /6:00pm – 8:00am 2 days rest

**Task Force 24/48 CID 8:00 am- 8:00 pm.**



## Appendix 5 - TTPS Performance Targets

### TTPS 2017 PERFORMANCE TARGETS

#### GOAL #1 – Reduce and Detect Crime

	Performance Areas	Performance Targets
1	Murders	10% Reduction
2	Violent Crimes	5% Reduction
3	Shootings and Woundings	5% Reduction
4	Serious Crimes	5% Reduction
5	Detection Rate (Serious Crimes)	30%
6	Detection Rate (White Collar Crimes)	5% Increase
7	Illegal Firearms	At least 765 Found and Seized
8	Illegal Drugs	5% Increase in Quantity Found and Seized
9	Training in Criminal Investigation	At least 100 Officers Trained
10	Training in Court Prosecution	At least 50 Officers Trained
11	Strengthening of Key Specialist Units	5% Increase in Manpower of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Special Branch</li> <li>- ACIB</li> <li>- OCNFB</li> <li>- FIB</li> <li>- CGIU</li> </ul>
12	Terrorism Prevention	At least 200 Officers Trained to Deal with Active Shooter Situations

## TTPS 2017 PERFORMANCE TARGETS

### GOAL #1 – Measures of Success

- 
- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Improvement in detection rate of serious crimes</li><li>• Solve rate</li><li>• Level of fear of crime – at least moderate to low ratings on fear of crime</li><li>• Number of persons arrested and charged for various crimes</li><li>• Implementation of policies:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Intelligence handling</li><li>- Covert operations</li></ul></li><li>• Establishment of Standard Operating Procedures and/or Memorandums of Understanding with at least three (3) stakeholders</li><li>• Training</li><li>• Reduction in murders</li><li>• Reduction in violent crimes</li><li>• Reduction in serious crimes</li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Reduction in murders, woundings &amp; shootings</li><li>• Improvement in public confidence and trust in the TTPS</li><li>• Training of officers in various ICT systems and programmes</li><li>• Crime detection</li><li>• ICT systems being employed within the TTPS</li><li>• Strengthening key operational areas via implementing technological solutions</li><li>• Establishment of Divisional Command Centres</li><li>• Detection of White Collar Crimes</li><li>• Detection of Transnational Crimes</li><li>• Publish Departmental Order with protocols for case management of White Collar Crimes</li></ul> |
|--|---|
-

## TTPS 2017 PERFORMANCE TARGETS

### GOAL #2 – Improve Safety on our Roadways and in Other Public Places

	Performance Areas	Performance Targets
1	RTAs	5% Reduction
2	Fatal RTAs	5% Reduction
3	Road Deaths	5% Reduction
4	Fatal RTAs involving pedestrians	5% Reduction
5	Mobile Patrols	5% Increase
6	Foot Patrols	5% Increase
7	Mounted Patrols	10% Increase
8	Bicycle Patrols (Tobago Division)	10% Increase
9	Persons tested in voluntary breath-testing exercises	5% Increase
10	Persons tested in regular breath-testing exercises	5% Increase
11	Tickets issued for exceeding the speed limit	10% Increase
12	Number of tickets issued for traffic offences	5% Increase overall
13	Vehicles equipped with trauma kits	5% Increase
14	Number of persons trained in the use of trauma kits	At least 100 Officers trained
15	Number of body worn cameras in use in the TTPS	10% Increase
17	Training in Tourist-oriented policing	At least 100 Officers from the Tobago Division trained

## TTPS 2017 PERFORMANCE TARGETS

### GOAL #2 – Measures of Success

- 
- Number of traffic tickets issued
  - Number of Mobile Patrols
  - Number of Highway Patrols
  - Number of Foot Patrols
  - Number of Mounted Patrols
  - Number of Bicycle Patrols
  - Reduction – Number of RTAs
  - Reduction – Number of Fatal RTAs
  - Reduction – Number of Road Deaths
  - Increase – Number of persons tested during Voluntary Breath-testing Exercises
  - Increase – Number of persons tested during Regular Breath-testing Exercises
  - Increase – Number of speeding tickets issued
  - Reduction – Number of pedestrian fatalities
  - Increase – Number of vehicles equipped with Trauma Kits
  - Increase – Number of persons trained in the use of Trauma Kits
  - Number of body-worn cameras in use across the TTPS
  - Establishment of the Inter-Agency Traffic Safety Action Committee (TSAC)
  - Production and publicizing of Driving Education Video Series
  - Reduction – Crimes perpetrated against tourists
  - Increase – Number of Officers trained in Tourist-oriented policing
  - Reduction – Number of crimes committed in specific locations
  - Establishment of Divisional Command Centres
  - Detection of White Collar Crimes
  - Detection of Transnational Crimes
  - Publish Departmental Order with protocols for case management of White Collar Crimes
-

## TTPS 2017 PERFORMANCE TARGETS

### GOAL #3 – Strengthen Community Centred Service and Stakeholder Management

	Performance Areas	Performance Targets
1	Number of Tribunal Cases Determined	10% Increase
2	Training in Tourist-oriented Policing	At least 100 Officers from the Tobago Division trained
3	Processing of Certificates of Character	Complete processing within 1 week of receiving the application
4	School Liaison Officers	10% Increase
5	Community Meetings	5% Increase overall
6	Police Youth Club (PYC) Membership	At least 5 new members added to each Police Youth Club
7	Police Youth Club (PYC) Expansion	At least 2 new PYCs formed in each Division
8	Accountability to the Public	Each Divisional Head will account to the public at least once per month for the performance of their division
9	Neighbourhood Watch Groups	At least five neighbourhood watch groups established in each Division
10	Customer Service Training	At least 200 Officers trained in the delivery of customer service
11	Police Misconduct	5% Reduction in complaints of misconduct made against Police Officers
12	Public Satisfaction Survey	Conduct a Public Satisfaction Survey to set the baseline for service delivery

13	Victim & Witness Support Unit Manpower	At least 6 additional Victim and Witness Support Officers employed
14	Training of Victim and Witness Support Officers	At least 10 Victim and Witness Support Officers trained to deliver improved services

---

## TTPS 2017 PERFORMANCE TARGETS

### GOAL #3 – Measures of Success

- 
- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Efficiency and quality of service</li><li>- Customer satisfaction</li><li>• Response time</li><li>- Telephone</li><li>- E999</li><li>- Certificate of Character</li><li>- Station – response to calls for help</li><li>• Decrease in Police misconduct</li><li>- Number of allegations</li><li>- Number of Complaints</li><li>• Officers charged for</li><li>- Disciplinary offences</li><li>- Criminal offences</li><li>• Clients supported by the Victim Support and Witness Unit</li><li>• Use of print media</li><li>• Public Service Announcements (PSAs)</li><li>• Use of Social Media (e.g. number of hits online)</li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Viewership/Reach</li><li>• Training of Officers in Tourist-oriented Policing</li><li>• Decrease in crimes committed against tourists</li><li>• Perception of safety &amp; security among tourists</li><li>• Updated Community Policing Plan</li><li>• Established system to address matters raised at stakeholder meetings</li><li>• Functional Station Councils</li><li>• At least one (1) community meeting per division per month</li><li>• School Liaison Officers</li><li>• Increase Police Youth Clubs</li><li>• Increase Police Youth Club membership</li><li>• Number of new community based projects led by Police Youth Clubs</li></ul> |
|---|---|
-

**TTPS 2017 PERFORMANCE TARGETS**  
**GOAL #4 – Strengthen the Organization**

	<b>Performance Areas</b>	<b>Performance Targets</b>
1	Leadership Training	At least 25 First Division Officers and Inspectors trained in a core leadership programme
2	Manpower in Tobago Division	At least 20 additional Police Officers assigned to the Tobago Division
3	Training in Tourist-oriented Policing	At least 100 Officers from the Tobago Division trained
4	Health and Wellness of Employees	At least 200 Officers and staff exposed to a Health and Wellness Programme
5	Revision of Standing Orders	At least six (6) Standing Orders revised for process improvement
6	Promote the TTPS as an employer of choice	At least two (2) advertisements published to promote the TTPS as an employer of choice
7	Monitoring and Evaluation	At least three (3) persons employed to monitor and evaluate programmes and initiatives in the TTPS
8	Blood Donor Account	At least 200 Officers identified as contributing to the TTPS Blood Donor Account
9	Transition to Retirement Programme	At least 40 Officers trained in the Transition to Retirement Programme



10	Strengthening Institutional Capacity	At least 20 high quality persons recruited to strengthen the organization
11	Promote positive image of the TTPS	At least one successful story about the TTPS published each day in the media
12	Spiritual Health & Wellness of Employees	At least one (1) inter-faith service conducted in each Police geographical division

---


## TTPS 2017 PERFORMANCE TARGETS

### GOAL #4 – Measures of Success


- 
- Quarterly Appraisals
  - Implementation of Absence Management Policy
  - Number of Officers – disciplinary matters before Tribunal
  - Decrease in absenteeism:
    - Sick leave
    - Vacation leave
    - Injury leave
  - TTPS Blood Donor Account established
  - Transition to Retirement Programme
  - Employee Assistance Programme
  - Health & Wellness Programme for employees
  - Training of Officers in key areas pertinent to marginalized and vulnerable groups
  - Use of Technology
  - Strategic Human Resource Plan
  - ICT Strategic Plan
  - Reduction - Crime
  - Reduction – Police misconduct
  - Reduction - Absenteeism
  - Succession Planning
  - Improved promotion system for SDOs
  - Customer satisfaction
  - Public awareness of the TTPS
  - Public trust and confidence in TTPS
  - Community based projects
  - Partnership between Police and stakeholders and communities
  - Reduction in crimes committed against tourists
  - Tourist oriented policing
-

## Appendix 6 – Promotional Process for First and Second Divisions


### TTPS 1<sup>st</sup> Division Process




## TTPS 2<sup>nd</sup> Division Process




## Appendix 7 – TTPS Executive Organizational Structure



TTPS Executive Organizational Structure - Administration



TTPS Executive Organizational Structure - Operations



## Appendix 8 – Datasets and Documents Requested of the TTPS

Data Requested	Data Received	Date Received	Comments
<b>DATASETS</b>			
<b>Nominal Rolls</b>	Nominal rolls as of the end of April for each Division /Branch /Unit/within the TTPS	May 19th, 2017	37 documents in a variety of file types (Word, Excel, pdf) and with varying fields were received. A master list was then created by the Implementation Team and some standardization applied (Divisions, Units, Ranks etc.) to allow for data analysis. However as there was no standard nominal roll template, some Units supplied information that could be used (separate Rank, Acting Rank fields etc.) while some did not. As a result the Nominal Rolls masterlist cannot be considered to be completely accurate. Additionally, no Nominal rolls list was provided to the Implementation Team so it is difficult to determine whether all Units and Sub Units were represented on the Masterlist. Searching for known Police Officers did not always return a record.
	Nominal rolls from the Versadex	May 22nd	Though the Versadex system is the ultimate repository of HR data from the TTPS, it is not up-to-date. Data from this dataset still had to be used for data analysis as it was the only source of particular data types (e.g. date of birth and gender).
<b>CAPA Data</b>	Minor, Major and Serious Crimes 2008-2017	May 19th, 2017	Data well organized and received in a timely fashion upon request.
	Homicide Data	May 31st, 2017	“”
	Minor Offenses	June 14th, 2017	“”
	Road Traffic Accidents	June 9th, 2017	“”



<b>Extended Sick Leave</b>			Requested from TTPS HR and was unable to get from them as they do not have a comprehensive, up-to-date database with this info. Was then given 2016 and 2017 Extended sick leave data from TTPS Registry.
<b>Complaints</b>	Suspension SUMMARY data	May 29th, 2017	Summary data and not individual data received from Complaints.
<b>IhRIS Payroll data</b>	TTPS Payroll and Commuted Overtime	July 5th, 2017	The TTPS indicated that generating overtime data will take an extremely long time due to network limits and time constraints. A request was therefore made on June 2nd, 2017 to the IhRIS Unit at the Ministry of Finance. Data received covers payroll information for Commuted Officers only.
<b>Financial Data</b>	Audit Report/Management Letter for the periods 2015 and 2016	May 22nd, 2017	N/A
	Releases to date - Estimated vs Actual		Pulled from the Estimates of Recurrent Expenditure. A request was made for further releases for financial 2013/2014 and 2014/2015 but this data has not been provided to date
	Asset Register of Fleet Vehicles	May 24th. 2017	A further request was made for additional information on Fleet of Vehicles, such as annual cost spent on purchasing vehicles, functional or nonfunctional.
	Asset Register of Land and Buildings	May 24th. 2017	N/A
<b>PCA</b>	Reports of Matters, etc		Awaiting data
<b>GIS Data</b>	Shapefiles of Police Stations, Police Station Jurisdictions and Police Divisions	May 8th, 2017	N/A

<b>DOCUMENTS</b>			
<b>iHRIS</b>	Departmental Order on Overtime Management	May 23rd, 2017	N/A
<b>HR Policies</b>	List of Officers on leave, transfer and suspensions	May 22nd, 2017	N/A
	Contract Positions	June 9th, 2017	N/A
	Training Plan 2017-2019	June 9th, 2017	N/A
	Operating Plan for 2017	June 9th, 2017	N/A
	Strategic Plan for 2017	June 9th, 2017	N/A
	List of Established Positions	June 9th, 2017	N/A
	Officers awaiting medical board	June 9th, 2017	N/A
	Job descriptions unique to the TTPS	June 9th, 2017	N/A
	Absence Management, Policy and Procedures Manual	June 22nd, 2017	N/A
	Mapping of Leave Process	June 22nd, 2017	N/A
	Powerpoint Presentation for Absence Management	June 23rd, 2017	N/A
	Draft Employee Assistance Program Policy	July 5th, 2017	N/A
	Draft OSH Policy	July 5th, 2017	N/A

	List of SoP of the TTPS	July 6th, 2017	N/A
	Organizational Structure - Planning, research & Project Implementation	July 4th, 2017	N/A
	Acting appointments within all ranks	July 5th, 2017	Inaccuracies in data submitted

## Appendix 9 – TTPS Facilities Listing

TTPS FACILITIES LISTING							
Division	Premises (Address)	Land/ Building	Size	Owned/Leased/ Rented	Occupied/ Unoccupied	Monthly Rental (if applicable)	
Port of Spain	1	St. Clair Police Station, Serpentine Road, St. Clair	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	2	Belmont Police Station, Belmont Circular Road, Belmont	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	3	Besson Street Police Station, #4 Picadilly Street, Port of Spain	Both		rental	Occupied	\$41,400.00
	4	Central Police Station (Old Police Headquarters), St. Vincent Street, Port of Spain	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	5	Woodbrook Police Station, Baden Powell Street, Woodbrook	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	6	Police Administration Building, Cor. Edward and Sackville Street, Port of Spain	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	7	Police Hospital, St. James Barracks, St. James	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	8	Police Second Division Mess, Long Circular Road, Port of Spain	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	9	Port of Spain Special Unit, Duncan Street	Both		rental	Occupied	\$20,101.43
	10	Facilities Management Unit, Wrightson Road, Port of Spain	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	11	Police Stores, Wrightson Road, Port of Spain	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	12	Riverside Plaza, Port of Spain ( <b>Divisional Headquarters</b> )	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	13	Car Park, Riverside Plaza	Both		rental	Occupied	\$129,202.50
	14	Police Training Academy, Saaman Drive, Western Main Road, St. James	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	15	Mounted Branch, Long Circular Road, St. James	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	16	Fraud Squad, Cor. Park & Richmond Street, POS	Both		Owned	Occupied	

Port of Spain	17	MATCO Building, #112 Henry Street, POS	Both		rental	Occupied	\$249,550.00
	18	Administrative Support Centre (Sunjet), Edward Street, Port of Spain	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	19	MOPS	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	20	Traffic Branch	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	21	Transport & Telecom Building	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	22	E999 (Police Training Academy)	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	23	Stolen Vehicles Carpark, Abbatoir Road, Port of Spain	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	24	Justice Protection Unit (Homicide Port of Spain)	Both		rental	Occupied	\$28,750.00
	25	St. Barbs Police Post, Upper St. Barbs Road, Laventille	Both		Owned	Occupied	
Division	Premises (Address)		Land/ Building	Size	Owned/Leased/ Rented	Occupied/ Unoccupied	Monthly Rental (if applicable)
Western	26	St James Police Station, Cor. Lazare Street and Western Main Road, St. James <b>(Divisional Headquarters)</b>	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	27	Carenage Police Station, School Street, Carenage	Both	8900 sq. ft.	rented	Occupied	\$26,082.00
	28	Four Roads Police Station, Diego Martin Main Road, Four Roads, Diego Martin	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	29	Maraval Police Station, Saddle Road, Maraval	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	30	West End Police Station, Cor. Diego Martin Main Road and Wendy Fitzwilliam Boulevard, Diego Martin	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	31	Special Branch, Agra Court Building, St. James	Both		rental	Occupied	\$409,400.00
	32	Police Canine Academy, Chagaramas	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	33	Hot Point	Both		Owned	Occupied	
Division	Premises (Address)		Land/ Building	Size	Owned/Leased/ Rented	Occupied/ Unoccupied	Monthly Rental (if applicable)

<b>Central</b>	<b>34</b>	Chaguanas Police Station ( <b>Divisional Headquarters</b> ), Railway Road, Chaguanas (opposite the Roman Catholic Church)	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	<b>35</b>	Couva Police Station, Southern Main Road, Couva (opposite the Telephone Exchange)	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	<b>36</b>	Caroni Police Station, Southern Main Road, Caroni (near Young Singh Factory)	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	<b>37</b>	Cunupia Police Station, Southern Main Road, Cunupia (next to NP Gas Station)	Both		Owned	Occupied	
<b>Central</b>	<b>38</b>	Brasso Police Station, Brasso, Caparo Valley Road, Brasso	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	<b>39</b>	Freeport Police Station, LP # 142 Mission Road, Freeport	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	<b>40</b>	Las Lomas Police Post, Las Lomas No.1 Chin Chin Road Cunupia	Both		rental	Occupied	\$3,500.00
	<b>41</b>	Gran Couva Police Station, Cor. Corosal Street and Main Road, Gran Couva	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	<b>42</b>	Anti -Kidding Unit, Couva					
	<b>43</b>	Social Work- Freeport	Both		rental	Occupied	\$19,500.00
	<b>44</b>	Old Brasso Station (container), Corner Marshall Street & Mammoral Road Flanagin Town					
<b>45</b>	Longdenville Police Post, Longdenville Main Road, Longdenville	Both		Owned	Occupied		
<b>Division</b>		<b>Premises (Address)</b>	<b>Land/ Building</b>	<b>Size</b>	<b>Owned/Leased/ Rented</b>	<b>Occupied/ Unoccupied</b>	<b>Monthly Rental (if applicable)</b>
<b>Southern</b>	<b>46</b>	Barrackpore Police Station, Papourie Road, Barrackpore	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	<b>47</b>	Gasparillo Police Station, Bonne Aventure Road, Gasparillo	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	<b>48</b>	Marabella Police Station, Southern Main Road, Marabella	Both		Owned	Occupied	

	49	Mon Repos Police Station, Corner Smith & Naparima Mayaro Road, Mon Repos	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	50	Moruga Police Station, Grand Chemin, Moruga Road, Moruga	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	51	Princes Town Police Station, Naparima Mayaro Road, Princes Town	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	52	Ste. Madeleine Police Station, #120 Manahambre Road, Ste. Madeleine	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	53	Stolen Vehicles, Usine Ste. Madeleine	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	54	St. Margaret's Police Station, Southern Main Road, Claxton Bay	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	55	Tableland Police Station, Naparima Mayaro Road, Tableland	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	56	San Fernando Police Station ( <b>Divisional Headquarters</b> ), #3 Knox Street, Harris Promenade South, San Fernando	Both		<b>leased</b>	Occupied	\$1428,776.70
	57	St. Mary's Police Post, Moruga Road, St Mary's	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	58	Complaints Unit- South, 11 Gooding Village, San Fernando	Both		<b>rental</b>	Occupied	\$57,500.00
	59	Homicide South	Both		<b>rental</b>	Occupied	\$47,150.00
	60	Debe Police Post/ South Highway Patrol, Lallbeharry Trace Junction, Debe	Both		Owned	Occupied	
Division		Premises (Address)	Land/ Building	Size	Owned/Leased/ Rented	Occupied/ Unoccupied	Monthly Rental (if applicable)
South Western	61	Cedros Police Station, Cedros Security Complex, Bonasse Village, Cedros	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	62	Erin Police Station, Erin Beach Road, Erin	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	63	Fyzabad Police Station, Corner Butler Avenue and Guapo Main Road, Fyzabad	Both		Owned	Occupied	

	64	Guapo Police Station, Southern Main Road, KTO Stretch, Guapo	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	65	La Brea Police Station, LP 42 New Jersey, La Brea	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	66	Oropouche Police Station, High Road, St. Mary's Village, South Oropouche	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	67	Penal Police Station, S.S Erin Road Penal Junction Penal	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	68	Point Fortin Police Station, Guapo Cap-De-Ville Main Road, Point Fortin (next to TRINMAR)	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	69	Santa Flora Police Station, S.S Erin Santa Flora	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	70	Siparia Police Station, Cor Lalla Street and Siparia Erin Road, Siparia	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	71	Siparia Police Station ( <b>Divisional Headquarters</b> ), Siparia Erin Road, Siparia	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	72	Cap-De-Ville Police Post, # 346 Southern Main Road, Cap-De-Ville, Point Fortin	Both		Owned	Occupied	
Division		Premises (Address)	Land/ Building	Size	Owned/Leased/ Rented	Occupied/ Unoccupied	Monthly Rental (if applicable)
Northern	73	Arima Police Station, Broadway Street, Arima (old)	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	74	Arima Police Station, Broadway Street, Arima ( <b>new</b> )	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	75	Arouca Police Station, Five Rivers Junction, Arouca	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	76	Cumuto Police Station, Cumuto Main Road, Cumuto	Both		Owned	Occupied	
Northern	77	La Horquetta Police Station, De Freitas Boulevard, Maloney Gardens, Arima	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	78	Maracas/St. Joseph Police Station, LP #51 El Chorro Road, Maracas/St. Joseph	Both		<b>rental</b>	Occupied	\$44,850.00
	79	Piarco Police Station, Golden Grove Road, Piarco	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	80	San Raphael Police Station, San Raphael Junction, Tumpuna Road, Arima	Both		Owned	Occupied	



	81	St. Joseph Police Station, Abercromby & Market Street, St. Joseph	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	82	Tunapuna Police Station, Cor. Eastern Main Road and Pasea Road, Tunapuna <b>(Divisional Headquarters)</b>	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	83	Tumpuna Stores, Tumpuna Road, Arima	Both		rental	Occupied	\$109,250.00
	84	Maloney Police Station, Flamingo Blvd, Maloney	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	85	Police Canine & Forensic, Cumuto	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	86	Old Arouca Building, Eastern Main Road, Arouca	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	87	Maloney Police Post	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	88	Malabar Police Post, #10 Banyan Boulevard, Malabar	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	89	Pinto Police Post, #3 Pinto Road, Arima	Both		Owned	Occupied	
Division		Premises (Address)	Land/ Building	Size	Owned/Leased/ Rented	Occupied/ Unoccupied	Monthly Rental (if applicable)
Eastern	90	Biche Police Station, 15 ¼ mm Cuanapo Southern Main Road, Biche	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	91	Manzanilla Police Station, North Manzanilla Road, Manzanilla			rental		\$12,000.00
	92	Matelot Police Station, 46 mm Andrew Street, Matelot	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	93	Matura Police Station, 10½ mm Toco Main Road, Matura	Both		rental		\$5,200.00
	94	Mayaro Police Station, Naparima Mayaro Road, Mayaro	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	95	Rio Claro Police Station, Cor. Guayaguayare Road and High Street, Rio Claro	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	96	Toco Police Station, 29 mm Paria Main Road, Toco	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	97	Sangre Grande Police Station <b>(Divisional Headquarters)</b> , Cor. Toco and Eastern Main Road	Both		Leased	Occupied	\$1274,297.98
	98	Valencia Police Post, Eastern Main Road, Valencia	Both		Owned	Occupied	

Division	Premises (Address)	Land/ Building	Size	Owned/Leased/ Rented	Occupied/ Unoccupied	Monthly Rental (if applicable)	
North Eastern	99	Morvant Police Station, <b>(Divisional Headquarters)</b> Cor. Lady Young Avenue and Busby Street, Morvant	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	100	Blanchisseuse Police Station, Paria Main Road, Blanchisseuse	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	101	Barataria Police Station, 3rd Avenue, Barataria	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	102	Maracas Police Station, North Coast Road, Maracas Bay	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	103	Santa Cruz Police Station, Saddle Road, Santa Cruz (next to the RC School)	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	104	San Juan Police Station, Cemetery, San Juan	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	105	Inter-Agency Task Force /GEB	Both		rental	Occupied	\$920,000.00
	106	San Juan Sub-Station, Eastern Main Road, San Juan	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	107	Cyber Crime Unit, Valsayn	Both		rental	Occupied	\$12,000.00
108	Stolen Vehicles- Storage Facility- Aranguez	Land		Rental	Occupied	\$40,250.00	
Division	Premises (Address)	Land/ Building	Size	Owned/Leased/ Rented	Occupied/ Unoccupied	Monthly Rental (if applicable)	
Tobago	109	Scarborough Police Station, Young Street, Scarborough <b>(Divisional Headquarters)</b>	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	110	Charlotteville Police Station, New Street, Charlotteville	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	111	Crown Point Police Station, Milford Road, Crown Point (next to the Airport)	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	112	Moriah Police Station, 35 mm Northside Road, Moriah	Both		Owned	Occupied	
	113	Old Grange Police Station, Main Road, Carnbee	Both		rental	Occupied	\$36,513.00
	114	Roxborough Police Station, Corner Union Street and Windward, Roxborough	Both		rental	Occupied	

	<b>115</b>	CCTV Centre- Tobago	Both		<b>rental</b>	Occupied	
	<b>116</b>	Social Work Unit	Both		<b>rental</b>	Occupied	\$4,000.00

## Appendix 10 – Information Technology Expenditure Listing

### INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY UNIT –SYSTEM AND PROCESSES: Assessment of existing technology in TTPS

#### Question 1 &2

1. Type and cost of Equipment over period 2008 – 2016
2. Where the technology is located and used

QTY	DESCRIPTION	TOTAL EXPENDITURE	LOCATION OF EQUIPMENT PURCHASED
	<b>YEAR : 2010</b>		
150	Dell Optiplex 780	\$ 885,000.00	Various Divisions
3	HP Proliant DL360 G7 Server	\$ 123,750.00	All Three (3) equipment were issued to Police Academy, Server Room
10	Cisco Router 2811	\$ 597509.35	Nothing Recorded in the Inventory Software for this item however, two (2) of this item were issued as follows: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. (1) Cisco 2811 Router was issued to Blanchisseuse</li> <li>2. (1) Cisco 2811 was issued to Sealots Stolen Vehicles</li> </ol>
10	Catalyst 2975GS POE 48-Ports		Server Room Administration/ South
15	Cisco 2800 Series Router 256 FlashCard		(2) Cisco 2800 went to Tobago Other Routers issued to other Server Rooms throughout TTPS
30	Cisco 2801 Router Power Supply		Issued to Various Stations
	Cisco 2801 Small Branch Routers		Issued to Various Stations
5	Policom sound-Station with 20 Voice Stations	\$ 60,202.50	COP and other Executive Offices
6	HP Proliant DL580 Servers	\$ 939,469.50	Items were issued to various Police Stations for CCTV
150	Logitech WebCams	\$ 74,250.00	Issued to various Division, Units and Branches
21	BL460 G1 UPGRADE TO 32GB	\$ 188,622.00	IT Unit Server Room
6	BL260 G5 UPGRADE TO 32GB		IT Unit Server Room
12	16 CHANNEL QNAP	\$ 961,675.05	Items were issued as follows: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 1 x Woodbrook for CCTV Project</li> <li>2. 1 x Viostar Qnap</li> <li>3. 1 x La Horquetta</li> <li>4. Various Divisions</li> </ol>
20	40 CHANNEL QNAP		Distributed to various Divisions
15	HP 9100 TOUCHSMART	\$ 103,721.25	Computer Systems no longer serviceable however there are three (3) remaining in use: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 1 x PACD, Snr Supt</li> <li>2. 2 x Estimates Section</li> <li>3. 1 x Public Affairs</li> </ol>

	Xerox Printers	\$ 651,600.00	<p>XEROX 3635 PHASER</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 1 x Special Branch, CIU</li> <li>2. 1 x Legal Unit</li> <li>3. 1 x Blanchisseuse</li> </ol> <p>XEROX 8570 DN COLORQUBE</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 1 x Special Branch, CIU</li> <li>2. 1 x Riverside Plaza, ACP North West</li> <li>3. 1 x Arouca, Charge Room</li> <li>4. 1 x Tobago, Old Grange</li> <li>5. 1 x Stolen Vehicles, Old HQ</li> <li>6. 1 x Besson Street, CCTV Response Unit</li> <li>7. 1 x Mayaro Station</li> <li>8. 1 x Pinto Police Post</li> <li>9. 1 x Aranguez, IT Room</li> <li>10. 1 x Aranguez, IATF</li> </ol>
	HOLOVIEW SECURE ID CARDS FOR FUEC	\$ 945,000.00	Issued to Firearms Section
78	Mitel 5312 IP Phones	\$ 46,875.62	Mitel IP/ PBX installed at Agra and Matco Building
20	Mitel 5324 IP Phones		Mitel IP/ PBX installed at Agra and Matco Building
5	Mitel 5360 IP Phones		Mitel IP/ PBX installed at Agra and Matco Building
3	Mitel 3300 Basic System Administrator Course		Part of the acquisition
150	Dell Optiplex Computers 780 (Microfast Int'l)	\$ 870,000.00	<p>Issued to various Units/ Sections and Branches throughout TTPS</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 1 x Mirror Building, Photography</li> <li>2. 1 x Sangre Grande Viewing Station</li> <li>3. 1 x MATCO, PSB</li> <li>4. 1 x Aranguez, Chief Clerk</li> <li>5. 1 x Old HQ, CID</li> <li>6. 1 x Aranguez, GEB Asp</li> <li>7. 1 x MATCO, CAPA</li> <li>8. 1 x Old HQ, Court and Process</li> <li>9. 1 x Court and Process</li> <li>10. 1x Police Admin, CRO</li> <li>11 1 x San Juan Sub Station CCTV</li> </ol>
40	DELL INSPIRON 15R LAPTOPS	\$ 269,800.00	Issued to various Divisions/ Units and Branches

150	22"LCD MONITORS	\$ 218,453.04	<p>Issued to various Divisions/ Units and Branches</p> <p>Items were issued as follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 1 x Human Resources, Vacation Leave</li> <li>2. 1 x Human Resources, Contracts Section</li> <li>3. 1 x Aranguez, GEB</li> <li>4. 2 x CAPA</li> <li>5. 2 x Tobago IT Unit</li> <li>6. 2 x CAPA</li> <li>7. 1 x St Joseph Station</li> <li>8. 1 x Police Admin, Human Resources</li> <li>9. 1 x High Court Cells</li> <li>10. 1 x E999 Superintendent</li> <li>11. 1 x MATCO, IT</li> <li>12. 1 x Human Resources, Head Human Resource</li> <li>13. 1 x Helpdesk</li> <li>14. 2 x OPACS</li> <li>15. 1 x Headquarters</li> <li>16. 1 x OCNFB, Snr Supt</li> <li>17. 1 x MATCO, CAPA</li> </ol>
30	APC Smart -UPS 1500VA USB Serial RM 2U 120V	\$ 229,399.00	<p>Issued to various Divisions/ Units and Branches : Items were issued as follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 1 x Anti-Corruption Investigations Bureau on Loan</li> <li>2. 1 x Riverside Plaza, Server Room</li> <li>3. 1 x Freeport, Highway Patrol</li> <li>4. 1 x Ultimate Solutions for installation at Tumpuna Road</li> <li>5. 1 x Police Stores, Tumpuna Road</li> <li>6. 1 x WoodBrook Station</li> <li>7. 2 x Tumpuna Road</li> <li>8. 1 x St Clair Police</li> <li>9. 1 x Belmont, CCTV</li> <li>10. 1 x Barataria Station</li> <li>11. 1 x Scarborough Station</li> <li>12. 1 x La Horquetta Station</li> <li>13. 1 x Police Admin</li> <li>14. 2 x Fingerprint</li> <li>15. 1 x Riverside Plaza, Homicide</li> <li>16. 1 x St James Station</li> <li>17. 1 x St Madeleine Station</li> <li>18. 1 x to be repaired</li> </ol>

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>19. 1 x MATCO, IT Unit</li> <li>20. 1 x Arouca Station, Homicide Dept</li> <li>21. 1 x San Fernando Station</li> </ul>
--	--	--	---

QTY	DESCRIPTION	TOTAL EXPENDITURE	LOCATION OF EQUIPMENT PURCHASED
	<b>YEAR : 2011/2012</b>		
1	HP Storage Works P4500 G2 36TB SAS	\$ 814,677.90	Server Rooms
1	HP Storage Works P4500 G2 7.2TB SAS		Server Rooms
3	HP Proliant DL580 G7 with 1TB Disk space	\$ 500,970.00	Server Rooms
100	Vehicles Tracking Units	\$ 230,000.00	VARIOUS DIVISIONS
	VMware VSphere Enterprise Plus with 1P 1year 9x5 E-LTU	\$ 576,581.00	Server Rooms
50	Dell OptiPlex 790 (5yr warranty)	\$ 253,000.00	ALL DIVISIONS
100	Dell OptiPlex 790 (5yr warranty)	\$ 506,000.00	All Divisions
25	Dell Latitude E5520n Laptop w Docking Station & Bags	\$ 164,875.00	POS, CENTRAL & SOUTH WESTERN DIVISIONS
27	Dell Latitude E5520n Laptop & Bags	\$ 151,875.00	CENTRAL, POS, SOUTHERN & TOBAGO DIVISIONS
25	47" VIZIO Monitors	\$ 166,625.00	CCTV Locations
3	HP Proliant DL580 G7 with 1TB Disk space	\$ 500,970.00	Various Locations
150	Dell OptiPlex 7010 (5yr warranty)	\$ 759,000.00	Various Locations
100	2TB SATA Hard Drive	\$ 229,500.00	Various Locations
50	HP LaserJet Pro 400 Colour MFP M475dw Printer	\$ 222,250.00	VARIOUS DIVISIONS
50	Dell Latitude E5530n with Bags (5 years warranty)	\$ 342,500.00	ALL DIVISIONS
150	Dell OptiPlex 7010 (5yr warranty)	\$ 759,000.00	ALL DIVISIONS



YEAR : 2015/2016			
QTY	DESCRIPTION	TOTAL EXPENDITURE	LOCATION OF EQUIPMENT PURCHASED
	Backup Storage Promise 18401 Storage SKU	\$ 105,006.90	Networking equipment – Server Room
	UPS Back UPS System	\$ 286,379.00	Various Divisions / Units and Branches issued with Computer
40	Each colour Xerox Printer Consumable Ink	\$ 224,664.00	Various Divisions / Units and Branches
	TMA Database Solution	\$ 427,740.25	Software Solution for IT Unit / Planning & Development Unit and Police Quarter Master Stores
	Frontier DL650 Pro Dry Complete Mini Lab System Consumables for Photography Unit	\$ 151,915.00	Installed at Photography Unit – Head Office
	Fibre Optic Installation - Riverside Plaza Back Bldg.,	\$ 162,137.35	Installation of Network Equipment at Riverside Plaza
20	Samsung Galaxy Note Tablets for Cyber Crime Unit	\$ 139,840.00	Issued to Cyber Crime Unit
	FTR Interrogator Systems	\$ 192,308.25	Installed at various Units e.g Riverside Plaza
	Xerox 9303 Colour Cube Multifunction Printer with APC UPS	\$ 123,000.00	Issued to Commissioner of Police Office as a replacement
	Sharepoint 2013 Human Resource Application	\$ 993,600.00	Installed in various sections at Human Resource Branch
200	AVL Units	\$ 575,000.00	Installed various vehicles throughout the service
	Sharepoint 2013 Police Academy	\$ 138,000.00	Installed at Policy Academy
	APC Precision Cooling System POS Data Centre - Phase III	\$ 895,833.19	Installed at IT Unit Server Room
	Fibre Optic Installation - Academy IT Admin Bldg Garage Booth	\$ 128,341.15	Installation of Network Equipment at Police Academy
	Fujifilm Frontier DL650 Pro Dry Complete Mini Lab System with Film Scanner (on board)	\$ 450,000.00	Installed at Photography Unit – Head Office
	Fujifilm Frontier DL650 Pro Dry Complete Mini Lab System without Film Scanner	\$ 385,000.00	Installed at Photography Unit – San Fernando
33	Catalyst 2960 - 24 Port POE (32 SMARTNET Catalyst 2960 - 48 port	\$ 929,216.78	Various Divisions/ Units and Branches

YEAR : 2013/2014			
	HP Blade Servers	\$ 789,015.95	Items were issued as follows: 1. Police Admin, Server Room 2. Police Admin, Server Room
	E- Registry License	\$ 629,248.00	This License Renewal was purchased for Case Management Unit
	Camera Maintenance - 1 Yr	\$ 405,375.00	This maintenance was done for: Penal, Marabella , Mon Repos , Homicide South , Cunupia , Couva, Freeport, Caroni, Brasso Las Lomas, Gran Couva , Longdenville , Maracas St Joseph , Pinto Road, Malabar, MOPS and Woodbrook
	Tunapuna Police Station CCTV Deployment	\$ 500,935.87	Tunapuna Police Station
	Fyzabad Police Station CCTV Deployment	\$ 422,486.75	Fyzabad Police Station
	St. Clair Police Station CCTV Deployment	\$ 371,946.92	St. Clair Police Station
	Capdeville Police Station CCTV Deployment	\$ 185,986.13	Capdeville Police Station
	Belmont Police Station CCTV Deployment	\$ 638,760.91	Belmont Police Station
	Barrackpore Police Station CCTV Deployment	\$ 453,331.84	Barrackpore Police Station
	Santa Flora Police Station CCTV Deployment	\$ 363,147.67	Santa Flora Police
	St. Marys Police Station CCTV Deployment	\$ 274,433.96	St. Mary's Police Station
	Biche Police Station CCTV Deployment	\$ 369,791.57	Biche Police Station
	Debe Police Station CCTV Deployment	\$ 346,716.58	Debe Police Station
	Maraval Police Station CCTV Deployment	\$ 421,682.90	Maraval Police Station
	Barataria Police Station CCTV Deployment	\$ 807,438.09	Barataria Police Station
	Gasparillo Police Station CCTV Deployment	\$ 377,955.56	Gasparillo Police Station
15	48Port POE Switch	\$ 528,020.19	Various units/ branches and Sections
20	Small Branch Routers	\$ 504,765.21	Items were issued as follows: 1. 1 x Caroni Station 2. 1 x Toco Police Station 3. 1 x Chaguanas, Data Entry 4. 1 x Police Stores, Tumpuna Road 5. 1 x Complaints, South

			6. 1 x Knowsley Police Post 7. 1 x Moruga, Charge Room 8. 1 x San Raphael Station 9. 1 x Mirror Building 10. 1 x New Maloney Station 11. 1 x New Cumuto Station 12. 1 x Subhash Ramcharan 13. 1 x Moruga Charge Room 14. 1 x La Brea Station 15. 1 x Oropouche Station 16. 1 x Brasso Station 17. 1 x Police Admin 18. 1 x Aranguez Station 19. 1 x Besson Street
20	24 Port Switches	\$ 431,983.74	Items were issued as follows:  1. 2 x Tumpuna Road 2. 1 x Freeport, Social Workers
	Xerox Colorqube 9303 Printer	\$ 945,585.00	Various units/ branches and Sections
	Xerox Colorqube 9303 Printer with Consumables	\$ 389,789.75	Consumables for Xerox Printers

**Question 3**

How effective is the technology (Data to show)

Based on the systems and services implemented over the period (2010 – present) personnel are now equipped with Computer Systems, Network connectivity, Software Solutions, and Databases to capture information for reporting purposes and to aid in the fight against crime. Some of these systems include and not limited to IAPro, Ibase2, the ability to send emails internally and externally as a faster means of communications as well as provide services to the public in more efficient means utilizing **Livescan Fingerprinting Services** etc. **GPS devices** has also been deployed and installed in vehicles assigned to nine (9) divisions for the management of Police Vehicles.

#### Question 4

##### Any shortages regarding request or demands

In an effort to meet our technological mandate, continue our existing projects and implement new programmes that provides the products and services required to meet the needs of all our Human Resource Division and simultaneously assists the organization in the maintenance of law and order within a national context; the Information Technology Unit will require adequate financial resources to acquire the necessary equipment and services.

#### Question 5

##### Training to use or support technology

Training is highly critical in keeping abreast of emerging technology as well as aligning technology with the Strategic goals and objectives of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service in areas such as Maintenance of critical services, configuring of servers, networking, databases and implementing mobile technology to name a few. Thereby, making such systems more efficient, sustainable, scalable and robust would improve the technological functionality of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

Training in the use of an application/system/ implemented technology has been a key practice once they have been operationalize. Generally it has been policy when an application/system/ implemented technology has been operationalized that the necessary personnel using the application/system/ implemented technology are given the necessary training. In instances where all the personnel are unable to be trained key personnel from the IT Unit are trained with the aim of transferring the knowledge to users.

In instances where there is a large pool of persons to be trained, it is envisioned that facilitators from the Police Academy will be trained in the use of applications/systems with the aim of transferring that knowledge to the necessary personnel in batches.

#### Question 7

Recommendations for improvements and reform: short and medium term:

- **Implementation of Application/Systems/ New Technology**

Due to the nature/culture of the environment in which we work, or changes in the laws of the Trinidad and Tobago we are sometimes faced with the challenge of being unable to implement applications/systems/ new technology that will assist the effective operations of the organization in a timely manner. We need to ensure that there is total buy-in of the system are obtained from all stakeholders.

- **Procurement of Equipment**

The purchase of equipment in some instances is a recurrent expenditure due to the continuous need to replace outdated/obsolete equipment. Therefore we must ensure that all replacements are fit for purpose and meets the needs of the users.

- **Deployment of CCTV Cameras**

With regards to the deployment of CCTV device there is a need to ensure that the policies are enforced with regard to the retention time for footage, troubleshooting and maintenance of Cameras, routine inspection of cameras system by IT Personnel to ensure that they are operational and the management of vendors on site.

- **Financial Challenges**

IT Unit encounters the inability to maintain a technologically sound infrastructure however servicing and upgrading of systems and services impacts highly with regards to funding.



## Appendix 11 - Focus Groups

### TTPS Officers

1. *Please think back to your first day of work as a Police Officer. Tell us how you felt,*
  - a. *What made you most proud?*
  - b. *Were you enthusiastic?*
  - c. *What contributions did you see yourself making?*

#### **Main themes/challenges:**

- There was a generational divide between the older and younger officers with regard to motivations for entering the TTPS. Older generations often saw the TTPS as a career goal and something to be proud of. Conversely, younger generations typically resorted to applying to the TTPS when other options failed.
- The change in attitude towards the TTPS in society has resulted in a change in the individuals who apply to the TTPS, which in turn affects the quality of the service received from these individuals.

#### **Recommendations:**

- Improved incentives to attract individuals who truly desire to be in the TTPS.

2. *What has been your most rewarding experience?*

#### **Main themes/challenges:**

- The knowledge that they have helped people with their problems/issues
- Being recognized by the TTPS for their service
- The respect and recognition from the public when wearing their uniform
- Ability to rub shoulders with all ranks in society

3. *Describe some of the aspects of your job that are currently working well.*

#### **Main themes/challenges:**

- Salary is on time
- Overtime payments

- Expansion of autonomy to make decisions with regards to their area of responsibility (1<sup>st</sup> Division)
  - Ability of junior officers to approach senior officers with concerns, issues, ideas etc. This was viewed as a change from 20 years ago (1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Division)
  - Punctuality (SRPs)
4. *Describe what challenges you are currently experiencing within the TTPS.*
- a. *Specific manpower challenges (Probe: Numbers vs Efficiency)*

**Main themes/challenges:**

- Common comment that the Divisions, Units, Branches etc. are understaffed and that officers are therefore burnt out.
- Officers are taken from stations with lower crime districts transferred to other stations/task forces etc. but their numbers are not replaced resulting in very understaffed shifts.
- Manpower hours lost due to officers being absent for extended sick leave, injury leave etc. is so extensive that senior officers are not able to perform their strategic duties but instead have to perform the duties of junior officers.
- Officers indicated that there are too many special units/branches performing the same function and that staffing these units is resulting in the understaffing of the Divisions.
- Officers in special units/branches are being trained in specialized fields but are then transferred to units where those skills are not needed. This results in the loss of that knowledge for the initial Unit and the need to train a new individual.
- SRPs indicated that the overall police service manpower should be increased.

**Recommendations:**

- Merge the repetitive special units/branches together to relieve manpower challenges at other locations and to improve efficiency.
- Implementation of more stringent disciplinary measures to curb abuse of leave.
- Extension of retirement age as the current retirement age conflicts with staffing requirements.

*4. Describe what challenges you are currently experiencing within the TTPS.*

*b. Work/life balance*

**Main themes/Challenges**

- No work/life balance. Work overwhelms everything else.
- Officers are overworked and unable to pay attention to their health and diet. As a result, there is an upsurge of lifestyle diseases such as diabetes and heart disease as well as mental diseases such as depression and stress.
- Police Officers' children are often left unattended due to the extensive hours that their parents work.
- The EAP is not designed to help officers with serious issues such as domestic abuse.
- Some SRPs indicated that they prefer to remain as SRPs rather than joining the Police Service as it affords them the ability to maintain a family life and be there for their children.

**Recommendations**

- Police Officers should be allowed to go home with firearms to protect their family as their families are at risk due to possibly being targeted by criminals. Officers indicated that they have applied for firearms many years ago and are still awaiting a response.
- Vehicles should be available for police officers to go home so not to be at risk while unarmed but in uniform.
- A dietician should be available to TTPS officers.
- Shift hours should be adjusted so that officers can spend more time with their families.
- Regular, mandatory fitness evaluations for all Officers.

*4. Describe what challenges you are currently experiencing within the TTPS.*

*c. Support of senior and junior officers*

**Main themes/challenges:**

- Some junior officers indicated that they have the support of their immediate supervisors but not the senior officers higher up.



- Some junior officers indicated that they only get support if they follow orders blindly.
- Some junior officers indicated that they do not get support from their senior officers who they describe as not having a caring or human aspect.
- SRPs indicated that they do not get support from the regular police, whether junior or senior officers.
- Loss of manpower resources when SRPs leave after their 40 hours for the week are complete.

*4. Describe what challenges you are currently experiencing within the TTPS.*

*d. Sexual Harassment*

**Main themes/challenges:**

- Sexual harassment does exist but is not an overwhelming problem.
- Sexual harassment exists but is not spoken about.
- Some problems are more related to sexism than sexual harassment.
- While sexual harassment exists, a bigger problem is corruption within the service using sexual favours between junior and senior officers.
- Officers in the Tobago Division indicated that female-female sexual harassment is becoming a growing problem.
- Officers indicated that sexual harassment often occurs through the use of social media, videos, pictures etc.

*4. Describe what challenges you are currently experiencing within the TTPS.*

*e. Leave*

**Main themes/challenges:**

- There is abuse of both sick and injury leave.
- There is lack of accountability on leave matters.
- The current system with matters before the Medical Board, re backlog of matters, needs to be addressed urgently.

- There is a charge for the abuse of sick leave but it is not being enforced so there is currently no consequence for abusing of sick leave.
- Abuse of leave causes remaining officers to be overturned.

*4. Describe what challenges you are currently experiencing within the TTPS.*

f. Court

**Main themes/challenges:**

- Officers are fearful to go to court and “look stupid” in the witness box.
- Officers often feel attacked by the lawyers and magistrate.
- There is limited training on how to handle oneself in the witness box.
- Several supervisors do not have court experience themselves so they cannot help their junior officers.

**Recommendations:**

- Regular mock court training sessions should be held to prepare officers.
- Improved court training during recruitment training

*4. Describe what challenges you are currently experiencing within the TTPS.*

g. Tools and Equipment

**Main themes/challenges:**

- Vehicles are available but there isn't always a designated driver available.
- Vehicles are not being acquired by the TTPS that are appropriate for the hilly terrain in Tobago.
- The maintenance of vehicles is not frequent enough and parts are often hard to locate.
- VMCOTT often subcontracts their duties to private garages/mechanics but they do so not on a fair basis but to their friends etc.

- There is a huge lack of office supplies – printers, paper, ink etc. that result in Officers having to pay out of their pocket to prepare files for court etc. or borrow from other offices/station.
- Bullet proof vests are not recycled as frequently as they should and are not always classified to stop the calibre of bullets that are currently being used by criminals.
- Preferential allocation of kits to particular units such as IATF and Guard & Emergency Unit while other units and Divisions do not get equipment they need.
- Some Police Stations do not have enough working guns, radios etc.

**Recommendations:**

- Passing of necessary legislation to allow the use of non-lethal weapons.
- Proper budgeting for maintenance of tools and equipment and not just the purchasing of said items.

*4. Describe what challenges you are currently experiencing within the TTPS.*

h. Technology

**Main themes/challenges:**

- Network is overloaded and often crashes.
- CCTV street cameras are often not working or footage is not available.
- Data is not standardized throughout the Police Service.
- The intranet keeps crashing.
- Ticket books are not self-carbonating and officers often have to chase blue carbon slips in the breeze.
- Technology is not current with industry standards.
- Servicing of various technologies are not frequently conducted.
- No live link with the licensing office exists and paper based request system is still in use.

- Tracing of calls can take weeks and the information has to be requested from the telecommunication companies.

**Recommendations:**

- Maintenance of CCTV cameras
- Updating of network and various technologies within the system
- Standardized data across the TTPS
- Call tracing to be available from within the TTPS
- More online meetings/conferences rather than everyone being requested to come into Port of Spain
- Police Officers should be required to do mandatory cybercrime training
- Provision of e-ticketing technology
- Better communication system with licensing office
- Use of a file management system that allows officers to be better able to access their own file information, payslips etc.

*4. Describe what challenges you are currently experiencing within the TTPS.*

- i. Public Opinion (Probe: How it affects duties, is it justified, how it could be changed?)

**Main themes/challenges:**

- Overall negative opinion of SRPs by the public to the point that members of the public come to a station to make a report and do not want to give it to the SRP at the desk.
- People do not trust the police and therefore keep information to themselves that would help fight crime if given to the police.
- There is a negative stigma associated with the Police due to the behaviour of some police officers.
- Members of the public use the fact that a few police officers are corrupt to not make any effort to cooperate with the Police.

- Opinion among the municipal police that the public trusts them more than the regular police but that there are inadequate numbers for them to accommodate more members of the public.

**Recommendations:**

- Rogue officers need to be quickly routed out of the Police Service.
- Better communication to the public of the successes that the Service accomplishes.
- More community policing to improve police service/public relationship

*4. Describe what challenges you are currently experiencing within the TTPS.*

j. Relationship with Defence Force (Joint Policing)

**Main themes/challenges:**

- Public respects the Defence Force more than the Police
- Though most joint exercises work well sometimes the two organizations don't mesh.

**Recommendations:**

- Increased joint policing with the Defence Force

*4. Describe what challenges you are currently experiencing within the TTPS.*

k. Training (inclusive tools, equip, tech etc)

**Main themes/challenges:**

- New recruits are coming out of training without the ability to be a driver for the TTPS.
- A lot of bias in who is selected for training.
- Senior officers are selected for training though the training is not related to their day to day duties while junior officers who need the training are not selected to go.
- Police Officers are not given updated firearms training after recruitment and they lose their skill to fire accurately.

- SRP training is too short.

**Recommendations:**

- Training should be regularly provided in:
  - o Firearms
  - o Self-defence
  - o Court
  - o Customer relations
  - o First aid
  - o Computer technologies
  - o Mandatory defensive driving
  - o Handling mentally ill individuals
  - o Tactical
  - o Financial management training (not only during recruitment)
- Resettlement training for retiring police officers similar to what the Defence Force offers
- Promotional training is needed either in preparation for or just after an officer has been promoted so that he/she is up-to-date on what functions and duties of that position.

*4. Describe what challenges you are currently experiencing within the TTPS.*

1. Corruption within the TTPS

**Main themes/challenges:**

- Low salary encourages officers to accept bribes
- “The fish always rots from the head”
- The public condemns the police service for corruption more than they do any other organization.
- Junior officers are stopped from performing their duty (giving a ticket, arrest etc.) before senior officers are in the pocket of rich businessmen.

**Recommendations:**

- Stricter penalties for corrupt officers
- Strengthen the Professional Standards Bureau

*5. In your opinion are there specific units/divisions/stations etc. that are over or under staffed?*

**Main themes/challenges:**

- All stations indicated that they are understaff. Some units, such as Cybercrime and Criminal Gang Intelligence Unit (CGIU) are also understaff while some, such as Homicide, indicated that they are adequately staffed.
- Officers reiterated often that there are too many special units/branches with duplication of responsibilities and result in lowered manpower for stations.

**Recommendations:**

- Consolidation of units that duplicate duties and tasks

6. What training would you like to be offered by the TTPS for you to best perform your duties?

**Recommendations:**

- Greater use of senior and retired officers in the Training Academy.
  - See questions 4k for list of training topics requested by Officers.
7. How do you feel about the present promotional system?

**Main themes/challenges:**

- System take too long and is demotivating and discouraging
- SRPs cannot be promoted within the SRP system and must instead join the regular police.
- Appraisal process is flawed with regards to the point system where some factors get a disproportionate amount of points. For example, a law degree provides a large number of points, which results in numerous officers pursuing law even when it might be more beneficial for them to get a Management degree.
- Individuals spend years in a special unit, then get promoted and transferred, for example, to a police station, where they do not know the procedures.

8. What do you think about the present method of appointing a Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner? Why? What would you recommend?

**Main themes/challenges:**

- The appointment of the COP and DCP should not be a political appointment. The Prime Minister should not be able to veto the appointment.
- The current method takes too long.

**Recommendations:**

- An independent body should be responsible for the appointment of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner.

9. What do you think about the current method by which SRPs are absorbed into the TTPS?

Main themes/challenges:

- SRPs who are absorbed into the system and then are promoted often have to be micromanaged by senior officers due to lack of experience.
- SRPs have to pay the Police doctor out of pocket. This should be covered by the TTPS.
- Regular Police view SRPs who have been absorbed into the Service as a threat as they are taking the promotion exams and are being promoted before the regular police.
- More involved background checks need to be done on SRPs before absorbing them.
- It is beneficial to absorb SRPs rather than train new recruits as they already have the experience.

10. If you were in charge of the TTPS, what are some of the changes you would make?

Recommendations:

- Reduce the number of special units.
- Have the officers who have law degrees be more involved in court. Police prosecutors should be trained lawyers.
- Standardize procedures across the service.
- Change the police uniform to be better suited to the tropical environment.
- Better leave management. Officers should not be able to take 2 or 3 years leave.
- Remove biases in the promotional process.
- Improve communication and the sharing of intelligence/data between units.
- Improve the compensation package for officers.
- Review the SRP Policy
- Treat Tobago and Trinidad officers equally in areas such as training, accommodations, flights etc.
- Appoint a disciplinary officer for Tobago. Discipline reports are collecting and nothing is being done.
- Better succession planning
- Send experienced officers to the special units instead of young officers
- Absorb the SRPs
- Ability to carry firearms outside of the job.
- Extend the retirement age
- Extend the age of officers for the call back program.
- Police Divisions should have representatives from the various units/branches
- Improved canine facilities
- Recreation for police officers e.g. an indoor range in each Division



11. The purpose of our session was to obtain your views on how we can strengthen the Police Service so that it can better serve our country. Have we missed anything?

- Childcare facilities for Police Officers
- Better Wellness program for police officers

#### Civilian Staff

1. Describe what challenges you are currently experiencing within the TTPS?

- Short-staffed. Persons are acting for short periods, are retired or are transferred to another unit e.g. Prisons.
- Salary impacts the number of hours civilians work. They are not paid overtime.
- Benefits and salary are issues, there is a big differential between what they make and what a desk Officer makes.
- Police Officers perceive the civilians are in the positions they should have and they interact with them accordingly.
- There isn't any room for advancement/promotion since the Police Officers are first considered for the vacancies civilians are qualified for.
- How superiors act, their attitude, impacts the quality/quantity of a clerk's service.
- Extended sick leave a huge issue. The system/process to enter information is terribly flawed and Police Officers are abusing the system.
- Lack of stationery – have to re-cycle; no basic toiletries; equipment problems and no copier/printer supplies; Info Tech support not forthcoming.
- Seven percent (7%) reduction in expenses mandate affecting daily functions and they are worried that they may be sent home because of this mandate.
- S.W. Division: Electrical shorts, it is an old building; hazardous environment.
- Calibre of some civilian staff is poor. Low work ethic especially among young staff.
- Contract persons in the job for long periods not being absorbed. Instead new clerks are being hired.
- Re-hiring of retired personnel is not fair to them because they are being released to accommodate these personnel.
- There is a CISCO phone on each desk but not working (S.W. Div), must use the PBX to call HR.
- Turnover high – 3 months; persons are moved before they are fully able to understand the duties. So work is left behind for the next person.
- Receipt of gratuity is an issue. It is laborious having to piece information together to be paid. H.Q. always losing Officers' documents.

2. Do you think you experience more issues as a civilian staff member than if you were a Police Officer?

- Yes. Especially with work start and end times.
- Can produce more work within a short period of time than what is normal but still encounter problems with supervisor if arrive late for work.

3. *Describe what challenges you are currently experiencing within the TTPS.*

*Leave:*

- There is a schedule but approval to proceed is most times delayed (approval comes from HR).
- Must constantly be in touch with HR to get approvals.

*Performance Appraisals:*

- They have to coerce supervisors to get Performance Appraisals done via involving HR to follow up with the supervisors.
- All persons get the same grade despite quality of service and performance.
- There is victimization in the performance appraisal process.

*Corruption:*

- Yes there is corruption in the Service.
- Regular Police Officers would spend five minutes at Court and claim for eight hours.
- Officers issuing traffic tickets but are not present at Court to ensure tickets are paid at Court.
- Superiors either sanctioning overtime blindly or Officers' submissions not being properly checked back. Most times it is the same Officers repeatedly abusing OT.

*Sexual Harassment:*

- Generally, the Police Officers are respectful.
- Never experienced among civilian staff. Maybe in the stations.

*Public Perception:*

- Neighbours do not acknowledge/respect Police Officers.
- Public dislikes Police Service because of the negative interactions they have had with them.

4. *Tell us what training needs do you see for the civilian staff within the TTPS*

- Management/Supervisory Skills.

- Accounting.
  - Customer Relations.
  - PMA'S
  - Job-related – as it pertains to job functions.
5. What would you change if you were in a position to do so?
- Commend staff who work diligently. Address weak staff.
  - Decentralize some tasks e.g. leave processing.
  - Criteria for recruiting SRP's should be reviewed; their physical profile (height, size, etc.) does not portray that of a Police Officer.
  - Implement a shift system: civilian work the early hours and the Officers the early to late hours to accommodate requests from Officers that travel to POS to attend to matters at Admin.
  - Need more social workers to assist the Officers with their needs.

#### Defence Force

1. How do you see the relationship between the TTPS and the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (TTDF)?

- The TTDF supports the TTPS by being responsible for external threats while the TTPS is responsible for internal threats.
- There is a good overall relationship between the TTPS and the TTDF.
- Some members of the TTDF feel that some members of the TTPS are not accepting the recommendations of the TTDF in crime fighting which they believe can be very effective.
- In fact, some members of the TTDF feel that such a refusal by the TTPS is deliberate in that they genuinely do not want to solve crime.
- Some members of the TTDF feel that the joint patrols and collaboration are now corrupting TTDF officers.
- Some of the core competencies in the TTDF are suffering in the quest to assist TTPS.
- Some of TTDF members have been ridiculed by the TTPS.
- Some members of the TTDF felt that systems in TTPS are not the issue, it is the culture.
- There was a feeling that leadership in the TTPS is a problem.
- There seems to be a disconnect between Units and among ranks in that one Unit is unaware of what is going on on the ground and in the district/jurisdiction.
- Too much time and energy is spent on reducing current statistics and not enough is spent on the source of the problems and the reasons for crime.
- There are deviations from the plan of action for patrolling trouble areas with no plausible reason for the deviation. TTDF has to do too much micro-managing when

assisting TTPS to ensure a plan is executed. The TTDF soldier is making sacrifices that the Police Officer do not, for example, spending his/her time off on duty.

- The disrespect and scant courtesy meted out to soldiers is de-motivating. Sometimes the soldier is blamed when patrols do not take place.

2. What do you think is the cause of leadership issues in the TTPS? Tell us about the challenges?

- The disrespect and scant courtesy meted out to soldiers is de-motivating. Sometimes the soldier is blamed when patrols do not take place.

- In the Air Guard persons are conditioned to account for jobs they are tasked with. There is cause and effect, a penalty for non-action. There is no such thing in the TTPS.

- There is a difference in the dress code when on duty and when doing a raid. TTPS headwear and uniforms look like gangster wear so perception of public has disintegrated i.e. no respect, not observing laws.

- This perception is bleeding onto TTDF and becoming problematic for them.

- Salary level is also an issue. The soldiers are taunted by Police Officers by the difference in income.

- TTPS units operate in isolation, do not share information amongst themselves.

- Challenge: Compare the reports generated by the TTDF and the TTPS after a joint operation. TTDF must submit factual reports but the TTPS inflate the numbers when reporting presence of Police Officers, along with input of rank, name and regimental numbers.

- The Air Guard has worked with TTPS air service and they are more professional. Has had no bad experiences with that unit.

- On joint patrols the TTPS physically assault persons without reason.

- There is corruption in the TTPS when arrests are made. Soldiers can become corrupted when constantly exposed to this. Hence the 'older' soldiers are assigned.

- The TTPS is not about solving crime.

- The behaviours of civilians trained into a Defence Force formation is no different to those trained into the TTPS but the difference is that in the TTDF negative behaviours are quickly followed by consequences.

- In the TTDF, trainees are continually nurtured and cultured into doing what they joined the TTDF to do. Maybe the same system can be adopted by the TTPS.

3. If you were in a position to change aspects of the TTPS, what would you like to see done?

- Improve the vetting system in the recruitment process.

- Quality of the instructors. There must be maintenance training.

- There was cross-training between the TTDF and the TTPS for the first batch of the IATF. If continued, the TTDF/TTPS collaboration would improve.

- Plans must be targeted, purposeful and executed as organized.

- From an operations perspective, there is reluctance by senior police officers to accept changes but the junior police officers want the changes.

- Increase the rate of crime detection and conviction.
- Better judicial support. In tying weapons to criminals, Forensics has only matched 2 out of approximately 50 in a three year period. There is not enough manpower in Forensics.
- Turnover of cases – there needs to be quick convictions of criminals. The criminals remain free or are running business from their cells.
- Management of leave, especially those of senior officers. There is too much leave pending just before retirement.
- Contracted civilian staff should be employed to do administrative work, for example, taking reports at stations.
- Enforcement of regulations to deal with rogue police officers in quick time. If they are left without being penalized the younger police officers would be influenced to do wrong as well.
- There must be more discipline. They must be more respectful to superiors.
- If they are seeking to capture criminals, use of sirens and lights when approaching the scene defeats the purpose.
- Interaction with the public – there is too much verbal abuse. There must be better form of engagement. They require training to fine tune this.

#### 4. What do you think about the role of SRPs in the police service?

- The SRP's are at the forefront in public interaction in certain areas, for example, at police stations. This requires more intense training; they are under-trained to be placed at the front.

#### Trinidad and Tobago Fire Service

1. Tell us something about your formation's relationship with the TTPS

The Fire Service Division interacts with the TTPS with respect to :

- Suspicion of arson
- Serious road traffic accidents
- Life safety coverage for formal events
- Explosive escorts
- Retrieval of a body (search and rescue)

All of the participants indicated that their interaction with the TTPS in the main have been very cordial and collaborative. The benefits derived from working with the TTPS are:

- Continued dialogue
- Practical (on the spot) training with respect to crime
- Sharing of information

- Good networking skills
  - Develop a relationship Officers
2. Describe to us your role with the TTPS in the performance of your duties
- The participants indicated that their roles are distinctly different in nature.
  - The both parties respond to emergency calls with respect to the roles outlined in the answers to Question 2.
  - The Fire Officers focus primarily on preservation of life and attending to the injured. The Police focus on preserving the crime scene. As a result of the foregoing, conflict arises.
3. Tell us about the challenges you have with your relationship with the TTPS.
- Meeting timelines with respect to generating reports of incidents.
  - Clear lines of demarcation of duties and responsibilities on the crime scene.
  - Duplication of roles when generating reports.
  - Police doing parallel investigations with Fire Service.
  - Having Police respond in quick time to incidents occurring in 'Hot Spot' areas.
  - Need for greater communication.
  - TTPS needs to have more intense follow ups
4. If you were head of your formation, what are some of the changes you would make if you are the Head of the TTPS?
- Ensure there is joint training to identify clear lines of roles and responsibilities, simulations, exercises outlining steps in the process.
  - Re-institute training programmes with UTT and JSSC for all arms of the Ministry of National Security re. roles and functions – theoretical and operational.
  - Develop clear Standards of Operations (SOP's) and joint patrols.
  - Institute a forum with TTPS for sharing of views, joint command, etc.
  - Create a Central system dispatch unit to avoid duplication of resources.

#### Probation Officers

1. Tell us something about Probation Department's relationship within the TTPS
- Police officers are quite willing to collaborate and share information on clients
  - Police Officers are not aware of the role and function of Probation Officers
  - Police Officers don't collaborate well with Probation Officers when they request assistance as a general member of the public.

#### 7.4.5.1 Recommendations:

- There should be a liaison officer at Police Stations to facilitate Probation Officers in their request for information
- There should be more specialized units needed in the TTPS
- There should be mandatory refresher courses for Police Officers
- Implement Insurance/Risk Plan for all Police Officers
- Take measures to curb long absences from duty
- Revise remuneration packages to prevent officers from accepting bribes and engaging in other corrupt practices.
- Increase availability of vehicles in the TTPS
- Revamp the entry qualifications for Police Officers
- Increase awareness of duties and standards in the police service to improve customer service.
- Examine the administration system to reduce issues related to seniors, stifling the development of their subordinates.
- Hire an external body to “police” the police administration.
- Make public the examples of corrupt police officers as a lesson to younger police officers.
- The government should not be involved in the selection of the Commissioner of Police.
- Increase networking with all agencies.
- Increase access to foreign aid/training for competent officers to be trained/access scholarships abroad.
- Increase collaboration with probation officers and school visit.

#### Municipal Police

##### 1. What is the relationship between the TTPS and Municipal Police?

- Officers in the TTPS feel that they are superior to the municipal police and there are problems in our relationships.
- It is felt that TTPS’s superiors do not respect municipal police officers and this disrespect filters down to TTPS’s junior officers. This affects our collaboration.
- The TTPS is not educated on the role of municipal police. There is need to clarify the roles and functions of TTPS and the Municipal Police; too much duplication.
- In some areas, the relationship between municipal police and TTPS are better than others.
- In some areas, TTPS officers only show up for joint work with the municipal police where extra duty payments are involved.
- In many instances, the public is directed from the TTPS to municipal police during late hours or when the TTPS officers are feeling lazy.
- Municipal police undergo the same training as regular police at the Police Academy and many times they perform better than regular police. However, when it

comes to awards and recognition at the Academy, the municipal police do not receive them as all such awards go towards the regular police.

2. What are your thoughts on the proposed expansion of Municipal Police?

- It is long overdue and should be expedited.

3. Is there an adequate number of officers? How many are required?

- Not enough manpower.

- Need approximately 100+ in each corporation especially because of the population/housing growth. TTPS deals with districts, Municipal Police handles the entire Corporation.

4. Describe some challenges you are currently experiencing.

- Tools and Equipment are badly needed. Some corporations have many recreational areas, business areas etc. as well as areas that young persons patronize and these need policing by municipal police.

- Vehicles are needed to patrol because some jurisdictions are large i.e. whole of the southwest peninsula. The current fleet is run-down.

- There are leaks when police exercises are planned so perpetrators disappear or criminal activity is halted.

- Adequate physical accommodation (office/station), equipment, etc. is required if manpower is to increase.

- Lines of reporting are blurred i.e. reporting to an ACP and at times to a CEO. CEOs cannot instruct, they can make requests of the MP's. However, the MP depend on CEOs for funding therefore there must be diplomacy to maintain relationships.

- Prior to 1974, salary and allowances of MP's were on par with TTPS. At present, they earn 40% less in allowances. The Soogrim Report noted that municipal police perform 60% work as regular police and their allowances should be reduced by 40%. This matter is now before the courts.

5. Do you think the TTPS has adequate manpower?

- They have too many Officers.

- The problem is not numbers, it is a matter of their management and deployment.

- There are too many sections in the TTPS.

6. What are your views on the recruitment process?



- In the last recruitment, persons were taken ‘off the street’, classified as temporary Police, and were sent to train approximately one year later.
- Age bracket not feasible.

7. What training areas are municipal police interested in and what are your comments on training?

Training Areas:

- Community Policing.
- Child Protection, Domestic Violence, First Responder
- Ability to handle destitutes / vagrants.
- Gang Awareness, Kidnapping, Cyber Crime

Comments on Training:

- The Academy does not adequately prepare persons to become an Officer.
- Some municipal police officers have funded their own training/education.
- Hoping for standardization in training identified to participate in. This mandate should come from the ACP to all Corporations. At present some Corporations train staff, some do not. Training programmes vary.

8. Would municipal police officers like to be absorbed into the TTPS?

- All of the municipal police officers present wanted to remain as a municipal police officer.
- They said that the municipal police unit is like a family and are not willing to cross over.
- Municipal police has all of the powers of a regular police.

9. Have you encountered instances of sexual harassment?

- Yes, but it is not widespread, only a few. It does take place.

10. Is there corruption in municipal police?

- Yes, it exists, but is not widespread.

11. What do you think about the present method of appointing a Commissioner of Police?

- The Prime Minister should not have the power of veto. This is a problem.
- The process should be changed.
- The Police Service Commission should be solely in charge of this process since the appraisal for the Commissioner of Police's extension originates from this body.

12. What do you think about the current method by which SRP's are absorbed into the TTPS?

- See no problem with this absorption once the incumbents are qualified and meet the other criteria of TTPS.
- SRPs were intended for the municipal unit however, they were kept by the TTPS.
- There should be an independent recruiting body/agency doing recruitment of all officers – regular police, municipal police, SRPs.

13. Other matters:

- Municipal police need their own Employee Assistance Programme. Currently using TTPS psychiatrist and doctors but it becomes an issue when service is used and they identify themselves as municipal police.
- Municipal police should have one Public Relations Department to ensure public knows about them and what they do. They indicated that even the Attorney General's department was unaware of their roles and functions. The opportunity is there with the window of the 2014 regulations and the current ACP.
- TTPS heads need to establish good rapport with and extend communications to the municipal police and respect their roles and abilities in order that all i.e. junior and senior Police Officers, can follow suit.
- The body needs to have a proper vision and mission to follow. Training should be ongoing, recruitment, deployment, remuneration, performance appraisal, etc., needs adequate attention.
- There should be a liaison officer between the TTPS and municipal police.

#### TTPS Retirees Association

1. How do you feel when you hear comments about the present crop of Police Officers?

- Embarrassed by the conversations but still try to look at what the current trainees are exposed to in terms of training. Who are consulted in the community when recruiting and doing the background checks?

- Feel sick, frustrated, angry, embarrassed. There is no pride in having been a Police Officer.
- Embarrassed. Appearance at 'turnout' is poor. Police of old looked crisp, stiff. Present batch is ill-disciplined. No penalty/consequence for actions.
- Feel annoyed, disappointed. However, recognizes that competition exists between Divisions, Stations, etc. The reward for firearms recovery is high and fosters competition, therefore processes are overridden to meet the end result.
- Asst. Superintendents, Inspectors: Egos are big so not rolling up sleeves and tackling crime.
- Disappointment that no corrective action is taken by superiors/powers that be. Discipline is the bedrock of such an organization. No respect for seniors. Confinement to Barracks in former days prevented recruits from re-associating with corrupt elements.
- Enforcement is nil in T&T so laws are not respected. Processes towards discipline of a junior take too long.
- Persons seeking promotion without knowledge. A Constable goes on vacation and returns to work as a Sergeant.
- Police Officers now hold no interest in Policing. They are interested in Leave and Pay. Inspectors need training. Officers unaware of the laws. The only persons serious about crime are the criminals
- Performance Appraisals are not utilized to correct behaviours of juniors. Must return to the fundamentals.
- Lack of knowledge is rife in the Police Service.
- Rogue Police Officers not being addressed. Garnering evidence is a challenge.
- Nepotism decides where Officers are assigned or whether they are recruited.
- Persons are not assigned out of Barracks into the area where best able to function based on skill evaluation.
- Officers do not like to 'make' cases nor go to Court.
- Confused about what is the correct Police uniform, too many variations. Appearance poor: male and female hairstyles, holding hat in their hands, cell phones in hand, etc. Physical stature does not command respect.
- Public feels it is a waste of time to report minor offences.
- Denial of "Due Process" has resulted in a steady breakdown of discipline because swift disciplinary action was removed/eroded because of this claim.
- How much impact does background check have on recruitment of an individual? Under Freedom of Information Act a person can demand to see the background check and litigate if it does not fall to their favour denying them entry to TTPS.
- Interviewees – whether school, institution or neighbours – prefer not to give negative comments on an individual being investigated.

*Recommendations:*

- There should be checks and balances even in training. Audit the product and compare to training.
- Three years ago the IRO suggested to the Academy that religious sessions be included in training content. Awaiting feedback.
- Training components must be tweaked to match reality.
- Re-visit design of Police Stations – seniors cannot see the Charge Room as they are too far back in the building.
- ASP's and Inspectors must be held accountable for adherence to regulations and for persons under their command.
- Implement a half-way house where habits/behaviours can be broken or altered before persons enter the Academy. This would be at the person's expense which would indicate their seriousness.
- Should engage COSTATT to institute Certificate or Diploma in Policing so persons interested in the Service can be inducted from this cohort.
- Each rank should have training that prepares the incumbent to operate effectively in the position.
- Employ use of electronic Performance Appraisal (used by the UN). With this system, goals are set and person works towards achieving them.
- There should be more than one investigator providing reports which can be compared to aid thoroughness of check.
- Mr. Clive Bertrand had presented a document to the Police Academy proffering the services of members of the Retirees Association to do training at the Academy.
- There should be an aptitude and ability assessment at the Academy. This would identify the skills of the graduate so they can be placed in a unit most suitable to skills.
- Continue to build a skills bank for Police Officers when they cycle through Stations. This information will prove useful in future assignments.
- Referenced GEB "ROPE" (Repeat Offenders.....) which is a wealth of information which can be used to predict when crime activity will happen so manpower can be assigned effectively.
- Customize international methods of policing to suit our environment and make it work e.g. one man patrols with relevant IT support.
- Bring in persons at different ranks with the expertise i.e. start at Sergeant, Inspector, Asst. Superintendent, etc. not necessarily always starting at Constable level and working up to higher ranks.
- Organize Neighbourhood Watch systems beforehand not only after burglary occurs.

2. What criteria is considered when Officers are being assigned to Stations?

- In years past the new Police Officer had to work for three years doing ordinary policing work before being assigned. Officers were monitored and evaluated every three months or so over this time and sent for training as required in order to tighten up on performance.

3. How can the TTPS reduce the overtime expense? Do all areas of work demand 24 hours of service or can some operate on 8 or 12 hours?

- On any given day the full manpower strength is required.
- Have Officers work on committed salaries only. No more overtime.
- Use a more scientific approach i.e. budget salaries beforehand. Identify and assess necessary areas for overtime, calculate budget and assign staff accordingly.
- Determine ratio of Officer to civilian using the benchmark and work from there. More evaluation of a situation before assigning persons to overtime situations.
- Suspensions and leave currently bleeding the Service, who is going to make the changes necessary to cut the overtime bill?

4. In which areas can Police Officers be relieved of duties that can be performed by another agency?

- Impounding animals.
- Administration.
- Emergency calls centre (E999).
- Community Comfort Patrols – can be done by ex-Police.
- Undercover Policing in communities for information gathering.
- Liquor license, Dancehall license
- High offices escort – not one for outsourcing to a private agency. Transport at this level should remain at TTPS. Maybe for lower level dignitaries who are not under threat.

5. What do you think are the reasons for non-implementation of recommendations to change the operations of the Police Service?

- Implementation involves cost and it is only recently the Commissioner of Police received autonomy and accountability functions.
- Police do not know how to champion for their needs.
- There was a top-down approach to implementing ideas and recommendations.
- The Commissioner of Police is now aware of resources at hand and making efforts to utilize them.
- Former CoP Gibbs' and Asst Ewatski's association with the TTPS Retirees Association opened the door to CoP Williams for recommendations to be observed/heard.

6. Additional Comments

- Need to remove rogue Police.

- Judiciary: Matters stay too long in Court. Plea bargaining will capture whistle-blowers to assist in bringing down high-level drug dealers.
- Case Management is a waste of time.
- In the past the TTPS had Matrons who did surprise visits to Stations.

## Appendix 12: Survey Analysis Tables

12: 1 – Age x Rating of Staffing within the TTPS

Age Groups (Years)	Rating of Staffing within TTPS (%)				
	Very Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Very Satisfactory	Total
21-30	13	43	43	1	100
31-40	12	50	36	2	100
41-50	15	52	29	4	100
51+	10	36	51	3	100

12: 2 – Rank x Rating of Staffing within the TTPS

Rank	Rating of Staffing within TTPS (%)				
	Very Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Very Satisfactory	Total
Constable	12	48	38	2	100
Corporal- Sergeant	18	47	33	2	100
Inspector – ACP	7	41	48	4	100

12: 3 – Number of Years in Service x Rating of Staffing within the TTPS

Number of Years in Service	Rating of Staffing within TTPS (%)				
	Very Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Very Satisfactory	Total
Less than 5	12	40	46	2	100
6-10	9	57	34	0	100
11-20	14	52	29	5	100
21-30	18	41	38	3	100
31+	12	47	38	3	100

12: 4 – Age x Rating of Organization of TTPS to Address Crime

Age Groups (Years)	Rating of Organization of TTPS to Address Crime (%)				
	Very Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Very Satisfactory	Total
21-30	10	58	32	0	100
31-40	9	56	32	3	100
41-50	7	51	39	3	100
51+	8	26	58	8	100

12: 5 – Rank x Organization of TTPS to Address Crime

Rank	Organization of TTPS to Address Crime (%)				
	Very Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Very Satisfactory	Total
Constable	11	51	36	2	100
Corporal- Sergeant	7	55	35	3	100
Inspector – ACP	6	33	54	7	100

12: 6 - Number of Years in Service x Organization of TTPS to Address Crime

Number of Years in Service	Organization of TTPS to Address Crime (%)				
	Very Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Very Satisfactory	Total
Less than 5	8	52	39	1	100
6-10	8	56	34	2	100
11-20	9	60	26	5	100
21-30	11	53	33	3	100
31+	8	37	50	5	100



12: 7 - Rank x Use of Civilians in TTPS to Help Police

Rank	Use of Civilians in TTPS to Help Police (%)				
	Very Little	Little	Much	Very Much	Total
Constable	28	41	22	9	100
Corporal-Sergeant	30	45	17	8	100
Inspector – ACP	18	41	28	13	100

12: 8 - Age x Rating of Leadership of the TTPS

Age Groups (Years)	Rating of Leadership of the TTPS (%)				
	Very Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Very Satisfactory	Total
21-30	18	43	35	4	100
31-40	15	36	47	2	100
41-50	14	31	53	2	100
51+	2	11	60	27	100

12: 9 - Age x Deployment of Officers Based on Training, Qualifications & Experience

Age Groups (Years)	Deployment of Officers Based on Training, Qualifications & Experience (%)				
	Not At All	Sometimes	Often	Very Often	Total
21-30	14	67	16	3	100
31-40	15	65	15	5	100
41-50	11	67	16	6	100
51+	9	64	23	4	100

12: 10 - Educational Background x Deployment of Officers Based on Training, Qualifications & Experience

Educational Background	Deployment of Officers Based on Training, Qualifications & Experience (%)				
	Not At All	Sometimes	Often	Very Often	Total
CXC / CSEC / O' Levels	15	67	14	4	100
CAPE / A' Levels / Tech / Voc	10	75	10	5	100
University	13	59	24	4	100

12: 11 - Age x Favouritism in Assigning Officers to Divisions/Units/Sections

Age Groups (Years)	Organization of TTPS to Address Crime (%)				
	Very Often	Often	Sometimes	Not At All	Total
21-30	51	31	13	5	100
31-40	42	25	30	3	100
41-50	39	33	28	0	100
51+	26	23	43	8	100

12: 12 - Rank x Favouritism in Assigning Officers to Divisions/Units/Sections

Rank	Favouritism in Assigning Officers to Divisions/Units/Sections (%)				
	Not At All	Sometimes	Often	Very Often	Total
Constable	3	28	26	43	100
Corporal-Sergeant	1	19	34	46	100
Inspector – ACP	6	44	26	24	100

12: 13 - Number of Years in TTPS x Favouritism in Assigning Officers to  
Divisions/Units/Sections

Number of Years	Favouritism in Assigning Officers to Divisions/Units/Sections (%)				
	Not At All	Sometimes	Often	Very Often	Total
Less than 5	4	23	26	47	100
6-10	0	25	29	46	100
11-20	2	31	32	35	100
21-30	2	27	32	39	100
31+	5	34	27	34	100

12: 14 - Age x Availability of Tools and Equipment to Perform Duties

Age Groups (Years)	Availability of Tools and Equipment to Perform Duties (%)				
	Very Little	Little	Much	Very Much	Total
21-30	38	43	17	2	100
31-40	45	43	9	3	100
41-50	27	44	23	6	100
51+	19	38	38	5	100

12: 15 - Rank x Availability of Tools and Equipment to Perform Duties

Rank	Availability of Tools and Equipment to Perform Duties (%)				
	Very Little	Little	Much	Very Much	Total
Constable	43	40	14	3	100
Corporal-Sergeant	28	47	20	5	100
Inspector-ACP	11	45	40	4	100

12: 16 - Age x Time Spent Doing Paper Work Daily

Age Groups (Years)	Time Spent Doing Paper Work Daily (%)					Total
	0 hours	1-3 hours	4-6 hours	7-9 hours	10+ Hours	
21-30	7	40	37	11	5	100
31-40	3	22	45	23	7	100
41-50	3	33	49	10	5	100
51+	4	30	45	15	6	100

12: 17 - Rank x Time Spent Doing Paper Work Daily

Rank	Time Spent Doing Paper Work Daily (%)					Total
	0 hours	1-3 hours	4-6 hours	7-9 hours	10+ hours	
Constable	5	32	39	18	6	100
Corporal- Sergeant	4	32	44	12	8	100
Inspector-ACP	0	27	59	11	3	100

12: 18 - Age x Impact of Introduction of Technology on Ability to Perform Job

Age Groups (Years)	Impact of Introduction of Technology on Ability to Perform Job (%)				Total
	Not At All	Very Little	Moderately	Very Much	
21-30	20	32	38	10	100
31-40	14	34	37	15	100
41-50	7	25	51	17	100
51+	3	10	51	36	100

12: 19 - Rank x Impact of Introduction of Technology on Ability to Perform Job

Rank	Impact of Introduction of Technology on Ability to Perform Job (%)				
	Not At All	Very Little	Moderately	Very Much	Total
Constable	17	23	39	11	100
Corporal-Sergeant	6	25	51	18	100
Inspector-ACP	2	9	53	33	100

12: 20 - Number of Years in Service x Impact of Introduction of Technology on Ability to Perform Job

Number of Years in Service	Impact of Introduction of Technology on Ability to Perform Job (%)				
	Not At All	Very Little	Moderately	Very Much	Total
Less than 5	16	35	38	11	100
6-10	20	33	35	12	100
11-20	15	26	44	15	100
21-30	6	31	48	15	100
31+	4	15	52	29	100

12: 21 - Age x Rating of Availability of Transportation to Perform Duties

Age Groups (Years)	Rating of Availability of Transportation to Perform Duties (%)				
	Very Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Very Satisfactory	Total
21-30	48	36	14	2	100
31-40	45	27	27	1	100
41-50	22	33	37	8	100
51+	11	21	55	13	100

12: 22 - Number of Years in Service x Rating of Availability of Transportation to Perform Duties

Number of Years in Service	Rating of Availability of Transportation to Perform Duties (%)				
	Very Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Very Satisfactory	Total
Less than 5	45	40	14	1	100
6-10	47	26	25	2	100
11-20	38	22	35	5	100
21-30	30	25	43	2	100
31+	13	29	46	12	100

12: 23 - Age x Rating of Training and Development Opportunities in the TTPS

Age Groups (Years)	Rating of Training and Development Opportunities in TTPS (%)				
	Very Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Very Satisfactory	Total
21-30	31	42	26	1	100
31-40	24	41	34	1	100
41-50	16	40	42	2	100
51+	8	33	52	7	100

12: 24 - Rank x Rating of Training and Development Opportunities in the TTPS

Rank	Rating of Training and Development Opportunities in TTPS (%)				
	Very Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Very Satisfactory	Total
Constable	24	43	31	2	100
Corporal-Sergeant	18	43	38	1	100
Inspector-ACP	8	26	61	5	100

12: 25 - Number of Years in TTPS x Rating of Training and Development Opportunities  
in the TTPS

Number of Years in TTPS	Rating of Training and Development Opportunities in TTPS (%)				
	Very Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Very Satisfactory	Total
Less than 5	29	41	29	1	100
6-10	21	44	30	5	100
11-20	20	50	27	3	100
21-30	20	35	45	0	100
31+	11	33	52	4	100

12: 26 - Age x Rating of Efficiency of Internal Communication within the TTPS

Age Groups (Years)	Rating of Efficiency of Internal Communication with the TTPS (%)				
	Very Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Very Satisfactory	Total
21-30	28	44	28	0	100
31-40	25	50	25	0	100
41-50	15	54	31	0	100
51+	9	41	48	2	100

12: 27 - Age x Abuse of Sick and Injury Leave

Age Groups (Years)	Sick and Injury Leave Abuse (%)				
	Very Little	Little	Much	Very Much	Total
21-30	4	17	37	42	100
31-40	3	14	36	47	100
41-50	2	15	26	57	100
51+	3	11	24	62	100

12: 28 - Age x Abuse of Study Leave

Age Groups (Years)	Study Leave Abuse (%)				
	Very Little	Little	Much	Very Much	Total
21-30	33	46	13	8	100
31-40	22	42	22	14	100
41-50	17	40	24	19	100
51+	14	30	26	30	100

12: 29 - Rank x Abuse of Study Leave

Rank	Study Leave Abuse (%)				
	Very Little	Little	Much	Very Much	Total
Constable	24	45	18	13	100
Corporal-Sergeant	18	29	27	26	100
Inspector-ACP	15	44	22	19	100

12: 30 - Number of Years in Service x Abuse of Study Leave

Number of Years in Service	Study Leave Abuse (%)				
	Very Little	Little	Much	Very Much	Total
Less than 5	32	42	19	7	100
6-10	26	47	15	12	100
11-20	17	46	20	17	100
21-30	15	35	30	20	100
31+	14	34	24	28	100



12: 31 - Age x Abuse of Medical Exemptions

Age Groups (Years)	Medical Exemptions Abuse (%)				
	Very Little	Little	Much	Very Much	Total
21-30	8	28	30	34	100
31-40	5	21	31	43	100
41-50	4	26	21	49	100
51+	2	16	20	62	100

12: 32 - Rank x Abuse of Medical Exemptions

Rank	Medical Exemptions Abuse (%)				
	Very Little	Little	Much	Very Much	Total
Constable	6	27	26	41	100
Corporal-Sergeant	5	20	25	50	100
Inspector-ACP	2	15	22	61	100

12: 33 - Number of Years in TTPS x Abuse of Medical Exemptions

Number of Years in TTPS	Medical Exemptions Abuse (%)				
	Very Little	Little	Much	Very Much	Total
Less than 5	5	28	28	39	100
6-10	8	29	20	43	100
11-20	8	19	36	37	100
21-30	5	26	32	37	100
31+	3	17	17	63	100

12: 34 - Age x Extent of Corruption within the TTPS

Age Groups (Years)	Extent of Corruption within the TTPS (%)				
	Very Little	Little	Much	Very Much	Total
21-30	1	17	29	53	100
31-40	3	14	42	41	100
41-50	1	26	35	38	100
51+	14	32	27	27	100

12: 35 - Number of Years in Service x Extent of Corruption within the TTPS

Number of Years in Service	Extent of Corruption within the TTPS (%)				
	Very Little	Little	Much	Very Much	Total
Less than 5	1	13	32	54	100
6-10	5	25	28	42	100
11-20	2	20	43	35	100
21-30	3	18	47	32	100
31+	8	29	31	32	100

12: 36 - Age x Rating of Disciplinary Process in the TTPS

Age Groups (Years)	Rating of Disciplinary Process in TTPS (%)				
	Very Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Very Satisfactory	Total
21-30	9	45	40	6	100
31-40	13	49	34	3	100
41-50	21	56	22	1	100
51+	33	48	19	0	100

12: 37 - Number of Years in TTPS x Rating of Disciplinary Process in the TTPS

Number of Years in TTPS	Rating of Disciplinary Process in TTPS (%)				
	Very Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Very Satisfactory	Total
Less than 5	12	44	40	4	100
6-10	13	43	42	2	100
11-20	10	59	25	6	100
21-30	25	52	23	0	100
31+	26	55	18	1	100

12: 38 - Age x Performance Standards / Targets

Age Groups (Years)	Performance Standards / Targets (%)				
	Very Unrealistic	Unrealistic	Realistic	Very Realistic	Total
21-30	4	31	56	9	100
31-40	1	31	63	5	100
41-50	3	25	64	8	100
51+	4	11	75	10	100

12: 39 - Number of Years in Service x Performance Standards / Targets

Number of Years in Police Service	Performance Standards / Targets (%)				
	Very Unrealistic	Unrealistic	Realistic	Very Realistic	Total
Less than 5	2	32	56	10	100
6-10	5	28	62	5	100
11-20	0	25	70	5	100
21-30	6	25	63	6	100
31+	3	19	68	10	

12: 40 - Age x Last Time Appraisal Was Done

Age Groups (Years)	Last Time Appraisal Was Done (%)						
	Never	More Than 6 Years Ago	5-6 Years Ago	3-4 Years Ago	1-2 Years Ago	Within Last Year	Total
21-30	47	0	0	3	15	35	100
31-40	20	9	3	11	22	35	100
41-50	6	9	4	10	30	42	100
51+	2	2	2	12	24	58	100

12: 41 - Rank x Last Time Appraisal Was Done

Rank	Last Time Appraisal Was Done (%)						
	Never	More Than 6 Years Ago	5-6 Years Ago	3-4 Years Ago	1-2 Years Ago	Within Last Year	Total
Constable	30	5	2	11	21	31	100
Corporal- Sergeant	3	9	5	7	34	42	100
Inspector- ACP	1	2	2	13	16	66	100

12: 42 - Number of Years in Service x Last Time Appraisal Was Done

Number of Years in Service	Last Time Appraisal Was Done (%)						
	Never	More Than 6 Years Ago	5-6 Years Ago	3-4 Years Ago	1-2 Years Ago	Within Last Year	Total
Less than 5	53	0	0	4	13	30	100
6-10	9	6	6	16	25	38	100
11-20	7	20	3	18	28	24	100
21-30	5	2	2	10	30	51	100
31+	1	5	3	10	26	54	100

12: 43 - Age x Rating of Overall Performance Appraisal System in the TTPS

Age Groups (Years)	Rating of Overall Performance Appraisal System in TTPS (%)				
	Very Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Very Satisfactory	Total
21-30	29	42	27	2	100
31-40	31	39	29	1	100
41-50	29	46	24	1	100
51+	19	41	38	2	100

12: 44 - Age x Rating of Rewards and Recognition Policies in the TTPS

Age Groups (Years)	Rating of Rewards and Recognition Policies in TTPS (%)				
	Very Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Very Satisfactory	Total
21-30	40	50	10	0	100
31-40	37	50	13	0	100
41-50	31	54	14	1	100
51+	15	51	33	1	100

12: 45 Rank x Satisfaction with Rewards and Recognition Policies in TTPS

Rank	Satisfaction with Rewards and Recognition Policies in TTPS (%)				
	Very Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Very Satisfactory	Total
Constable	36	51	12	1	100
Corporal – Sergeant	35	51	13	1	100
Inspector – ACP	12	55	32	1	100

12: 46 - Age x Rating of Compensation Package in the TTPS

Age Groups (Years)	Rating of Compensation Package in TTPS (%)				
	Very Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Very Satisfactory	Total
21-30	38	37	25	0	100
31-40	45	38	16	1	100
41-50	38	40	21	1	100
51+	28	38	32	2	100

12: 47 - Age x Satisfaction with Current Job

Age Groups (Years)	Satisfaction with Current Job (%)					Total
	Very Dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Neither Satisfied Nor Dissatisfied	Satisfied	Very Satisfied	
21-30	1	12	36	39	12	100
31-40	2	12	28	43	15	100
41-50	4	11	25	43	17	100
51+	1	2	4	55	38	100

12: 48 - Age x Public Confidence in the TTPS

Age Groups (Years)	Motivation in Current Job (%)					Total
	No Confidence At All	Very Low Confidence	Low Confidence	High Confidence	Very High Confidence	
21-30	13	57	25	5	0	100
31-40	20	51	28	1	0	100
41-50	15	38	44	3	0	100
51+	3	41	49	7	0	100

12: 49 - Rank x Satisfaction with Present System in Appointing Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners of Police

Rank	Satisfaction with Present System in Appointing Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners of Police (%)		
	No	Yes	Total
Constable	19	81	100
Corporal-Sergeant	10	90	100
Inspector-ACP	14	86	100

12: 50 - Rank x Suitability of One Association Representing Both Division of Officers in the TTPS

Rank	Suitability of One Association Representing Both Division of Officers (%)				
	Very Unsuitable	Unsuitable	Suitable	Very Suitable	Total
Constable	9	30	49	12	100
Corporal-Sergeant	8	27	41	24	100
Inspector – ACP	19	30	35	16	100

12: 51 - Number of Years in TTPS x Suitability of One Association Representing Both Division of Officers

Number of Years in Service	Suitability of One Association Representing Both Division of Officers (%)				
	Very Unsuitable	Unsuitable	Suitable	Very Suitable	Total
Less than 5 years	6	25	55	14	100
6-10 years	11	40	43	6	100
11-20 years	15	30	43	12	100
21-30 years	10	25	47	18	100
31+ years	15	28	35	22	100

12: 52 - Rank x Entry and Promotion Processes in the TTPS

Rank	Entry and Promotion Processes in the TTPS (%)				
	Very Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Very Satisfactory	Total
Constable	24	40	33	3	100
Corporal-Sergeant	42	38	18	2	100
Inspector – ACP	14	50	33	3	100



## **Appendix 13: Paper on Police Governance Presented by Professor Emeritus Ramesh Deosaran, ORTT**

**Title:** Police Governance from Constitutional Puzzle to Political Disguise

**Presented at:** Annual Conference of Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (Torarica Hotel, Paramaribo, Surinam, May 16-19, 2016)

### **INTRODUCTION**

Triggered by Sir Robert Peel's intervention in 1829, as public policing evolved in England during the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, a major, controversial issue was who controls the police, in particular the Police Chief, and how. The meandering controversies within the vocal spaces of politicians, scholars and practitioners themselves led to the still unsettled Police Act of 1996 in the UK with the relatively large chunk of police control in the hands of the British Home Office, implying centralised political control.

During the 19<sup>th</sup> and early in the 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, America, following but gradually drifting from the early British ideas of policing, institutionalised the offices of sheriff and constable – the former appointed by local political authorities.. Urbanisation, industrialisation and the increase in serious crimes and public disorder pushed American cities towards more decentralised policing and under substantial political control – the latter condition becoming of intense controversy because of widespread allegations of protection rackets and ties between police and political corruption.

Two related steps were then taken to help establish police integrity. One was to transform the police into a “quasi-military” bureaucratic agency. Two, to obtain police accountability by establishing police oversight bodies which themselves, containing political appointees, became controversial and largely ineffective.

The notable, overarching feature of all this are the compelling, almost zealous, pressures for political control over the police, especially over its chief. This matter of police

control, as a work in progress, presents a sharpened dilemma for civil society in a multi-party democracy.

### **The ACCP Challenge**

I insert this brief summary of political control to indicate that control of Police Chiefs and Commissioners in the Caribbean will be of increasing concern both in the public mind and among Commissioners themselves. And while it may be uncomfortable for an individual Commissioner to express his or her professional views on the matter, it will be helpful if as a professional association, the ACCP should give it some collective attention from the viewpoints of principle, experience and practice.

From my observations, while matters of police operations and performance, organisational structure, police technology and community relations – as important as they are – have been receiving much attention in the criminal justice and policing literature, relatively little attention is given to who controls the police, especially the commissioners - how, why and with what consequences. Political control is taken for granted. But there are political and law enforcement implications. In pressing for professional independence, Lord Denning in a famous judgment said of the police:

*“A constable is not the servant of anyone, save of the law itself. No Minister of the Crown can tell him that he must, or must not, keep observation on this place or that, or that he must, or must not, prosecute this man or than one. Nor can any police authority tell him so. The responsibility for law enforcement lies on him. He is answerable to the law alone. (R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex. P. Blackburn [1968] 2 QB 136)*

This judgement relates to the use of police discretion, depending, however, on police integrity especially in the lower ranks where discretion is regularly required. Further, while the police execute law enforcement, law enforcement goes beyond police work. Other law enforcement agencies are customs, immigration, etc and to some extent concerns over political control also extend to them.

There are three reasons for having increased attention to this matter of police control over the police. (1) In a democratic society, there is a fundamental principle of having civilian control over the police. (2) The police, under its Commissioner or Chief, must exercise its investigative powers without fear or favour and especially treat everyone as being equal in the eyes of the law. (3) The police commissioner should be politically independent enough to investigate and help prosecute crime without fear or favour.

These principles, in practice, can find themselves in competition and conflict with one another, depending on the level of political control over the police in the small, multi-party societies of the Caribbean. It is not that the police in other countries do not face such vulnerability. However, as a relatively new system, and largely politically independent, Caribbean politics is different in its application, a major reason being that while other more developed societies have certain restraining traditions and corrective norms beyond and apart from laws and statutes, we rely much more on written laws and regulations which can be evaded or manipulated by the political and economic elites. Political control in a multi-party democracy over any state agency is not a neutral process.

### **Oversight and Appointment**

This is not a statement of disrespect but more so a warning, a red flag. After all, with the allegations from the Panama Papers, high-profile allegations of unethical if not illegal actions across the Caribbean, abuse of political power and threats of diminishing public confidence in the police, the need for police independence and leadership integrity has increased. The media, especially the hostile rise and spread of social media, are not sympathetic. Before we illustrate the constitutional puzzle and oversight complexity in Trinidad and Tobago, let us take a brief look at police oversight in three other Caribbean countries.

**Jamaica:** The country's constitution provides for a Police Service Commission whose five members are appointed by Governor General on the recommendation of the Prime Minister

and after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. The Governor General, on the recommendation of the PSC is empowered to appoint members from Inspector up to Commissioner of Police. The Police Service Commission is empowered to make recommendations to the Governor General with respect to discipline, appointments and promotions of members of the Jamaican Constabulary Force above the rank of Inspector. This Commission also handles appeals from all ranks. The Police Service Commission has delegated authority to the Commissioner to appoint members of the Force from Constable up to Sergeant.

**Barbados:** The Police Service Commission – its chairman and a maximum of four members - are appointed by the Governor General on the recommendation of the Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. Generally, the power to discipline, appoint or promote police officers is vested in the Governor General, acting on the advice of the Police Service Commission. (Section 96(1))

**Guyana:** The Police Service Commission chairman is appointed by the popular-elected President after “meaningful consultation” with the Leader of the Opposition and chairman of the Public Service Commission. Four other members are appointed by this President “upon nomination by the National Assembly after it has consulted such bodies as appear to it to represent the majority of the members of the Police Force and any other such body it s deems fit.”

In Guyana’s multi-party, multi-ethnic society, the President appoints the Police Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner after “meaningful consultations” with the Leader of the Opposition and chairperson of the Police Service Commission. (Section 211(1) The Police Service Commission is empowered to make appointments of or above the rank of Inspector, to exercise disciplinary control and remove such officers and hear appeals. The PSC delegates power to the Commissioner to make appointments below Inspector, to discipline and remove officers below such rank. (212(1-5))

## **Review**

This brief review tells us that essentially the appointment and removal of a Commissioner of Police in these countries are politically-driven but in slightly different ways. In *Jamaica*, the Prime Minister recommends to the Governor General whom to put as PSC members. The PSC recommends to the Governor General whom to put as Police Commissioner. In *Barbados*, the Prime Minister recommends to the Governor General whom to put as PSC members. The PSC then recommends to the Governor General whom to put as Police Commissioner. In *Guyana*, the President appoints the chairman and four other members of the PSC after “meaningful consultations” with Leader of the Opposition, chairperson of the Public Service Commission and other relevant organisations. The President appoints the Police Commissioner after consulting with the Leader of the Opposition and chairperson of the Public Service Commission.

For related interest, in New Zealand the Governor General appoints its Police Commissioner on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. Recently, according to the UK Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act, of 2011, Chiefs or Commissioners in designated areas are elected by popular ballot.

## **The Trinidad and Tobago Oversight Puzzle and Disguised PM Veto**

If there were any doubt that the appointment of a Police Commissioner in Trinidad and Tobago attracts heated political controversy, the parliamentary debate over the new PNM government’s new appointment procedures last year should quickly remove such doubt. There were intense rancour and cross-allegations.

In the years 2006 to 2009, the main objective of the Constitutional amendments to Sections 122 and 123 were intended to improve police management and protect the police service, in particular the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police, from undue political influence. And more precisely, to remove the veto power held by the Prime Minister over the appointment of Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police.

In fact, this was the joint agreement between the Government and the Opposition way back in 2002. A complicated, convoluted system was subsequently legislated to achieve this insulating objective. The fact is that the Prime Minister's veto still exists, not in statutory form but slyly within the relationship between cabinet and parliament. It remains an oversight puzzle - political control in disguise. Let's trace the evolution of this disguised result.

1. The 1962 Constitution stated that the members of the PSC shall be appointed by the Governor-General acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. (Section 98(2)). And the power to appoint, promote and discipline police officers was vested in the PSC. (Section 99(1))
2. The 1962 Constitution added that before the PSC appoints a Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner, it must get the approval of the Prime Minister – a veto power. (Section 99(5))
3. As far back as 1974, a high-powered Constitution Reform Report recommended that “all Service Commissions (including the Police Service Commission) be appointed by the President in his own discretion after consulting with the Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition and any other persons she may think fit. None of these appointments should be subject to parliamentary approval since they are to act independently of politics.” (Wooding Constitution Reform Report, 1974, p. 97) The then PNM Government rejected this.
4. The Report sensibly argued that free from partisan political influence, such public officers would be free to serve any new political administration.
5. The 1976 Constitution created a significant change, that is, it strengthened the power of the President by stating that the PSC shall be appointed by the President *after consultation with* and not *on the advice of* the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition. However, the PM's veto power over appointment of Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner remained. (Sections 122, 123)

6. In 2002, PM Patrick Manning, noting the large-scale dissatisfaction by his government and the public over “police management, corruption, promotion and indiscipline,” sought substantial police reform with three Bills driven on advice by a group of US consultants in 2004 costing over \$12 million.
7. The heated, protracted debates in parliament between 2006 to 2009 compelled Prime Minister Manning to seek a compromise by having a joint Govt-Opposition committee work out the details of appointing police officers and police oversight. The new Constitutional amendments and regulations, jointly approved in Parliament, diluted the powers of the PSC, increased the powers of the Police Commissioner, and provided police control by elected politicians and parliament.
8. The protracted delays and clash of competing interests generated by these new oversight laws eventually created what members of both Government and Opposition, senior lawyer, prominent citizens, former Police Service Commissioners and editorials described as “a bizarre, confusing, convoluted system.” A former head of the public service called it “a bureaucratic monstrosity” which has remained so since 2009. (Reginald Dumas)

**The New Oversight Laws. Constitution Sections 122, 123 amended and Legal Notices. (2006, 2007, 2009)**

9. What are some of the new laws? Firstly, the Constitution states that the Commissioner “shall have complete powers to manage the Police Service and appoint, promote and discipline officers except Deputy Commissioners.”
10. The PSC members are nominated by the President after consultation with the PM and Leader of the Opposition. The President then send these nominations and resumes to Parliament for debate, approval or disapproval by unanimous or majority vote. According to the President, this process has resulted in many qualified persons refusing to accept PSC membership.

11. To appoint a Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, the PSC required the Director of Personnel Administration (DPA) to contract a firm who then advertised regionally and internationally for a suitable firm to advertise, recruit and provide a short list of candidates to the PSC who then submits its chosen candidate to the President who then sends this candidate to the elected members of Parliament for open debate (affirmative resolution), approval or disapproval. If Parliament approves, the selected name is returned to the PSC for formal appointment. If not approved, the process is restarted.
12. The first attempt to appoint a Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police through these new oversight laws cost over \$4 million, with the first candidate proposed being rejected by a PNM majority in parliament and the second attempt which hired two Canadians as Commissioner and Deputy in 2011 resulted in both prematurely resigning in 2013.
13. It is now almost three years since the country has an Acting Commissioner – renewed every six months since 2013 - and a perpetual string of Acting Deputies – an undue embarrassment and quite likely a record heading for the Guinness World Book of Records. Inefficiency with wrecked police governance.
14. In 2011, the new chairman of the PSC was appointed by the government to chair a 11-member high-powered committee to review the administrative and legislative framework for the PSC in order to establish improved effectiveness and efficiency. The Report by this Multi-Sector Review Team and its recommendations, submitted in 2013, were not implemented by the Government. A new government came into office in September 2015.

### **The New Puzzle.**

15. The new amendments (2016) by this new Gov't for appointing a Commissioner and Deputy now require that the Commissioner and Deputy be a national of Trinidad and Tobago.



16. The recruitment process is now triggered when the Minister of National Security requests the PSC, through the Tenders Board Act, to hire a private firm to advertise and recruit. This firm then sends a short list to the PSC who then sends the top Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police candidates to Parliament through the President. Again, Parliament debates, then approves or disapproves etc., etc. - as before.
  
17. Overall, this convoluted appointment process raises six issues: (1) The PSC powers are significantly weakened. (2) Given the determining role of parliament, the PSC has become an expensive redundancy and an irrelevant rubber stamp. (3) The process, though intended to be a constitutionally-driven one, has been reduced to significant privatisation, with the public officer DPA removed and the PSC vetting powers numbed. (3) With the political directorate having significant determination from start to finish in the appointment process, it means political control has been strengthened. (4) Faced with such circumstances, it may be less costly, more efficient and constitutionally proper to remove the private firm and allow the PSC itself to conduct the recruitment process. (5) Alternatively, let the Parliament itself arrange to hire an appropriate consultant to recruit and recommend without having a PSC. (6) If political control over the Commissioner is inevitable in a democracy, then why don't we now do as the UK and have our Commissioners elected by popular vote? (6) Should a CoP be appointed on three or five year contract or given permanent tenure like judges?
  
18. The final issue is the PM veto which was a major objection by the Opposition in 2006. Has it been completely removed by the new constitutional amendments in 2009? Or even in 2016? Not at all. And the fact that the then Opposition helped frame the amendments makes this more intriguing. It was felt by the bipartisan team in 2009 that bringing the appointments of Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to Parliament would take care of the PM's direct veto over them. The veto still exists in disguise.

19. How? The Lower House of Parliament is controlled by majority vote. The cabinet controls the majority vote. The PM appoints and controls the ministers of cabinet. His view ultimately determines how cabinet and the majority vote in parliament. Therefore if he approves or disapproves of a proposed candidate for Commissioner, so will the majority vote in Parliament. His veto continues to exist in political disguise.
20. To add to the oversight complexity, the new government has proposed a Police Management Board and a Police Inspectorate. The implications of already having a Police Complaints Authority, a PSC and a Commissioner with “complete powers to manage the Police Service” are yet to be explained.
21. Now, some form of civilian control of a Police Commissioner is necessary in a democracy, But civilian control does not, should not, necessarily mean direct political control. As indicated earlier, there are dangers in excessive political control, especially in operational matters.
22. The Westminster system of parliamentary democracy does facilitate the transformation of civilian control into political control. But for the protection of small, multi-party democracies in the Caribbean, a judicious balance must be struck – a balance between the voice of the people’s representatives and the need for a Commissioner with the professional independence to investigate crime without fear or favour, and treating all equally in the eyes of the law.
23. Given the changing nature and extent of crime and connected international pressures, political control of Commissioners of Police will become a high-profile subject of discussion across the Caribbean in the coming years.
24. There is now enough brain power and experience within the ACCP to establish a Working Group on this crucial matter to examine the present, consider the best public-interest way forward and make recommendations when appropriate.

Handwritten signature and date '2013' in black ink.

**REPORT OF**

**THE MULTI-SECTOR REVIEW TEAM**

**ON**

**THE POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION**

13 MARCH 2013

## TABLE OF CONTENT

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

#### PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

#### PART TWO: ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT

The Police Service Commission

The PSC Secretariat

Widening of remit of the PSC

Recruitment and termination

Hearing of appeals

#### PART THREE: LEGISLATIVE REPORT

Introduction

An Act to incorporate the PSC

Appointment and dismissal of Commissioners

Administrative and financial autonomy

Widening of remit of the PSC

Selection process of police executive

Selection criteria for police executive

Hearing of appeals

Police Service Commission Regulations

#### PART FOUR: RECOMMENDATIONS

Administrative recommendations

Legislative recommendations

## APPENDICES

- Appendix A: Secretariat Positions Required
- Appendix B: Police Service Commission Secretariat Organizational Charts
- Appendix C: Duties of Positions in Police Service Commission Secretariat
- Appendix D: Sections 122, 122A, 123, 123A of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago
- Appendix E: The Appointment of the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police (Qualification and Selection Criteria) Order, 2009 (Legal Notice No. 101 of 2009)
- Appendix F: The Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police (Selection Process) Order, 2009 (Legal Notice No. 102 of 2009)
- Appendix G: The Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police (Acting Appointments) (Selection Process) (No. 2) Order, 2009 (Legal Notice No. 103 of 2009)
- Appendix H: The Police Service Commission (Appeal) Regulations, 2009 (Legal Notice No. 270 of 2009)

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Multi-Sector Review Team (**the Review Team**) was created to consider providing greater autonomy, relevance and clarity to the constitutional mandate and functions of the Police Service Commission (**PSC**). The Review Team comprised Members of Parliament representing both sides of the House, experts in the field of law, organization development and human resources management and was chaired by the Chairman of the PSC.

The Review Team's mission is to execute the bi-partisan pledge made in Parliament to have the legislative and administrative framework of the PSC reviewed two years after the constitutional amendments of 2007.

The Review Team, based on its terms of reference, held five (5) meetings between 11 October 2011 and 1 November 2012 at the office of the PSC. The Review Team, at its first meeting on 11 October 2011, established a Strategic Sub-Committee (**the Sub-Committee**), chaired by the Chairman of the Law Reform Commission, to examine the issues and prepare a draft report in accordance with its terms of reference. The Sub-Committee submitted its draft report to the Review Team on 12 June 2012.

After considering the draft report during a number of meetings, the Review Team raised a number of issues and suggestions which, on 3 October 2012, the Review Team requested the Sub-Committee to reconvene and consider the suggestions made, in particular by the Ministry of Public Administration, and prepare an amended draft report for the final consideration by the Review Team.

The Sub-Committee met fifteen (15) times; fourteen (14) times to deliberate and prepare the first draft report and then a final time to take into account and consider the issues and suggestions of the Review Team and to prepare an amended draft report for the final approval of the Review Team. The amended draft report consists of four parts: an introduction, an administrative section, a legislative section and recommendations. The amended draft report contains thirty-seven (37) recommendations divided into two (2) groups: Administrative (22) and Legislative (15). The amended draft report also contains eight (8) appendices that provide support information to the report.

## PART ONE – INTRODUCTION

1.1 On 24 September 2011, the Honourable Prime Minister, Mrs. Kamla Persad-Bissessar SC, Senator the Honourable Anand Ramlogan SC, Attorney General and Senator the Honourable Brigadier John Sandy (Rtrd), Minister of National Security met with the members of the PSC to consider legal, administrative and operational reforms to the PSC. The members of the PSC present at the meeting were Professor Ramesh Deosaran, Chairman and Commissioners Addison Khan, Jacqueline Cheeseman, Martin George and Kenneth Parker. Also considered at the meeting was the reciprocal relationship between the PSC and other related agencies, such as, the Ministry of National Security, Ministry of the Attorney General, the Police Service and the Ministry of Public Administration. At this meeting, the discussions focused on the urgent need for reforms to the PSC and its Secretariat (in the above mentioned terms).

1.2 Joint agreement was reached at this meeting of 24 September 2011 to establish the Review Team to consider providing greater autonomy, relevance and clarity to the constitutional mandate and functions of the PSC.

### Members of the Review Team

- 1.3 The members of the Review Team are:
- Professor Ramesh Deosaran, Chairman, Police Service Commission and Chairman of the Multi-Sector Review Team.
  - Senator the Honourable Anand Ramlogan SC, Attorney General.
  - Senator the Honourable Brigadier John Sandy (Rtrd), Minister of National Security (represented by Mr. Keith Renaud, Director, Office of Law Enforcement Policy (OLEP) and Ms. Michelle Ottley-Jones, Legal Officer). Brigadier John Sandy was replaced by the Honourable Jack Austin Warner, MP, Minister of National Security.
  - Honourable Carolyn Seepersad-Bachan, MP, Minister of Public Administration.

- Honourable Dr. Keith Rowley, MP, Leader of the Opposition (represented by Donna Cox, MP).
- Ms. Gillian Macintyre, Acting Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Public Administration.
- Mr. Ian Macintyre, SC, Chief Parliamentary Counsel, Ministry of the Attorney General.
- Mr. Samraj Harripaul, SC, Chairman, Law Reform Commission, Ministry of the Attorney General, and Chairman of the Strategic Sub-Committee.
- Dr. Kerry Sumesar-Rai, Director, Monitoring, Evaluation and Education, Police Service Commission Secretariat and Secretary of the Multi-Sector Review Team.
- Mr. Alwyn L. Daniel, Management Consultant.
- Ms. Kandice Rampersad, Legal Consultant, Ministry of the Attorney General.
- Sgt. Anand Ramesar, President, Trinidad and Tobago Police Social and Welfare Association.

1.4 The reform objective, as discussed at the meeting of 24 September 2011, was strongly supported by key stakeholders at a Round Table discussion held on 6 October 2011. Present at this meeting were the Chairman and members of the PSC, members of the Secretariat, representatives from the Office of the Leader of the Opposition, the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police, Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Select Committee of Parliament appointed to inquire into and report on Municipal Corporations and Service Commissions, Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Public Administration, the Director of Personnel Administration and representatives from the Ministry of the Attorney General, Ministry of National Security and the Police Service of Trinidad and Tobago. The outcome of this stakeholders' Round Table discussion is now called "The Hilton Consensus."

1.5 The Hilton Consensus focused on the theme "Challenges for Reform." The Chairman of the PSC, Professor Deosaran, delivered a presentation on "Governance





Structure Architecture.” He highlighted the ambiguities governing all the entities. Members of the PSC in effect expressed the need for change in the legislation to avoid confusion with respect to governance and managing public safety and the need for all agencies empowered with public safety to work closely together to fight crime.

1.6 The Hilton Consensus was followed by the first meeting of the Review Team on 11 October 2011. The focus of the meeting was that the PSC must not only be independent in principle but also in practice. It was agreed that the PSC should be independent and thus, for example, it should be in command of its own funds, staff and resources, thereby enabling it to operate efficiently and effectively in pursuit of its constitutional mandate. Also of relevance to the Review Team’s mission is the bi-partisan pledge made in Parliament to have the legislative and administrative framework of the PSC reviewed two years after the constitutional amendments of 2007.

1.7 It is against this background that the Review Team was charged with the following terms of reference agreed between the Chairman of the PSC and the Prime Minister’s representative, the Honourable Attorney General:

**Terms of Reference**

- a. To conduct a review of the relevant constitutional sections regarding the PSC’s mandate, oversight functions and its relationship with the Police Service and other relevant agencies, and make recommendations to enhance and strengthen the independence, efficiency and effectiveness of the PSC and its Secretariat
- b. To consider the status and number of Police Service Commissioners and make recommendations for their full-time or part-time status, as well as, matters of remuneration
- c. To widen the jurisdiction of the PSC to include Assistant Commissioners of Police and Civilian Heads in order to increase the efficiency of the Police Service

- d. To review and enhance the status of the PSC Secretariat and make recommendations for inserting the Secretariat into the revised constitutional framework
- e. To review the status and function of the PSC and its Secretariat and make recommendations so as to provide an independent administrative structure in terms of budget, staffing and other related financial, human and physical resources
- f. To review the structure and composition of the Secretariat and make recommendations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its support functions
- g. To review the structure of the PSC Appeals Tribunal and make recommendations for its structure and functions to be inserted into the revised constitutional framework.

1.8 The Review Team was mandated to produce a final report with recommendations. This final report will then be submitted to the Honourable Prime Minister. In order to assist the Review Team in achieving these important objectives, the Sub-Committee was appointed on 11 October 2011, to produce a draft report based on the aforementioned terms of reference (TOR).

#### **Members of the Strategic Sub-Committee**

- 1.9 The members of the Sub-Committee were:
- Mr. Samraj Harripaul SC, Chairman, Law Reform Commission, Chairman Strategic Sub-Committee
  - Mr. Ian Macintyre SC, Chief Parliamentary Counsel
  - Dr. Kerry Sumesar-Rai, Director Monitoring, Evaluation and Education, Police Service Commission Secretariat-Secretary
  - Mr. Alwyn Daniel, Management Consultant

- Ms. Kandice Rampersad, Legal Consultant, Ministry of the Attorney General.

Mr. Martin Samuel, Junior Legal Officer, Police Service Commission Secretariat, and Ms. Marisa Jogie, Legal Research Officer II, Law Reform Commission, were assigned to assist the Sub-Committee.

1.10 The Sub-Committee was mandated by the Review Team to examine and consider the administrative and legislative reforms necessary for the expeditious and efficient working of the PSC. During the period 22 November 2011 to 29 October 2012, the Sub-Committee held fifteen (15) meetings and in keeping with the TOR made recommendations pertaining to the following general subject areas, namely:

- The PSC and its Secretariat (in response to TOR a, b, d & f)
- Recruitment of Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police (in response to TOR a)
- Widening of the remit of the PSC (in response to TOR c)
- Hearing of appeals (in response to TOR g).

1.11 The Sub-Committee in pursuit of its mandate observed that the following aspects of the TOR could not be addressed:

- (a) As set out in TOR b, “matters of remuneration”, has to be addressed by the Salaries Review Commission and falls outside the purview of the Sub-Committee; and
- (b) As set out in TOR d, “inserting the Secretariat into the revised constitutional framework”, was found to be unnecessary. The status of the Secretariat would be addressed in the proposed legislation to incorporate the PSC.

1.12 The Sub-Committee was mandated to produce the draft report by 29 February 2012. In light of the intensive discussions, extensive research and critical examination of current legislation and the need to ensure clarity and consistency with proposals, the draft report was unavoidably delayed.

1.13 The Sub-Committee submitted a draft report on 12 June 2012 to the Chairman of the Review Team and was asked by the Review Team on 3 October 2012 to make amendments to the report and prepare an amended draft report for the final approval of the Review Team.

#### **Meetings of the Review Team**

1.14 The Review Team met on five (5) occasions. At its first meeting on 11 October 2011 the Sub-Committee was established to prepare a draft report which was submitted on 12 June 2012.

1.15 The Review Team met on 18 July 2012, 22 August 2012 and 3 October 2012 to consider and discuss the draft report submitted by the Sub-Committee, and to make recommendations and amend the draft report as the Review Team considered necessary.

1.16 At its fourth meeting held on 3 October 2012, the Review Team made suggestions and requested the Sub-Committee to reconvene and consider the issues and suggestions made during the last three meetings, and to amend the draft report for final approval by the Review Team.

1.17 The Sub-Committee considered the following issues in preparing the amended draft report:

- Widening the remit of the PSC, inclusion/ exclusion of Senior Superintendents
- The appellate function
- Terms and condition for the members of the appellate body
- Qualification of members of the PSC
- The Protective Services Commission.

## PART TWO – ADMINISTRATIVE

### Introduction

2.1 This Part of the report discusses the administrative changes, together with recommendations needed to be implemented in order to achieve the effective and efficient operations of the PSC and its Secretariat. This Part deals with the following subject areas:

- The PSC
- The PSC Secretariat
- Widening of remit of the PSC
- Recruitment and Termination
- Hearing of Appeals

### The PSC

2.2 The PSC is established under section 122 of the Constitution. The current members of the PSC comprise a Chairman and four (4) additional members, all of whom are appointed by the President. The President after consultation with the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition nominates persons who are qualified and experienced in the disciplines of law, sociology, finance or management to be appointed as members of the PSC. A person is only appointed to the PSC by the President after his appointment is approved by the House of Representatives. The President in his own discretion appoints the Chairman from among the members of the PSC. In addition, it should be noted that members of the Commission hold office on a part time basis.

2.3 Members of the Sub-Committee discussed the issue of statutory incorporation of the PSC. The Sub-Committee agreed that the constitutional status of the PSC would remain unchanged. It was also pondered whether an Act of Parliament would be required to make the PSC autonomous, and also to provide for a number of pertinent issues that will seek to enhance and strengthen the operations and effectiveness of the PSC.

2.4 Members of the Sub-Committee also examined the required qualifications and experience for the members of the PSC as stated in the section 122(3) of the Constitution. It was noted that the Ministry of Public Administration suggested that qualifications in human resources management and experience in public policy and monitoring and evaluation should be included in the recommendations. It was discussed that the requirements of members of the PSC would be in two (2) categories:

- (a) qualification and 15 years experience in the fields of law, finance, sociology and human resource management; and
- (b) qualification or experience in the areas of public policy and monitoring and evaluation.

2.5 The Sub-Committee noted that currently there is no position of Deputy Chairman in the PSC. Members of the Sub-Committee felt that the PSC should be restructured to include the position of Deputy Chairman. This position would be useful to assist the PSC in the conduct of its affairs with greater efficiency. Members of the Sub-Committee were of the view that the Deputy Chairman should be appointed by the President in his own discretion from among the Commissioners of the PSC.

2.6 Members also examined the issue of the part-time or full-time status of the members of the PSC and were of the considered view that if the Secretariat should be fully staffed and operationalized the current status of Commissioners as part-time should be retained.

2.7 Members of the Sub-Committee examined the issue of the expansion of the membership in the PSC. In light of the recommendation to widen the remit of the PSC but to keep the membership as part-time, the Sub-Committee recommends that the membership of the PSC should be expanded from five (5) to seven (7) members. The numerical expansion of the PSC is required in light of the following:

- Increased constitutional remit of the PSC to include, in addition to the positions of Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners of Police and the

Assistant Commissioners of Police. This would result in an increased governance from four (4) positions to fifteen (15)

- Increase in the number of reports generated by the Secretariat and the intensity and volume of work envisaged in reviewing the reports
- The recruitment, selection and placement of Assistant Commissioners of Police who are currently under the purview of the Commissioner of Police, will now fall under the jurisdiction of the PSC
- The anticipated increase in the workload will necessitate the PSC establishing sub-committees to efficiently address those matters that require intensive analysis and prudent decision making
- The expanded number of staff of the Secretariat will require the PSC to expend increased time to address recruitment and discipline among the members of its staff.

#### **The PSC Secretariat**

2.8 The establishment of the PSC Secretariat came out of a number of meetings between the PSC, the Director of Personnel Administration (DPA), the Minister of National Security and Professor Mastrofski. In 2007, Cabinet agreed to the employment on contract of thirty-nine (39) members of staff in the Service Commission Department for assignment to the Police Service Commission Secretariat. Three (3) persons from the Service Commissions Department, who previously provided administrative services to the PSC, were incorporated into the Secretariat. This brought the total establishment to forty-two (42). However, the current staffing of the Secretariat is thirty-eight (38). It should be noted that the majority of the members of the Secretariat are employed on contract on a full -time basis.

2.9 Members of the Sub-Committee discussed the issue as to whether or not the PSC should have power to appoint and confirm its own staff. Members of the Sub-Committee noted that all Service Commissions have the power under section 129 (1) of the Constitution to regulate their procedure by regulations subject to the consent of the Prime Minister. Members agreed that the PSC should be provided with the power to



appoint and confirm the head of the Secretariat and its own staff and to enter into contracts of employment with the persons recruited to its Secretariat, including the head of the Secretariat.

2.10 The head of the Secretariat will be responsible for the management and operations of the Secretariat and will be accountable to the PSC. Therefore, in managing and operating the Secretariat on behalf of the PSC, the head is to be accountable to the PSC.

2.11 It was clearly recognised that the Secretariat is the administrative, logistical and technical support arm of the PSC. Hence, members of the Sub-Committee agreed that the PSC will provide general directions to and supervision of the Secretariat, including the head of the Secretariat. The PSC will approve the Secretariat's framework of operations, including its strategic plans, operational plans and budgets.

2.12 A new and revised structure of the PSC Secretariat is necessary to enable the PSC to perform its mandate under the Constitution. It is envisaged that the revised structure of the Secretariat will provide the necessary human resources and tools to enable greater efficiency and effectiveness in its operations. The Secretariat on behalf of the PSC will:

- Monitor and evaluate the “efficiency and effectiveness of the discharge” of the functions of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police, Assistant Commissioner of Police and by extension the work of the Police Service. This is in keeping with the remit of the PSC as specified under section 123(1) (c), (d) and (e) of the Constitution (**see Appendix D**)
- Make site visits as required to police installations to properly monitor the “efficiency and effectiveness of the discharge” of the functions of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police, Assistant Commissioner of Police [and Senior Superintendents]
- Complete special assignments including examining and assessing the operations and service delivery of the Police Service
- Evaluate the outputs and impact of the Police Service

- Facilitate the recruitment, selection and placement of persons to the ranks of Commissioner of Police, Deputy Commissioners of Police and Assistant Commissioners of Police as well as within the Secretariat
- Investigate and examine decisions and certain actions of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners of Police and Assistant Commissioners of Police
- Assess its own operations and make recommendations for improvements and enhancement.

2.13 The Secretariat will be required to prepare and submit quarterly reports to the PSC and to also prepare and submit other reports as requested by the PSC.

2.14 The Secretariat will be provided with resources to look after its own affairs. Financial resources must be provided to the Secretariat for the efficient performance of its functions. The Secretariat will be required to fill vacancies, train its staff, conduct performance appraisal, prepare budgets, manage financial resources provided, request grants, audit the use of resources, maintain its own stores and inventory of supplies, procure goods and services, prepare, execute and manage contracts, provide administrative support to the PSC, account to the PSC on its operations, requests, allocations, management and use of resources, account to the Ministry of Finance and prepare records for external auditing.

2.15. The members of the Sub-Committee considered the need for eighteen (18) additional persons to the Secretariat in light of the widening of the remit of the PSC and consequently the increase in the volume of work required to efficiently and effectively service the needs of the PSC. The additional responsibilities and functions will necessitate a new structure (**see Appendix B**). The new establishment requires staff of approximately sixty (60) (**see Appendix A**). It is recommended that the additional staff of eighteen members of the Secretariat should be employed on contract. This cadre includes staff for the administrative, financial, technical, communication and other support for the Secretariat. Members of the Sub-Committee discussed the duties of the additional eighteen persons (18) (**see Appendix C**). Members of the Sub-Committee

were of the view that the Secretariat should be given authority to recruit the additional eighteen (18) persons.

2.16 In order to promote and maintain independence and autonomous operations, the PSC should be given its own funds. It was agreed if the PSC is to be given its own budget it must be subject to the Exchequer and Audit Act, Chap. 69:01 and any other applicable legislation.

2.17 The budget would be managed by the head of the Secretariat, since the Secretariat is the administrative arm of the PSC. The PSC and its Secretariat would require funding to deal with day to day operations.

2.18 The head of the Secretariat would be the accounting officer entrusted with the responsibility to prepare budget documents, submit estimates of expenditure and manage funds allocated for the operations of the PSC. The Sub-Committee discussed the issue of creating a separate office for a person to be appointed as the accounting officer, but decided against such a recommendation because it was felt that the management and operations of the PSC and the Secretariat would better be achieved by the head of the Secretariat exercising both operational and financial management.

2.19 It is the recommendation of the Sub-Committee that the head of the Secretariat be re-designated as the Chief Executive Officer instead of Director of the Secretariat (Monitoring, Evaluation and Education).

#### **Widening of remit of the PSC**

2.20 Under section 123(1) of the Constitution, the PSC has the power to appoint persons to hold or act in the offices of Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police, make appointments on promotion to these offices, dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over these office holders and monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of the discharge of their functions. Currently the PSC has responsibility for the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners of Police (**see Appendix D**). It was suggested by the Ministry of Public Administration that the PSC should be expanded to

create a Protective Services Commission thereby taking control and responsibility for all the protective services. This suggestion fell outside the remit of the Review Team and was not part of the Terms of Reference. The Sub-Committee therefore was unable to address the suggestion. The Sub-Committee also noted that the creation of such a Commission required consultation with the agencies to be affected and the Public Service Commission as that body now has the responsibility for the Prison Service and the Fire Service.

2.21 The Sub-Committee is of the view that the ranks of Assistant Commissioner of Police (from 1 January 2014) should be included under the purview of the PSC. The justifications put forward for this recommendation included the need for succession planning and the managerial functions exercised by such officers. The Sub-Committee was of the view that it was prudent and important to plan for the recruitment of the prospective Commissioners of Police in a strategic manner.

2.22 The Sub-Committee considered the view of members of the Review Team with regards to the inclusion on the rank of Senior Superintendents. The Ministry of Public Administration objected to the inclusion of that rank on the grounds that the PSC would be stretched to deal with the Senior Superintendents and the Commissioner of Police may disassociate himself from liability if he was not responsible for the appointment of such officers. The Sub-Committee felt that the Ministry's proposal should be accepted.

2.23 The PSC has under its purview four (4) positions, namely, the Commissioner of Police and three (3) Deputy Commissioners. The total number of officers to be brought under the purview of the PSC would increase from four (4) to fifteen (15). The ranks will consist of -

- 1 Commissioner
- 3 Deputy Commissioners
- 11 Assistant Commissioners

The PSC will be required to monitor, evaluate and appraise all officers under its purview.

2.24 The Sub-Committee was also mandated to consider widening the remit of the PSC to include the Civilian Heads of the Police Service in order to increase the efficiency of the Service. There are currently ten (10) Civilian Heads in the Service namely, Head of: Executive Management Services; Legal Unit Services; Internal Audit; Planning, Research and Project Implementation; Finance and Accounts; Information Technology; Human Resources; Administration; Director of Public Affairs and Media Relations; and Provost, Police Training Academy. These office holders are appointed on contract by the Commissioner of Police.

2.25 The Sub-Committee considered the issue and decided that the current position should remain unchanged in light of the proposed expansion of the remit of the PSC to include other ranks of the Police Service. It was felt that the PSC would be challenged to undertake the responsibility to deal with both the existing and proposed ranks of the Police Service and the ten Civilian Heads simultaneously.

#### **Recruitment and termination**

2.26 It is the recommendation of the Sub-Committee that the PSC should be responsible for the recruitment process to fill the offices of Commissioner of Police, Deputy Commissioner of Police and Assistant Commissioner of Police. The Sub-Committee recommended that the current position in so far as it applies to the requirement for parliamentary approval for the offices of the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police should be unchanged. However, the appointment process for the offices of Assistant Commissioner of Police will not be subject to parliamentary approval. All officers under the purview of the PSC will be appointed by the PSC after the recruitment and selection process has been completed. The names of persons appointed will be communicated to the Minister of National Security for his information and, where appropriate, to the Commissioner of Police.

2.27 It is recommended that the PSC should also be responsible for terminating the appointment of Assistant Commissioners of Police. It is recommended that such termination of the appointment should be done on the same grounds applicable to the

Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police as set out in section 123(8) of the Constitution, which provides as follows:

*"(8) The Police Service Commission may terminate the services of the Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner of Police on any of the following grounds:*

*(a) where the officer is absent from duty without leave for seven consecutive days, during which he has failed to notify the Police Service Commission of the cause of his absence, whether he holds a permanent, temporary, or contractual appointment;*

*(b) breach of contract, where the officer is appointed on contract;*

*(c) reported inefficiency based on his performance appraisal reports,*

*after giving him an opportunity to be heard;*

*(d) where the officer holds a permanent appointment –*

*(i) on dismissal in consequence of disciplinary proceedings;*

*(ii) on being retired on medical grounds;*

*(iii) on being retired in the public interest; or*

*(iv) on the abolition of office."*

Members of the Sub-Committee noted that the PSC may dismiss an officer pursuant to section 129 of the Constitution where the officer is convicted of a criminal charge before a court and is given a right to show cause why he should not be dismissed.

### **Hearing of appeals**

2.28 Under section 123(1)(f) of the Constitution, the PSC is given power to hear and determine appeals from decisions of the Commissioner of Police or his delegate in relation to matters of promotion and discipline. This position was introduced in the 2006

and 2007 amendments to the Constitution. In general, a person aggrieved by a decision of the PSC would seek redress by way of a judicial review application.

2.29 The Sub-Committee decided that the issue of hearing of appeals from decisions of the Commissioner of Police should be revised. The Sub-Committee was informed that there were approximately two hundred and twenty four (224) appeals before the current Appellate Tribunal of the PSC and the Tribunal met twice per month. As at the end of October 2012, the Tribunal determined five (5) appeals and is currently hearing one (1). The Ministry of Public Administration suggested to the Review Team that the Public Service Appeal Board could be used to hear and determine such appeals. Without any data on the subject of the operations of the PSAB, the Sub-Committee was unable to make a determination of the feasibility of that suggestion. Members of the Sub-Committee therefore maintained the view that an appellate body should be created to hear the appeals. The body would not be a superior court of record. The current appellate jurisdiction of the PSC under section 123(1)(f) of the Constitution should be transferred directly to the appellate body.

2.30 Further it is recommended that the appellate body be mandated to hear appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of Police or his delegate on matters of promotion and discipline. A person aggrieved by the decision of the appellate body would have a right to review that decision before the High Court.

2.31 This appellate body would be established under the Constitution, similar to the Public Service Appeal Board (PSAB). The Sub-Committee emphasized the need to ensure that the appellate body was independent of the Commission. For example, it was recommended that the resources of the body should be under its own management. This body will have its own staff as well as administrative support. This body will be responsible for the management of its own affairs and the conduct of its business. It is intended to be a constitutionally independent body with the power to hear appeals against specified types of decisions of the Commissioner of Police.

2.32 It is recommended that the appellate body should be headed by a Chairman who would be an attorney-at-law with at least ten (10) years experience. The other members of the body would be an attorney-at-law of at least seven (7) years standing and another person with experience in industrial relations, human resource management or public policy and who is either a post-graduate with seven (7) years experience or a graduate with a first degree and ten (10) years experience. The members of the appellate body would be employed full-time on contract because of the present workload.

2.33 The three members of the appellate body would be appointed by the President after consultation with the Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition and the Chairman of the PSC. The members should be appointed for a term between three (3) to five (5) years and be eligible for re-appointment.

2.34 It is recommended that a Registrar should lead the support staff of the appellate body and should be appointed by the Judicial and Legal Services Commission. The Registrar would be the accounting officer for the appellate body. The body would be audited by the Auditor General's Department in keeping with the Exchequer and Audit Act, Chap. 69:01.

2.35 In order to further provide for the independence of the appellate body, it is recommended that the terms and conditions of service of the three members of the appellate body and support staff should be determined by the Salaries Review Commission or the Chief Personnel Officer, as appropriate.



## PART THREE – LEGISLATIVE

### Introduction

3.1 This Part of the Report shows the current legislation affecting the PSC together with the proposed legislative changes put forward by the Sub-Committee and the justification for same. This Part deals with the following subject areas:

- An Act to incorporate the PSC
- Appointment and dismissal of Commissioners
- Widening the remit of the PSC
- Selection process of police executive
- Selection criteria for police executive
- Autonomy of PSC
- Hearing of appeals
- Police Service Commission Regulations.

### An Act to Incorporate the PSC

3.2 It is recommended that there should be a separate Act of Parliament to incorporate the PSC (hereafter referred to as “the proposed Act”). The proposed Act would regulate the powers and duties of the PSC and its Secretariat. The Sub-Committee noted that the Ombudsman, Auditor General and Integrity Commission are constitutional creatures but separate Acts provide for their incorporation and operation. Members considered that some of the areas to be included in the proposed Act should be:

- Incorporation of the Commission
- Powers of the Commission
- Delegation of authority
- Management of the Commission
- The Secretariat
- Procedures of the Commission
- Staff
- Financial provisions

- Appeals

### **Appointment and dismissal of Commissioners**

3.3 As mentioned above in paragraph 2.2, members of the PSC are appointed by the President, under section 122 of the Constitution. Before they are appointed they are nominated by the President and must be approved by Parliament.

3.4 The appointment of Commissioners to the PSC is presently subject to affirmative resolution of the House of Representative. The Sub-Committee was of the view that in the past this process resulted in undue invasion of the privacy of potential candidates. In addition, it was noted that no other Commission is subject to such a process. It is recommended that such appointments should be made by the President after consultation with the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition.

3.5 The Sub-Committee is of the view that there should be a Deputy Chairman of the PSC appointed by the President in his own discretion from amongst the members of the PSC. In light of the complexity of the Chairman's function, it was felt that the Deputy Chairman's position would be useful for delegation and improved coordination of the oversight mandate.

3.6 The Sub-Committee noted that the PSC comprises five (5) members. However, in light of the expanded remit of the PSC it is recommended that two (2) members be added to the PSC.

3.7 Under section 122A(1)(a) of the Constitution a member of the PSC maybe dismissed by the President after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition if the member fails to attend four (4) consecutive meetings without reasonable cause. Members of the Sub-Committee were informed that the operation of this provision has proven to be a challenge because often members of the PSC may be absent for two (2) or three (3) consecutive meetings but not four (4). This situation has seriously affected the operations of the PSC for example, the inability to get a quorum. It is recommended that this ground of removal be amended to provide for the dismissal of

a member by the President where the member is absent for four (4) meetings during a period of four (4) consecutive months.

3.8 These measures would necessitate an amendment of section 122 of the Constitution (**see Appendix D**).

#### **Widening of the remit of the PSC**

3.9 In order to achieve the widening of the jurisdiction of the PSC, legislative changes would be necessary. Section 123 of the Constitution, which deals with the Commission's jurisdiction over the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioners of Police, would have to be amended to include the rank of Assistant Commissioners of Police (**see Appendix D**). In order to give the PSC the jurisdiction to deal with the recruitment, appointment, promotion, discipline, transfer, monitoring, evaluation, appraisal and dismissal of these three ranks, there will be a need to provide regulations for the procedure to govern these powers of the PSC. The Sub-Committee envisaged that the proposed Act would provide for the making of regulations to deal with all these matters.

3.10 The constitutional amendment to sections 123 and 123A of the Constitution should be subject to a proclamation after its enactment. Also the proposed Act should be subject to a proclamation upon its enactment. It is recommended that both pieces of legislation should be proclaimed simultaneously. This is necessary to ensure a smooth transition of the jurisdiction over the offices of Assistant Commissioners of Police from the Commissioner of Police to the PSC. Members discussed the need to ensure that the relevant regulations under the proposed Act would be prepared and published at the date of proclamation of the proposed Act.

3.11 In light of the proclamation of the constitutional amendment Act (which would amend sections 123 and 123A of the Constitution), it would be necessary to revoke the three (3) constitutional Orders of 2009. These Orders are:

- The Appointment of the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police (Qualification and Selection Criteria) Order, 2009 (Legal Notice No.

101 of 2009), which deals with the qualification and selection criteria for appointment of the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioners of Police (**see Appendix E**)

- The Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police (Selection Process) Order, 2009 (Legal Notice No. 102 of 2009), which deals with the selection process of the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioners of Police (**see Appendix F**)
- The Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police (Acting Appointments) (Selection Process) (No. 2) Order, 2009 (Legal Notice No. 103 of 2009), which deals with acting appointments of the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioners of Police (**see Appendix G**).

3.12 The members of the Sub-Committee noted that the general principle is that where regulations are made subject to an enabling power and the enabling power is no longer enforced the subsidiary legislation, including Orders, would no longer have the force of law. Hence, it is the recommendation of the Sub-Committee that the regulations under the proposed Act should be prepared and published at the same time when the proposed Act is proclaimed in order to ensure a smooth transition.

3.13 Members noted the law in relation to the ranks of Assistant Commissioner of Police currently exist under the Police Service Act, Chap. 15:01 and its regulations. In order to achieve the transfer of the jurisdiction to deal with Assistant Commissioners of Police, this would necessitate amendments to the Police Service Act and its Regulations. Regulations under the proposed Act would therefore have to make provisions for recruitment, appointment, promotion, discipline, transfer, monitoring, evaluation, appraisal and dismissal of these two ranks.

3.14 The contract of employment of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners of Police (**otherwise referred to as the police executive in this report**) are presently signed by the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of National Security. This is not covered by legislation. It is the recommendation of the Sub-Committee that the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Security should sign the contract for the

employment of those persons where appropriate. This proposal should also apply to the rank of Assistant Commissioners of Police. This measure would be placed in the proposed Act.

3.15 The PSC has the power under section 123(1)(d) of the Constitution to monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of the discharge of the functions of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners of Police. The Sub-Committee recommends that the PSC shall also have the power to evaluate the effectiveness of the discharge of the functions of the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioners of Police after exercising its monitoring function. This is to enhance the powers and efficiency of the PSC and to allow for more accountability from the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioners of Police. This proposal should also apply to the ranks of Assistant Commissioners of Police. This would require an amendment to the Constitution.

3.16 Where the Commissioner of Police or a Deputy Commissioner of Police is absent from office for any reason, prior approval for such absence should be given by the PSC. Members noted that where such an office holder is absent it may be necessary to make an acting appointment and hence the need for the PSC to be aware of the absence and the duration of the absence. Members also noted that in the case of sick leave, it may not always be possible to grant prior approval. Where an officer proceeds on sick leave in excess of two days, the notification of that leave together with a medical certificate should be communicated to the PSC by the officer as soon as possible. Members noted that the PSC should be aware of the history of the absence of these officers since this would impact on the overall assessment of the performance of the officers.

3.17 Members discussed the issue of the PSC requesting information from various sources in the performance of its functions because it is often denied access to such information. It is recommended that the PSC should have power to request oral or written information from any source regarding its oversight function of the Police Service and to send for persons, papers and records in the performance of its duties.

### **Selection Process of Police Executive**

3.18 Members noted that the current selection process for the office of Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioners of Police is cumbersome and unduly expensive. Currently, the PSC advises the Director of Personnel Administration (DPA) to initiate this process; the DPA then advertises for a firm to conduct the recruitment process or retains a firm to advertise and conduct the recruitment process. The firm then proceeds to manage the advertisement for the positions to be filled, processes the applications, conducts the background checks of each candidate, screens and selects candidates for assessment, conducts the assessment of candidates, evaluates the candidates and submits a short list to the PSC. The PSC then interviews those candidates placed on the short list and create its own merit list. The list is then sent to the President who sends a notification to the Parliament for approval. The selection process has proven to be time consuming and costly in the past and the results have not been satisfactory.

3.19 The Sub-Committee recommended that the selection process for the offices of Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioners of Police should be changed to give the PSC the jurisdiction to select and appoint persons to these two (2) offices. This would eliminate the roles currently played by the office of the DPA and the firm and simplify the procedure. The PSC would advertise and prepare the short list and then forward same to the President for forwarding to the Parliament for approval. This change would require the repealing of the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police (Selection Process) Order, 2009 and the procedure placed in the proposed Act.

3.20 The recommendation to widen the remit of the PSC to include the rank of Assistant Commissioners of Police would require an amendment of section 123 of the Constitution. The selection process for the ranks of Assistant Commissioner would be the same as for the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police, save and except for parliamentary approval.

3.21 Consequently, members noted that the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police (Selection Process) Order 2009, which deals with the selection

process of the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioners of Police, would have to be repealed when the constitutional amendment to section 123 comes into force (see Appendix F).

### **Selection Criteria for Police Executive**

3.22 The present qualifications and experience required for the offices of Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police are set out in the Appointment of the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police (Qualification and Selection Criteria) Order, 2009 (see Appendix E). Under this Order, a candidate for the office of Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner must have a University degree in law, criminal justice, criminology, police service management or any other relevant degree. In addition, the Commissioner of Police must have no less than fifteen (15) years experience in law enforcement and no less than twelve (12) years of experience for the Deputy Commissioner of Police..

3.23 The Sub-Committee recommends the following additional qualifications and experience:

- The Commissioner of Police should have some qualification in the fields of management, human resource and finance because of the range of his functions
- The Deputy Commissioner of Police in charge of administration should have specific qualification in management consistent with his area of responsibility
- The qualification required for the Assistant Commissioner should be the same as Deputy Commissioner but with ten years of experience

3.24 These recommendations would require the Appointment of the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police (Qualification and Selection Criteria) Order, 2009 to be repealed and the criteria for the selection of these two office holders to be placed in the regulations under the proposed Act.

### **Administrative and financial autonomy of PSC**

3.25 The PSC presently relies exclusively on the DPA for all resources. The Sub-Committee recommends that the PSC should have administrative and financial independence. This is to avoid the bureaucratic delays now being experienced by the PSC and to give way to more speed and efficiency.

3.26 The head of the Secretariat (to be designated as the Chief Executive Officer) would be the accounting officer. The staff would be employed on contract. The Secretariat would be audited by the Auditor General's Department in keeping with the Exchequer and Audit Act, Chap. 69:01.

3.27 These measures would require the necessary administrative measures to be implemented.

### **Hearing of appeals**

3.28 The Sub-Committee recommends that the appellate function of the PSC under section 123 (1)(f) of the Constitution should be transferred to an independent appellate body. The appellate body would be a constitutional body vested with this appellate jurisdiction.

3.29 This measure would necessitate the repealing of the Police Service Commission (Appeal) Regulations, 2009 (Legal Notice No. 270 of 2009) **(see Appendix H)**.

3.30 In order to achieve the transfer of the appellate jurisdiction to the appellate body, section 123(1) of the Constitution would have to be amended.

3.31 Additionally in order to create the appellate body, expand its jurisdiction and appoint members to it, the Constitution would have to be amended. Perhaps, a new Part III can be inserted under Chapter 9 of the Constitution to provide for the appellate body and related matters.

3.32 Members of the Sub-Committee recommended that the appellate body should be given the power to make regulations to regulate its procedure and the procedure in



relation to hearing of appeals under the Constitution. This power should be provided for under the Constitution.

3.33 The members of the Sub-Committee recommended that the amendments to the Constitution to create the appellate body should come into force on the same date as the proposed Act. The Sub-Committee also envisaged that regulations to give effect to the appellate body would be prepared and published simultaneously on the date of the Proclamation of the proposed Act.

#### **Police Service Commission Regulations**

3.34 The current Police Service Commission Regulations were made before the amendments to the Constitution in 2006 and 2007 and as such have become out dated. The proposed legislative changes would increase the need for amendment.

3.35 Some of the issues to be dealt with by the amendments to these Regulations should include the relationship between the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioners of Police and the PSC as well as procedure to deal with discipline promotions and transfers of those police officers who are within the jurisdiction of the PSC.

3.36 However, members of the Sub-Committee recommended that these Regulations should be repealed and the relevant provisions, if any, should be included as regulations under the proposed Act.

## PART FOUR – RECOMMENDATIONS

### • Administrative Recommendations

- 4.1 In relation to the administrative issues, the Sub-Committee makes the following recommendations:
- 4.2 The required qualifications and experience for appointment to the PSC should be expanded to include:
- (a) qualification and 15 years experience in the fields of law, finance, sociology and human resource management and
  - (b) qualification or experience in the areas of public policy and monitoring and evaluation.
- 4.3 There should be a new position of Deputy Chairman of the PSC, who should be appointed by the President in his own discretion from among the members of the PSC.
- 4.4 The membership of the Commission should be increased from five (5) to seven (7) but their appointments should continue to remain part-time.
- ✓4.5 Appointment of members to the PSC should not be made subject to parliamentary approval but should be made by the President after consultation with the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition.
- ✓4.6 The ground of removal be amended to provide for the dismissal of a member of the PSC by the President where the member is absent for four (4) meetings during a period of four (4) consecutive months without reasonable cause.
- ✓4.7 The PSC and its Secretariat should have full administrative autonomy. The PSC should have the autonomy and authority to recruit, retain and instruct its own support staff so as to enable the PSC to discharge and perform its duties efficiently, effectively and fairly.

4.8 The Secretariat should be given the authority to recruit an additional eighteen (18) persons in light of the widening of the remit of the PSC.

✓ 4.9 The PSC and its Secretariat should have full financial autonomy. The PSC should be given its own budget. The head of the Secretariat should be appointed the accounting officer.

4.10 The head of the Secretariat should be re-designated as the Chief Executive Officer.

4.11 The head of the Secretariat should be responsible for the management and operations of the Secretariat and should be accountable to the PSC.

✓ 4.12 The powers of the PSC should be expanded to include within its constitutional remit the offices of the Assistant Commissioner of Police.

4.13 The PSC should be responsible for the recruitment process for filling the offices of Commissioner of Police, Deputy Commissioner of Police and Assistant Commissioner of Police. The recruitment of the Assistant Commissioner of Police will be done in consultation with the Commissioner of Police.

4.14 The current position in so far as it applies to the requirement for parliamentary approval for the offices of the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police should be unchanged.

4.15 The appointment process for the offices of Assistant Commissioner of Police should not be subject to parliamentary approval.

4.16 The PSC should also be responsible for terminating the appointment of Assistant Commissioners of Police. Termination should be done on the same grounds applicable for Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police.

4.17 The current appellate function vested in the PSC by the Constitution to hear appeals from decisions of the Commissioner of Police on matters of promotion and discipline should be removed and given to an independent constitutional appellate body.

4.18 The appellate body should be given the power to make regulations and to regulate its own procedure and the procedure in relation to hearing of appeals.

4.19 The appellate body should be chaired by an attorney-at-law with at least ten (10) years experience and two other members. The three members of the appellate body should be appointed by the President after consultation with the Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition and the Chairman of the PSC.

4.20 A Registrar should lead the support staff and should be appointed by the Judicial and Legal Services Commission. The Registrar would be the accounting officer for the appellate body.

4.21 The terms and conditions of service of the three members of the appellate body and support staff should be determined by the Salaries Review Commission or the Chief Personnel Officer, as appropriate.

#### **Legislative Recommendations**

4.22 In relation to giving effect to the administrative issues, the Sub-Committee makes the following legislative recommendations:

4.23 There should be an Act of Parliament to incorporate the PSC to provide for the aforementioned changes.

4.24 Section 122 of the Constitution would have to be amended to achieve the various administrative changes to the composition, qualification and structure of the PSC. Section 122A(1)(a) of the Constitution would have to be amended to change the ground

of dismissal of a member of the PSC which provides for such dismissal when a member is absent from a specified number of meetings.

4.25 Sections 123 and 123A of the Constitution would have to be amended to widen the remit of the PSC to include the office of Assistant Commissioner of Police and to give the PSC the power to request oral or written information from any source regarding its oversight function of the Police Service, to send for persons, papers and records in the performance of its duties.

4.26 The transfer of jurisdiction over Assistant Commissioners of Police would necessitate amendments to the Police Service Act and its Regulations to make provision for the appointment, promotion, transfer and discipline of this.

4.27 The selection criteria for the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police should be amended to include the office of Assistant Commissioner of Police. In addition, the qualifications and relevant experience required would differ in each case.

4.28 The selection and appointment process for the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police should be simplified and brought under the jurisdiction of the PSC, subject to parliamentary approval.

4.29 The PSC should have power to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the discharge of the functions of the Commissioner of Police, Deputy Commissioners of Police and Assistant Commissioners of Police and request reports from anyone with respect to the performance of the police service and visit any police installation.

4.30 The word “complete” should be deleted from section 123A(1) of the Constitution as it is a controversial issue among the Ministry of National Security, the PSC and the Commissioner of Police. It was felt that it distorts the proper exercise of power by the Commissioner and it is in the best interest of the service to delete the word “complete”.

4.31 The Constitution should be amended to provide for the establishment, functions and powers of the appellate body. The appellate body should be given the power to regulate its function.

4.32 The Police Service Commission (Appeal) Regulations, 2009 (Legal Notice No. 270 of 2009) should be repealed when equivalent regulations are made by the appellate body.

4.33 The proposed Act, the constitutional amendment to sections 122, 122A, 123, 123A and the proposed section to provide for the appellate body should be enacted and come into force on a date to be fixed by Proclamation.

4.34 Regulations to give the PSC the jurisdiction to deal with the recruitment, appointment, promotion, discipline, transfer, monitoring, evaluation, appraisal and dismissal of the Commissioner of Police, Deputy Commissioners of Police and Assistant Commissioners of Police should be prepared under the proposed Act and should be published on the date the proposed Act comes into force.

4.35 It is recommended that the Police Service Commission Regulations be repealed and the relevant provisions included under the proposed Act.

***Professor Ramesh Deosaran, Chairman***

***Senator the Honourable Anand Ramlogan SC***

***Honourable Jack Austin Warner, MP***

***Honourable Carolyn Seepersad-Bachan, MP***

***Honourable Donna Cox, MP***

***Ms. Gillian Macintyre***

***Mr. Ian Macintyre, SC***

***Mr. Samraj Harripaul, SC***

***Dr. Kerry Sumesar-Rai, Secretary***

***Mr. Alwyn L. Daniel***

***Ms. Kandice Rampersad***

***Sgt. Anand Ramesar***